Federal Aviation Administration v. Cooper
Supreme Court of the United States3/28/2012
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Full Opinion
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2011 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ET AL. v.
COOPER
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 10â1024. Argued November 30, 2011âDecided March 28, 2012
Respondent Cooper, a licensed pilot, failed to disclose his human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) diagnosis to the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA) at a time when the agency did not issue medical cer-
tificates, which are required to operate an aircraft, to persons with
HIV. Subsequently, respondent applied to the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) and received long-term disability benefits on the
basis of his HIV status. Thereafter, he renewed his certificate with
the FAA on several occasions, each time intentionally withholding in-
formation about his condition. The Department of Transportation
(DOT), the FAAâs parent agency, launched a joint criminal investiga-
tion with the SSA to identify medically unfit individuals who had ob-
tained FAA certifications. The DOT provided the SSA with the
names of licensed pilots, and the SSA, in turn, provided the DOT
with a spreadsheet containing information on those pilots who had
also received disability benefits. Respondentâs name appeared on the
spreadsheet, and an investigation led to his admission that he had
intentionally withheld information about his HIV status from the
FAA. His pilot certificate was revoked, and he was indicted for mak-
ing false statements to a Government agency. He pleaded guilty and
was fined and sentenced to probation. He then filed suit, alleging
that the FAA, DOT, and SSA violated the Privacy Act of 1974, which
contains a detailed set of requirements for the management of rec-
ords held by Executive Branch agencies. The Act allows an aggrieved
individual to sue for âactual damages,â 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4)(A), if
the Government intentionally or willfully violates the Actâs require-
ments in such a way as to adversely affect the individual. Specifical-
ly, respondent claimed that the unlawful disclosure to the DOT of his
2 FAA v. COOPER
Syllabus
confidential medical information had caused him mental and emo-
tional distress. The District Court concluded that the Government
had violated the Act. But, finding the term âactual damagesâ ambig-
uous, the court relied on the sovereign immunity canon, which pro-
vides that sovereign immunity waivers must be strictly construed in
the Governmentâs favor, to hold that the Act does not authorize the
recovery of nonpecuniary damages. Reversing the District Court, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that âactual damagesâ in the Act is not am-
biguous and includes damages for mental and emotional distress.
Held: The Privacy Act does not unequivocally authorize damages for
mental or emotional distress and therefore does not waive the Gov-
ernmentâs sovereign immunity from liability for such harms. Pp. 4â
19.
(a) A waiver of sovereign immunity must be unequivocally ex-
pressed in statutory text, see e.g., Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192,
and any ambiguities are to be construed in favor of immunity, United
States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 531. Ambiguity exists if there is a
plausible interpretation of the statute that would not allow money
damages against the Government. United States v. Nordic Village,
Inc., 503 U. S. 30, 37. Pp. 5â6.
(b) The term âactual damagesâ in the Privacy Act is a legal term of
art, and Congress, when it employs a term of art, â âpresumably
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each bor-
rowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken,â â Molzof
v. United States, 502 U. S. 301, 307. Even as a legal term, the precise
meaning of âactual damagesâ is far from clear. Although the term is
sometimes understood to include nonpecuniary harm, it has also been
used or construed more narrowly to cover damages for only pecuniary
harm. Because of the termâs chameleon-like quality, it must be con-
sidered in the particular context in which it appears. Pp. 6â9.
(c) The Privacy Act serves interests similar to those protected by
defamation and privacy torts. Its remedial provision, under which
plaintiffs can recover a minimum award of $1,000 if they first prove
at least some âactual damages,â âparallelsâ the common-law torts of
libel per quod and slander, under which plaintiffs can recover âgen-
eral damagesâ if they first prove âspecial damages.â Doe v. Chao, 540
U. S. 614, 625. âSpecial damagesâ are limited to actual pecuniary
loss, which must be specially pleaded and proved. âGeneral damag-
esâ cover nonpecuniary loss and need not be pleaded or proved. This
parallel suggests the possibility that Congress intended the term âac-
tual damagesâ to mean âspecial damages,â thus barring Privacy Act
victims from any recovery unless they can first show some actual pe-
cuniary harm. That Congress would choose âactual damagesâ instead
of âspecial damagesâ is not without precedent, as the terms have oc-
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
Syllabus
casionally been used interchangeably. Furthermore, any doubt about
the plausibility of construing âactual damagesâ as special damages in
the Privacy Act is put to rest by Congressâ deliberate refusal to allow
recovery for âgeneral damages.â In common-law defamation and pri-
vacy cases, special damages is the only category of compensatory
damages other than general damages. Because Congress declined to
authorize general damages, it is reasonable to infer that Congress in-
tended the term âactual damagesâ in the Act to mean special damag-
es for proven pecuniary loss. Pp. 9â14.
(d) Although the contrary reading of the Privacy Act accepted by
the Ninth Circuit and advanced by respondent is not inconceivable, it
is plausible to read the Act as authorizing only damages for economic
loss. Because Congress did not speak unequivocally, the Court
adopts an interpretation of âactual damagesâ limited to proven pecu-
niary harm. To do otherwise would expand the scope of Congressâ
sovereign immunity waiver beyond what the statutory text clearly
requires. P. 14.
(e) Respondent raises several counterarguments: (1) common-law
cases often define âactual damagesâ to mean all compensatory dam-
ages; (2) the elimination of âgeneral damagesâ from the Privacy Act
means that there can be no recovery for presumed damages, but
plaintiffs can still recover for proven mental and emotional distress;
(3) because some courts have construed âactual damagesâ in similar
statutes to include mental and emotional distress, Congress must
have intended âactual damagesâ in the Act to include mental and
emotional distress as well; and (4) precluding nonpecuniary damages
would lead to absurd results, thereby frustrating the Actâs remedial
purpose. None of these arguments overcomes the sovereign immuni-
ty canon. Pp. 14â19.
622 F. 3d 1016, reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER, JJ., joined. KAGAN,
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, WashÂ
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10â1024
_________________
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. STANMORE CAWTHON
COOPER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 28, 2012]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5 U. S. C.
§552a, contains a comprehensive and detailed set of reÂ
quirements for the management of confidential records
held by Executive Branch agencies. If an agency fails to
comply with those requirements âin such a way as to have
an adverse effect on an individual,â the Act authorizes the
individual to bring a civil action against the agency.
§552a(g)(1)(D). For violations found to be âintentional or
willful,â the United States is liable for âactual damages.â
§552a(g)(4)(A). In this case, we must decide whether the
term âactual damages,â as used in the Privacy Act, inÂ
cludes damages for mental or emotional distress. We hold
that it does not.
I
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires
pilots to obtain a pilot certificate and medical certificate as
a precondition for operating an aircraft. 14 CFR §§61.3(a),
(c) (2011). Pilots must periodically renew their medical
certificates to ensure compliance with FAA medical standÂ
2 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
ards. See §61.23(d). When applying for renewal, pilots
must disclose any illnesses, disabilities, or surgeries they
have had, and they must identify any medications they are
taking. See 14 CFR pt. 67.
Respondent Stanmore Cooper has been a private pilot
since 1964. In 1985, he was diagnosed with a human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and began taking
antiretroviral medication. At that time, the FAA did not
issue medical certificates to persons with respondentâs
condition. Knowing that he would not qualify for renewal
of his medical certificate, respondent initially grounded
himself and chose not to apply. In 1994, however, he ap-
plied for and received a medical certificate, but he did so
without disclosing his HIV status or his medication. He
renewed his certificate in 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004,
each time intentionally withholding information about his
condition.
When respondentâs health deteriorated in 1995, he
applied for long-term disability benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §401 et seq. To subÂ
stantiate his claim, he disclosed his HIV status to the
Social Security Administration (SSA), which awarded him
benefits for the year from August 1995 to August 1996.
