Adoption of Vito

This appeal arises from the denial of a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption.2 The case concerns a child who tested positive for cocaine at the time of his birth in January, 1992, and who has lived with his foster parents (also his preadoptive parents) since he was discharged from the hospital one month after his birth. Vito has never lived with his biological mother.3 He is now eight and one-half years old.

On February 16, 1996, the Department of Social Services (department or DSS) filed a petition to dispense with parental consent for the adoption of Vito in the Probate and Family Court Department, pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3 (1998 ed.).4 In termination proceedings, a judge must assess the fitness of the parent and the adequacy of the department’s adoption plan. See G. L. c. 210, § 3 (b), (c). The probate judge concluded that the mother was unfit to parent Vito, but found that the department’s adoption plan was not in his best interest because it did not provide for significant postadoption contact with Vito’s mother *552and biological siblings.5 She denied the petition. The judge provided that, on a timely filing of a motion for reconsideration, she might reconsider the denial and enter a new judgment should the department submit a new adoption plan that provided for postadoption contact between Vito and his biological mother and siblings, including eight yearly visits with his biological mother, as long as the mother is not abusing drugs and the contact continues to be in Vito’s best interests.

The department appealed.6 The Appeals Court vacated the probate decree and directed that a decree enter allowing the department’s petition to dispense with consent. Adoption of Vito, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 355, 358-359 (1999). The Appeals Court further found the judge’s proposal for postadoption visitation was both permissible and sound, but ordered that, given the passage of time, the Probate Court should hear anew any petition for postadoption visitation filed within thirty days. Id. We granted the department’s application for further appellate review, challenging the judge’s requirement of postadoption visitation in the adoption plan and departmental involvement after the adoption.7

We vacate the judge’s order denying the petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption. The judge’s conclusion that the mother is unfit is not challenged.8 With respect to the judge’s denial of the petition based on failure to provide for postadop*553tion contact in the adoption plan, we hold that a judge may order limited postadoption contact, including visitation, between a child and a biological parent where such contact is currently in the best interests of the child. The judge has the authority to ensure that such contact in the best interests of the child is maintained during an appropriate transitional period.

Judicial exercise of equitable power to require postadoption contact is not warranted in this case, however, because there is little or no evidence of a significant, existing bond between Vito and his biological mother, and no other compelling reason for concluding that postadoption contact is currently in his best interests. Vito has formed strong, nurturing bonds with his preadoptive family; and the record supports little more than speculation that postadoption contact will be important for his adjustment years later, in adolescence. See Adoption of Greta, post 577, 589 (2000). Accordingly, we remand the case to the Probate and Family Court and direct that a decree enter granting the department’s petition to dispense with the biological mother’s consent to Vito’s adoption.

I

We summarize in some detail the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the judge. In 1990 Vito’s biological mother began using crack cocaine, which she continued to do until 1995, with occasional periods of nonuse. Prior to May, 1991, when a judge in the Boston Juvenile Court awarded temporary custody of her three oldest children to the department, see G. L. c. 119, § 24, she had been trading food stamps and using public welfare benefits to purchase crack cocaine. Her children were often left at home alone. When Vito tested positive for cocaine at birth, an abuse and neglect report concerning him was filed two days after his birth, alleging his positive cocaine screen and his mother’s failure to obtain prenatal care. See G. L. c. 119, § 51A. The report was substantiated. In February, 1992, the existing care and protection petition for Vito’s three older siblings was amended to include Vito, and he was placed in the temporary custody of the department.

Vito was discharged from the hospital one month after his birth and was placed in the home of his foster parents; his siblings had been placed in other homes. In March, 1992, the Boston Juvenile Court ordered the department to assume permanent custody of Vito and his three older siblings; the *554mother’s whereabouts were unknown to the department at that time.

