Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership Levitz Furniture Corporation, Intervenor in D.C. v. Kmart Corporation

OPINION OF THE COURT

Appellant, Kmart Corporation (“Kmart”), appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In that order, the district court permanently enjoined Kmart from constructing certain barriers and traffic control devices on a piece of its property. Appellee, the Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership (“Epstein”), holds an easement over the Kmart property. The easement is- dedicated to ingress and egress from Epstein’s landlocked parcel. The district court’s order also enjoined Kmart from removing a sign on its property that had been erected and maintained by Epstein’s tenant, Levitz Furniture Co. (“Levitz”). It held that Levitz had an implied easement or, in the alternative, an easement by estoppel, permitting the sign on the Kmart parcel. Finally, the injunction prohibited Kmart generally from future violations of the Declaration of Easements. See Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 828 F.Supp. 328 (E.D.Pa.1993).

Kmart asserts that its proposed plan to improve the disputed area by constructing traffic control devices does not interfere with the purpose of the easement. Kmart also challenges the injunction as overly restrictive and broad. We agree with the district court that Kmart’s proposed plan would substantially interfere, in some respects, with rights specifically conveyed in the Declaration of Easements, but we conclude that Epstein may not unreasonably enforce the easement to exclude all of the improvements Kmart plans. Thus we hold that the injunction as drafted by the district court is overly broad. We will, therefore, remand this case to the district court so that it may modify the injunction in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Kmart also contends that Levitz has not shown it has either an easement by implication or an easement by estoppel to maintain its sign on Kmart property. We agree. Thus, we will reverse the district court’s determination that Levitz has an easement to maintain its sign on the Kmart parcel. 1

I.

Prior to October 21, 1975, Louis W. Epstein (“Louis”) and Morris Epstein (“Morris”) owned a parcel of land on MacArthur Road in Whitehall Township, Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, as tenants in common. Levitz leased the northwestern portion of the parcel since 1962. On October 21, 1975, Morris and Louis divided the parcel. Louis acquired *765 sole ownership of the part Levitz leased and the land that lay immediately to the northwest of the Levitz parcel (“the dominant estate” or “Louis’s parcel”). Morris acquired the remainder of the land (“the servient estate” or “Morris’s parcel”). This division of the property would have land-locked Louis’s parcel but for the contemporaneous Declaration of Easements Louis and Morris executed and recorded. It established an “L-shaped” non-exclusive right-of-way across Morris’s property to secure ingress and egress from Louis’s property. The easement area is 100 feet wide at MaeArthur Road and then turns right at slightly less than a right angle to form the second leg which is 50 feet wide. The second leg leads to Louis’s property.

The Declaration states that the purpose of the easement is for “ingress, egress, and regress” to both parcels. Appellant’s Appendix (“App.”) at 112. The Declaration also states that “[n]o barriers, fences, curbs or other obstruction to the free and unhampered use of said easement area and right of way shall hereafter be permitted.” Id. It provides that maintenance expenses incurred in the upkeep of the easement, including the “painting of direction signals for the flow of traffic on said area,” will be shared by the parties. Id. at 113.

. At present, the 100-feet-wide portion of the easement is paved and access is gained from MaeArthur Road through two thirty-five-foot cuts in the curb, one for ingress and one for egress.

In 1963, before division of the original parcel, Levitz had erected and paid for a sign along MaeArthur Road, on what became the servient estate, outside the area which was to become the easement of way. The sign directs traffic to Levitz’s store which is set 518 feet from MaeArthur Road. At all times Levitz has assumed the expense of lighting the sign and paying for its maintenance. Neither the severance agreement nor the Declaration of Easements mentions the sign.

On November 4, 1992, Kmart acquired the servient estate from Morris for the purpose of erecting a shopping center that would house a number of retail establishments including a Kmart store. As part of its development plan, Kmart proposed substantial modifications to the easement area including erection of concrete barriers, painting of directional traffic lines, including an overhead sign, and erection of traffic control devices. The development plan also proposed moving the Levitz sign, which now sits adjacent to MaeArthur Road, in order to allow construction of a deceleration lane on MaeArthur Road.

