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Full Opinion
(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2021 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BADGEROW v. WALTERS ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 20â1143. Argued November 2, 2021âDecided March 31, 2022
The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes a party to an arbitration agree-
ment to petition a federal court for various forms of relief. But the
Actâs authorization of such petitions does not itself create the subject-
matter jurisdiction necessary for a federal court to resolve them. Ra-
ther, the federal court must have an âindependent jurisdictional basisâ
to do so. Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576,
582. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49, this Court assessed
whether there was a jurisdictional basis to decide an FAA Section 4
petition to compel arbitration by means of examining the partiesâ un-
derlying dispute. The Court reasoned that specific language in Section
4 instructed a federal court to âlook throughâ the petition to the âun-
derlying substantive controversy.â Id., at 62. If the dispute underlying
a Section 4 petition falls within the courtâs jurisdictionâfor example,
by presenting a federal questionâthen the court may rule on the peti-
tion to compel arbitration.
In this case, the question presented is whether that same âlook-
throughâ approach to jurisdiction applies to applications to confirm or
vacate arbitral awards under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. Petitioner
Denise Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against her em-
ployerâs principals (collectively, Walters), alleging that she was unlaw-
fully terminated. After arbitrators dismissed Badgerowâs claims, she
filed suit in Louisiana state court to vacate the arbitral award. Wal-
ters removed the case to Federal District Court and applied to confirm
the award. Badgerow then moved to remand the case to state court,
arguing that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to resolve the partiesâ
requestsâunder Sections 10 and 9 of the FAA, respectivelyâto vacate
or confirm the award. The District Court applied Vadenâs look-through
approach, finding jurisdiction in the federal-law claims contained in
2 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Syllabus
Badgerowâs underlying employment action. The District Court
acknowledged that Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA lack the distinctive
text on which Vaden relied, but it applied the look-through approach
anyway so that âconsistent jurisdictional principlesâ would govern all
kinds of FAA applications. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Vadenâs âlook-throughâ approach to determining federal jurisdic-
tion does not apply to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards
under Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA. Pp. 4â16.
(a) Congress has granted federal district courts jurisdiction over two
main kinds of cases: suits between citizens of different States as to any
matter valued at more than $75,000 (diversity cases), 28 U. S. C.
§1332(a), and suits âarising underâ federal law (federal-question
cases), §1331. Normally, a court has federal-question jurisdiction
whenever federal law authorizes an action. But because this Court
has held that the FAAâs provisions do not themselves support federal
jurisdiction, a federal court must find an independent basis for juris-
diction to resolve an arbitral dispute. In this case, neither application
reveals a jurisdictional basis on its face. So to find an independent
basis for jurisdiction, the District Court had to look through the Sec-
tion 9 and 10 applications to the underlying substantive dispute,
where a federal-law claim satisfying §1331 indeed exists.
In Vaden, this Court approved the look-through approach for a Sec-
tion 4 petition by relying on that sectionâs express language. That lan-
guage provides that a party to an arbitration agreement may petition
for an order to compel arbitration in a âUnited States district court
which, save for [the arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdictionâ
over âthe controversy between the parties.â âThe phrase âsave for [the
arbitration] agreement,â â the Court stated, âindicates that the district
court should assume the absence of the arbitration agreement and de-
termine whether [the court] âwould have jurisdiction . . .â without itâ by
looking through to the âunderlying substantive controversyâ between
the parties. 556 U. S., at 62.
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA contain none of the statutory language
on which Vaden relied. So under ordinary principles of statutory con-
struction, the look-through method should not apply. â[W]hen Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits
it in another section of the same Act,â this Court generally takes the
choice to be deliberate. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___. That holds
true for jurisdictional questions, as federal âdistrict courts may not ex-
ercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.â Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Al-
lapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S. 546, 552. Because a statutory basis
for look-through jurisdiction is lacking in Sections 9 and 10, the Court
cannot reach the same result here as in Vaden. Pp. 4â9.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3
Syllabus
(b) Walters presents a two-part argument to justify exercising juris-
diction here. Walters first claims that Section 4âs language does not
authorize look-through jurisdiction, but is only a capacious venue pro-
vision designed to give applicants a broad choice among federal courts
possessing jurisdiction. Walters next construes Section 6âwhich re-
quires any FAA application to âbe made and heard in the manner pro-
vided by law for the making and hearing of motionsââto provide the
basis for an FAA-wide look-through rule.
Waltersâs reading of Section 4 does not comport with how Vaden un-
derstood Section 4 or with the actual text of that provision, which
never mentions venue, and refers only to jurisdiction. And Waltersâs
Section 6 argument fares no better. Courts do not possess jurisdiction
to decide ordinary motions by virtue of the look-through method. So
Congress would not have prescribed that method by telling courts, as
Section 6 does, to treat FAA applications like motions. Pp. 9â12.
(c) Walters also makes several policy arguments preaching the vir-
tues of adopting look-through as a uniform jurisdictional rule. Walters
claims that a uniform rule will promote âadministrative simplicityâ;
that the look-through approach will be âeasier to applyâ than a test
grounding jurisdiction on the face of the FAA application itself; and
that the look-through rule will provide federal courts with more com-
prehensive control over the arbitration process. Brief for Respondents
27, 28. But â[e]ven the most formidable policy arguments cannot over-
come a clear statutory directive.â BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 593 U. S. ___, ___. And anyway, Walters oversells the
superiority of his proposal. First, uniformity in and of itself provides
no real advantage here because courts can easily tell whether to apply
look-through or the normal jurisdictional rules. Second, the use of
those ordinary rules, in the context of arbitration applications, is
hardly beyond judicial capacity. And third, there are good reasons why
state, rather than federal, courts should handle applications like the
ones in this case. Pp. 12â16.
975 F. 3d 469, reversed and remanded.
KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J.,
and THOMAS, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT,
JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20â1143
_________________
DENISE A. BADGEROW, PETITIONER v.
GREG WALTERS, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[March 31, 2022]
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq.,
authorizes a party to an arbitration agreement to seek sev-
eral kinds of assistance from a federal court. Under Section
4, for example, a party may ask the court to compel an ar-
bitration proceeding, as the agreement contemplates. And
under Sections 9 and 10, a party may apply to the court to
confirm, or alternatively to vacate, an arbitral award.
Yet the federal courts, as we have often held, may or may
not have jurisdiction to decide such a request. The Actâs
authorization of a petition does not itself create jurisdiction.
Rather, the federal court must have what we have called an
âindependent jurisdictional basisâ to resolve the matter.
Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U. S. 576,
582 (2008).
In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U. S. 49 (2009), we as-
sessed whether there was a jurisdictional basis to decide a
Section 4 petition to compel arbitration by means of exam-
ining the partiesâ underlying dispute. The text of Section 4,
we reasoned, instructs a federal court to âlook throughâ the
2 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
petition to the âunderlying substantive controversyâ be-
tween the partiesâeven though that controversy is not be-
fore the court. Id., at 62. If the underlying dispute falls
within the courtâs jurisdictionâfor example, by presenting
a federal questionâthen the court may rule on the petition
to compel. That is so regardless whether the petition alone
could establish the courtâs jurisdiction.
The question presented here is whether that same âlook-
throughâ approach to jurisdiction applies to requests to con-
firm or vacate arbitral awards under the FAAâs Sections 9
and 10. We hold it does not. Those sections lack Section 4âs
distinctive language directing a look-through, on which
Vaden rested. Without that statutory instruction, a court
may look only to the application actually submitted to it in
assessing its jurisdiction.
