Karl Rove & Company v. Richard Thornburgh, Richard Thornburgh, Cross-Appellee, and Raymond P. Dimuzio, Defendant-Cross-Appellee

This appeal arises from a diversity jurisdiction suit on a contractual debt. Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee Richard Thornburgh (“Thornburgh”) asks us to reverse the district court’s judgment holding him personally liable for a contractual obligation incurred during his campaign for the U.S. Senate by the “Thornburgh for Senate Committee” (the “Committee”), Thorn-burgh’s unincorporated principal campaign committee. He argues that the district court erred by finding that — personally and through his general agent, Murray Dickman (“Dickman”) — Thornburgh authorized, assented to, or ratified the Committee’s contract on which the court held him personally liable. The Republican National Committee (“RNC”), appearing as amicus curiae, argues that the district court ignored notions of federalism, and thus applied an incorrect legal standard, in determining Thornburgh’s liability for the Committee’s debt.

In response, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Ap-pellant, Karl Rove & Company (“Rove & Company”) cross appeals the district court’s dismissal of Rove & Company’s claim against Defendant/Cross-Appellee, Ray Dimuzio (“Dimuzio”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rove & Company argues in the alternative that if Thornburgh is not liable for the Committee’s contract, then Dimuzio is, thus vesting the court with personal jurisdiction. As we conclude that the district court properly interpreted and applied the correct legal standard, we affirm the district court’s judgment holding Thornburgh liable and dismissing Rove & Company’s claim against Dimuzio for lack of personal jurisdiction.

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Baokground

The facts material to the outcome of this appeal are relatively straightforward and, for the most part, undisputed. As the district court in its opinion has already provided an accurate and detailed chronology of the events leading up to this litigation, 1 we limit our reiteration to those facts directly relevant to the issues raised on appeal.

In 1991, Thornburgh ran in a special election to fill the U.S. Senate seat that had become vacant when Pennsylvania Senator John Heinz was killed in an aircraft accident. Dickman, a longtime Thornburgh aide, agreed to the offer of Rove & Company to provide direct mail fundraising services for the campaign, upon Thornburgh’s entering into the U.S. Senate race and establishment of a principal campaign committee. The in *1277 stant dispute arose when, after Thornburgh lost the election, the then-insolvent Committee failed to pay Rove & Company for services that it had provided pursuant to a contract with the Committee, dated September 18, 1991 (the “September Contract”).

There is no longer any dispute regarding the existence or quantum of the Committee’s liability to Rove & Company on the September Contract. On appeal, therefore, the only issue is whether Thornburgh personally has joint and several liability with the Cranmittee for the debt to Rove & Company. If not, then we must consider whether Dimuzio is personally hable for the debt, and thus subject to the jurisdiction of the court.

The September Contract was between Rove & Company and the Committee, not Thornburgh. That agreement contained a signature line for both parties and identified “Murray Diekman” as the proposed signatory for the Committee. 2 Rove signed the contract and forwarded it to Bob Mason (“Mason”), the Financial Director of the Committee, who, in turn, delivered it to Dick-man. But neither Diekman nor anyone else ever signed the document for the Committee. The district court found nonetheless that Rove & Company and the Committee thereafter conducted business according to the terms of the September Contract. 3 There is no evidence in the record, however, that Thornburgh ever saw this agreement or knew of its terms and conditions.

Diekman is a longtime Thornburgh aide, who, according to the district court, was widely known to be Thornburgh’s spokesman. 4 Karl Rove (“Rove”), the president of Rove & Company, initiated the contact with Diekman when Rove learned that Thorn-burgh was interested in running in the special election to select Heinz’ successor. Rove contacted Diekman because Rove was aware of Dickman’s association -with Thornburgh and knew that Diekman was the person who had been in primary control of Thornburgh’s previous campaigns.