In 2002, the Department of Transportation (DOT), the
FAAâs parent agency, launched a joint criminal investigaÂ
tion with the SSA, known as âOperation Safe Pilot,â to
identify medically unfit individuals who had obtained FAA
certifications to fly. The DOT gave the SSA a list of names
and other identifying information of 45,000 licensed pilots
in northern California. The SSA then compared the list
with its own records of benefit recipients and compiled a
spreadsheet, which it gave to the DOT.
The spreadsheet revealed that respondent had a current
medical certificate but had also received disability beneÂ
fits. After reviewing respondentâs FAA medical file and
his SSA disability file, FAA flight surgeons determined in
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
Opinion of the Court
2005 that the FAA would not have issued a medical cer-
tificate to respondent had it known his true medical
condition.
When investigators confronted respondent with what
had been discovered, he admitted that he had intention-
ally withheld from the FAA information about his HIV
status and other relevant medical information. Because of
these fraudulent omissions, the FAA revoked respondentâs
pilot certificate, and he was indicted on three counts of
making false statements to a Government agency, in
violation of 18 U. S. C. §1001. Respondent ultimately
pleaded guilty to one count of making and delivering a
false official writing, in violation of §1018. He was senÂ
tenced to two years of probation and fined $1,000.1
Claiming that the FAA, DOT, and SSA (hereinafter
Government) violated the Privacy Act by sharing his
records with one another, respondent filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of
California. He alleged that the unlawful disclosure to the
DOT of his confidential medical information, including his
HIV status, had caused him âhumiliation, embarrassment,
mental anguish, fear of social ostracism, and other severe
emotional distress.â App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a. Notably,
he did not allege any pecuniary or economic loss.
The District Court granted summary judgment against
respondent. 816 F. Supp. 2d 778, 781 (2008). The court
concluded that the Government had violated the Privacy
Act and that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether
the violation was intentional or willful.2 But the court
ââââââ
1 Respondent eventually applied for recertification as a pilot. After
reviewing respondentâs medical records, including information about
his HIV diagnosis and treatment, the FAA reissued his pilot certificate
and medical certificate. Brief for Respondent 5, n. 1.
2 With certain exceptions, it is unlawful for an agency to disclose a
record to another agency without the written consent of the person to
whom the record pertains. 5 U. S. C. §552a(b). One exception to this
4 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
held that respondent could not recover damages because
he alleged only mental and emotional harm, not economic
loss. Finding that the term âactual damagesâ is âfacially
ambiguous,â id., at 791, and relying on the sovereign
immunity canon, which provides that waivers of sovereign
immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the GovÂ
ernment, the court concluded that the Act does not authorÂ
ize the recovery of damages from the Government for
nonpecuniary mental or emotional harm.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth CirÂ
cuit reversed and remanded. 622 F. 3d 1016, 1024 (2010).
The court acknowledged that the term âactual damagesâ
is a â âchameleonâ â in that âits meaning changes with the
specific statute in which it is found.â Id., at 1029. But the
court nevertheless held that, as used in the Privacy Act,
the term includes damages for mental and emotional
distress. Looking to what it described as â[i]ntrinsicâ and
â[e]xtrinsicâ sources, id., at 1028, 1031, the court concluded
that the meaning of âactual damagesâ in the Privacy
Act is not ambiguous and that âa construction that limits
recovery to pecuniary lossâ is not âplausible,â id., at 1034.
The Government petitioned for rehearing or rehearing
en banc, but a divided court denied the petition. Id., at
1019. The Government then petitioned for certiorari, and
we granted review. 564 U. S. ___ (2011).
II
Because respondent seeks to recover monetary compenÂ
sation from the Government for mental and emotional
harm, we must decide whether the civil remedies proviÂ
ââââââ
nondisclosure requirement applies when the head of an agency makes a
written request for law enforcement purposes to the agency that
maintains the record. See §552a(b)(7). The agencies in this case could
easily have shared respondentâs medical records pursuant to the
procedures prescribed by the Privacy Act, but the District Court conÂ
cluded that they failed to do so.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5
Opinion of the Court
sion of the Privacy Act waives the Governmentâs sovereign
immunity with respect to such a recovery.
A
We have said on many occasions that a waiver of soverÂ
eign immunity must be âunequivocally expressedâ in
statutory text. See, e.g., Lane v. Peña, 518 U. S. 187, 192
(1996); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30,
33 (1992); Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
U. S. 89, 95 (1990). Legislative history cannot supply a
waiver that is not clearly evident from the language of
the statute. Lane, supra, at 192. Any ambiguities in the
statutory language are to be construed in favor of immu-
nity, United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527, 531 (1995),
so that the Governmentâs consent to be sued is never en-
larged beyond what a fair reading of the text requires,
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U. S. 680, 685â686 (1983)
(citing Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U. S. 675,
686 (1927)). Ambiguity exists if there is a plausible interÂ
pretation of the statute that would not authorize money
damages against the Government. Nordic Village, supra,
at 34, 37.
The question that confronts us here is not whether
Congress has consented to be sued for damages under the
Privacy Act. That much is clear from the statute, which
expressly authorizes recovery from the Government for
âactual damages.â Rather, the question at issue concerns
the scope of that waiver. For the same reason that we
refuse to enforce a waiver that is not unambiguously
expressed in the statute, we also construe any ambiguities
in the scope of a waiver in favor of the sovereign. Lane,
supra, at 192.
Although this canon of interpretation requires an unÂ
mistakable statutory expression of congressional intent to
waive the Governmentâs immunity, Congress need not
state its intent in any particular way. We have never
6 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
required that Congress use magic words. To the contrary,
we have observed that the sovereign immunity canon âis
a tool for interpreting the lawâ and that it does not âdisÂ
plac[e] the other traditional tools of statutory construcÂ
tion.â Richlin Security Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U. S.
571, 589 (2008). What we thus require is that the scope of
Congressâ waiver be clearly discernable from the statutory
text in light of traditional interpretive tools. If it is not,
then we take the interpretation most favorable to the
Government.
B
The civil remedies provision of the Privacy Act provides
that, for any âintentional or willfulâ refusal or failure to
comply with the Act, the United States shall be liable for
âactual damages sustained by the individual as a result of
the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled
to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000.â 5 U. S. C.
§552a(g)(4)(A). Because Congress did not define âactual
damages,â respondent urges us to rely on the ordinary
meaning of the word âactualâ as it is defined in standard
general-purpose dictionaries. But as the Court of Appeals
explained, âactual damagesâ is a legal term of art, 622
F. 3d, at 1028, and it is a âcardinal rule of statutory conÂ
structionâ that, when Congress employs a term of art, â âit
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that
were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learnÂ
ing from which it was taken,â â Molzof v. United States, 502
U. S. 301, 307 (1992) (quoting Morissette v. United States,
342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952)).
Even as a legal term, however, the meaning of âactual
damagesâ is far from clear. The latest edition of Blackâs
Law Dictionary available when Congress enacted the
Privacy Act defined âactual damagesâ as â[r]eal, substanÂ
tial and just damages, or the amount awarded to a comÂ
plainant in compensation for his actual and real loss or
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7
Opinion of the Court
injury, as opposed on the one hand to ânominalâ damages,
and on the other to âexemplaryâ or âpunitiveâ damages.â
Blackâs Law Dictionary 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). But this
general (and notably circular) definition is of little value
here because, as the Court of Appeals accurately observed,
the precise meaning of the term âchanges with the specific
statute in which it is found.â 622 F. 3d, at 1029.
The term is sometimes understood to include nonpecuÂ
niary harm. Take, for instance, some courtsâ interpretaÂ
tions of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U. S. C. §3613(c),
and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U. S. C.