I
This case grows out of the arbitration of an employment
dispute. Petitioner Denise Badgerow worked as a financial
advisor for REJ Properties, a firm run by respondents Greg
Walters, Thomas Meyer, and Ray Trosclair. (For ease of
reference, we refer from now on only to Walters.)
Badgerowâs contract required her to bring claims arising
out of her employment to arbitration, rather than to court.
So when she was (in her view, improperly) fired, she initi-
ated an arbitration action against Walters, alleging unlaw-
ful termination under both federal and state law. The ar-
bitrators sided with Walters, dismissing Badgerowâs
claims.
What happened afterwardâwhen Badgerow refused to
give upâcreated the jurisdictional issue we address today.
Believing that fraud had tainted the arbitration proceeding,
Badgerow sued Walters in Louisiana state court to vacate
the arbitral decision. Walters responded by removing the
case to Federal District Courtâand, once there, applying to
confirm the arbitral award. Finally, Badgerow moved to
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3
Opinion of the Court
remand the case to state court, arguing that the federal
court lacked jurisdiction over the partiesâ requestsâunder
Sections 10 and 9, respectivelyâto vacate or confirm the
award.
The District Court assessed its jurisdiction under the look
through approach this Court adopted in Vaden v. Discover
Bank. See 2019 WL 2611127, *1 (ED La., June 26, 2019).
That approach, as just noted, allows a federal court to exer-
cise jurisdiction over an FAA application when the partiesâ
underlying substantive dispute would have fallen within
the courtâs jurisdiction. See supra, at 1â2. The District
Court acknowledged that Vaden involved a different kind of
arbitration dispute: It concerned a petition to compel arbi-
tration under the FAAâs Section 4, rather than an applica-
tion to confirm or vacate an arbitral award under Section 9
or 10. And Vadenâs âreasoning was grounded on specific
textâ in Section 4 that Sections 9 and 10 âdo[ ] not contain.â
2019 WL 2611127, *2. But the court thought it should ap-
ply the look-through approach anyway, so that âconsistent
jurisdictional principlesâ would govern all kinds of FAA ap-
plications. Ibid. And under that approach, the court had
jurisdiction because Badgerowâs underlying employment
action raised federal-law claims. The court thus went on to
resolve the dispute over whether fraud had infected the ar-
bitration proceeding. Finding it had not, the court granted
Waltersâs application to confirm, and denied Badgerowâs ap-
plication to vacate, the arbitral award.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the District Courtâs finding of jurisdiction, relying
on a just-issued Circuit precedent. See 975 F. 3d 469, 472â
474 (2020) (citing Quezada v. Bechtel OG&C Constr. Servs.,
Inc., 946 F. 3d 837, 843 (2020)). In that decision, the Fifth
Circuit had echoed the reasoning of the District Court here.
Yes, the language of Section 4 directing use of the look-
through approach âis in fact absent inâ the FAAâs other sec-
4 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
tions. 946 F. 3d, at 842. But, the court continued, a âprin-
ciple of uniformityâ applying to the FAA âdictates using the
same approach for determining jurisdiction under each sec-
tion of the statute.â Ibid.; but see id., at 845â846 (Ho, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting that asserted principle in favor of
â[f ]idelity to textâ). As applied to this case, that analysis
meant that the district court had jurisdiction over Waltersâs
Section 9 and Badgerowâs Section 10 applications.
Courts have divided over whether the look-through ap-
proach used in Vaden can establish jurisdiction in a case
like this oneâwhen the application before the court seeks
not to compel arbitration under Section 4 but to confirm,
vacate, or modify an arbitral award under other sections of
the FAA.1 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 593
U. S. ___ (2021), and now reverse the judgment below.
II
The district courts of the United States are courts of lim-
ited jurisdiction, defined (within constitutional bounds) by
federal statute. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of America, 511 U. S. 375, 377 (1994). Congress has
granted those courts jurisdiction over two main kinds of
cases. District courts have power to decide diversity
casesâsuits between citizens of different States as to any
matter valued at more than $75,000. See 28 U. S. C.
§1332(a). And they have power to decide federal-question
casesâsuits âarising underâ federal law. §1331. Typically,
ââââââ
1 Compare Quezada v. Bechtel OG&C Constr. Servs., Inc., 946 F. 3d
837, 843 (CA5 2020) (holding that the look-through approach applies to
applications to confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitral award); Ortiz-Espi-
nosa v. BBVA Securities of P. R., Inc., 852 F. 3d 36, 47 (CA1 2017) (same);
Doscher v. Sea Port Group Securities, LLC, 832 F. 3d 372, 381â388 (CA2
2016) (same); McCormick v. America Online, Inc., 909 F. 3d 677, 680â
684 (CA4 2018) (same), with Goldman v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,
834 F. 3d 242, 252â255 (CA3 2016) (holding that the look-through ap-
proach does not apply to those applications); Magruder v. Fidelity Bro-
kerage Servs., 818 F. 3d 285, 287â289 (CA7 2016) (same).
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5
Opinion of the Court
an action arises under federal law if that law âcreates the
cause of action asserted.â Gunn v. Minton, 568 U. S. 251,
257 (2013). So when federal law authorizes the action, the
party bringing itâonce again, typicallyâgets to go to fed-
eral court.
But that is not necessarily true of FAA-created arbitra-
tion actions. As noted above, the FAA authorizes parties to
arbitration agreements to file specified actions in federal
courtâmost prominently, petitions to compel arbitration
(under Section 4) and applications to confirm, vacate, or
modify arbitral awards (under Sections 9 through 11). See
supra, at 1. But those provisions, this Court has held, do
not themselves support federal jurisdiction. See Hall
Street, 552 U. S., at 581â582; Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. (Were
it otherwise, every arbitration in the country, however dis-
tant from federal concerns, could wind up in federal district
court.) A federal court may entertain an action brought un-
der the FAA only if the action has an âindependent jurisdic-
tional basis.â Hall Street, 552 U. S., at 582. That means an
applicant seeking, for example, to vacate an arbitral award
under Section 10 must identify a grant of jurisdiction, apart
from Section 10 itself, conferring âaccess to a federal fo-
rum.â Vaden, 556 U. S., at 59. If she cannot, the action
belongs in state court. The FAA requires those courts, too,
to honor arbitration agreements; and we have long recog-
nized their âprominent roleâ in arbitral enforcement. Ibid.;
see id., at 71; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, 12â
16 (1984).2
ââââââ
2 This Court has held that the FAAâs core substantive requirementâ
Section 2âs command to enforce arbitration agreements like other con-
tractsâapplies in state courts, just as it does in federal courts. See
Southland Corp., 465 U. S., at 12â16. We have never decided whether
the FAAâs more procedural provisions, including Sections 4 and 9
through 11, also apply in state courts. See Vaden, 556 U. S., at 71, n. 20;
see also post, at 7 (BREYER, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that they
do not). But we have made clear that Section 2 âcarries with itâ a duty
for States to provide certain enforcement mechanisms equivalent to the
6 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
The issue here is about where a federal court should look
to determine whether an action brought under Section 9 or
10 has an independent jurisdictional basis. An obvious
place is the face of the application itself. If it shows that
the contending parties are citizens of different States (with
over $75,000 in dispute), then §1332(a) gives the court di-
versity jurisdiction. Or if it alleges that federal law (beyond
Section 9 or 10 itself ) entitles the applicant to relief, then
§1331 gives the court federal-question jurisdiction. But
those possibilities do Walters no good. He and Badgerow
are from the same State. And their applications raise no
federal issue. Recall that the two are now contesting not
the legality of Badgerowâs firing but the enforceability of an
arbitral award. That award is no more than a contractual
resolution of the partiesâ disputeâa way of settling legal
claims. See Vaden, 556 U. S., at 63. And quarrels about
legal settlementsâeven settlements of federal claimsâtyp-
ically involve only state law, like disagreements about other
contracts. See Kokkonen, 511 U. S., at 378â382. So the Dis-
trict Court here, as Walters recognizes, had to go beyond the
face of the Section 9 and 10 applications to find a basis for
jurisdiction. See Brief for Respondents 26â27. It had to
proceed downward to Badgerowâs employment action,
where a federal-law claim satisfying §1331 indeed exists.