The district court found that this plan would require all patrons who wish ingress to Louis’s parcel and the Levitz store to .use a right-hand lane fourteen feet wide, as the only lane from which a right-hand turn could be made. Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 334-35. Patrons exiting Louis’s parcel and the Levitz store would be confined to two lanes of the easement which then widens to four lanes. The district court also found,- under the proposed plan, that delivery trucks, so-called “eighteen wheelers,” would be forced to go outside the lane marked for entry to Levitz’s store in order to complete the right-hand turn necessary to gain access to the Levitz parking area. Id. at 336.

In December of 1992, Epstein filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County seeking injunctive relief. It claimed that Kmart’s proposed development plan violated the Declaration of Easements. Kmart removed the case to federal court and, shortly thereafter, Levitz intervened and sought in-junctive relief to prohibit removal of its - sign. Levitz and Epstein filed a motion for a pre-liminary injunction which the district court consolidated into a trial on the merits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a)(2). The district court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and permanently enjoined Kmart from erecting barriers or directional devices in the easement area. The injunction also restricted Kmart from all future violations of the Declaration. Holding that Levitz had obtained an easement over Kmart’s land both by estoppel and implication, the district court also enjoined Kmart from removing Levitz’s sign.

Kmart filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

While we will reverse factual conclusions of the district court only if they are *766 clearly erroneous, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), we exercise plenary review over the trial court’s choice and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of those precepts to the historical facts. Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir.1981). Moreover, “[t]he district court cannot, by couching a legal conclusion as a finding of fact, prevent appellate review of legal errors.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 680 F.2d 927, 931 n. 3 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982). We review the grant of a motion for a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion but, as set forth above, “factual determinations prerequisite to issuing the injunction are reviewed for clear error, and we conduct a plenary review of legal questions.” McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d Cir.1990).

When a federal court sits in diversity, it applies state law and if the state’s highest court has not spoken on the issue, the federal court must predict how it would rule if presented with the issue. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1365 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir.1990)).

III.

We begin with the access easement. Kmart contends that its proposed development plan for this area will not substantially interfere with the dominant estate’s use. Alternately, it argues that the injunction, as entered, is too broad.

A.

In the case of express easements, the terms of the conveyance determine the rights and liabilities of the parties. Hann v. Saylor, 386 Pa.Super. 248, 562 A.2d 891, 893 (1989). The express language of the agreement, unless ambiguous, controls. See Merrill v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 409 Pa. 68, 185 A.2d 573, 575 (1962). A court should construe ambiguous terms in favor of the grantee. Id. (citing Hammond v. Hammond, 258 Pa. 51, 101 A. 855 (1917)). In this case, the Declaration of Easements is clear. It describes the property precisely and states that its purpose is “ingress, egress, and regress” to and from Epstein’s landlocked parcel on which Levitz was and is a tenant. App. at 112.

“[T]he owner of land, who grants a right of way over it, conveys nothing but the right of passage and reserves all incidents of ownership not granted.” Mercantile Library Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 235 Pa. 5, 83 A. 592, 595 (1912). The owner of the servient estate may make continued use of the area the easement covers so long as the use does not “substantially interfere” with the easement’s purpose. Id.; see also Hann, 562 A.2d at 894 (“‘The owner of the servient estate may not interfere with the free and full use of the easement granted, even though the owner of the easement may have an alternative route.’ ”) (quoting 12A P.L.E. Easements § 80).

In Pennsylvania, each party to an easement “has a right to insist that the terms of the agreement be complied with, and that, so long as the easement is enjoyed, it shall remain substantially as it was at the time the right accrued, regardless of whether benefit or damage will result from a proposed change.” Piro v. Shipley, 211 Pa. 36, 60 A. 325, 329 (1905) (quotation omitted). The district court determined that both parties not only had the right to use the easement for the stated purpose, i.e. ingress, egress and regress, but that the entire easement must be kept open for that purpose. Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 338-39 (citing Hann, 562 A.2d at 894).