§§1681n, 1681o. A number of courts have construed âacÂ
tualâ damages in the remedial provisions of both statutes
to include compensation for mental and emotional disÂ
tress. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F. 2d 634,
636â638 (CA7 1974) (authorizing compensatory damages
under the FHA, 42 U. S. C. §3612, the predecessor to
§3613, for humiliation); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F. 2d
380, 384 (CA10 1973) (stating that damages under the
FHA âare not limited to out-of-pocket losses but may
include an award for emotional distress and humiliationâ);
Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Assn., 682
F. 2d 509, 513â514 (CA5 1982) (per curiam) (explaining
that, â[e]ven when there are no out-of-pocket expenses,
humiliation and mental distress do constitute recoverable
elements of damageâ under the FCRA); Millstone v.
OâHanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F. 2d 829, 834â835 (CA8 1976)
(approving an award of damages under the FCRA for âloss
of sleep, nervousness, frustration and mental anguishâ).
In other contexts, however, the term has been used or
construed more narrowly to authorize damages for only
pecuniary harm. In the wrongful-death provision of the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), for example, Congress
authorized âactual or compensatory damages, measured
by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death.â 28
U. S. C. §2674, ¶2. At least one court has defined âactual
8 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
damagesâ in the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U. S. C. §101(b)
(1970 ed.), as âthe extent to which the market value of
a copyrighted work has been injured or destroyed by an
infringement.â Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc., 772 F. 2d 505, 512 (CA9 1985); see also
Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F. 3d 909, 917 (CA9 2002) (holding
that â âhurt feelingsâ over the nature of the infringementâ
have no place in the actual damages calculus). And some
courts have construed âactual damagesâ in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §78bb(a), to mean âsome
form of economic loss.â Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc.,
556 F. 2d 460, 464 (CA9 1977); see also Osofsky v. Zipf,
645 F. 2d 107, 111 (CA2 1981) (stating that the purpose of
§78bb(a) âis to compensate civil plaintiffs for economic loss
suffered as a result of wrongs committed in violation of the
1934 Actâ); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F. 2d 792, 810 (CA5
1970) (noting that the âgistâ of an action for damages
under the Act is âeconomic injuryâ).3
Because the term âactual damagesâ has this chameleonÂ
like quality, we cannot rely on any all-purpose definition
but must consider the particular context in which the term
ââââââ
3 This narrow usage is reflected in contemporaneous state-court deciÂ
sions as well. See, e.g., Reist v. Manwiller, 231 Pa. Super. 444, 449,
n. 4, 332 A. 2d 518, 520, n. 4 (1974) (explaining that recovery for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is allowed âdespite the total
absence of physical injury and actual damagesâ); Nalder v. Crest Corp.,
93 Idaho 744, 749, 472 P. 2d 310, 315 (1970) (noting that damages for
âmental anguishâ due to the wrongful execution of a judgment âare
allowable only as an element of punitive but not of actual damagesâ). It
is also reflected in post-Privacy Act statutes and judicial decisions. See,
e.g., 17 U. S. C. §1009(d)(1)(A)(ii) (defining âactual damagesâ in the
Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 as âthe royalty payments that
should have been paidâ); 18 U. S. C. §2318(e)(3) (2006 ed., Supp. IV)
(calculating âactual damagesâ for purposes of a counterfeit labeling
statute in terms of financial loss); Guzman v. Western State Bank of
Devils Lake, 540 F. 2d 948, 953 (CA8 1976) (stating that compensatory
damages in a civil rights suit âcan be awarded for emotional and mental
distress even though no actual damages are provenâ).
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9
Opinion of the Court
appears.4
C
The Privacy Act directs agencies to establish safeguards
to protect individuals against the disclosure of confidenÂ
tial records âwhich could result in substantial harm, emÂ
barrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any indi-
vidual on whom information is maintained.â 5 U. S. C.
§552a(e)(10); see also §2(b), 88 Stat. 1896 (stating that the
âpurpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for
an individual against an invasion of personal privacyâ).
Because the Act serves interests similar to those protected
by defamation and privacy torts, there is good reason to
infer that Congress relied upon those torts in drafting the
Act.
In Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614 (2004), we held that the
Privacy Actâs remedial provision authorizes plaintiffs to
recover a guaranteed minimum award of $1,000 for violaÂ
ââââââ
4 The dissent criticizes us for noting that the dictionary definition
contains an element of circularity. The dissent says that the definiÂ
tionââ â[a]ctual damagesâ compensate for actual injuryââis âplain
enough.â Post, at 3 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR, J.). But defining âactualâ
damages by reference to âactualâ injury is hardly helpful when our task
is to determine what Congress meant by âactual.â The dissentâs referÂ
ence to the current version of Blackâs Law Dictionary, which provides
that âactual damagesâ can mean âtangible damages,â only highlights
the termâs ambiguity. See Blackâs Law Dictionary 445 (9th ed. 2009).
If âactual damagesâ can mean âtangible damages,â then it can be
construed not to include intangible harm, like mental and emotional
distress. Similarly unhelpful is the dissentâs citation to a generalÂ
purpose dictionary that defines âactualâ as âexisting in fact or realityâ
and âdamagesâ as âcompensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a
wrong or injury.â Websterâs Third New International Dictionary 22,
571 (2002) (emphasis added). Combining these two lay definitions says
nothing about whether compensation for mental and emotional distress
is in fact imposed by law. The definitions merely beg the question we
are trying to answer. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that âactual
damagesâ has taken on different meanings in different statutes, as our
examples amply illustrate.
10 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
tions of the Act, but only if they prove at least some
âactual damages.â Id., at 620, 627; see §552a(g)(4)(A).
Although we did not address the meaning of âactual damÂ
ages,â id., at 622, n. 5, 627, n. 12, we observed that the
provision âparallelsâ the remedial scheme for the commonÂ
law torts of libel per quod and slander, under which plainÂ
tiffs can recover âgeneral damages,â but only if they prove
âspecial harmâ (also known as âspecial damagesâ), id., at
625; see also 3 Restatement of Torts §575, Comments a
and b (1938) (hereinafter Restatement); D. Dobbs, Law of
Remedies §7.2, pp. 511â513 (1973) (hereinafter Dobbs).5
âSpecial damagesâ are limited to actual pecuniary loss,
which must be specially pleaded and proved. 1 D. HagÂ
gard, Cooley on Torts §164, p. 580 (4th ed. 1932) (hereinafÂ
ter Cooley).6 âGeneral damages,â on the other hand, cover
âloss of reputation, shame, mortification, injury to the
feelings and the like and need not be alleged in detail and
require no proof.â Id., §164, at 579.7
ââââââ
5 Libel per quod and slander (as opposed to libel and slander per se)
apply to a communication that is not defamatory on its face but that is
defamatory when coupled with some other extrinsic fact. Dobbs §7.2, at
512â513.
6 See also 3 Restatement §575, Comment b (âSpecial harm . . . is harm
of a material and generally of a pecuniary natureâ); Dobbs §7.2, at 520
(âSpecial damages in defamation cases mean pecuniary damages, or at
least âmaterial lossâ â (footnote omitted)). Special damages do not
include mental or emotional distress. See 3 Restatement §575, ComÂ
ment c (âThe emotional distress caused to the person slandered by his
knowledge that he has been defamed is not special harm and this is so
although the distress results in a serious illnessâ); Dobbs §7.2, at 520
(âEven under the more modern approach, special damages in defamaÂ
tion cases must be economic in nature, and it is not enough that the
plaintiff has suffered harm to reputation, mental anguish or other
dignitary harm, unless he has also suffered the loss of something
having economic valueâ).
7 See also id., §3.2, at 139 (explaining that noneconomic harms âare
called general damagesâ); W. Prosser, Law of Torts §112, p. 761 (4th ed.