In other words, the court had to look through the Section 9
and 10 applications to the underlying substantive dispute,
although that dispute was not before it. Could the court do
so?
ââââââ
FAAâs. See Vaden, 556 U. S., at 71 (referring specifically to Sections 3
and 4). And most, if not all, States in fact provide procedural vehicles,
similar to those in the FAA, to enforce arbitration agreementsâinclud-
ing, as here, to resolve post-arbitration disputes by means of confirming,
modifying, or vacating arbitral awards. See, e.g., Revised Uniform Arbi-
tration Act of 2000 §§22â24, 7 U. L. A. 26 (2009) (adopted in 21 States
and the District of Columbia); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§1285â1287.6
(West 2022); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §§7510â7511 (West 2022).
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7
Opinion of the Court
In Vaden, this Court approved the look-through approach
for a Section 4 petition, relying on that sectionâs express
language. Under Section 4, a party to an arbitration agree-
ment may petition for an order to compel arbitration in a
âUnited States district court which, save for [the arbitra-
tion] agreement, would have jurisdictionâ over âthe contro-
versy between the parties.â3 That text, we stated, âdrives
our conclusion that a federal court should determine its ju-
risdiction by âlooking throughâ a §4 petition to the underly-
ing substantive controversyââto see, for example, if that
dispute â âarises underâ federal law.â 556 U. S., at 62.
To show why that is so, we proceeded methodically
through Section 4âs wording. âThe phrase âsave for [the ar-
bitration] agreement,â â we began, âindicates that the dis-
trict court should assume the absence of the arbitration
agreement and determine whether [the court] âwould have
jurisdiction . . .â without it.â Ibid. (first alteration in origi-
nal). But â[j]urisdiction over what?â Ibid. âThe text of Sec-
tion 4,â we continued, ârefers us to âthe controversy between
the parties.â â Ibid. And that âcontroversy,â we explained,
could not mean the dispute before the court about âthe ex-
istence or applicability of an arbitration agreementâ; after
all, the preceding save-for clause had just âdirect[ed] courtsâ
to assume that agreement away. Id., at 63. The âcontro-
versy between the partiesâ instead had to mean their âun-
derlying substantive controversy.â Id., at 62 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). âAttending to the languageâ of
ââââââ
3 In full, the relevant sentence of Section 4 reads: âA party aggrieved
by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States dis-
trict court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under
title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit
arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agree-
ment.â
8 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
Section 4 thus required âapprov[ing] the âlook throughâ ap-
proachâ as a means of assessing jurisdiction over petitions
to compel arbitration. Ibid. The opposite view was not
merely faulty; it was âtextual[ly] implausib[le].â Id., at 65.
But Sections 9 and 10, in addressing applications to con-
firm or vacate an arbitral award, contain none of the statu-
tory language on which Vaden relied. Most notably, those
provisions do not have Section 4âs âsave forâ clause. They
do not instruct a court to imagine a world without an arbi-
tration agreement, and to ask whether it would then have
jurisdiction over the partiesâ dispute. Indeed, Sections 9
and 10 do not mention the courtâs subject-matter jurisdic-
tion at all.4 So under ordinary principles of statutory con-
struction, the look-through method for assessing jurisdic-
tion should not apply. â[W]hen Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it
in another section of the same Act,â we generally take the
choice to be deliberate. Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. ___, ___
(2021) (slip op., at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have no warrant to redline the FAA, importing Section
4âs consequential language into provisions containing noth-
ing like it. Congress could have replicated Section 4âs look-
through instruction in Sections 9 and 10. Or for that mat-
ter, it could have drafted a global look-through provision,
applying the approach throughout the FAA. But Congress
did neither. And its decision governs.
ââââââ
4 Section 9 provides, in relevant part, that if an arbitration agreement
states âthat a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the [arbitral]
award,â then a âparty to the arbitration may applyâ within a year to the
federal court located where the award was made (or any other court spec-
ified) âfor an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must
grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or correctedâ
as the Act otherwise prescribes.
Section 10 provides, in relevant part, that a United States court âmay
make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to
the arbitrationâ if the award is tainted in any of four specified ways.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9
Opinion of the Court
Nothing in that conclusion changes because a jurisdic-
tional question is before us. The federal âdistrict courts
may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.â
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U. S.
546, 552 (2005). And the jurisdiction Congress confers may
not âbe expanded by judicial decree.â Kokkonen, 511 U. S.,
at 377. Those bedrock principles prevent us from pulling
look-through jurisdiction out of thin airâfrom somehow
finding, without textual support, that federal courts may
use the method to resolve various state-law-based, non-di-
verse Section 9 and 10 applications. The look-through rule
is a highly unusual one: It locates jurisdiction not in the ac-
tion actually before the court, but in another controversy
neither there nor ever meant to be. We recognized that rule
in Vaden because careful analysis of Section 4âs text showed
that Congress wanted it applied to petitions brought under
that provision. See 556 U. S., at 62â65. But Congress has
not so directed in Sections 9 and 10. Congress has not au-
thorized a federal court to adjudicate a Section 9 or 10 ap-
plication just because the contractual dispute it presents
grew out of arbitrating different claims, turning on differ-
ent law, that (save for the partiesâ agreement) could have
been brought in federal court. And because a statutory ba-
sis for look-through jurisdiction is lacking here, we cannot
reach the same result as in Vaden: That would indeed be
jurisdictional âexpan[sion] by judicial decree.â Kokkonen,
511 U. S., at 377.
Walters contests that view of the statute. Unlike the
Courts of Appeals to have adopted his position, including
the Fifth Circuit below, see supra, at 3â4, he offers a read-
ing of the FAAâs text to justify exercising jurisdiction here.5
ââââââ
5 By contrast, the dissenting opinion reads, from start to finish, more
like the decisions of the courts below: Even when that opinion finally
turns to the FAAâs text, it emphasizes something much like the lower
courtsâ uniformity principle. See post, at 9â11; supra, at 3â4. Because,
the dissent says, all the FAAâs sections âdescribe connected components
10 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
Waltersâs argument comes in two parts. First, Walters
says, the language in Section 4 that Vaden construed does
not in fact authorize the use of the look-through jurisdic-
tional method. In his view, that sentence is only a capa-
cious âvenue provision,â serving to âexpand[ ] venue to the
limits of [federal] jurisdictionâ (and thus to give an appli-
cant a broad choice among federal courts possessing juris-
diction). Brief for Respondents 12, 23. Second, Walters
claims that Section 6 provides the basis for an FAA-wide
look-through jurisdictional rule. Under Section 6, any FAA
application âshall be made and heard in the manner pro-
vided by law for the making and hearing of motions.â That
provision, Walters claims, requires use of the look-through
approach because â[f]ederal courts have jurisdiction over
motions when they have jurisdiction over the underlying
action.â Brief for Respondents 19 (internal quotation marks
omitted). So to recap Waltersâs theory: Section 4 does not
establish any jurisdictional rule for applications to compel
in particular, while Section 6 establishes the look-through
jurisdictional rule for all kinds of FAA applications.