Two Pennsylvania cases support the district court’s conclusion by refusing to restrict use of portions of the easement even though the purpose of the easement could be fulfilled on the remaining part. In Scoppa v. Myers, 341 Pa.Super. 61, 491 A.2d 148 (1985), the plaintiffs sought a declaration of rights in a twenty-foot-wide alley. The trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to use the alley under an easement by implication but then determined that ingress and egress could be had by using only fifteen feet of the alley. After concluding that the purpose of the easement could be fulfilled by a dedication of less than the entire easement area, *767 the court required the defendants to clear only fifteen feet of the alley for plaintiffs’ use. Id. 491 A.2d at 149. The superior court reversed. It held that once the plaintiffs had established their entitlement to the entire twenty feet, a court could not restrict that entitlement to that which was necessary to accommodate the use. Id. at 150. “Although the trial court obviously attempted to achieve a compromise solution satisfactory to all parties, that solution was not consistent with applicable legal principles.” Id.

In a case involving similar principles, Kinzey v. Marolt, 288 Pa.Super. 426, 432 A.2d 234 (1981), the plaintiffs had a fifty-foot-wide easement by implication along a right-of-way that crossed the defendants’ trailer park. The plaintiffs did not develop the easement nor open it to travel, and the defendants placed trailers and power lines over it. Plaintiffs objected to the erection of barriers in the easement area. The trial court ordered the defendants to. clear only twenty-five feet of the easement because that was all that was necessary for the plaintiffs’ use as a right-of-way. Here, too, the superior court reversed. It held “[t]he [plaintiffs] ha[d] an easement by implication over the entire width of the street, [sic] and could open and improve same at anytime, even though the portion of Third Street, here in question, ha[d] never been opened or dedicated to a public use.” Id. 432 A.2d at 235-36 (citation omitted). Thus, in Pennsylvania, the fact that the purpose of an easement can be accomplished in less than the whole area dedicated to the easement does not give the servient estate the right to deny access to the unnecessary portion of the property. 2

With these principles in mind, we consider Kmart’s proposed modifications to the easement area. They include demarcation of three ingress and four egress lanes to and from MacArthur Road and a median area with painted arrows indicating - which lane accommodates traffic in a particular direction. Only one ingress and two egress lanes would accommodate traffic proceeding to the part of the “L” shaped easement which leads to the Levitz property. The district court observed that this plan would reduce the 100-foot-wide easement previously wholly dedicated to “ingress, egress, and regress” into one ingress lane of fourteen feet. Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 339. This, the district court concluded, was a “substantial interference” with the easement. Id.

' Kmart contends that even under the unmodified easement, Levitz customers use only the fourteen-foot lane because it is the closest lane to the right turn that patrons 'ultimately have to make to travel the second part of the “L.” Kmart argues that any other use would be unsafe because cars would have to dart across a 100-foot entrance way and drive diagonally, across other lanes of traffic, to the portion of the easement that enters- the Epstein property. Kmart suggests the district court erred when it determined that Kmart’s traffic lane assignments substantially, interfered with use and enjoyment of the easement because Levitz patrons never engaged in a use other than that suggested by the improvements. Kmart says the only modification .to use of the easement Levitz patrons would encounter would be their restriction to the right lane for right turn's. 3

*768 This argument by Kmart reduces to a contention- that its plan would adequately meet both Epstein’s and Levitz’s needs. This contention does not lack common-sense appeal, but the district court’s findings of fact on this question are decisive under Scoppa and Kinzey. Its finding that the proposed additions would limit the use of the easement for those seeking ingress to the. Epstein property to one fourteen-foot lane is not clearly erroneous. Under Scoppa and Kin-zey, the easement cannot be so restricted. In addition, the erection of curbing within the easement area that Kmart proposes for a median would not only eliminate that area of the easement from its dedicated purpose, as the district court recognized, but would directly contravene an express provision of the Declaration. 4 See Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 339, 341. The district court also found that Kmart’s proposal would severely hamper furniture supply trucks from entering the property Levitz occupies and uses for a retail furniture store. Id.' at 336. This fact alone is enough to establish substantial interference with the easement. When taken together, the changes Kmart proposes would seriously deprive Levitz and the dominant tenement of the free and unhampered use of the easement area granted by the Declaration.