1971) (noting that â âgeneralâ damages may be recovered for the injury
to the plaintiffâs reputation, his wounded feelings and humiliation, and
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11
Opinion of the Court
This parallel between the Privacy Act and the commonÂ
law torts of libel per quod and slander suggests the possiÂ
bility that Congress intended the term âactual damagesâ
in the Act to mean special damages. The basic idea is that
Privacy Act victims, like victims of libel per quod or slanÂ
der, are barred from any recovery unless they can first
show actualâthat is, pecuniary or materialâharm. Upon
showing some pecuniary harm, no matter how slight, they
can recover the statutory minimum of $1,000, presumably
for any unproven harm. That Congress would choose to
use the term âactual damagesâ instead of âspecial damagesâ
was not without precedent. The terms had occasionally
been used interchangeably. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 455 F. 2d 857, 862 (CA9 1972) (holding that plainÂ
tiff could not establish libel per quod because he âdid not
introduce any valid and sufficient evidence of actual damÂ
ageâ); Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research
Corp., 325 F. 2d 761, 765 (CA6 1963) (stating that âlibel
per quod standing alone without proof of actual damages
. . . will not support a verdict for the plaintiff â); M & S
Furniture Sales Co. v. Edward J. De Bartolo Corp., 249
Md. 540, 544, 241 A. 2d 126, 128 (1968) (âIn the case of
words or conduct actionable only per quod, the injurious
effect must be established by allegations and proof of
special damage and in such cases it is not only necessary
to plead and show that the words or actions were defamaÂ
tory, but it must also appear that such words or conduct
caused actual damageâ); Clementson v. Minnesota Tribune
Co., 45 Minn. 303, 47 N. W. 781 (1891) (distinguishing
âactual, or, as they are sometimes termed, âspecial,â damÂ
agesâ from âgeneral damagesâthat is, damages not pecuÂ
ââââââ
resulting physical illness and pain, as well as estimated future damÂ
ages of the same kindâ (footnotes omitted)); 3 Restatement §621, ComÂ
ment a (stating that, in actions for defamation, a plaintiff may recover
general damages for âimpairment of his reputation or, through loss of
reputation, to his other interestsâ).
12 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
niary in their natureâ).8
Any doubt about the plausibility of construing âactual
damagesâ in the Privacy Act synonymously with âspecial
damagesâ is put to rest by Congressâ refusal to authorize
âgeneral damages.â In an uncodified section of the Act,
Congress established the Privacy Protection Study ComÂ
mission to consider, among other things, âwhether the
Federal Government should be liable for general dam-
ages.â §5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907, note following 5 U. S. C.
§552a, p. 712. As we explained in Doe, âCongress left the
question of general damages . . . for another day.â 540
U. S., at 622. Although the Commission later recom-
mended that general damages be allowed, ibid., n. 4,
Congress never amended the Act to include them. For
that reason, we held that it was âbeyond serious doubtâ
that general damages are not available for violations of
the Privacy Act. Id., at 622.
By authorizing recovery for âactualâ but not for âgenÂ
eralâ damages, Congress made clear that it viewed those
terms as mutually exclusive. In actions for defamation
and related dignitary torts, two categories of compensa-
tory damages are recoverable: general damages and special
damages. Cooley §164, at 579; see also 4 Restatement
§867, Comment d (1939) (noting that damages for interÂ
ference with privacy âcan be awarded in the same way in
which general damages are given for defamationâ).9 BeÂ
ââââââ
8 The dissent disregards these precedents as the product of careless
imprecision. Post, at 8, n. 6. But just as we assume that Congress did
not act carelessly, we should not be so quick to assume that the courts
did. The better explanation for these precedents is not that the courts
were careless, but that the term âactual damagesâ has a varied meanÂ
ing that, depending on the context, can be limited to compensation for
only pecuniary harm.
9 See also Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 382â383, 294 A. 2d 326,
332â333 (1972) (âHaving admittedly alleged or proven no special
damages, the plaintiff here is limited to a recovery of general damages
. . .â); Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N. D. 568, 574, 178 N. W.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 13
Opinion of the Court
cause Congress declined to authorize âgeneral damages,â
we think it likely that Congress intended âactual damÂ
agesâ in the Privacy Act to mean special damages for
proven pecuniary loss.
Not surprisingly, this interpretation was accepted by
the Privacy Protection Study Commission, an expert body
authorized by Congress and highly sensitive to the Actâs
goals. The Commission understood âactual damagesâ in
the Act to be âa synonym for special damages as that term
is used in defamation cases.â Personal Privacy in an
Information Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection
Study Commission 530 (July 1977); see also ibid. (âThe
legislative history and language of the Act suggest that
Congress meant to restrict recovery to specific pecuniary
losses until the Commission could weigh the propriety of
extending the standard of recoveryâ). Although we are not
bound in any way by the Commissionâs report, we think it
confirms the reasonableness of interpreting âactual damÂ
agesâ in the unique context of the Privacy Act as the
equivalent of special damages.
ââââââ
792, 794 (1920) (per curiam) (âGenerally speaking, there are recognized
two classes of damages in libel cases, general damages and special
damagesâ); Winans v. Chapman, 104 Kan. 664, 666, 180 P. 266, 267
(1919) (âActual damages include both general and special damagesâ);
Childers v. San Jose Mercury Printing & Publishing Co., 105 Cal. 284,
288â289, 38 P. 903, 904 (1894) (explaining that special damages, âas
a branch of actual damages[,] may be recovered when actual pecuniary
loss has been sustainedâ and that the âremaining branch of actual
damages embraces recovery for loss of reputation, shame, mortification,
injury to feelings, etc.â); see generally Dobbs §7.3, at 531 (âThough the
dignitary torts often involve only general damages . . . , they sometimes
produce actual pecuniary loss. When this happens, the plaintiff is
usually entitled to recover any special damage he can prove . . . â); 1
F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §5.30, p. 470 (1956) (âWhen liability
for defamation is established, the defendant, in addition to such âgenÂ
eralâ damages as may be assessed by the jury, is also liable for any
special damage which he has sustainedâ).
14 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
D
We do not claim that the contrary reading of the statute
accepted by the Court of Appeals and advanced now by
respondent is inconceivable. But because the Privacy Act
waives the Federal Governmentâs sovereign immunity, the
question we must answer is whether it is plausible to read
the statute, as the Government does, to authorize only
damages for economic loss. Nordic Village, 503 U. S., at
34, 37. When waiving the Governmentâs sovereign imÂ
munity, Congress must speak unequivocally. Lane, 518
U. S., at 192. Here, we conclude that it did not. As a
consequence, we adopt an interpretation of âactual damÂ
agesâ limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm. To
do otherwise would expand the scope of Congressâ soverÂ
eign immunity waiver beyond what the statutory text
clearly requires.
III
None of respondentâs contrary arguments suffices to
overcome the sovereign immunity canon.
A
Respondent notes that the term âactual damagesâ has
often been defined broadly in common-law cases, and in
our own, to include all compensatory damages. See Brief
for Respondent 18â25. For example, in Birdsall v. CooÂ
lidge, 93 U. S. 64 (1876), a patent infringement case, we
observed that â[c]ompensatory damages and actual damÂ
ages mean the same thing.â Ibid. And in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323 (1974), we wrote that actual
injury in the defamation context âis not limited to out-ofÂ
pocket lossâ and that it customarily includes âimpairment
of reputation and standing in the community, personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.â Id., at
350.
These cases and others cited by respondent stand for the
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 15
Opinion of the Court
unremarkable point that the term âactual damagesâ can
include nonpecuniary loss. But this generic meaning does
not establish with the requisite clarity that the Privacy
Act, with its distinctive features, authorizes damages for
mental and emotional distress. As we already explained,
the term âactual damagesâ takes on different meanings in
different contexts.