But Waltersâs understanding of Section 4 does not com-
port with what it says. The language of that provision
never mentions âvenueâ; it refers only to âjurisdiction.â
That is a signal, sharp and clear, that the section provides
a jurisdictional rule. And even suppose (against all odds)
that Congress had meant to state the venue rule Walters
proposes without ever using the word âvenue.â In that
ââââââ
of a single matterâ (namely, a âcourtâs arbitration-related enforcement
powerâ), and because those provisions serve the same âgeneral pur-
pose[ ],â the statute âpermitsâ a court to hold that âSection 4âs jurisdic-
tional rule should apply throughout.â Post, at 9â12. But the (nigh-inev-
itable) connection among a statuteâs diverse provisions does not give a
court carte blanche to move rules or concepts from any one section to any
or all others. For the reasons already stated, we cannot read this non-
uniform statuteâsetting out a jurisdictional rule in one section but con-
spicuously omitting it in all othersâas though it applied a single rule
throughout. See supra, at 8â9.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11
Opinion of the Court
event, Congress could have simply permitted filing the pe-
tition in any district court with jurisdiction (or even more
simplyâbecause a court can never act without jurisdic-
tionâin any district court). Given that (in Waltersâs view)
the jurisdictional rule comes from another provision, Con-
gress would not have needed to (again) spell out its content.
But spelling out the ruleâs contentâby describing the look-
through methodâis exactly what Section 4 does. That de-
scription can serve one purpose only: to establish jurisdic-
tion where it would otherwise not exist.
And that is how Vaden understood Section 4. Our deci-
sion, like the relevant text, never once referred to venue.
Instead, we spoke, throughout the opinion, of the way Sec-
tion 4 provides for jurisdiction. We formulated the question
presented as whether the district court could âexercise ju-
risdiction over [the partyâs] §4 petition.â 556 U. S., at 53;
see id., at 57 (stating that â[w]e granted certiorariâ to decide
whether district courts could use the look-through method
âto determine whether federal-question jurisdiction exists
over [a] §4 petitionâ). And we framed our holding as about
jurisdiction: â[A] federal court should determine its jurisdic-
tion by âlooking throughâ a §4 petition.â Id., at 62; see id.,
at 72 (ROBERTS, C. J., dissenting) (differing about the ruleâs
application, but agreeing that a court presented with a Sec-
tion 4 petition should use the look-through method âin de-
termining whether it has jurisdictionâ). In short, Section
4âs âsave forâ text âdr[ove] our conclusionâ not about venue,
but about âjurisdiction.â Id., at 62. And so that text, as
shown above, contradicts Waltersâs positionâfor it appears
in Section 4 alone, rather than also in Sections 9 and 10.
See supra, at 8â9.
Waltersâs theory fares no better in construing Section 6âs
mention of motions to prescribe a look-through rule for the
whole FAA. Here, Walters commits the opposite of his fault
in reading Section 4: He now reads a provision containing
12 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
no express reference to jurisdiction in fact to set out a juris-
dictional rule. There may be rare contexts in which courts
can, without such a reference, âinfer that Congress has ex-
panded our jurisdictionââbut this is not one. Welch v.
Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U. S. 468,
474 (1987) (plurality opinion). The look-through method, as
noted before, is a jurisdictional outlier. See supra, at 9. For
Congress to prescribe it by telling courts, a la Section 6, to
treat FAA applications like motions in other kinds of litiga-
tion would be not just oblique but simply bizarre. Courts,
after all, do not possess jurisdiction to decide ordinary mo-
tions by virtue of the look-through method. A motion (un-
like a typical FAA application) is part of a case actually in
court. Jurisdiction to decide the case includes jurisdiction
to decide the motion; there is no need to âlook throughâ the
motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court.
And if the look-through rule does not apply to motions, then
Section 6âs reference to motions cannot direct the look-
through rule. We have formerly described that provisionâs
function as something different: Section 6, we said, ensures
that FAA applications âget streamlined treatmentââa kind
of âexpedited review,â as compared to what a party would
receive if she brought a normal contract suit. Hall Street,
552 U. S., at 582, and n. 3. However hard we squint, we
cannot also discern in Section 6 an FAA-wide look-through
rule; the only such rule in the FAA, applying only to peti-
tions to compel, resides in Section 4.
Waltersâs more thought-provoking arguments sound not
in text but in policy. Here, Waltersânow joined by the dis-
sentâpreaches the virtues of adopting look-through as a
âsingle, easy-to-apply jurisdictional testâ that will produce
âsensibleâ results. Brief for Respondents 28 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see post, at 4â9 (opinion of BREYER,
J.) (lauding the âadvantagesâ of look-throughâs âpractical
consequencesâ). First, Walters says, a uniform jurisdic-
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13
Opinion of the Court
tional rule, applying to all FAA applications alike, will nec-
essarily promote âadministrative simplicityâ because a
court will not have to figure out which rule to apply. Brief
for Respondents 27. Second, he claims, the look-through
rule is âeasier to applyâ than a test that would ground juris-
diction on the face of the FAA application itself. Id., at 28
(internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, he says,
the latter approach confronts courts with âhard questionsâ
about how to determine diversity jurisdiction (including its
amount-in-controversy component) across a range of set-
tingsâfor the Section 9 and 10 applications at issue here,
as well as for Section 5 and 7 petitions (obviously not at is-
sue) to appoint arbitrators or compel the presence of wit-
nesses. Id., at 41. (The dissentâs vaunted practical âad-
vantagesâ also mostly concern avoiding those diversity
issues. Post, at 4; see post, at 4â7.)6 Finally, Walters con-
tends that only the look-through rule will provide federal
courts with comprehensive control over the arbitration pro-
cess, including the period after the award. The opposite po-
sition, he says, will âclose the federal courthouse doors to
manyâ post-arbitration motions, even when they grow out
of disputes raising âexclusively federal claims.â Brief for Re-
spondents 37, 46.
Walters himself quotes back to us the topline answer to
those theories, reflecting its obviousness: âEven the most
formidable policy arguments cannot overcome a clear stat-
utory directive.â Id., at 44 (quoting BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (slip op.,
at 12); alteration omitted). Waltersâs (and the dissentâs)
what-makes-best-sense assertions rest on the view that
ââââââ
6 The dissentâs lead item in this vein concerns a Section 5 petition to
appoint an arbitrator that is made âin tandem withâ a Section 4 petition
over which a federal court has jurisdiction. Post, at 5. Because Section
5 is not at issue here, we do not express any view about whether the
relationship that the dissent hypothesizes would give the court jurisdic-
tion over the appointment request.