From the time of his removal from his mother’s care in January, 1992, while in the hospital, until January, 1995, his biological mother visited Vito only once.9 During that ninety-minute visit, Vito responded minimally to his biological mother, withdrew from her and attached himself to his foster mother. At the end of that visit, the mother agreed to visit Vito again at the end of the month, on his first birthday, but although the foster mother and Vito arrived for the birthday visit, the mother failed to attend; she did not telephone to cancel the visit. Following the failed January, 1993, birthday visit, the biological mother made no request for a visit with héf son for the remainder of 1993. During 1994 there were no visits with Vito, and little contact between the biological mother and the department; she told the department she had relocated to Florida.

In 1995, while back in Massachusetts in prison on shoplifting charges, Vito’s mother signed a department service plan, entered a drug rehabilitation program and began visits with Vito and his siblings.10 Vito’s mother was released from prison in October, 1995. The judge found that the mother’s visits with Vito have been generally consistent since March, 1995, and that she has attended monthly supervised visits since her release. The judge found that Vito and his biological mother have “no emotional sharing” between them and remain dissociated, despite pleasant play and conversation. The judge found that Vito did not show any genuine interest in his biological siblings and did not ap*555pear to have formed any emotional attachment to his biological mother; he did not appear to be excited to see her and separated from her with no difficulties or emotional overtones. The judge nevertheless made an ultimate finding that Vito had formed “a positive relationship” with his biological mother that has developed since visitation began when she was incarcerated.11 The judge found that Vito’s mother, however, had not fully complied with the department’s service plan tasks, and concluded that Vito’s biological mother cannot now resume care and custody of Vito because “she has not secured adequate stable housing, has not adequately addressed her issues of lengthy substance abuse history and has not acquired any meaningful parenting skills training.” She also concluded that Vito’s mother’s drug abuse and resultant neglect “was severe and of a lengthy duration,” although she had improved in the last two years.

In contrast, the judge found that Vito is “fully integrated into his foster family both emotionally and ethnically.” The judge found that it was “important” to Vito to belong to his foster family “because that was the only family he had known,” and that “[t]he foster parents are invested in adopting [Vito]; they perceive him as their own son.”12 She found that Vito “has a significant attachment to his foster family,” and that separating Vito from his foster family could result in a range of negative responses, from severe depression to less severe trauma.

The judge concluded that, by clear and convincing evidence, *556Vito’s mother is currently unfit to parent him. She specifically found that the biological mother “lacks the current ability, capacity, fitness and readiness” to parent Vito. Her unavailability to Vito, she concluded, resulted in Vito’s “life-long placement with [his foster] family, to which he is now attached.” Despite the fact that the biological mother “cares deeply for and has good intentions toward the child,” however, “[g]ood intentions ... are insufficient to establish fitness to parent a child.”

The judge further determined that “racial issues may at sometime in the future” become a problem for Vito (emphasis added). She found that Vito’s relationship with his biological mother is “crucial” for his “racial and cultural development and adjustment,” that his best interests will be served by continued “significant” contact with her after any adoption, and that under the department’s adoption plan Vito would have limited or no connection to his African-American family or culture.13 She found that the department’s plan is not in Vito’s “best interest so long as it does not provide for significant ongoing contact with [his] [m]other and [biological] siblings.”

II

A

Despite numerous appellate decisions to the contrary, the department argues that there is no authority for the judge to enter an order requiring postadoption visitation in a termination proceeding, pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 3, or at least, that such an order cannot be made where there is an identified, preadoptive family and the child has no bond with the biological parent. Sixteen years ago we commented on whether “post-adoption visitation for the benefit of the child may be ordered” in connection with a decree dispensing with the need for a parent’s consent to adoption. Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 702 (1984). We said then that under the terms of G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c), “we see no reason why a judge dealing with a petition to dispense with parental consent may not evaluate ‘the plan proposed by the department’ ... in relation to all the elements *557the judge finds are in the child’s best interests, including parental visitation.”14 Id. We concluded in that case that the equitable powers of courts in this area permit a judge, in her discretion, to evaluate an adoption plan proposed by the department that apparently did not contemplate visitation by the mother, and decide whether visitation is in the child’s best interests. Id. at 702-703, citing Petition of the New Bedford Child & Family Serv. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 385 Mass. 482, 487 (1982). See G. L. c. 215, § 6 (giving Probate and Family Court general equity jurisdiction); Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 561 (1982) (“Our Probate Courts . . . [possess] inherent powers apart from statutory authorization. These powers are broad and flexible, and extend to actions necessary to afford any relief in the best interests of a person under their jurisdiction”). See also note 21, infra.