Kmart cites no Pennsylvania cases that would permit relocation or redefinition of the terms of an easement provided only that the modified easement is adequate for its original purpose. It relies on cases from other jurisdictions that preclude unreasonable restriction of the land’s use by the servient tenement so long as the modification of the easement will not interfere with its purpose. In RFS, Inc. v. Cohen, 772 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.Ct.App.1989), the plaintiff, a shopping center, had a general right of ingress over the defendant’s adjoining shopping center. The easement included a restriction which said “[gjrantor shall not erect any barriers or other obstructions which will in any manner impair ingress and egress over the Grantor Premises.” Id. at 715. The trial court enjoined the defendant’s attempt to establish traffic control devices on its own property. The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed. The court stated that “so long as the dominant estate receives all of the uses that it bargained for and is entitled to under the easement, equity will not restrict the free and full utilization of the servient estate.” Id. at 716-17. In reaching its result, it held that the interests, of the respective parties had to be balanced. Id. at 718.

Kmart cites RFS for the proposition that a court should balance the adequacy of a limitation on an express easement against the purpose of the easement. Pennsylvania rejected that proposition in Scoppa and Kin-zey. In both those cases, the trial court’s use of the balancing test RFS endorses was rejected. Thus, RFS is inconsistent with existing Pennsylvania law. It is also distinguishable. The easement in RFS was a general grant rather than a precisely defined easement over a clearly demarcated property.

Kmart argues, however, if it can be demonstrated that the Epstein property would not be harmed at all by the additions, it should be permitted to make the alterations. Therefore, Kmart contends the district court erred in not considering its contentions that its proposed changes would funnel additional traffic to the Epstein property with the potential to increase usage. These additions included a “jug-handle” off of MacArthur Road which would permit individuals traveling north on MacArthur to turn directly into the property, an act currently not possible because of a median. This argument too runs into the holdings of Scoppa and Kinzey — that a court may not reduce the size of an express easement merely because its purpose can be otherwise fulfilled. We think the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not authorize a court of equity to enforce a subsequent owner of a servient tenement’s unilateral redefinition of the terms and constraints of a bargained-for easement over the objections of the owner of the dominant tenement. When the subsequent owner purchases the property, he is charged with full *769 knowledge of the express terms of a recorded easement, and the owner of the dominant tenement is entitled to enforcement as written without risking limitation as a result of a court’s determination that the rights can be otherwise served. Kmart purchased the land in 1992 with full knowledge of the terms of the easement. We assume it paid a fair price for the land as encumbered by the easement.

Presumably, the Epsteins knew what they wanted when they bargained for an easement 100 feet wide.' To accept Kmart’s argument would frustrate their intent and make the rights and obligations of those who claim under them indefinite and uncertain. Kmart got what it bargained for, and it points to no Pennsylvania cases that indicate the scope of the easement can be reduced on the basis of relative need.

Alternatively, Kmart contends that the traffic control plan it seeks to install on the land is required by Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) regulations if it is to develop its land for commercial purposes. As Levitz and Epstein observe, Kmart has not argued that only the particular piece of land subject to the easement can be used for ingress and regress to its own property. 5 Kmart owns a total of 855 feet of property fronting on MacArthur Road. It has not presented evidence showing that PennDOT will approve no plan for access to its property except one that would interfere with Epstein’s declared rights.

In summary, the district court correctly determined that Kmart’s plan effectively limited the area for ingress to the Epstein property to fourteen feet. Its plan also calls for construction of an island protected by a curb in the center of the easement and encroachment into the easement by other curbing. In those sections, no ingress or egress could take place. This would constitute at least a partial infringement and, under the decisions in Scoppa and Kinzey, such limitation of an express easement is impermissible. Moreover, the easement specifically prohibits curbing in the easement area. The district court did not err in concluding that the Kmart proposal would constitute a “substantial interference” with Epstein’s rights. Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 339, 345.

Kmart’s contention that the logical effect of the district court’s decision is to dedicate a 100-foot-wide strip of its land to the exclusive service of Levitz’s property fares no better. To the contrary, in holding that the proposed plan would create a substantial interference, the district court merely, concluded that the easement prohibited Kmart from .interfering with the intent of the grantor and grantee of the easement to permit the owners of Epstein’s dominant parcel to use part of what is now Kmart property for access to and from the Epstein property. Its conclusion, consistent with the express language of the grant, seems to us required by Pennsylvania law.