B
Respondentâs stronger argument is that the exclusion of
âgeneral damagesâ from the statute simply means that
there can be no recovery for presumed damages. Privacy
Act victims can still recover for mental and emotional
distress, says respondent, so long as it is proved. See Brief
for Respondent 54â56.10
This argument is flawed because it suggests that proven
mental and emotional distress does not count as general
damages. The term âgeneral damagesâ is not limited to
compensation for unproven injuries; it includes compensaÂ
tion for proven injuries as well. See 3 Restatement §621,
Comment a (noting that general damages compensate for
âharm which . . . is proved, or, in the absence of proof,
is assumed to have caused to [the plaintiffâs] reputationâ).
To be sure, specific proof of emotional harm is not required
to recover general damages for dignitary torts. Dobbs
§7.3, at 529. But it does not follow that general damages
cannot be recovered for emotional harm that is actually
proved.
Aside from the fact that general damages need not be
proved, what distinguishes those damages, whether
proved or not, from the only other category of compensa-
tory damages available in the relevant common-law suits is
the type of harm. In defamation and privacy cases, âthe
affront to the plaintiffâs dignity and the emotional harm
ââââââ
10 The dissent advances the same argument. See post, at 9â11.
16 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
doneâ are âcalled general damages, to distinguish them
from proof of actual economic harm,â which is called âspeÂ
cial damages.â Id., §3.2, at 139; see also supra, at 10, 12â
13, and nn. 6, 7, 9. Therefore, the converse of general
damages is special damages, not all proven damages, as
respondent would have it. Because Congress removed
âgeneral damagesâ from the Actâs remedial provision, it is
reasonable to infer that Congress foreclosed recovery for
nonpecuniary harm, even if such harm can be proved, and
instead waived the Governmentâs sovereign immunity only
with respect to harm compensable as special damages.
C
Looking beyond the Privacy Actâs text, respondent
points to the use of the term âactualâ damages in the
remedial provisions of the FHA, 42 U. S. C. §3613(c), and
the FCRA, 15 U. S. C. §§1681n, 1681o. As previously
mentioned, courts have held that âactualâ damages within
the meaning of these statutes include compensation for
mental and emotional distress. Supra, at 7. Citing the
rule of construction that Congress intends the same lanÂ
guage in similar statutes to have the same meaning, see
Northcross v. Board of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412
U. S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam), respondent argues that
the Privacy Act should also be interpreted as authorizing
damages for mental and emotional distress. See Brief for
Respondent 25â32.
Assuming for the sake of argument that these lower
court decisions are correct, they provide only weak support
for respondentâs argument here. Since the term âactual
damagesâ can mean different things in different contexts,
statutes other than the Privacy Act provide only limited
interpretive aid, and that is especially true here. Neither
the FHA nor the FCRA contains text that precisely mirÂ
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 17
Opinion of the Court
rors the Privacy Act.11 In neither of those statutes did
Congress specifically decline to authorize recovery for
general damages as it did in the Privacy Act. Supra, at
12â13. And most importantly, none of the lower court
cases interpreting the statutes, which respondent has
cited, see Brief for Respondent 29â31, involves the soverÂ
eign immunity canon.
Respondent also points to the FTCA, but the FTCAâs
general liability provision does not even use the term
âactual damages.â It instead provides that the âUnited
States shall be liableâ for certain tort claims âin the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individualâ
under relevant state law. 28 U. S. C. §2674, ¶1. For that
reason alone, the FTCAâs general liability provision is not
a reliable source for interpreting the term âactual damagesâ
in the Privacy Act. Nor does the FTCAâs wrongfulÂ
death provisionâwhich authorizes âactual or compensa-
tory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting
from such death,â §2674, ¶2âprove that Congress underÂ
stood the term âactual damagesâ in the Privacy Act to
include nonpecuniary mental and emotional harm. To the
contrary, it proves that actual damages can be understood
to entail only pecuniary harm depending on the context.
Because the FTCA, like the FHA and FCRA, does not
share the same text or design as the Privacy Act, it is not
a fitting analog for construing the Act.
ââââââ
11 Compare 42 U. S. C. §3613(c)(1) (stating that âthe court may award
to the plaintiff actual and punitive damagesâ); 15 U. S. C. §1681n(a)(1)
(authorizing â(A) any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a
result of the failure or damages of not less than $100 and not more than
$1,000; or (B) . . . actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result
of the failure or $1,000, whichever is greaterâ); §1681o(a)(1) (authorizÂ
ing âany actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the
failureâ) with 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4)(A) (authorizing âactual damages
sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in
no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of
$1,000â).
18 FAA v. COOPER
Opinion of the Court
D
Finally, respondent argues that excluding damages for
mental and emotional harm would lead to absurd results.
Persons suffering relatively minor pecuniary loss would
be entitled to recover $1,000, while others suffering only
severe and debilitating mental or emotional distress would
get nothing. See Brief for Respondent 33â35.
Contrary to respondentâs suggestion, however, there is
nothing absurd about a scheme that limits the GovernÂ
mentâs Privacy Act liability to harm that can be substantiÂ
ated by proof of tangible economic loss. Respondent inÂ
sists that such a scheme would frustrate the Privacy Actâs
remedial purpose, but that ignores the fact that, by delibÂ
erately refusing to authorize general damages, Congress
intended to cabin relief, not to maximize it.12
ââââââ
12 Despite its rhetoric, the dissent does not dispute most of the steps
in our analysis. For example, although the dissent belittles the soverÂ
eign immunity canon, the dissent does not call for its abandonment.
See post, at 2â3. Nor does the dissent point out any error in our underÂ
standing of the canonâs meaning. See ibid. The dissent acknowledges
that statutes and judicial opinions sometimes use the term âactual
damagesâ to mean pecuniary harm, see post, at 5, and that determining
its meaning in a particular statute requires consideration of context,
see ibid. In addition, the dissent concedesâas it must in light of our
reasoning in Doe v. Chao, 540 U. S. 614 (2004)âthat the common law
of defamation has relevance in construing the term âactual damagesâ in
the Privacy Act. See post, at 7â9.
The dissentâs argument thus boils down to this: The text and purpose
of the Privacy Act make it clear beyond any reasonable dispute that the
term âactual damages,â as used in the Act, means compensatory damÂ
ages for all proven harm and not just damages for pecuniary harm.
The dissent reasons that, because the Act seeks to prevent pecuniary
and nonpecuniary harm, Congress must have intended to authorize the
recovery of money damages from the Federal Government for both
types of harm. This inference is plausible, but it surely is not unavoidÂ
able. The Act deters violations of its substantive provisions in other
waysâfor instance, by permitting recovery for economic injury; by
imposing criminal sanctions for some violations, see 5 U. S. C. §552a(i);
and possibly by allowing for injunctive relief under the Administrative
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 19
Opinion of the Court
* * *
In sum, applying traditional rules of construction, we
hold that the Privacy Act does not unequivocally authorize
an award of damages for mental or emotional distress.
Accordingly, the Act does not waive the Federal GovernÂ
mentâs sovereign immunity from liability for such harms.
We therefore reverse the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
ââââââ
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §§702, 706; see Doe, supra, at 619, n. 1
(noting that the absence of equitable relief in suits under
§§552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) may be explained by the availability of such relief
under the APA).
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 1
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 10â1024
_________________
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS v. STANMORE CAWTHON
COOPER
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 28, 2012]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG
and JUSTICE BREYER join, dissenting.
Congress enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 for the stated
purpose of safeguarding individual privacy against Gov-
ernment invasion. To that end, the Act provides a civil
remedy entitling individuals adversely affected by certain
agency misconduct to recover âactual damagesâ sustained
as a result of the unlawful action.