Since our 1984 decision, numerous Appeals Court decisions have expressed an understanding that judges may effect or require postadoption visitation as an outcome of termination proceedings. See, e.g., Adoption of Vito, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 349, 354-355 (1999); Adoption of Lars, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 30, 34-36 (1998); Adoption of Hugo, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 863, 865, 868, S.C., 428 Mass. 219 (1998), cert. denied sub nom. Hugo P. v. George P., 526 U.S. 1034 (1999); Adoption of Warren, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 626 n.5 (1998); Adoption of Nicole, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 259, 264 (1996); Adoption of Arthur, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 1105 (1993); Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 137 n.5, 138-139 (1990). See also Adoption of Kristin, 43 Mass. App. Ct. 915, 915-916 (1997) (assuming power of probate judge to establish mechanism for biological mother to request postadoption visitation of adoptive parents and for adoptive parents to respond); Adoption of Abigail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 199 (1986) (postadoption visitation may be included in adoption plan). That was a correct understanding of our law.15

The concurrence argues that G. L. c. 210, § 3, “does not *558expressly or by reasonable implication” grant the Probate Court judge the power to order postadoption contact, and that “[ajbsent such authority . . . this power can[not] be created by resort to general equity powers.” Post at 570. The concurrence would deny in this context the centuries-old equitable authority of courts to act in the best interests of children, even absent express or inferable statutory directives, when those children are properly under the courts’ jurisdiction, as they plainly are here. See, e.g., Gardner v. Rothman, 370 Mass. 79, 80 (1976) (general equity jurisdiction of Probate Court extends to persons and estates of infants); J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as Administered in England and America §§ 1352, 1353 (13th ed. 1886) (in case concerning child, court “acts throughout with all the anxious care and vigilance of a parent; and it allows neither the guardian nor any other person to do any act injurious to the rights or interests of the [child]”); id. at §§ 1327-1329, 1333-1334 (long-standing equitable jurisdiction over persons and property of infants flows from Crown’s general power as parens patriae to protect those who have no other lawful protector). Following the reasoning of the concurrence would effectively overturn years of precedent involving a long line of cases basing the authority of judges to order postadoption and other visitation on the Probate Court’s equitable authority. See, e.g., Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 702 (1984); Adoption of Gwendolyn, supra at 137 n.5, 138-139.16

The department acknowledges that our case law has recog*559nized that a court may utilize its equitable powers to order post-adoption contact, but, in essence, asserts that the recent legislative amendments to G. L. c. 210 amount to a legislative repudiation of the view that postadoption contact may be judicially ordered.17 The concurrence similarly argues that the amendments “further support [the] view that the Legislature did not intend that Probate Court judges order postadoption visitation.” Post at 575. We do not agree. The amendments by their terms were not aimed at overturning the centuries-old equitable authority of courts to act in the best interests of children, when those children are properly under the courts’ jurisdiction.

With the possible, narrow exception of postadoption judicial modification of voluntary contact agreements between biological parents and adoptive parents, see G. L. c. 210, § 6D, we see nothing in the relevant, amended provisions of G. L. c. 210 that erodes this long-recognized equitable authority to act in the best interests of the child. Even where biological and prospective adoptive parents do agree on postadoption contact, the Legislature provided for judicial involvement to approve the agreement. See G. L. c. 210, § 6C. It would be anomalous to conclude that such provisions were meant to eliminate entirely judicial involvement in other related contexts.18 To the contrary, various provisions of the statute mandate that the judge act in *560those best interests during termination and adoption proceedings. See Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 212 (1993). See also G. L. c. 210, § 3 (a), (b) (court may dispense with need for consent to adoption in best interests of child); id. at § 5A (court shall order removal of child from proposed adoptive home if in best interests of child); id. at § 5B (“[i]n making orders for adoption, the judge shall consider ... all factors relevant to the physical, mental and moral health of the child”); Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 863 (1999) (focus in determining post-termination visitation is on best interests of child). Our decision today is both deferential to and entirely consistent with the “essential particulars” of the statutory adoption scheme of this Commonwealth. Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 210 (1993).19