B.

That conclusion, however, does not settle the whole issue. Kmart also argues the district court proceeded improperly in reaching its decision to grant the injunction or, in the alternative, that the injunction is overbroad in its scope.

1.

Whatever the strict substantive law that controls this case, Kmart contends the district court, as a court of equity, should not have granted an injunction without balancing the hardships that its enforcement would have on the servient estate. Generally, when an individual willfully infringes on the easement of another, a court sitting in equity does not consider the hardship on the defendant that will result from an injunction enforcing a clear right. In Gey v. Beck, 390 Pa.Super. 317, 568 A.2d 672 (1990), the court stated,

[W]hereas in a case involving an unintentional violation of a restriction on land the chancellor must engage in a balancing of the harm that results from the violation against the harm that would result from issuing an injunction to remedy the violation, in a case involving an intentional violation application of a balancing test is improper.

*770 Id. 568 A.2d at 678; see also Peters v. Davis, 426 Pa. 231, 231 A.2d 748, 752 (1967) (balancing inappropriate where defendant “takes a chance” by violating covenant).

Kmart says its plan could not be an intentional violation because the preparation of the plan itself created no actual violation or real interference. This misses the point. Where a defendant acts unintentionally and incurs expense without knowledge that his conduct is wrong, the equities of the situation may be considered. The equities are different, however, when one is about to go ahead with actions it knows are contrary to an easement. Kmart had full knowledge of the easement when it purchased the property, yet it prepared plans that would, if carried out, substantially interfere with the easement. If Epstein and Levitz had waited, their litigating positions might have been worse. The fact that Kmart was stopped in the planning state from intentionally violating the easement rather than in commission of the act does not invoke the policy in favor of a balancing of the equities that arises in the case of unintentional encroachment.

Because the rights of the parties under the easement are unclear, Kmart also contends willful infringement has not been shown. This argument again misses the point of the balancing test. A court balances equities to avoid harsh results that strict application of law could inflict on a blameless party. The policies underlying cases that permit a defendant otherwise devoid of culpability to show undue harm from strict legal enforcement are not present here. Pennsylvania courts do not balance equities when the defendant “takes a chance” that its action will be permissible under an existing easement or restriction, as Kmart has done here. See Peters, 231 A.2d at 752 (quoting Ventresca v. Ventresca, 182 Pa.Super. 248, 126 A.2d 515, 518 (1956)). The district court did not err in refusing to consider the burden it put on Kmart by requiring it to comply with the express terms of the easement.

2.

Kmart also argues that the injunction is overbroad or vague because of its restrictions on the use of its own property. The injunction states in relevant part,

Defendant Kmart Corporation is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from constructing or erecting any barriers, fences, curbs, or other obstructions within the easement area_ Defendant is permanently enjoined from erecting any traffic signals and signs, and painting lane demarcation lines, in the easement area, that would direct traffic in respect to Plaintiffs property. Defendant is permanently enjoined from otherwise violating any of the terms of the Declaration of Easements.

Defendant Kmart Corporation is permanently enjoined from removing or relocating Levitz’s freestanding sign located on Defendant’s property or otherwise interfering with or diminishing the implied easement for the Levitz sign.

Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 345. Kmart contends this injunction is overly broad because it limits its ability to use directional signs to direct traffic flow and so provide safe ingress to its property. It points out that the Declaration of Easements itself contemplates the painting of traffic direction signals. Paragraph (d) of the Declaration states in relevant part,

[T]he reasonable and necessary costs of maintaining the easement area ... including ... painting of direction signals for the flow of traffic on said area ... shall be borne equally by Louis W. Epstein and Morris Epstein, their successors and assigns.

App. at 113. Thus, Kmart concludes, it is the injunction, not the Declaration of Easements, that forever restricts the servient estate owner from painting traffic demarcation lines. Epstein and Levitz respond that any demarcation that prohibits traffic from using the easement to enter the Epstein property would violate the easement.