Today the Court holds that âactual damagesâ is limited
to pecuniary loss. Consequently, individuals can no longer
recover what our precedents and common sense under-
stand to be the primary, and often only, damages sus-
tained as a result of an invasion of privacy, namely mental
or emotional distress. That result is at odds with the text,
structure, and drafting history of the Act. And it cripples
the Actâs core purpose of redressing and deterring viola-
tions of privacy interests. I respectfully dissent.
I
The majority concludes that âactual damagesâ in the
civil-remedies provision of the Privacy Act allows recovery
for pecuniary loss alone. But it concedes that its interpre-
tation is not compelled by the plain text of the statute or
otherwise required by any other traditional tool of statu-
2 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
tory interpretation. And it candidly acknowledges that a
contrary reading is not âinconceivable.â Ante, at 14. Yet be-
cause it considers its reading of âactual damagesâ to be
âplausible,â the majority contends that the canon of sover-
eign immunity requires adoption of an interpretation most
favorable to the Government. Ibid.
The canon simply cannot bear the weight the majority
ascribes it. âThe sovereign immunity canon is just thatâa
canon of construction. It is a tool for interpreting the law,
and we have never held that it displaces the other tra-
ditional tools of statutory construction.â Richlin Security
Service Co. v. Chertoff, 553 U. S. 571, 589 (2008) (opinion
of ALITO, J.). Here, traditional tools of statutory construc-
tionâthe statuteâs text, structure, drafting history, and
purposeâprovide a clear answer: The term âactual dam-
agesâ permits recovery for all injuries established by
competent evidence in the record, whether pecuniary or
nonpecuniary, and so encompasses damages for mental
and emotional distress. There is no need to seek refuge in
a canon of construction, see id., at 589â590 (declining to
rely on canon as there is âno ambiguity left for us to con-
strueâ after application of âtraditional tools of statutory
interpretation and considerations of stare decisisâ), much
less one that has been used so haphazardly in the Courtâs
history, see United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S.
30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (canon is ânothing
but a judge-made rule that is sometimes favored and
sometimes disfavoredâ) (collecting cases).
It bears emphasis that we have said repeatedly that,
while âwe should not take it upon ourselves to extend
the waiver [of sovereign immunity] beyond that which
Congress intended,â â[n]either . . . should we assume the
authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended.â
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117â118 (1979)
(emphasis added). See also, e.g., Block v. Neal, 460 U. S.
289, 298 (1983) (âThe exemption of the sovereign from suit
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 3
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
involves hardship enough where consent has been with-
held. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of con-
struction where consent has been announcedâ (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In the Privacy Act, Congress
expressly authorized recovery of âactual damagesâ for
certain intentional or willful agency misconduct. The
Court should not âas a self-constituted guardian of the
Treasury import immunity back into a statute designed to
limit it.â Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61,
69 (1955).
II
A
âIn a statutory construction case, the beginning point
must be the language of the statute, and when a statute
speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the
statuteâs meaning, in all but the most extraordinary cir-
cumstance, is finished.â Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drill-
ing Co., 505 U. S. 469, 475 (1992). The language of the
civil-remedies provision of the Privacy Act is clear.
At the time Congress drafted the Act, Blackâs Law Dic-
tionary defined âactual damagesâ as â[r]eal, substantial
and just damages, or the amount awarded to a complain-
ant in compensation for his actual and real loss or in-
juryâ and as â[s]ynonymous with âcompensatory damages.â â
Blackâs Law Dictionary 467 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (hereinafter
Blackâs). The majority claims this is a âgeneralâ and âno-
tably circularâ definition, ante, at 7, but it is unclear why.
The definition is plain enough: âActual damagesâ compen-
sate for actual injury, and thus the term is synonymous
with compensatory damages. See Blackâs 467 (defining
âcompensatory damagesâ as damages that âwill compen-
sate the injured party for the injury sustained, and noth-
ing more; such as will simply make good or replace the
4 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
loss caused by the wrong or injuryâ).1 There is nothing
circular about that definition.2 It is the definition this
Court adopted more than a century ago when we recog-
nized that â[c]ompensatory damages and actual damages
mean the same thing; that is, that the damages shall be
the result of the injury alleged and proved, and that the
amount awarded shall be precisely commensurate with
the injury suffered.â Birdsall v. Coolidge, 93 U. S. 64
(1876). It is the definition embraced in current legal
dictionaries. See Blackâs 445 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
âactual damagesâ as â[a]n amount awarded to a complain-
ant to compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages
that repay actual losses.âAlso termed compensatory
damages; tangible damages; real damagesâ (italics omit-
ted)). And it is the definition that accords with the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term. See Websterâs Third
New International Dictionary 22, 571 (2002) (defining
âactualâ as âexisting in fact or realityâ and âdamagesâ as
âcompensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong
or injury caused by a violation of a legal rightâ). Thus,
both as a term of art and in its plain meaning, âactual
damagesâ connotes compensation for proven injuries or
ââââââ
1 Blackâs Law Dictionary also defined âactual damagesâ as synony-
mous with âgeneral damages.â Blackâs 467. While âgeneral damagesâ
has a specialized meaning of presumed damages in libel and slander
cases, see n. 4, infra, it more generally can mean damages that âdid in
fact result from the wrong, directly and proximately.â Blackâs 468.
2 The majority declares the definition circular because âdefining âac-
tualâ damages by reference to âactualâ injury is hardly helpful when our
task is to determine what Congress meant by âactual.â â Ante, at 9, n. 4.
âActual injury,â however, is far from an unhelpful reference. This
Court already has recognized in the defamation context that âactual
injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss.â Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U. S. 323, 350 (1974). That accords with the definitions of the
terms. See Blackâs 53, 924 (defining âactualâ as â[r]eal; substantial;
existing presently in act, having a valid objective existence as opposed
to that which is merely theoretical or possible,â and âinjuryâ as â[a]ny
wrong or damage done to anotherâ).
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 5
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
losses. Nothing in the use of that phrase indicates proven
injuries need be pecuniary in nature.
The majority discards all this on the asserted ground
that âthe precise meaning of the term âchanges with the
specific statute in which it is found.â â Ante, at 7 (quoting
622 F. 3d 1016, 1029 (CA9 2010)). Context, of course, is
relevant to statutory interpretation; it may provide clues
that Congress did not employ a word or phrase in its
ordinary meaning. That well-established interpretive rule
cannot, however, render irrelevantâas the majority would
have itâthe ordinary meaning of âactual damages.â
Moreover, the authority the majority cites for its claim
that âactual damagesâ has no fixed meaning underminesâ
rather than supportsâits holding. Each cited authority
involves either a statute in which Congress expressly
directed that compensation be measured in strictly eco-
nomic terms, or else a statute (e.g., the Copyright Act of
1909) in which economic loss is the natural and probable
consequence of a violation of the defined legal interest.3
Neither factor is present here. Notably absent from the
Privacy Act is any provision so much as hinting that âac-
tual damagesâ should be limited to economic loss. And
while â â âhurt feelingsâ over the nature of the [copyright]
infringementâ â may âhave no place in the actual damages
calculusâ under the Copyright Act of 1909, ante, at 8 (quot-
ing in parenthetical Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F. 3d 909, 917
(CA9 2002)), the majority provides no basis for concluding
that âhurt feelingsâ are equally invalid in an Act con-
cerned with safeguarding individual privacy. Thus, while
context is no doubt relevant, the majorityâs cited authority
does little to help its cause in the stated context of this
statute.
ââââââ
3 See 28 U. S. C. §2674; 17 U. S. C. §1009(d)(1); 18 U. S. C. §2318(e)(3)
(2006 ed., Supp. IV); 17 U. S. C. §101(b) (1970 ed.); 15 U. S. C. §78bb(a)
(2006 ed., Supp. IV).
