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Full Opinion
Computers have become an indispensable part of our daily lives. We use them for work; we use them for play. Sometimes we use them for play at work. Many employers have adopted policies prohibiting the use of work computers for nonbusiness purposes. Does an employee who violates such a policy commit a federal crime? How about someone who violates the terms of service of a social networking website? This depends on how broadly we read the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
FACTS
David Nosal used to work for Korn/Ferry, an executive search firm. Shortly after he left the company, he convinced some of his former colleagues who were still working for Korn/Ferry to help him start a competing business. The employees used their log-in credentials to download source lists, names and contact information from a confidential database on the companyâs computer, and then transferred that information to Nosal. The employees were authorized to access the database, but Korn/Ferry had a policy that forbade disclosing confidential information.
Nosal filed a motion to dismiss the CFAA counts, arguing that the statute targets only hackers, not individuals who access a computer with authorization but then misuse information they obtain by means of such access. The district court initially rejected Nosalâs argument, holding that when a person accesses a computer âknowingly and with the intent to defraud ... [it] renders the access unauthorized or in excess of authorization.â Shortly after-wards, however, we decided LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.2009), which construed narrowly the phrases âwithout authorizationâ and âexceeds authorized accessâ in the CFAA. Nosal filed a motion for reconsideration and a second motion to dismiss.
The district court reversed field and followed Brekkaâs guidance that â[t]here is simply no way to read [the definition of âexceeds authorized accessâ] to incorporate corporate policies governing use of information unless the word alter is interpreted to mean misappropriate,â as â[s]uch an interpretation would defy the plain meaning of the word alter, as well as common sense.â Accordingly, the district court dismissed counts 2 and 4-7 for failure to state an offense. The government appeals. We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3731; United States v. Russell, 804 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1986). We review de novo. United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 913 (9th Cir.2002).
DISCUSSION
The CFAA defines âexceeds authorized accessâ as âto access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.â 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6). This language can be read either of two ways: First, as Nosal suggests and the district court held, it could refer to someone whoâs authorized to access only certain
The government argues that the statutory text can support only the latter interpretation of âexceeds authorized access.â In its opening brief, it focuses on the word âentitledâ in the phrase an âaecesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.â Id. § 1030(e)(6) (emphasis added). Pointing to one dictionary definition of âentitleâ as âto furnish with a right,â Websterâs New Riverside University Dictionary 435, the government argues that Korn/Ferryâs computer use policy gives employees certain rights, and when the employees violated that policy, they âexceedfed] authorized access.â But âentitledâ in the statutory text refers to how an aecesser âobtain[s] or alter[s]â the information, whereas the computer use policy uses âentitledâ to limit how the information is used after it is obtained. This is a poor fit with the statutory language. An equally or more sensible reading of âentitledâ is as a synonym for âauthorized.â
In its reply brief and at oral argument, the government focuses on the word âsoâ in the same phrase. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (âaecesser is not entitled so to obtain or alterâ (emphasis added)). The government reads âsoâ to mean âin that manner,â which it claims must refer to use restrictions. In the governmentâs view, reading the definition narrowly would render âsoâ superfluous.
The governmentâs interpretation would transform the CFAA from an anti-hacking statute into an expansive misappropriation statute. This places a great deal of weight on a two-letter word that is essentially a conjunction. If Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use restrictionsâ which may well include everyone who uses a computerâwe would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose.
While the CFAA is susceptible to the governmentâs broad interpretation, we find Nosalâs narrower one more plausible. Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 primarily to address the growing problem of computer hacking, recognizing that, â[i]n intentionally trespassing into someone elseâs computer files, the offender obtains at the very least information as to how to break into that computer system.â S.Rep. No. 99-432, at 9 (1986), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2487 (Conf. Rep.). The government agrees that the CFAA was concerned with hacking, which is why it also prohibits accessing a computer âwithout authorization.â According to the government, that prohibition applies to hackers, so the âexceeds authorized accessâ prohibition must apply to people who are authorized to use the computer, but do so for an unauthorized purpose. But it is possible to read both prohibitions as applying to hackers: â[Wjithout authorizationâ would apply to outside hackers (individuals who have no authorized access to the computer at all) and âexceeds authorized accessâ would apply to inside hackers (individuals whose initial access to a computer is authorized but who access unauthorized information or files). This is a perfectly plausible construction of the statutory language that maintains the CFAAâs focus on hacking rather than turning it into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate.