True to form, Diekman also played a prominent role during this senatorial campaign. He took part in the Committee’s decision to hire Michele Davis (“Davis”) as campaign manager, a position characterized as the chief executive officer of the Committee. Diekman was the primary point of contact between the Committee and Thornburgh; Diekman was also one of the persons involved in the Committee’s decisions to hire Rove & Company, then whether to pay Rove & Company, and, if so, when to pay Rove & Company.

Diekman conducted the initial negotiations with Rove & Company on behalf of the Committee and, in the early stages of the campaign, delivered much of the material that Rove & Company needed to conduct the direct mail campaign. 5 For example, in response to Rove’s request, Diekman obtained and supplied Thornburgh’s own fist of political donors, a collection of Thornburgh’s speeches, personal letters, previous campaign materials, and an exemplar of Thornburgh’s signature. Diekman was also the person who instructed Rove that Thornburgh wanted the letterhead on all solicitation letters to read “Dick Thornburgh,” not “Richard Thorn-burgh.” In his discussions with Rove, however, Diekman never expressly represented himself as an agent for either Thornburgh or the Committee.

Thornburgh’s direct interactions with Rove and with Rove & Company were more limit *1278 ed than Dickman’s. In fact, the district court found that Rove’s only personal contact with Thornburgh occurred on September 23 or 24, 1991, when Rove accidentally ran into Thornburgh in an airport. 6 Rove stated that he identified himself to Thornburgh as the person running the direct mail fundraising campaign, and that Thornburgh responded by telling Rove that he was doing a good job and to keep up the good work. At no time, however, was Rove or anyone else told by Thornburgh that he intended to be personally liable to Rove & Company for the September Contract or any other debt incurred with regard to the services provided by Rove & Company.

Thornburgh denied that he knew whom the Committee had retained to provide direct mail fundraising services. He did acknowledge, however, that he was aware that the Committee had contracted to have such services provided and that the Committee was being charged for these services. Neither did Thornburgh object to the Committee’s decision to purchase direct mail fundraising services; in fact, he testified that: “I assisted the [Cjommittee in whatever way that I could in helping them to raise money through a direct mail effort” and “I cooperated with [the Committee] and facilitated with them and facilitated their efforts to see that the contract [for direct mail services] went forward.”

In support of those fundraising efforts, Thornburgh authorized the Committee to use his signature on the solicitation letters; he made available his political donors’ list; and, he reviewed and edited the content and language of several fundraising letters. Thorn-burgh testified that he inspected the letters for accuracy to “protect his reputation.” Although Thornburgh did not review each such letter, the district court found that there was very little variation in these fundraising letters, and that “once Thornburgh had approved the content and language of a given story or statement attributed to him, there would be no need for him to review subsequent letters reincorporating the same substance.” 7 Finally, Thornburgh admitted that he had the authority, if he desired, to stop completely all direct mail fundraising efforts on his behalf at any time.

Thornburgh also testified regarding his knowledge of and interactions with the Committee. On his statement of candidacy, Thornburgh designated the Committee as his only “principal campaign committee.” He also approved Dimuzio as treasurer of the Committee.

Thornburgh testified, however, that he did not know who was on the Committee, did not select or approve its members, and did not know who had authority to act for the Committee. He further testified that he was not familiar with the inner workings of the Committee, was not involved in the management of Committee finances, did not know how the Committee spent its funds, and played no part in the Committee’s selection of vendors in general or Rove & Company in particular.

In light of the fact that Thornburgh is a “very experienced and intelligent politician with intimate knowledge of the inner workings of political campaigns,” the district court found that Thornburgh’s testimony regarding his attenuation from the Committee lacked credibility. 8 The district court commented that “there is no way a man of his intellect— a man who was entrusted with the governorship of his home state and who served as Attorney General for his nation — did not have control of the organization running his campaign either directly or through persons in his confidence and of his choosing.” 9 The district court found more credible the testimony of Mason, who had stated that Thorn-burgh was “ultimately in control” of the campaign. 10

In all, Rove & Company completed 28 separate projects, mailed 695,094 letters, and raised over $750,000, netting $425,000 for the Thornburgh campaign. Among those totals, 11,440 solicitation letters were mailed to Texas residents, 306 of whom responded and contributed a total of $83,034. All of the *1279 money received by the Committee was used exclusively to fund Thornburgh’s campaign for the Senate. Of Rove’s total billings to the Committee, $169,732.48 went unpaid, excluding interest and attorneys’ fees.