6 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
B
Indeed, the relevant statutory contextâthe substantive
provisions whose breach may trigger suit under the civil-
remedies provisionâonly reinforces the ordinary meaning
of âactual damages.â
Congress established substantive duties in the Act that
are expressly designed to prevent agency conduct result-
ing in intangible harms to the individual. The Act re-
quires agencies to âestablish appropriate administrative,
technical, and physical safeguardsâ to ensure against
security breaches that could result in âsubstantial harm,
embarrassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any indi-
vidual.â 5 U. S. C. §552a(e)(10). It also requires agencies
to âmaintain all recordsâ used in making a determination
about an individual in a manner that is âreasonably neces-
sary to assure fairness to the individual in the determina-
tion.â §552a(e)(5). Thus an agency violates the terms of
the Act if it fails, e.g., to maintain safeguards protecting
against âembarrassmentâ; there is no additional require-
ment that the pocketbook be implicated. An agencyâs
intentional or willful violation of those duties triggers
liability for âactual damagesâ under §552a(g)(4) in the
event of an adverse impact. §§552a(g)(1)(C)â(D), (g)(4).
Adopting a reading of âactual damagesâ that permits
recovery for pecuniary loss alone creates a disconnect
between the Actâs substantive and remedial provisions. It
allows a swath of Government violations to go unreme-
died: A federal agency could intentionally or willfully forgo
establishing safeguards to protect against embarrassment
and no successful private action could be taken against it
for the harm Congress identified. Only an interpretation
of âactual damagesâ that permits recovery for nonpecuni-
ary harms harmonizes the Actâs substantive and remedial
provisions. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 7
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
(1997) (statutory interpretation must consider âthe
broader context of the statute as a wholeâ).4
The majority draws a different conclusion from the sub-
stantive provisions of the Privacy Act. It (correctly) in-
fers from them that the Act âserves interests similar to
those protected by defamation and privacy torts.â Ante,
at 9. It then points to our observation in Doe v. Chao, 540
U. S. 614, 625 (2004), that the Actâs civil-remedies provi-
sion âparallelsâ the remedial scheme for the common-law
torts of defamation per quod, which permitted recovery
of âgeneral damagesâ (i.e., presumed damages) only if a
plaintiff first establishes âspecial damagesâ (i.e., monetary
loss).5 Ante, at 10. That âparallel,â the majority con-
cludes, âsuggests the possibility that Congress intended
the term âactual damagesâ in the Act to mean special dam-
ages.â Ante, at 11.
The majority reads too much into Doe. At issue in that
ââââââ
4 It bears noting that the Privacy Act does not authorize injunctive
relief when a suit is maintained under 5 U. S. C. §§552a(g)(1)(C) and
(D). Rather, injunctive relief is available under the Act only for a
limited category of suits: suits to amend a record and suits for access to
a record. See §§552a(g)(2), (g)(3). Thus an individual who, like peti-
tioner, brings suit under subparagraph (g)(1)(C) or (D) for an inten-
tional or willful violation of the Act will be without a remedy under
the majorityâs reading of âactual damages.â
5 As the majority notes, âgeneral damagesâ at common law refers to
damages âpresumedâ to accrue from the violation of the legally pro-
tected right. No proof of actual injury was required. See D. Dobbs,
Law of Remedies §7.2, p. 513 (1973) (hereinafter Dobbs); Doe, 540 U. S.,
at 621. âSpecial damages,â in contrast, âmeant monetary loss.â Dobbs §7.2,
at 512; Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. Common-law defamation actions falling
within the rubric of defamation per se allowed successful plaintiffs to
recover âgeneral damages.â See Dobbs §7.2, at 513; Doe, 540 U. S., at
621. This stood in contrast to actions sounding in defamation per quod,
which permitted recovery only if the plaintiff established âspecial
damages.â See Dobbs, §7.2 at 512; Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. Even in
defamation per quod cases, a plaintiff could recover nonpecuniary
injuries upon establishing some pecuniary loss. See Dobbs §7.2, at 521;
Doe, 540 U. S., at 625. See also ante, at 10.
8 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
case was the question whether the Actâs civil-suit provi-
sion authorized recovery of a guaranteed minimum award
of $1,000 absent proof of some âactual damages.â The
Court answered in the negative, and in the course of doing
so replied to petitionerâs argument that there was âsome-
thing peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages . . .
only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual dam-
ages.â 540 U. S., at 625. Although the Court cited the
Actâs parallels to defamation per quod actions in noting
that nothing was âpeculiarâ about the Actâs remedial
scheme, Doe did not take the further step of deciding that
âactual damagesâ means economic loss alone. Indeed, it
expressly reserved that question. Id., at 627, n. 12.
The majority, moreover, is wrong to conclude that the
Actâs parallels with defamation per quod actions suggest
Congress intended âactual damagesâ to mean âspecial
damages.â Quite the opposite. The fact that Congress
âwould probably have known aboutâ defamation per quod
actions, id., at 625, makes it all the more significant that
Congress did not write âspecial damagesâ in the civil-
remedies provision. This Court is typically not in the
business of substituting words we think Congress in-
tended to use for words Congress in fact used. Yet that is
precisely what the majority does when it rewrites âactual
damagesâ to mean âspecial damages.â6 In sum, the statu-
tory context, and in particular the Actâs substantive provi-
sions, confirms the ordinary meaning of âactual damages.â
Although the Act shares parallels with common-law defa-
mation torts, such analogies do not warrant a reading of
ââââââ
6 The majority cites a collection of lower court opinions that have used
âactual damagesâ in place of âspecial damagesâ to note that Congress
would not have been alone in using the former term to refer to the
latter. Ante, at 11â12. But that a handful of lower courts on occasion
have been imprecise in their terminology provides no basis to assume
the Legislature has been equally careless in the text of a statute.
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 9
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the phrase that is at odds with the statuteâs plain text.7
C
An uncodified provision of the Act, tied to the Actâs
drafting history, also reinforces the ordinary meaning of
âactual damages.â As the majority notes, prior to reconcil-
iation, the Senate and House bills contained civil-remedies
provisions that were different in a critical respect: The
Senate bill allowed for the recovery of âactual and general
damages,â whereas the House bill allowed for the recovery
of âactual damagesâ alone.8 In the reconciliation process,
the provision for âgeneral damagesâ was dropped and an
uncodified section of the Act was amended to require the
newly established Privacy Protection Study Commission to
consider, among its other jobs, âwhether the Federal Gov-
ernment should be liable for general damages incurred by
an individual as the result of a willful or intentional vio-
lation of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(1)(C) or (D).â
§5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907; see also Doe, 540 U. S.,
at 622.
As the Court explained in Doe, â[t]he deletion of âgeneral
damagesâ from the bill is fairly seen . . . as a deliberate
elimination of any possibility of imputing harm and
awarding presumed damages.â Id., at 623; see also id., at
ââââââ
7 There is yet another flaw in the majorityâs reasoning. At common
law a plaintiff who successfully established âspecial damagesâ in an
action for defamation per quod could proceed to recover damages for
emotional and mental distress. See ante, at 10; n. 5, supra. If âCon-
gress intended the term âactual damagesâ in the Act to mean special
damages,â ante, at 11, then an individual who successfully establishes
some pecuniary loss from a violation of the Actâpresumably as trivial
as the cost of a bottle of Tylenolâshould be permitted to recover for
emotional and mental distress. The majority, of course, does not accept
that result, and its piecemeal embrace of the common law undermines
its assertion that Congress intended âspecial damagesâ in place of
âactual damages.â
8 See S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §303(c)(1) (1974); H. R. 16373, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., §3 (1974).
10 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
622, n. 5 (âCongress explicitly rejected the proposal to
make presumed damages available for Privacy Act viola-
tionsâ). The elimination of presumed damages from the
bill can only reasonably imply that what Congress left
behindââactual damagesââcomprised damages that are
not presumed, i.e., damages proven by competent evidence
in the record. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S.