14 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
âthe FAA contains noâ such clear âdirectiveâ limiting look-
through jurisdiction to Section 4. Brief for Respondents 44â
45; see post, at 10. Having rejected that view, we cannot
find much relevance in his ideas, even if plausible, about
the optimal jurisdictional rule for the FAA. âIt is not for
this Court to employ untethered notions of what might be
good public policy to expand our jurisdiction.â Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 161 (1990). However the pros and
cons shake out, Congress has made its call. We will not
impose uniformity on the statuteâs non-uniform jurisdic-
tional rules.
And anyway, we think Walters oversells the superiority
of his proposal. First, uniformity in and of itself provides
no real advantage in this sphere. A court can tell in an in-
stant whether an application arises under Section 4 or, as
here, under Section 9 or 10; so it can also tell in an instant
whether to apply the look-through method or the usual ju-
risdictional rules. Second, the use of those ordinary rulesâ
most notably, relating to diversity jurisdictionâis hardly
beyond judicial capacity. Federal courts have faced, and
federal courts have resolved, diversity questions for over
two centuries, in diverse and ever-changing legal contexts.
Throughout, they have developed workable rules; and we
see no reason to think they will do differently here. Indeed,
past practice belies Waltersâs and the dissentâs gloomy pre-
dictions. Although they spin out hypotheticals designed to
make the project look ultra-confusing, they fail to identify
any actual problems that have arisen from courtsâ
longstanding application of diversity standards to FAA ap-
plications (without using look-through). And Waltersâs so-
lution does not even avoid the (purported) difficulty of
which he complains. For he does not claim (nor could he)
that look-through is the exclusive means of establishing
federal jurisdiction. Even if the underlying action does not
fall within a district courtâs jurisdiction, the application still
might do soâsay, because the parties have changed, and
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15
Opinion of the Court
are now diverse. See supra, at 6. So courts, on Waltersâs
own view, will still have to resolve questions aboutâand
develop rules forâdetermining diversity in the FAA con-
text. The difference is only one of degreeâand too small,
under any plausible theory of statutory interpretation, to
adopt Waltersâs proposal to rewrite the law.
Finally, we can see why Congress chose to place fewer ar-
bitration disputes in federal court than Walters wishes.
The statutory plan, as suggested above, makes Section 9
and 10 applications conform to the normalâand sensibleâ
judicial division of labor: The applications go to state, ra-
ther than federal, courts when they raise claims between
non-diverse parties involving state law. See supra, at 5â6.
As Walters notes, those claims may have originated in the
arbitration of a federal-law dispute. But the underlying dis-
pute is not now at issue. Rather, the application concerns
the contractual rights provided in the arbitration agree-
ment, generally governed by state law. And adjudication of
such state-law contractual rightsâas this Court has held
in addressing a non-arbitration settlement of federal
claimsâtypically belongs in state courts. See Kokkonen,
511 U. S., at 381â382; supra, at 6. To be sure, Congress
created an exception to those ordinary jurisdictional princi-
ples for Section 4 petitions to compel. But it is one thing to
make an exception, quite another to extend that exception
everywhere. See post, at 8 (disregarding this point). As this
Court has often said, the âpreeminentâ purpose of the FAA
was to overcome some judgesâ reluctance to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements when a party tried to sue in court instead.
E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 221
(1985). We have never detected a similar congressional
worry about judgesâ willingness to enforce arbitration
awards already made. So Congress might well have
thought an expansion of federal jurisdiction appropriate for
petitions to compel alone. Applications about arbitral deci-
sions could and should follow the normal rules.
16 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
Opinion of the Court
The result, as Walters laments, is to give state courts a
significant role in implementing the FAA. But we have long
recognized that feature of the statute. â[E]nforcement of
the Act,â we have understood, âis left in large part to the
state courts.â Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 25, n. 32 (1983); see Vaden, 556
U. S., at 59; Hall Street, 552 U. S., at 582. As relevant here,
Congress chose to respect the capacity of state courts to
properly enforce arbitral awards. In our turn, we must re-
spect that evident congressional choice.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 1
BREYER, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 20â1143
_________________
DENISE A. BADGEROW, PETITIONER v.
GREG WALTERS, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
[March 31, 2022]
JUSTICE BREYER, dissenting.
When interpreting a statute, it is often helpful to consider
not simply the statuteâs literal words, but also the statuteâs
purposes and the likely consequences of our interpretation.
Otherwise, we risk adopting an interpretation that, even if
consistent with text, creates unnecessary complexity and
confusion. That, I fear, is what the majorityâs interpreta-
tion here will do. I consequently dissent.
I
The question presented arises in the context of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act (FAA). 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq. The ques-
tion is technical and jurisdictional: How does a federal court
determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider a motion
to confirm or vacate an arbitration award? The FAA con-
tains several sections that seem to empower a federal court
to take certain specified actions related to arbitration pro-
ceedings. These include Section 4, which gives âany United
States district courtâ the power to âorderâ parties to a writ-
ten arbitration agreement to âproceedâ to arbitration; Sec-
tion 5, which gives âthe courtâ the power to âdesignate and
appoint an arbitratorâ; Section 7, which gives âthe United
States district court for the districtâ in which an arbitrator
is sitting the power to âcompel the attendanceâ of witnesses
whom the arbitrator has âsummonedâ; Section 9, which
2 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
gives âthe United States court in and for the district within
whichâ an arbitration award âwas madeâ the power to enter
an âorder confirming the awardâ; Section 10, which gives
âthe United States court in and for the district wherein the
[arbitration] award was madeâ the power to âmake an order
vacating the awardâ; and Section 11, which gives âthe
United States court in and for the district wherein the [ar-
bitration] award was madeâ the power to âmodif[y] or cor-
rec[t] the award.â 9 U. S. C. §§4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11. (Here, as
throughout, I have simplified the descriptions of the FAAâs
sections; the Appendix, infra, contains the full relevant
statutory language.) This case directly concerns jurisdic-
tion under Sections 9 and 10, but the Courtâs reasoning
applies to all the sections just mentioned.
At first blush, one might wonder why there is any ques-
tion about whether a federal court has jurisdiction to con-
sider requests that it act pursuant to these sections. The
sectionsâ language seems explicitly to give federal courts the
power to take such actions. Why does that language itself
not also grant jurisdiction to act? The answer, as the Court
notes, is that we have held that the FAAâs âauthorization of
a petition does not itself create jurisdiction.â Ante, at 1.
âRather, the federal court must have what we have called
an âindependent jurisdictional basisâ to resolve the matter.â
Ibid. (quoting Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U. S. 576, 582 (2008)).
We made clear how this works in Vaden v. Discover Bank,
556 U. S. 49 (2009), a case involving Section 4. As just
noted, Section 4 gives a district court the power to order
parties (who have entered into a written arbitration agree-
ment) to submit to arbitration. We held âthat a federal
court should determine its jurisdiction by âlooking throughâ
a §4 petition to the partiesâ underlying substantive contro-
versy.â Id., at 62. The court asks whether it would have
jurisdiction over that controversy, namely, whether that
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 3
BREYER, J., dissenting
underlying substantive controversy involves a federal ques-
tion or diversity (a dispute between parties from different
States with a value of more than $75,000). See 28 U. S. C.
§§1331, 1332. If so, then the federal court has jurisdiction
over a Section 4 petition asking the court to order the par-
ties to resolve that controversy in arbitration.