The government argues that defendants here did have notice that their conduct was wrongful by the fraud and materiality requirements in subsection 1030(a)(4), which punishes whoever:
knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). But âexceeds authorized accessâ is used elsewhere in the CFAA as a basis for criminal culpability without intent to defraud. Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) requires only that the person who âexceeds authorized accessâ have âobtain[ed] ... information from any protected computer.â Because âprotected computerâ is defined as a computer affected by or involved in interstate commerceâeffectively all computers with Internet accessâ the governmentâs interpretation of âexceeds authorized accessâ makes every violation of a private computer use policy a federal crime. See id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
The government argues that our ruling today would construe âexceeds authorized accessâ only in subsection 1030(a)(4), and we could give the phrase a narrower meaning when we construe other subsections. This is just not so: Once we define the phrase for the purpose of subsection 1030(a)(4), that definition must apply equally to the rest of the statute pursuant to the âstandard principle of statutory construction ... that identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning.â Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 232, 127 S.Ct. 2411, 168 L.Ed.2d 112 (2007). The phrase appears five times in the first seven subsections of the statute, including subsection 1030(a)(2)(C). See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4) and (7). Giving a different interpretation to each is impossible because Congress provided a single definition of âexceeds authorized accessâ for all iterations of the statutory phrase. See id. § 1030(e)(6). Congress obviously meant âexceeds authorized accessâ to have the same meaning throughout section 1030. We must therefore consider how the interpretation we adopt will operate wherever in that section the phrase appears.
In the case of the CFAA, the broadest provision is subsection 1030(a)(2)(C), which makes it a crime to exceed authorized access of a computer connected to the Internet without any culpable intent. Were we to adopt the governmentâs proposed interpretation, millions of unsuspecting individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct.
Employer-employee and company-consumer relationships are traditionally governed by tort and contract law; the governmentâs proposed interpretation of the CFAA allows private parties to manipulate their computer-use and personnel policies so as to turn these relationships into ones policed by the criminal law. Significant notice problems arise if we allow criminal liability to turn on the vagaries of private polices that are lengthy, opaque, subject to change and seldom read. Consider the typical corporate policy that computers can be used only for business purposes. What exactly is a ânonbusiness purposeâ? If you use the computer to check the weather report for a business trip? For the company softball game? For your vacation to Hawaii? And if minor personal uses are tolerated, how can an employee be on notice of what constitutes a violation sufficient to trigger criminal liability?
Basing criminal liability on violations of private computer use polices can transform whole categories of otherwise innocuous behavior into federal crimes simply because a computer is involved. Employees who call family members from their work phones will become criminals if they send an email instead. Employees can sneak in the sports section of the New York Times to read at work, but theyâd better not visit ESPN.com. And sudoku enthusiasts should stick to the printed puzzles, because visiting www.dailysudoku.com from their work computers might give them more than enough time to hone their sudoku skills behind bars.
The effect this broad construction of the CFAA has on workplace conduct pales by
For example, itâs not widely known that, up until very recently, Google forbade minors from using its services. See Google Terms of Service, effective April 16, 2007âMarch 1, 2012, § 2.3, http://www. google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/archive/ 20070416 (âYou may not use the Services and may not accept the Terms if ... you are not of legal age to form a binding contract with Google____â) (last visited Mar. 4, 2012).
Or consider the numerous dating websites whose terms of use prohibit inaccurate or misleading information. See, e.g., eHarmony Terms of Service § 2(1), http:// www.eharmony.com/abouVterms (âYou will not provide inaccurate, misleading or false information to eHarmony or to any other user.â) (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). Or eBay and Craigslist, where itâs a violation of the terms of use to post items in an
Not only are the terms of service vague and generally unknownâunless you look real hard at the small print at the bottom of a webpageâbut website owners retain the right to change the terms at any time and without notice. See, e.g., YouTube Terms of Service § l.B, http://www. youtube.com/t/terms (âYouTube may, in its sole discretion, modify or revise these Terms of Service and policies at any time, and you agree to be bound by such modifications or revisions.â) (last visited Mar. 4, 2012). Accordingly, behavior that wasnât criminal yesterday can become criminal today without an act of Congress, and without any notice whatsoever.