B. PkoCeduRAl HistoRY

Rove & Company filed the instant suit in federal district court against Thornburgh, Dimuzio, and the Committee, seeking recovery for breach of contract, quantum meruit, fraud, and theft of services. A bench trial was held on April 1 and 2,1993. On June 17, 1993, the district court dismissed Rove & Company’s claim against Dimuzio for lack of personal jurisdiction, but held Thornburgh and the Committee jointly and severally liable for breach of contract. Having found liability under this breach of contract, the district court did not address Rove & Company’s other theories of liability.

Thornburgh — but not the Committee— timely filed a notice of appeal. Thornburgh complains to us that the district court erred in holding him hable based on the finding that he, personally and through his general agent, Diekman, authorized, assented to, or ratified the September Contract between Rove & Company and the Committee. In particular, Thornburgh challenges the district court’s conclusions that he assented to the September Contract and that Diekman was his general agent, vested with authority to enter into contracts on behalf of Thorn-burgh personally.

Not unexpectedly, Rove & Company responds that the district court got it right. Guarding against the eventuality that we might reverse the district court, however, Rove & Company filed a cross appeal in the alternative, urging that the district court’s dismissal of the claim against Dimuzio for lack of jurisdiction in personam was error, and reiterating the claim that Dimuzio, as the designated treasurer of the Committee, is personally liable on the September Contract. Dimuzio not only asks us to dismiss Rove & Company’s cross appeal but to impose sanctions as well, arguing that Rove’s crpss appeal is frivolous and inadequately briefed.

II

ANALYSIS

This is truly a case in which procedure imitates substance. Rove & Company is a corporation created under the laws of Texas. The district court properly found that it had jurisdiction over the Committee because the Committee purposely availed itself of the services of this Texas corporation, which would perform a material part of its contractual obligations from and within Texas. 11 Likewise,' if either Thornburgh or Dimuzio is held liable for the September Contract — either as a result of such ¡person’s or persons’ conduct or that of an agent — for availing himself of the Texas Corporation’s services, then the court will have personal jurisdiction over such person or persons too as a result of this conduct. 12 Accordingly, we first consider who, if anyone, might be personally liable for the September Contract between. Rove & Company and the Committee.

A. The Legal FRAMEWORK of This Dispute

We have never before been called upon to consider the extent to which — or under what circumstances — a candidate for federal office, or the treasurer of such a candidate’s unincorporated principal campaign ' committee, may be held personally liable for a contractual debt incurred by such a committee. Accordingly, we must determine which jurisdiction’s body of substantive law governs such situations, then apply that law to the facts of this ease.

1. Applicable Substantive Law

The district court applied substantive state law in concluding that Thornburgh was liable for the Committee’s debts.. Thornburgh argues that state law is inapposite, as Congress, by enacting the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”), 13 preempted the application of state law by immunizing candidates for federal office from personal liability. In its amicus role, the RNC argues that because the resolution of this dispute will *1280 have a significant impact on important federal interests, federal common law, not state law, should govern. We address each argument, in turn.

a. FECA Preemption

For the first time on appeal, Thorn-burgh contends that by enacting FECA, Congress has preempted the field, thereby barring the application of state law to all situations involving the liability of candidates for federal office for the debts of their principal campaign committees. “We will ordinarily consider an argument advanced for the first time on appeal only if the issue is a purely legal one and if consideration of the argument is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice.” 14 In light of the importance of clarifying the extent to which candidates for federal office may be held personally liable for the debts of their campaign committees, the legal nature of that issue, the thorough briefing given the issue by both parties; and the extensive interest that has been evidenced in the outcome of this case, we have elected in this exceptional case to exercise our' broad discretion by reversing our ordinary practice and considering Thornburgh’s preemption argument. Our extraordinary decision to do so here should not be mistaken as any relaxation of our virtually universal practice of refusing to address matters raised for the first time on appeal.