The Vaden Court gave two reasons for adopting this
âlook-throughâ approach. The first, as the majority today
emphasizes, was textual. See 556 U. S., at 62. Section 4
says that a party seeking arbitration may petition for an
order compelling arbitration from
âany United States district court which, save for [the
arbitration] agreement, would have jurisdiction . . . in a
civil action . . . of the subject matter of a suit arising out
of the controversy between the parties.â (Emphasis
added.)
The words âsave for [the arbitration] agreement,â we rea-
soned, tell a court not to find jurisdiction by looking to the
petition to enforce the agreement itself, but instead to the
underlying controversy between the parties. See id., at 62â
63.
The second reason, which the majority today neglects,
was practical. Id., at 65. To find jurisdiction only where
the petition to enforce an arbitration agreement itself es-
tablished federal jurisdiction, we explained, would result in
âcurious practical consequences,â including unduly limiting
the scope of Section 4 and hinging jurisdiction upon distinc-
tions that were â âtotally artificial.â â Ibid. (quoting 1 I. Mac-
Neil, R. Speidel, & T. Stipanowich, Federal Arbitration Law
§9.2.3.3, p. 9:21 (1995) (hereinafter MacNeil)).
Today, the majority holds that this look-through ap-
proach does not apply to Section 9 or 10 because those sec-
tions lack Section 4âs âsave forâ language. Ante, at 2. This
reasoning necessarily extends to Sections 5, 7, and 11 as
4 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
well, for those sections, too, lack Sections 4âs âsave forâ lan-
guage. Ibid. (âWithout [Section 4âs] statutory instruction, a
court may look only to the application actually submitted to
it in assessing its jurisdictionâ). Although this result may
be consistent with the statuteâs text, it creates what Vaden
fearedâcurious consequences and artificial distinctions.
See 556 U. S., at 65. It also creates what I fear will be con-
sequences that are overly complex and impractical.
II
I would use the look-through approach to determine ju-
risdiction under each of the FAAâs related provisionsâSec-
tions 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Doing so would avoid the same
kinds of âcurious practical consequencesâ that drove the Va-
den Court to adopt the look-through approach in the first
place. Ibid.; see also Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Constr. Co., 529 U. S. 193, 202 (2000) (rejecting interpreta-
tion of the FAA that âwould create anomalous resultsâ).
Most notably, this approach would provide a harmonious
and comparatively simple jurisdiction-determining ruleâ
advantages that the majorityâs jurisdictional scheme seems
to lack. Cf. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U. S. 77, 94 (2010)
(rejecting â[c]omplex jurisdictional testsâ in favor of
âstraightforwardâ and â[s]imple jurisdictional rulesâ).
Consider some of the likely consequences of the majorityâs
reading, which applies the look-through approach only to
Section 4 (where the âsave forâ language appears), but not
to the FAAâs other sections (where it does not appear).
First, consider Section 5. That section says that, upon
application of one of the parties to an arbitration agree-
ment, âthe court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator.â
9 U. S. C. §5 (emphasis added). What happens when the
look-through approach shows that the underlying contro-
versy raises a federal question, but the application to ap-
point an arbitrator raises no federal question and does not
establish diversity? A party could ask a federal judge to
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 5
BREYER, J., dissenting
order arbitration under Section 4, but they could not then
ask that same (or any other) federal judge to appoint an ar-
bitrator for that very same arbitration under Section 5.
That does not seem to be what Congress had in mind for
these neighboring provisionsâprovisions that appear to as-
sume that a judge can appoint an arbitrator in tandem with
ordering parties to arbitration. Moreover, how is a federal
court to determine, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, the
amount at stake in a motion to appoint an arbitrator with-
out a look-through approach? Surely not by assessing the
value of the arbitratorâs request for pay.
Second, consider Section 7. It says that âupon petition
the United States district court for the district in whichâ an
arbitrator is sitting âmay compel the attendanceâ of persons
whom the arbitrator has âsummoned.â §7. Suppose that
the underlying substantive controversy does not qualify for
federal jurisdiction, meaning that a federal court would not
have jurisdiction to order arbitration under Section 4. If
arbitration proceeds by other means, can a federal judge
nonetheless compel the attendance of a witness at that ar-
bitration, based on diversity jurisdiction, if a request to do
so shows that the summoned witness lives out of State? If
there are two witnesses, one in State and one out of State,
can the federal judge compel the attendance of the second,
but not the first? Why would Congress have wanted parties
to toggle between federal and state court when seeking ju-
dicial enforcement of summons issued during a single arbi-
tration?
And at a more basic level, who are the relevant parties to
a Section 7 request when determining, for diversity pur-
poses, whether the Section 7 dispute is between citizens of
different States? The arbitrator and summoned witness?
The parties in arbitration? Only the âsummoningâ party
and the witness? Compare Washington National Insurance
Co. v. OBEX Group LLC, 958 F. 3d 126, 134 (CA2 2020)
6 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
(evaluating diversity based on summoning party and wit-
ness), with Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Center of Del. Cty. Ltd.,
95 F. 3d 562, 567â568 (CA7 1996) (evaluating diversity
based on parties in arbitration). And assume that a federal
court finds it does have jurisdiction over a Section 7 request,
even though the underlying controversy involves neither a
federal question nor diversity. âWhy would Congress have
wanted federal courts to intervene to enforce a subpoena
issued in an arbitration proceeding involving a controversy
that itself is not important enough, from a federalism
standpoint, to warrant federal-court oversight?â Maine
Community Health Options v. Albertsons Cos., 993 F. 3d
720, 726 (CA9 2021) (Watford, J., concurring).
Moreover, diversity jurisdiction requires not only that the
relevant parties be from different States but also that the
amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 28 U. S. C.
§1332(a). How does a federal judge determine whether
summoning a witness is itself worth $75,000? By examin-
ing the value of what the witness might say? By accounting
for travel expenses? See Maine Community Health, 993
F. 3d, at 723â724. As courts have recognized, there is âvery
little case law to guide [them] in determining whether en-
forcement of an arbitration subpoena against a third party
will enable someone to recover more than $75,000 in an ar-
bitration dispute with a different party.â Id., at 726 (Wat-
ford, J., concurring). These and other jurisdiction-related
questions do not arise if a federal judge can simply follow
Vadenâs principle for all FAA motions: Look through the
motions and determine whether there is federal jurisdiction
over the underlying substantive controversy. See 556 U. S.,
at 62â63.
Third, consider now Sections 9 and 10, the FAA sections
directly before us, along with Section 11. Section 9 gives
âthe United States court in and for the district within which
[an arbitration] award was madeâ the power to issue âan
order confirming the award.â Section 10 gives the same
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 7
BREYER, J., dissenting
court the power to âvacat[e]â the award for certain specified
reasons. And Section 11 gives that court the power to
âmodif[y] or correc[t] the award.â Where the partiesâ under-
lying dispute involves a federal question (but the parties
are not diverse), the majority holds that a party can ask a
federal court to order arbitration under Section 4, but it
cannot ask that same court to confirm, vacate, or modify the
order resulting from that arbitration under Section 9, 10, or
11. But why prohibit a federal court from considering the
results of the very arbitration it has ordered and is likely
familiar with? Why force the parties to obtain reliefâcon-
cerning arbitration of an underlying federal-question dis-
puteâfrom a state court unfamiliar with the matter?