323, 349â350 (1974) (distinguishing in defamation context
between presumed damages and damages for actual inju-
ries sustained by competent evidence in the record, which
include âimpairment of reputation and standing in the
community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and sufferingâ); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U. S. 247, 262â264
(1978) (distinguishing between presumed damages and
proven damages for mental and emotional distress).
Rather than view the deletion of general damages (pre-
sumed damages) as leaving the converse (proven dam-
ages), the majority supposes that the deletion leaves only a
subset of proven damagesâthose of an economic nature,
i.e., âspecial damages.â Once again, however, the major-
ityâs insistence that âCongress intended âactual damagesâ in
the Privacy Act to mean special damages for proven pecu-
niary loss,â ante, at 13, finds no basis in the statutory text,
see supra, at 8. And its response to the conclusion that
Congress retained recovery for proven damages when it
eliminated presumed damages is singularly unsatisfying.
The majority declares such a conclusion âflawedâ because
âgeneral damagesâ âincludes compensation for proven
injuries as well,â so that âwhat distinguishes [general]
damages, whether proved or not, from the only other
category of compensatory damages available in the rele-
vant common-law suits is the type of harmâ the term
encompassesâwhich the majority takes to be emotional
harm alone. Ante, at 15â16. That assertion is defective on
two scores. First, a plaintiff âs ability to present proof of
injury in a defamation per se action (and to recover for
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 11
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
such proven injury) does not alter the definition of âgen-
eral damages,â which we already explained in Doe means
âpresumed damages.â 540 U. S., at 621; see also id., at
623; n. 5, supra. Second, âgeneral damagesâ is not limited
to a âtypeâ of harm. The majorityâs contrary assertion that
the term permits recovery only for emotional âtypesâ of
harm overlooks the fact that âgeneral damages are partly
based on the belief that the plaintiff will suffer unprovable
pecuniary losses.â Dobbs §7.2, at 514 (emphasis added). It
thus was established at common law that in a defamation
per se action, âthe plaintiff is usually free to prove what-
ever actual pecuniary loss he can,â and âthe jury may be
permitted to view the actual pecuniary loss proven as the
tip of the iceberg, assume that there is still more un-
proven, and award damage accordingly.â Ibid.
At its core, the majority opinion relies on the following
syllogism: The common law employed two terms of art in
defamation actions. Because Congress excluded recovery
for âgeneral damages,â it must have meant to retain recov-
ery only for âspecial damages.â That syllogism, of course,
ignores that there is another category of damages. It is
the very category Congress used in the text of the Privacy
Act: âActual damages.â However much Congress may
have drawn âparallels,â ante, at 10, between the Act and
the common-law tort of defamation, the fact remains that
Congress expressly choose not to use the words âspecial
damages.â9
D
I turn finally to the statuteâs purpose, for â[a]s in all
cases of statutory interpretation, our task is to interpret
ââââââ
9 The majority cites the conclusions of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission in support of its interpretation of âactual damages.â The
majority rightfully does not claim this piece of postenactment, extratex-
tual material is due any deference; nor do I find its unelaborated
conclusions persuasive.
12 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
the words of th[e] statut[e] in light of the purposes Con-
gress sought to serve.â Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Organization, 441 U. S. 600, 608 (1979); see also
Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006) (âInter-
pretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the
whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context
of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authori-
ties that inform the analysisâ). The purposes of the Priv-
acy Act could not be more explicit, and they are consistent
with interpreting âactual damagesâ according to its ordi-
nary meaning.
âThe historical context of the Act is important to an
understanding of its remedial purposes. In 1974, Con-
gress was concerned with curbing the illegal surveillance
and investigation of individuals by federal agencies that
had been exposed during the Watergate scandal.â Dept.
of Justice, Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, Overview of
the Privacy Act 4 (2010). In particular, Congress recog-
nized that âthe increasing use of computers and sophisti-
cated information technology . . . has greatly magnified
the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any
collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal
information.â §2(a), 88 Stat. 1896. Identifying the right to
privacy as âa personal and fundamental right,â Congress
found it ânecessary and properâ to enact the Privacy Act
âin order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in
information systems maintained by Federal agencies.â
Ibid.
Congress explained that the âpurpose of this Act is to
provide certain safeguards for an individual against an
invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal agen-
cies, except as otherwise provided by law, to,â inter alia,
âbe subject to civil suit for any damages which occur as a
result of willful or intentional action which violates any
individualâs rights under this Act.â §2(b)(6), ibid. (empha-
sis added). That statement is an explicit reference to suits
Cite as: 566 U. S. ____ (2012) 13
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
brought under §552a(g)(4); no other provision speaks to a
civil suit based on âwillful or intentionalâ agency miscon-
duct. It signals unmistakably congressional recognition
that the civil-remedies provision is integral to realizing
the Actâs purposes.
Reading âactual damagesâ to permit recovery for any
injury established by competent evidence in the recordâ
pecuniary or notâbest effectuates the statuteâs basic
purpose. Although some privacy invasions no doubt result
in economic loss, we have recognized time and again that
the primary form of injuries is nonpecuniary, and includes
mental distress and personal humiliation. See Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U. S. 374, 385, n. 9 (1967) (âIn the âright of
privacyâ cases the primary damage is the mental dis-
tressâ); see also Gertz, 418 U. S., at 350 (â[A]ctual injuryâ
in defamatory falsehood cases âis not limited to out-of-
pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual
harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impair-
ment of reputation and standing in the community, per-
sonal humiliation, and mental anguish and sufferingâ).
Accord, 2 Dobbs §7.1.(1), at 259 (2d ed. 1993) (privacy is a
dignitary interest, and âin a great many of the casesâ in
which the interest is invaded âthe only harm is the affront
to the plaintiff âs dignity as a human being, the damage to
his self-image, and the resulting mental distressâ). That
accords with common sense.
In interpreting the civil-remedies provision, we must not
forget Congress enacted the Privacy Act to protect pri-
vacy. The majorityâs reading of âactual damagesâ renders
the remedial provision impotent in the face of concededly
unlawful agency action whenever the injury is solely
nonpecuniary. That result is patently at odds with Con-
gressâ stated purpose. The majority, however, does not
grapple with the ramifications of its opinion. It acknowl-
edges the suggestion that its holding leads to absurd
results as it allows individuals suffering relatively minor
14 FAA v. COOPER
SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting
pecuniary losses to recover $1,000 while others suffering
severe mental anguish to recover nothing. But it con-
cludes that âthere is nothing absurd about a scheme that
limits the Governmentâs Privacy Act liability to harm that
can be substantiated by proof of tangible economic loss.â
Ante, at 18. Perhaps; it is certainly within Congressâ
prerogative to enact the statute the majority envisions,
namely one that seeks to safeguard against invasions of
privacy without remedying the primary harm that results
from invasions of privacy. The problem for the majority is
that one looks in vain for any indication in the text of the
statute before us that Congress intended such a result.
Nowhere in the Privacy Act does Congress so much as hint
that it views a $5 hit to the pocketbook as more worthy of
remedy than debilitating mental distress, and the major-
ityâs contrary assumption discounts the gravity of emo-
tional harm caused by an invasion of the personal integ-
rity that privacy protects.
* * *
After today, no matter how debilitating and substantial
the resulting mental anguish, an individual harmed by
a federal agencyâs intentional or willful violation of the
Privacy Act will be left without a remedy unless he or she
is able to prove pecuniary harm. That is not the result
Congress intended when it enacted an Act with the ex-
press purpose of safeguarding individual privacy against
Government invasion. And it is not a result remotely
suggested by anything in the text, structure, or history of
the Act. For those reasons, I respectfully dissent.