Where the 1999 legislative amendments address postadoption contact agreements between biological parents and preadoptive parents in the context of termination proceedings, they presuppose the identification of the prospective adoptive parents at the time the proceedings occur. See St. 1999, c. 3, §§ 17, 21. These statutory postadoption contact provisions do not address those circumstances when termination proceedings occur and there is as yet no preadoptive parent identified. In such circumstances the equitable authority of the judge may be especially important in safeguarding the child’s best interests. Even where preadoptive parents are identified and attempt to make an agreement with the biological parents concerning postadoption contact, an impasse may be reached between the parties, as happened in this case.20 There, the judge’s equitable intervention may also be important to move the proceedings forward toward adoption *561while simultaneously securing postadoption contact that will benefit the child and that all parties want, but on which they cannot quite come to terms. The best interests of a child should not be held hostage to the negotiating skills of adults.

A judge’s equitable power to order postadoption contact, however, is not without limit.21 See Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 788 (1999) (Lynch, L, dissenting) (“Although Probate Court judges have broad equitable powers, these powers are not infinite”). This equitable authority does not derive from the statutory adoption scheme, but it must necessarily be attentive to the policy directives inherent in that scheme, as well as to constitutional limitations on intrusions on the preroga*562lives of the adoptive family. The adoption statute contemplates, for example, that after an adoption decree, “all rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent. . . shall, except as regards marriage, incest or cohabitation, terminate between the child so adopted and his natural parents.” G. L. c. 210, § 6 (1998 ed.). This provision strongly suggests that in ordinary circumstances adoption is meant to sever most enforceable obligations involving the biological parent with the child. See Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 216 (1993) (purpose of § 6 is to protect security of child’s newly created family unit by eliminating involvement with child’s natural parents). This statutory language is not a bar to judicial orders for postadoption contact, however, because an order for postadoption contact is grounded in the over-all best interests of the child, based on emotional bonding and other circumstances of the actual personal relationship of the child and the biological parent, not in the rights of the biological parent nor the legal consequences of their natural relation. Cf. G. L. c. 210, § 3 (b), (c), § 5B. See Adoption of Warren, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 620, 626 n.5 (1998) (decision as to postadoption visitation is question more of interests of child than of rights of parent); Adoption of Abigail, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 191, 199-200 (1986) (same). See also note 16, supra.

Constitutional considerations also guide the exercise of this equitable power. Adoptive parents have the same legal rights toward their children that biological parents do. See G. L. c. 210, § 6. See also Bottoms v. Carlz, 310 Mass. 29, 33 (1941). Parental rights to raise one’s children are essential, basic rights that are constitutionally protected.22 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 233 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 3 (1979). “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,” and in most circumstances we “have respected the private realm of family life which the state *563cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). State intrusion in the rearing of children by their parents may be justified only in limited circumstances.

At a pragmatic level, unnecessary involvement of the courts in long-term, wide-ranging monitoring and enforcement of the numerous postadoption contact arrangements could result from too ready an application of the court’s equitable power to issue contact orders.23 The postadoption contact arrangements contemplated by the judge in this case were both long term and wide ranging, and necessarily would have involved the court in ongoing arrangements between the biological mother and the adopting family for many years to come. But courts are not often the best place to monitor children’s changing needs, particularly the needs of young children. What may be in Vito’s best interest at the age of five says little about his best interests at age ten or fifteen.

We also recognize the concern raised by the department and the amici that untrammeled equitable power used to impose postadoption contact might reduce the number of prospective parents willing to adopt. Any practice that potentially reduces the pool of prospective adoptive parents raises grave concerns. We note that there are mechanisms to review the adoption plan and reassess it if a particular postadoption contact requirement might be delaying adoption. See Uniform Probate Court Practices Xa (14), (15) (2000) (providing for new court hearing and possible vacating of termination decree where adoption does not occur within specified time).