The government assures us that, whatever the scope of the CFAA, it wonât prosecute minor violations. But we shouldnât have to live at the mercy of our local prosecutor. Cf. United States v. Stevens, - U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1591, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (âWe would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.â). And itâs not clear we can trust the government when a tempting target comes along. Take the case of the mom who posed as a 17-year-old boy and cyberbullied her daughterâs classmate. The Justice Department prosecuted her under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) for violating MySpaceâs terms of service, which prohibited lying about identifying information, including age. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D.Cal.2009). Lying on social media websites is common: People shave years off their age, add inches to their height and drop pounds from their weight. The difference between puffery and prosecution may depend on whether you happen to be someone an AUSA has reason to go after.
In United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988), the Supreme Court refused to adopt the governmentâs broad interpretation of a statute because it would âcriminalize a broad range of day-to-day activity.â Id. at 949, 108 S.Ct. at 2763. Applying the rule of lenity, the Court warned that the broader statutory interpretation would âdelegate to prosecutors and juries the inherently legislative task of determining what type of ... activities are so morally reprehensible that they should be punished as crimesâ and would âsubject individuals to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory prosecution and conviction.â Id. By giving that much power to prosecutors, weâre inviting discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.
We remain unpersuaded by the decisions of our sister circuits that interpret the CFAA broadly to cover violations of corporate computer use restrictions or violations of a duty of loyalty. See United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.2010); United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.2010); Intâl Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir.2006). These courts looked only at the culpable behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the effect on millions of ordinary citizens caused by the statuteâs unitary definition of âexceeds authorized access.â They therefore failed to apply the long-standing principle that we must
We therefore respectfully decline to follow our sister circuits and urge them to reconsider instead. For our part, we continue to follow in the path blazed by Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, and the growing number of courts that have reached the same conclusion. These courts recognize that the plain language of the CFAA âtargetfs] the unauthorized procurement or alteration of information, not its misuse or misappropriation.â Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F.Supp.2d 962, 965 (D.Ariz.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Orbit One Commcâns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F.Supp.2d 373, 385 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (âThe plain language of the CFAA supports a narrow reading. The CFAA expressly prohibits improper âaccessâ of computer information. It does not prohibit misuse or misappropriation.â); Diamond Power Intâl, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1343 (N.D.Ga.2007) (â[A] violation for âexceeding authorized accessâ occurs where initial access is permitted but the access of certain information is not permitted.â); Intâl Assân of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wemer-Masuda, 390 F.Supp.2d 479, 499 (D.Md. 2005) (â[T]he CFAA, however, do[es] not prohibit the unauthorized disclosure or use of information, but rather unauthorized access.â).
CONCLUSION
We need not decide today whether Congress could base criminal liability on violations of a company or websiteâs computer use restrictions. Instead, we hold that the phrase âexceeds authorized accessâ in the CFAA does not extend to violations of use restrictions. If Congress wants to incorporate misappropriation liability into the CFAA, it must speak more clearly. The rule of lenity requires âpenal laws ... to be construed strictly.â United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820). â[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.â Jones, 529 U.S. at 858, 120 S.Ct. at 1912 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The rule of lenity not only ensures that citizens will have fair notice of the criminal laws, but also that Congress will have fair notice of what conduct its laws criminalize. We construe criminal statutes narrowly so that Congress will not unintentionally turn ordinary citizens into criminals. â[B]ecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.â United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971). âIf there is any doubt about whether Congress intended [the CFAA] to prohibit the conduct in which [Nosal] engaged, then âwe must choose the interpretation least likely to impose penalties unintended by Congress.â â United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 635 n. 22 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Arzate-Nunez, 18 F.3d 730, 736 (9th Cir.1994)).
This narrower interpretation is also a more sensible reading of the text and legislative history of a statute whose general purpose is to punish hackingâthe circumvention of technological access barriersâ not misappropriation of trade secretsâa subject Congress has dealt with elsewhere. See supra note 3. Therefore, we hold that
Because Nosalâs accomplices had permission to access the company database and obtain the information contained within, the governmentâs charges fail to meet the element of âwithout authorization, or exceeds authorized accessâ under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing counts 2 and 4-7 for failure to state an offense. The government may, of course, prosecute Nosal on the remaining counts of the indictment.
AFFIRMED.