On this point, we agree with Kmart. The injunction does appear to prevent any orderly restriction controlling incoming Lev-itz traffic in the interest of the safety and convenience of the users of both the dominant and the servient tenements. We think this is too broad. For example, the easement should not stop Kmart from prohibiting *771 Levitz customers, or anyone else, from engaging in unsafe driving within the easement. Thus, we think Kmart should be able to erect a speed limit sign. Likewise, for safety reasons, lane demarcations would be appropriate so long as Kmart is restrained from designing the lanes in a manner that would direct traffic away from Epstein’s property or .limit .Levitz customers to a single lane. Equal opportunities for access to both properties must be provided. Modifications that do not materially affect access to or from the Epstein property from the easement, do not violate its terms. Accordingly, the injunction is overly broad in prohibiting all traffic flow devices. It should be modified to restrain only those which would limit or prohibit customers seeking access to the Epstein property and the Levitz store from using the easement to the same extent as customers seeking access to Kmart’s premises.

Kmart’s additional objection to the district court’s vague “catch-all” command that “Defendant is permanently enjoined from otherwise violating any of the terms of the Declaration of Easements,” is also well taken. Epstein, 828 F.Supp. at 845. Kmart contends that under the “catch-all” provision, it can no longer effectively use the land for fear of violating the provisions of the Declaration of Easements. We stated in Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir.1974), “injunctions, which carry possible contempt penalties for their violation must be tailored to remédy the specific harms shown rather than to ‘enjoin “all possible breaches of the law.” ’ ” Id. at 1370 (quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 410, 65 S.Ct. 373, 385, 89 L.Ed. 322 (1945)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) provides in relevant part that “[ejvery order granting an injunction ... shall be specific in terms; [and] shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained.” . Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d). The party constrained is entitled to “fair and precisely drawn notice of what the injunction actually prohibits” because serious consequences may befall those who do not comply with court orders. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 444, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1126, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974); see also International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia- Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S.Ct. 201, 208, 19 L.Ed.2d 236 (1967). We recognize that “an injunction may be framed to bar future violations that are likely to occur.” Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1022 (9th Cir.1985) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059, 106 S.Ct. 802, 88 L.Ed.2d 778 (1986). Broad, non-specific language that merely enjoins a party to obey the law or comply with an agreement, however, does not give the restrained party fair notice of what conduct will risk contempt. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., 824. F.2d 665, 669 (8th Cird987).

In this case, the district court’s injunction against “otherwise” violating any term of the easement does, not- give Kmart fair notice as to all the conduct that is enjoined. Both parties have a right to use the roadway, and any improvements Kmart undertakes must meet PennDOT safety concerns. Kmart should be given fair notice of those improvements it can make and those that the Declaration prohibits. Absent further specification of the acts that would constitute a violation of the Declaration, we think this injunction threatens contempt for undetermined violations. Under the injunction’s specific terms, acts such as the erection of barriers and other directional devices that materially restrict the flow of traffic to and from the Epstein property for long periods are prohibited. We think the Declaration of Easements requires no more. A blanket prohibition against future interference with an agreement that has been interpreted in only one respect does not give Kmart notice of all other conduct that is potentially unlawful. This conclusion is particularly apropos in the case of a joint non-exclusive easement. Kmart and Epstein both have rights in this portion of the land. Considering the contentious nature of the parties to this case, future conflict is foreseeable. One party should not be allowed to hold the club of contempt forever over the other’s head.

*772 We will remand this case to the district court with directions to strike from its injunction the catch-all provision enjoining all further encroachments. On remand,, the district court should also modify the injunction to permit Kmart to propose a plan that includes traffic demarcation lines and devices that do not substantially and unreasonably interfere with ingress and egress over the easement area.

IV.

Turning to the Levitz sign, we note that Levitz erected it in 1963 just north of the easement area on the MacArthur Road frontage of what is now Kmart’s property. Under the initial terms of a 1962 lease between the Epstein brothers and Levitz, however, Levitz covenanted that it would not, “without the consent of the Lessor in writing ... [ejrect or install any exterior signs.” App. at 131— 32. While the district court found that Lev-itz initially erected the sign with the oral consent or permission of the lessor, Levitz apparently never complied with the lease by obtaining written consent. Epstein,