Where, as here, the child has formed strong, nurturing bonds with his preadoptive family, and there is little or no evidence of a significant, existing bond with the biological parent, judicial exercise of equitable power to require postadoption contact would usually be unwarranted. On the other hand, a judicial order for postadoption contact may be warranted where the evidence readily points to significant, existing bonds between the child and a biological parent, such that a court order abruptly disrupting that relationship would run counter to the child’s best interests. See Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 783, 785-786 (1999), and cases cited. Cases warranting a postadoption contact *564order are more likely to occur where no preadoptive family has yet been identified, and where a principal, if not the only, parent-child relationship in the child’s life remains with the biological parent.24 A necessary condition is a finding, supported by the evidence, that continued contact is currently in the best interests of the child.25 Because an order of postadoption contact affects the rights of the adoptive parents to raise their children, the order should be carefully and narrowly crafted to address the circumstances giving rise to the best interests of the child.

In such cases, the judge has the equitable authority to ensure that contact in the best interests of the child is maintained during an appropriate transitional period posttermination, see Adoption of Helen, 429 Mass. 856, 863 (1999), or even postadoption. The purpose of such contact is not to strengthen the bonds *565between the child and his biological mother or father, but to assist the child as he negotiates, often at a very young age, the tortuous path from one family to another. See Youmans v. Ramos, supra at 782-783. See also Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 221, 228 (1998). Each day judges must grapple with the consequences of significant relationships that develop between young children and the adults in whose care or custody they are placed. It is for that reason that our jurisprudence has always made the interest of the child paramount. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553 (1932).

Transitional provision for posttermination or postadoption contact in the best interests of the child, however, is a far different thing from judicial meddling in the child’s and adoptive family’s life, based not on evidence of the emotional ties and current dynamics between the child and the biological parent, but on speculation concerning some hypothetical dynamic between parent and child several years hence, later in adolescence, for example. Parental and familial autonomy cannot be so lightly cast aside. In Vito’s case the probate judge apparently favored postadoption contact because she was concerned about Vito’s future racial and cultural development and adjustment, presumably based on the guardian ad litem’s testimony that transracial adoptees, generally speaking, often have adjustment problems that emerge in adolescence. The judge appears to have inappropriately relied on the guardian ad litem’s speculation as to the future need of Vito to have contact with his mother in order to secure his identity years later, in adolescence. That is a matter that is properly left to the wise guidance of Vito’s new family. Cf. Adoption of Gwendolyn, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 139 (1990) (adoptive parents will be in best position to determine, as child grows up, what visitation is in her best interests).

Looking at the evidence of the actual circumstances of Vito’s life and relationships, testimony of the guardian ad litem made clear that Vito’s monthly visits with the biological mother had little or no impact on Vito’s sense of identity.26 Rather, the judge’s findings reveal that Vito strongly identified with his pre*566adoptive family, emotionally and ethnically. In the wake of her incarceration, there was evidence that the biological mother “cares deeply for and has good intentions toward” Vito. But there was powerful evidence that there was little or no emotional bonding between them, hardly surprising where Vito has spent his entire life living with, being nurtured and loved by, and identifying with his foster family.

There was also little in the record before us to suggest that Vito’s relationship with his biological mother was likely to become important to Vito’s adolescent identity. There was evidence of some possible future significance of the relationship in the guardian ad litem’s acknowledgment that, generally, adolescence may be a time when a transracial adoptee may experience adjustment problems, and that Vito would have little connection to an African-American family or culture living with his adoptive family. Generalities about what may be in the best interests of some children, without more, cannot be the basis of judicial orders concerning postadoption contact of a particular child; the best interests of the child standard is one grounded in the particular needs and circumstances of the individual child in question. See Petition of the Dep’t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 266 (1978), quoting Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 753 (1978).