. The opening screen of the database also included the warning: "This product is intended to be used by Korn/Ferry employees for work on Korn/Ferry business only.â
. Fowler's offers these as usage examples: "Everyone is entitled to an opinionâ and "We are entitled to make personal choices.â "Fowler's Modern English Usage: Entitled,â Answers .com, http ://www. answers .com/topic/ entitle (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
. Congress did just that in the federal trade secrets statuteâ18 U.S.C. § 1832âwhere it used the common law terms for misappropriation, including "with intent to convert,â âsteals,â "appropriatesâ and âtakes.â See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). The government also charged Nosal with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1832, and those charges remain pending.
. The government fails to acknowledge that its own construction of "exceeds authorized accessâ suffers from the same flaw of superfluity by rendering an entire element of subsection 1030(a)(4) meaningless. Subsection 1030(a)(4) requires a person to (1) knowingly and (2) with intent to defraud (3) access a protected computer (4) without authorization or exceeding authorized access (5) in order to further the intended fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). Using a computer to defraud the company necessarily contravenes company policy. Therefore, if someone accesses a computer with intent to defraudâsatisfying elements (2) and (3)âhe would invariably satisfy (4) under the government's definition.
. Although the legislative history of the CFAA discusses this anti-hacking purpose, and says nothing about exceeding authorized use of information, the government claims that the legislative history supports its interpretation. It points to an earlier version of the statute, which defined "exceeds authorized accessâ as âhaving accessed a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which such authorization does not extend.â Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 1213 (1986). But that language was removed and replaced by the current phrase and definition. And Senators Mathias and Leahyâmembers of the Senate Judiciary Committeeâexplained that the purpose of replacing the original broader language was to "remove[] from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a[n] ... employeeâs access to computerized data might be legitimate
. Enforcement of the CFAA against minor workplace dalliances is not chimerical. Employers have invoked the CFAA against employees in civil cases. In a recent Florida case, after an employee sued her employer for wrongful termination, the company counterclaimed that plaintiff violated section 1030(a)(2)(C) by making personal use of the Internet at workâchecking Facebook and sending personal emailâ-in violation of company policy. See Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904-T-23TBM, 2011 WL 1742028 (M.D.Fla. May 6, 2011). The district court dismissed the counterclaim, but it could not have done so if "exceeds authorized accessâ included violations of private computer use policies.
. This concern persists even if intent to defraud is required. Suppose an employee spends six hours tending his FarmVille stable on his work computer. The employee has full access to his computer and the Internet, but the company has a policy that work computers may be used only for business purposes. The employer should be able to fire the employee, but that's quite different from having him arrested as a federal criminal. Yet, under the governmentâs construction of the statute, the employee "exceeds authorized accessâ by using the computer for non-work activities. Given that the employee deprives his company of six hours of work a day, an aggressive prosecutor might claim that heâs defrauding the company, and thereby violating section 1030(a)(4).
. See, e.g., Craigslist Terms of Use (http:// www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use), eBay User Agreement (http://pages.ebay.com/help/ policies/user-agreement.html?rt=nc), eHarmony Terms of Service (http://www. eharmony.com/abouVterms), Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (http:// www.facebook.com/#!/legal/terms), Google Terms of Service (http://www.google.com/intl/ en/policies/terms/), Hulu Terms of Use (http:// www.hulu.com/terms), IMDb Conditions of Use (http://www.imdb.com/help/show_article? conditions), JDate Terms and Conditions of Service (http://www.jdate.com/Applications/ Article/ArticleView.aspx?CategoryID=1948& ArticleID=6498&HideNav=True#service), Linkedln User Agreement (http://www. linkedin.com/static?key=user_agreement), Match.com Terms of Use Agreement (http:// www.match.com/registration/membagr.aspx? lid=4), MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement (http://www.myspace.com/Help/Terms? pm_cmp=ed_footer), Netflix Terms of Use (https://signup.netflix.com/TermsOfUse), Pandora Terms of Use (http://www.pandora.com/ legal), Spotify Terms and Conditions of Use (http://www.spotify.com/us/legal/end-useragreemenV), Twitter Terms of Service (http:// twitter.com/tos), Wikimedia Terms of Use (http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/Terms_ ofLuse) and YouTube Terms of Service (http:// www.youtube.com/Vterms).
. A number of other well-known websites, including Netflix, eBay, Twitter and Amazon, have this age restriction.