To bolster his argument that FECA expressly preempts state law, Thornburgh relies on 2 U.S.C. § 453: “[T]he provisions of this Act, and the rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to federal office.” Thornburgh insists that here Congress expressly stated its intent that federal law preempt state law, 15 so that the court’s sole task is to “ ‘identify the domain expressly preempted.’” 16

Although Thornburgh attempts to stretch § 453 far enough to create a preemptive bar to applying state law to hold federal candidates personally liable, we cannot read FECA as extending that far. First, a “strong presumption” exists against preemption, 17 and “courts have given section 453 a narrow preemptive effect in light of its legislative history.” 18 In addition, nowhere in the text of FECA or accompanying regulations is the personal liability of a candidate addressed. Finally, the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) has opined that state law supplies the answer to the question who may be held hable for campaign committee debts. 19 Accordingly, in light of the FEC’s view, the strong presumption against preemption, the historically narrow reading of *1281 § 453, and FECA’s silence on the issue of candidate liability, we conclude that Thorn-burgh’s argument for express preemption must fail. 20

Thornburgh also claims conflict preemption, i.e., that state law cannot be enforced if it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of a federal purpose 21 — one of which under FECA is, according to Thorn-burgh, to separate a federal candidate from the raising and disbursing of funds for his campaign. The primary purpose of FECA, however, is to regulate campaign contributions and expenditures in order to eliminate pernicious influence — actual or perceived— over candidates by those who contribute large sums, 22 not to prevent candidates from spending their own money to get themselves elected. In fact, FECA merely requires that candidates reveal how much of their own money they spend; it does not keep a candidate from spending his own money on his own campaign for federal office or limit the amount that he may spend. We therefore reject Thornburgh’s second preemption contention that the application of state law in this case obstructs FECA’s purposes, thereby creating conflict preemption.

b. Federal Common Law & Other States’ Laws

To govern the liability of candidates for federal office for the contractual debts of their principal campaign committees, the RNC entreats us to abandon state law in favor of what, in essence, would amount to a federal common law. The RNC argues that such a radical approach is necessary because the application of state law to the facts of this case would jeopardize two vital and related federal interests: (1) attracting candidates to seek federal elective office, and (2) ensuring the vigor of the entire federal electoral process itself. As federalism imparts to all states a duty not to interfere with preeminent federal policy, the RNC entreats, we should interpret state law in a manner that will least affect these federal interests.

The RNC contends that citizens will be discouraged from seeking federal office if, as candidates, they can be held liable under state law for the debts incurred by their campaign committees. As this ease illustrates, the RNC continues, modern campaigns involve significant amounts of money and require a wide range of services that often must be procured from numerous vendors scattered throughout the country. Consequently, deduces the RNC, if each state’s law is applied to determine whether a candidate for federal office is liable for debts incurred in that state by his campaign committee, then the candidate will be exposed to a “nightmarish specter” of liability, and will run the risk of being haled into court in any state to answer under each state’s substantive law.

The RNC also maintains that the application of each state’s law to determine the liability of a candidate for federal office will harm the entire election process. The RNC posits that applying each state’s law could result in more cautious and less informative campaigning, as the fear of personal liability might make candidates reluctant to take advantage of the various methods and media available to communicate their message. The RNC perceives these policy concerns to be somewhat analogous to those that prompted the development of the doctrine of official immunity and thus asks us to look by analogy to immunity jurisprudence in fashioning a federal common law rule to apply today.