Assuming that it was proper to use racial grounds for determining Vito’s best interest, there was no evidence in the record that showed Vito would be deprived of all African-American contacts in his adolescence if regular visits with his biological mother were not mandated.27 While Vito’s foster family “currently” has no significant contacts with the African-American community, that fact says little, if anything, about *567contacts that his adoptive family might develop in the future, if this becomes important for their son. We discern no support for a determination that Vito’s relationship with his biological mother is “crucial” for his “racial and cultural development and adjustment.” Moreover, here the judge found that Vito “is a typical Latino child growing up in a Latino family . . . [and who] describe^] himself as Latino,” who was “fully integrated into his foster family both emotionally and ethnically,” and whose physical appearance was not strikingly different from his foster parents. His primary language is that of his foster family, not his biological mother. The judge found Vito “did not manifest any genuine interest in his biological siblings” and did not have an “emotional attachment” to his biological mother.

We conclude, therefore, that, although the probate judge had a statutory mandate to review the department’s adoption plan to determine whether the best interests of the child would be served by a termination decree with that plan, see G. L. c. 210, § 3 (b), (c), and although the judge had equitable authority to order post-adoption contact, including visitation, see Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 702-703 (1984), the judge’s determination that such postadoption contact was required was clearly erroneous in this case. See Adoption of Kimberly, 414 Mass. 526, 529 (1993). We recognize that judges must often make difficult choices, balancing the powerful ties that bind biological mothers to their children, however flawed their behavior to a child may have been, and the rights of children to be protected and nurtured in an often hostile world. Here, the evidence clearly revealed a strong bond to the preadoptive family, the only family Vito has ever known, and little to no attachment by him to his biological mother or his biological siblings. In such circumstances it was inappropriate to stall Vito’s adoption at the hurdle of termination proceedings, based on speculation about Vito’s need for contact with his biological mother to facilitate his adjustment later in adolescence to his racial identity.

B

The department makes the related argument that the judge cannot properly order it to amend its adoption plan to provide for postadoption contact. The department asserts that a judicial order to amend the department’s plan offends the separation of powers mandated by art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

*568The short answer to the department’s argument is that in this case the judge did not order the department to amend its plan, but merely refused to issue a termination decree under the department’s proposed plan. As noted above, in these termination proceedings the judge is statutorily obligated to assess the adoption plan proposed by the department to determine whether the best interests of the child would be served by a termination decree with that plan.28 See G. L. c. 210, § 3 (b), (c). We have already acknowledged that a judge may consider an alternative plan and may “properly order a plan different from the one proposed” by the department. Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 234 (1998). See Petition of the Dep’t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 477, 479 (1978) (court directed judge to order department to submit more detailed adoption plan). The judge may also consider a petition to amend the department’s plan to provide for rights of contact.29 See Petition of the Dep’t of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 703 (1984). Alternatively, the judge may, as she essentially did here, deny the petition with comment on the deficiencies of the plan. See G. L. c. 210, *569§ 3 (b), (c). See also Adoption of Hugo, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 863, 866 (1998) (judge has authority to approve or disapprove plan); Adoption of Stuart, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 381, 392, 394 (1995) (vacating termination decrees where no written departmental adoption plans in evidence and judge made no findings with respect to plans).

m

The department also argues that the probate judge erred in requiring its continued involvement with the biological mother or the adoptive family postadoption. The issue is not squarely before us because the judge denied the petition and did not directly order the department to continue its involvement post-adoption.30 Moreover, because we determine that no judicial requirement for postadoption contact was warranted in this case, we need not address here any departmental involvement in such contact.

For the foregoing reasons, the judge’s order denying the petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption is vacated. We remand the case to the Probate and Family Court Department and direct that a decree enter granting the department’s petition to dispense with parental consent to Vito’s adoption. Because several years have passed since judgment was entered in the trial court,31 the record is unclear as to the scope and depth of any current contact between Vito and his biological mother and siblings. The judge, in her discretion, may, but need not, determine that a further hearing would be helpful to determine whether contact between Vito and his biological mother or siblings during a circumscribed transition period currently would be in his best interests.

So ordered.