Or suppose that a party asks a federal court to vacate an
arbitration award under Section 10 because the arbitrator
ârefus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy.â §10(a)(3). To determine at least one im-
portant aspect of diversity jurisdictionâthe amount in con-
troversyâmust the court not look to the underlying dis-
pute? The same question arises with respect to a Section
11 motion to modify an arbitral award on the ground that
it âis imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of
the controversy.â §11(c).
The majority says that these and other problems require
only that the parties bring their FAA requests to state
courts. Ante, at 15â16. But we cannot be sure that state
courts have the same powers under the FAA that federal
courts have. The FAA says nothing about state courts; it
only explicitly mentions federal courts. See §7 (âUnited
States district courtâ); §9 (âthe United States courtâ); §10
(same); §11 (same). We have never held that the FAA pro-
visions I have discussed apply in state courts, and at least
one Member of this Court has concluded that they do not
apply there. See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577
U. S. 47, 59 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). State courts
8 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Cable Connec-
tion, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1351, 190
P. 3d 586, 597 (2008) (holding that §§4, 10, and 11 apply
only in federal court); In re Beckâs Superior Hybrids, Inc.,
940 N. E. 2d 352, 362â363 (Ind. App. 2011) (same for §7);
Henderson v. Summerville Ford-Mercury Inc., 405 S. C.
440, 450, 748 S. E. 2d 221, 226 (2013) (same for §9).
Relatedly, the majority also notes, correctly, that Section
9, 10, and 11 disputes about the enforceability of arbitral
awards âtypically involve only state law.â Ante, at 6. It thus
makes sense, the majority says, that these disputes would
belong primarily in state court. See ante, at 15. But the
same can be said for Section 4 disputes about the enforcea-
bility of arbitration agreements. These, too, typically in-
volve only questions of state law. That the dispute does not
implicate federal questions thus does not explain why Con-
gress would have wanted more federal court involvement at
the Section 4 stage than during the later stages.
It may be possible to eliminate some of these problems by
using a federal-question lawsuit or Section 4 motion as a
jurisdictional anchor. If a party to an arbitration agree-
ment files a lawsuit in federal court but then is ordered to
resolve the claims in arbitration, the federal court may stay
the suit and possibly retain jurisdiction over related FAA
motions. See §3; Vaden, 556 U. S., at 65. Similarly, some
courts have held that if a federal court adjudicates a Section
4 motion to order arbitration, the court retains jurisdiction
over any subsequent, related FAA motions. See Maine
Community Health, 993 F. 3d, at 725 (Watford, J., concur-
ring); see also McCormick v. America Online, Inc., 909 F. 3d
677, 684 (CA4 2018). But, as Vaden points out, to turn ju-
risdiction over these later motions on the presence or ab-
sence of a federal lawsuit or Section 4 motion is to turn ju-
risdiction on a â âtotally artificial distinctionâ ââparticularly
when the very purpose of arbitration is to avoid litigation.
556 U. S., at 65 (quoting 1 MacNeil §9.2.3.3, at 9:21).
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 9
BREYER, J., dissenting
I relate these practical difficulties in part to illustrate a
more fundamental point. The majority has tried to split
what is, or should be, a single jurisdictional atomâa single
statute with connected parts, which parts give federal
judges the power to facilitate a single arbitration proceed-
ing from start to finish: to order arbitration; appoint an
arbitrator; summon witnesses; and confirm, vacate, or mod-
ify an arbitration award. The need for simplicity, compre-
hension, workability, and fairness all suggest that these in-
terrelated provisions should follow the same basic
jurisdictional approach, namely, as Vaden explains, the
look-through approach.
III
The majorityâs interpretation is also at odds with what
this Court has said about the purposes underlying the FAA.
We have recognized that the statute reflects a clear â âpolicy
of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments.â â Cortez Byrd Chips, 529 U. S., at 201 (quoting Mo-
ses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
460 U. S. 1, 23 (1983)); see also id., at 22 (âCongressâ clear
intent, in the Arbitration Act, [was] to move the parties to
an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possibleâ).
We have thus interpreted the FAA to avoid âunneces-
sarily complicating the law and breeding litigation from a
statute that seeks to avoid it.â Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.
v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 275 (1995). âWhy,â we asked,
âwould Congress intend a test that risks the very kind of
costs and delay through litigation . . . that Congress wrote
the Act to help the parties avoid?â Id., at 278. In other
words, the FAA is a âsphereâ in which âuniformity in and of
itself provides [a] real advantage.â Ante, at 14.
IV
The majorityâs main point is straightforward: The text of
10 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
the statute compels the result. As the majority rightly
points out, we cannot disregard the statutory text or âover-
come a clear statutory directive.â Ante, at 13 (quoting Brief
for Respondents 44). A statute that says it applies only to
âfishâ does not apply to turnips. The majority also rightly
points out that the âsave forâ language setting forth the
look-through approach appears only in Section 4, and does
not appear in any of the later sections.
That fact, however, does not produce the âclear statutory
directiveâ upon which the majority relies. Nothing in the
text prohibits us from applying Section 4âs look-through ap-
proach to the succeeding sections. The statute does not say
that Section 4âs jurisdictional rule applies only to Section 4,
or that the same look-through approach does not apply else-
where. Nor does any other section provide its own jurisdic-
tional rule that would suggest Section 4âs rule should not
apply there.
Moreover, when we consider Section 4âs text setting forth
the look-through approach, we âconsider not only the bare
meaning of the word[s] but also [their] placement and pur-
pose in the statutory scheme.â Bailey v. United States, 516
U. S. 137, 145 (1995), superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Welch v. United States, 578 U. S. 120,
133 (2016). Various aspects of the FAAâs text and structure
suggest that Section 4âs jurisdictional rule should apply
throughout. Section 5, for example, which grants the power
to appoint an arbitrator, simply refers to âthe court.â Those
words, most naturally read, refer to the same court to which
the immediately preceding sectionâSection 4ârefers: a
âUnited States district courtâ with jurisdiction as deter-
mined by the look-through approach. Requests under the
FAAâs various sections are also generally described in the
text as âapplicationsâ or âmotions.â See §4 (âapplicationâ);
§5 (same); §9 (same); §10 (same); §11 (same); see also §6;
§12 (âmotion to vacate, modify, or correctâ); §13 (âapplica-
tion to confirm, modify, or correctâ). This implies that the
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 11
BREYER, J., dissenting
requests are all constituent parts of one broader enforce-
ment proceeding, not standalone disputes meriting individ-
ual jurisdictional inquiries. See, e.g., In re Wild, 994 F. 3d
1244, 1257 (CA11 2021) (en banc) (âthe term âmotionâ has
never been commonly understood to denote a vehicle for in-
itiating a new and freestanding lawsuitâ); A Modern Dic-
tionary of the English Language 446 (1911) (âmotion in
courtâ means âan application to a court . . . to have a rule or
order made which is necessary to the progress of the ac-
tionâ).
And, more importantly, all the sections describe con-
nected components of a single matter: a federal courtâs
arbitration-related enforcement power. One can read these
sections as a single whole, with each section providing one
enforcement tool, and one sectionâSection 4âproviding
both an enforcement tool and a jurisdictional rule applica-
ble to the entire toolbox. Read this way, the FAA provides
one set of complementary mechanisms through which a fed-
eral court might facilitate a single arbitrationâbut only
when the underlying substantive controversy is one that,
jurisdictionally speaking, could be brought in a federal
court had the parties not agreed to arbitrate. There is no
language in any of the sections that states, or suggests, that
we cannot interpret the Act in this way.