The RNC does not go so far as to advocate a rule that would immunize candidates from all liability: Rather, the RNC urges that candidates be held liable only in circumstances “[wjhere a candidate expressly and intentionally (even if unwisely) assents to *1282 personal liability.” The RNC argues that this standard dovetails neatly with the common law of agency as applied by some states, which, according to the RNC, provides that neither the candidate nor campaign officials will be held personally liable for campaign debts except insofar as such debts are personally and specifically authorized by the individual in question. 23

Although mindful of the concerns raised by the RNC, we decline its invitation either to abandon the established law of Texas or Pennsylvania in favor of another state’s law or to fabricate from the whole cloth a new and entirely untested federal common law. 24 We are not convinced that candidates for federal office are so imperiled by the application of state law to determine their liability for their committees’ debts as to warrant either such extreme measure. 25

A candidate for federal office already has at least two methods by which he could protect himself from personal liability for the contracts entered into by his principal campaign committee. First, he could incorporate his campaign committee. 26 If the committee were incorporated, then the candidate— whether or not he is a shareholder — is shielded from personal liability by the corporate entity, 27 assuming, of course, that he takes no personal action that creates liability apart from the corporation’s. Second, a candidate could include in all contracts entered into by his principal campaign committee a provision expressly stipulating that the contracting party may look only to the committee and its assets for compensation, 28 thereby eschewing the candidate’s personal liability, either directly or indirectly.

The test of time, we believe, confirms that these options are sufficient to protect candidates. Independent of the briefs filed with this court, our research has revealed remarkably few cases in which vendors have sought to hold candidates, or the officers of campaign committees for that matter, liable for the debts of the committee. We find this particularly noteworthy in light of the significant number of elections held periodically and the huge sums spent in such campaigns. We speculate that those few vendors who do not insist on payment in full in advance simply assume the risk of nonpayment, especially from losing candidates, lest such vendors acquire an undesired reputation within the political industry. Also, we gather that some *1283 losing candidates, looking ahead to possible future campaigns, seek to avoid an equally unsavory reputation in that industry by paying the financial obligations incurred by their campaign committees. Thus, there is a dearth of caselaw on the subject. 29

We are not convinced that any of the traditional reasons for abandoning settled law is present here. Applying state law has not heretofore proved to be significantly unworkable or inequitable. Courts have not abandoned this approach; neither have the circumstances surrounding the liability of candidates generally so changed of late as to rob this approach of its past relevance or justification. 30 Although the RNC argues that the application of state law to determine a candidate’s liability exposes him to a “nightmarish” specter of liability and lawsuits, these precise concerns were raised in dissent and rejected by the majority when the question was considered by the Tennessee Court of Appeals more than thirty-five years ago:

It is now a matter of general knowledge that a state-wide race for public office, either in a primary or general election, requires the expenditure of many, many thousands of dollars through many different hands for many different purposes.... Obviously, the candidate himself cannot supervise all of these many activities and many others not mentioned above, though he knows and intends that they will be done for him in behalf of his candidacy. In my humble opinion it would not be in the public interest to saddle upon every candidate for state-wide office a potential liability of so many thousands of dollars and the possibility of multiple claims against him with such limited opportunity to protect and indemnify himself against such liability. 31

Finally, we remain cognizant of the salient fact that this case is before us on diversity jurisdiction. We therefore sit as an Erie court, relegated to applying the applicable state law to the facts before us; federalism instructs us that it is not our place within the constitutional firmament to conjure up a new legal paradigm to replace one already fashioned by our learned colleagues in the state judiciary, or to supplant their considered judgment with that from another state. 32 Accordingly, contrary to the RNC’s exhortation to spin new gold out of old straw, we discern this case to burden us with a far more modest, albeit equally difficult, task: to apply faithfully and “federalistically” the appropriate state law to the facts of this dispute. This, of course, requires that we next determine which state’s laws to apply.

2. Choice of Law

All parties concede that if state law is applicable, only the laws of Texas or Pennsylvania could govern this case. All parties also recognize that under such circumstances the outcome of this appeal will be the same regardless of which of those two states’ laws we apply. 33 This is because both Texas and Pennsylvania, like the majority of the several states that have considered the issue, have applied by analogy the common law rule governing the liability of a member of an unincorporated nonprofit association to determine the liability of a candidate or a campaign committee official for conventional obligations incurred by that candidate’s unincorporated campaign committee. Accordingly, like the district court, we will decide this *1284 appeal based on the common law as interpreted by jurisdictions, such as Texas and Pennsylvania, that still follow that rule.

3. The Applicable Law

a. The Law of Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations

As noted, the common law has neither applied nor created a separate legal regime to resolve disputes concerning the liability of persons affiliated with unincorporated political campaign committees; rather, such disputes have been adjudicated by analogical extension of the law of unincorporated nonprofit associations. 34 That kind of assoeiation typically includes such entities as churches, labor unions, and social clubs. 35

Pursuant to this law, an individual is not liable for the debts of the association merely because of his status as a member or officer of the association. 36 Rather, principles of the law of agency are applied to the particular facts on a case by ease basis to decide whether the individual in question is liable. 37 Fundamentally, a member is personally responsible for a contract entered into by the nonprofit association only if— viewing him as though he were a principal and the association were his agent — that member authorized, assented to, or ratified the contract in question. 38 Both Texas and *1285 Pennsylvania have long embraced this rule. 39 In searching for the correct result it is important to remember at all times that this standard differs from the one that governs the liability of members of unincorporated associations organized for profit or to conduct a business, which standard determines liability of members under principles of partnership law, rather than the law of agency. 40

b. The Rationale for Holding Members of Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations Liable for Contracts Entered into by the Association

At common law it was necessary to hold certain members of an unincorporated association personally liable for the association’s contracts to protect third parties with whom the unincorporated association dealt. This was because an unincorporated association was not recognized as a juridical entity and thus could not be held liable for contracts entered into in its name. 41 Consequently, when a member contracted for services on behalf of an unincorporated nonprofit association, the common law treated that member as though he had represented himself to be the agent of a nonexistent principal. Under the law of agency, such a putative agent was and is held hable for the contract entered into on behalf of the nonexistent principal. 42

In the modern era, Texas, 43 Pennsylvania, 44 and many other states, 45 have enacted *1286 statutes permitting unincorporated associations to sue and be sued. In many of these “entity” states, third parties who contract with unincorporated nonprofit associations may now pursue a cause of action against the assets of the association itself. In such jurisdictions, therefore, a member of an association who enters into a contract on behalf of the association is not contracting for a nonexistent principal. One could argue, therefore, that it is no longer necessary or even appropriate for the laws of these jurisdictions to permit third parties to sue individually the members of an association for the contract debts incurred by the association in its own name. The argument would go as follows: The third party is no longer being misled or deceived about a nonexistent principal; such a party is contracting with a disclosed, juridical entity, the assets of which can be reached to satisfy any debt that the association may owe.

As appealing and logical as that argument might appear, however, that is not the way the law has developed. The courts of the states that have adopted statutes permitting suit against unincorporated associations have not altered or supplanted the preexisting common law rule governing the personal liability of association members. 46 The courts of both Pennsylvania and Texas have continued to hew to this line. 47

c. Problems With Applying the Law of Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations to Political Campaign Committees

Not surprisingly, borrowing from the law of unincorporated nonprofit associations to resolve disputes involving unincorporated campaign committees has presented some practical difficulties. Churches and social club.s often have bylaws or other instruments of governance that outline how the particular organization is going to be operated. For example, such documents typically describe the formalities by which one may become a member of the organization, or by which the association may enter into contracts with a third party. 48 As a result, many such associations maintain membership rosters or attendance records of group gatherings and meetings; and frequently, prior to committing the association to a contract with a third party, poll the membership to ascertain whether a consensus exists in support of the contemplated action. By sampling the membership, the association thus determines the number, and often the identity, of those members who assent to the undertaking.