In brief, the text does not prevent us from reading the
statute in a way that better reflects the statuteâs structure
and better fulfills the statuteâs basic purposes. See Allied
Bruce, 513 U. S., at 279 (adopting interpretation of FAA
that âthe statuteâs language permitsâ and that is more con-
sistent with â[t]he Actâs historyâ); Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U. S. 552, 563 (1988) (adopting outcome âthat the text of the
statute permits, and sound judicial administration coun-
selsâ).
V
The FAAâs legislative history reinforces the view of the
12 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER, J., dissenting
statute that I have just described. The Senate Report on
the bill that became the FAA refers to the FAAâs general
purposes. It makes clear Congressâ hope to avoid proce-
dural complexity. It refers to partiesâ âdesire to avoid the
delay and expense of litigation.â S. Rep. No. 536, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1924). Proponents of the bill thought it
would successfully serve that purpose because it would pro-
vide âvery simple machineryâ; âsimplify legal mattersâ; offer
âspeedyâ and âplain justiceâ; and allow âno opportunity for
technical procedure.â Joint Hearings on S. 1005 et al. be-
fore the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary,
68th Cong., 1st Sess., 16, 26, 27, 36 (1924) (hereinafter Joint
Hearings). These general purposes support a simplified ju-
risdictional rule.
The language of the House Report suggests more. It sug-
gests that the bill created a single jurisdictional procedure,
not a set of different procedures with distinct jurisdictional
rules. The Report says that the bill âprovides a procedure
in the Federal courts forâ enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)
(emphasis added). âThe procedure,â the Report continues,
âis very simple, . . . reducing technicality, delay, and ex-
pense . . . .â Ibid. (emphasis added). That singular proce-
dure, the Report explains, encompasses not only the initial
request for a federal court to order arbitration under Sec-
tion 4, but subsequent requests to vacate or modify an arbi-
tration award under Sections 10 and 11 as well. See ibid.
The principal drafter of the bill made the same point yet
more explicitly. He testified that under the FAA, âFederal
courts are given jurisdiction to enforce [arbitration] agree-
ments whenever . . . they would normally have jurisdiction
of a controversy between the parties.â Joint Hearings 34
(statement of Julius H. Cohen) (emphasis added). Immedi-
ately following, he said that âsuch enforcementâ includes
the power to appoint arbitrators under Section 5, which, of
course, lacks Section 4âs âsave forâ language. Ibid. And he
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 13
BREYER, J., dissenting
then proceeded to discuss the FAAâs other sections, all with-
out suggesting that their jurisdictional requirements were
any different. Ibid.; see also id., at 35â36.
Together, this history reinforces the interpretation of the
statute that I would adopt. It suggests that Congress in-
tended a single approach for determining jurisdiction of the
FAAâs interrelated enforcement mechanisms, not one ap-
proach for the mechanism provided in Section 4 and a dif-
ferent approach for the mechanisms provided in all other
sections.
* * *
In this dissent I hope to have provided an example of
what it means to say that we do not interpret a statuteâs
words âin a vacuum.â Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S.
169, 179 (2014). Rather, we should interpret those words
âwith reference to the statutory context, structure, history
and purpose[,] . . . not to mention common sense.â Ibid. (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Here, these considera-
tions all favor a uniform look-through approach. And the
statuteâs language permits that approach. Interpretation
of a statute must, of course, be consistent with its text. But
looking solely to the text, and with a single-minded focus on
individual words in the text, will sometimes lead to an in-
terpretation at odds with the statute as a whole. And I fear
that is what has happened in this case.
I suggest that by considering not only the text, but con-
text, structure, history, purpose, and common sense, we
would read the statute here in a different way. That way
would connect the statute more directly with the area of
law, and of human life, that it concerns. And it would allow
the statute, and the law, to work better and more simply for
those whom it is meant to serve. With respect, I dissent.
14 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER
Appendix , J., dissenting
to opinion of BREYER, J.
APPENDIX
9 U. S. C. §§4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11
â§4. Failure to arbitrate under agreement; petition to
United States court having jurisdiction for order to compel
arbitration; notice and service thereof; hearing and deter-
mination
âA party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or re-
fusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for
arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction un-
der title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject
matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five daysâ
notice in writing of such application shall be served upon
the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the
manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the fail-
ure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make
an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing
and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the
district in which the petition for an order directing such ar-
bitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement
or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in
issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in
default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty ju-
risdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue.
Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in
default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the
return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial
of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 15
BREYER
Appendix , J., dissenting
to opinion of BREYER, J.
an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the man-
ner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or
may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find
that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or
that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the pro-
ceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agree-
ment for arbitration was made in writing and that there is
a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an
order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the
arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.â
â§5. Appointment of arbitrators or umpire
âIf in the agreement provision be made for a method of
naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an um-
pire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be pro-
vided therein, or if a method be provided and any party
thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for
any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy,
then upon the application of either party to the controversy
the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbi-
trators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act
under the said agreement with the same force and effect as
if he or they had been specifically named therein; and un-
less otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration
shall be by a single arbitrator.â
â§7. Witnesses before arbitrators; fees; compelling attend-
ance
âThe arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title
or otherwise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing
any person to attend before them or any of them as a wit-
ness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any
book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed ma-
terial as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance
shall be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of
16 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER
Appendix , J., dissenting
to opinion of BREYER, J.
the United States courts. Said summons shall issue in the
name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them,
and shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of them,
and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served
in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify be-
fore the court; if any person or persons so summoned to tes-
tify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon pe-
tition the United States district court for the district in
which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting
may compel the attendance of such person or persons before
said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or per-
sons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for
securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment
for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United
States.â
â§9. Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; proce-
dure
âIf the parties in their agreement have agreed that a
judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award
made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the
court, then at any time within one year after the award is
made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so
specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon
the court must grant such an order unless the award is va-
cated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10
and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement
of the parties, then such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which
such award was made. Notice of the application shall be
served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court
shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had ap-
peared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is
a resident of the district within which the award was made,
such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his
attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion
Cite as: 596 U. S. ____ (2022) 17
BREYER
Appendix , J., dissenting
to opinion of BREYER, J.
in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be
a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be
served by the marshal of any district within which the ad-
verse party may be found in like manner as other process of
the court.â
â§10. Same; vacation; grounds; rehearing
â(a) In any of the following cases the United States court
in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order vacating the award upon the application of
any party to the arbitrationâ
â(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
or undue means;
â(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in
the arbitrators, or either of them;
â(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
â(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite
award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
â(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired,
the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
â(c) The United States district court for the district
wherein an award was made that was issued pursuant to
section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award
upon the application of a person, other than a party to the
arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the
award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly in-
consistent with the factors set forth in section 572 of title
5.â
18 BADGEROW v. WALTERS
BREYER
Appendix , J., dissenting
to opinion of BREYER, J.
â§11. Same; modification or correction; grounds; order
âIn either of the following cases the United States court
in and for the district wherein the award was made may
make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitrationâ
â(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation
of figures or an evident material mistake in the description
of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
â(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter
not submitted to them, unless it is a matter not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
â(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not
affecting the merits of the controversy.
The order may modify and correct the award, so as to effect
the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.â