Political campaign committees typically are not organized and operated in this manner because they are usually formed for limited purposes and short durations. The typical political campaign committee does not have bylaws; does not create or maintain a “membership” roster (assuming that “membership” is even a proper concept in the context *1287 of a political campaign committee); and does not consult its “members” every time the committee incurs a contractual obligation. Accordingly, as the instant case illustrates, the law of unincorporated nonprofit associations can be less than ideally suited to determine precisely who may be held accountable for the contractual debts incurred by an unincorporated campaign committee. Nonetheless, it is our task to resolve the instant controversy based on this body of law.

B. Liability of ThoRnburgh for the September Contract With the Committee

There is no dispute that Rove & Company and the Committee were the only nominate parties to the September Contract; both the language of the instrument and the intent of all parties are clear. As the district court properly concluded, and the parties do not contest on appeal, the Committee is liable for all amounts owed Rove & Company under that agreement.

Again, the only issue before us is whether — in addition to the Committee — Thorn-burgh, or in the alternative, Dimuzio, is jointly and severally liable with the Committee for its contractual debt. To answer this question, we must ascertain whether either man personally, or through his agent, authorized, assented to, or ratified the September Contract.

In holding Thornburgh liable, the district court found that he had assented to the September Contract. On appeal, Thorn-burgh proffers two arguments why this conclusion was wrong. He first argues that he was never a member of the Committee and, he contends, only “members” or officers of the Committee can assent to, authorize, or ratify Committee contracts. Second, Thorn-burgh asserts that, even if he were deemed to be a “member” of the Committee or otherwise had the capacity to incur personal liability for the Committee’s debts, he did nothing that could rise to the level of an assent to this agreement. We address each argument in turn.

1. Thornburgh’s Capacity to Assent

The district court found that “the law provides for personal liability if a member or officer or candidate authorizes, assents to, or ratifies a committee transaction.” 49 Thorn-burgh challenges this statement of the law, claiming that under the law governing unincorporated nonprofit associations only “members” or “officers” of the association have the legal capacity to incur personal liability for its debts.

Again, state law answers the question, “who may be held responsible for the debts of an unincorporated political campaign committee?” 50 In decisions addressing the liability of individuals for the debts of such committees, state courts have frequently recited the governing legal standard in terms of the actions of “officers” or “members” or both. 51 We do not read these cases, however, to exclude the capacity of the candidate qua candidate — by his own acts — to become liable for the debts of his designated principal campaign committee. To the contrary, *1288 many of these cases implicitly recognize that candidates have such capacity.

In Bloom v. Vauclain, 52 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court drew no distinction among candidates, members, and officers in its discussion of the rule governing the liability of individuals for the debts of campaign committees:.

The principles of law governing the responsibility of candidates and officers of such committees have been before the courts, and in all eases we have adhered to the rule laid down for voluntary associations. The mere fact that one is a candidate, an officer, or a member of a political organization does not, of itself, establish his liability, personally or otherwise, for debts incurred by that organization...-. But those who make a contract, not forbidden by law, are personally liable, and all are included in such liability who assented to the undertaking. 53

Likewise, in Progress Printing Corp. v. Jane Byrne Political Committee, 54 Hunt v. Davis, 55 and W.H. Brewton & Sons, Inc. v. Kennedy, 56 state courts discussed the potential personal liability of the candidate in a manner reflective of the fact that those courts drew no distinction among the respective capacities of the candidate, a member, and an officer of the committee, to incur liability for a campaign committee’s debts. 57

In fact, we have uncovered only one other case in which the question of a candidate’s capacity to assent to a contract of his campaign committee was even raised. 58 The opinion in that case is unclear whether the committee in question was the candidate’s principal campaign committee; and we are aware of no decision in which a court has held in favor of a candidate based on a finding that he lacked the capacity to incur liability for his principal campaign committee’s debts.

Thornburgh offers no legal foundation to support his conclusionary assertion that courts should fashion a rule that would insulate the candidate (but not the members and officers of his committee) from personal liability for the debts incurred by the candidate’s principal campaign committee. Query whether any reasonable explanation even exists, given that such a rule would appear to defy both logic and equity. To hold that candidates do not have capacity to incur lia *1289 bility for the debts of their principal campaign committees but that members and officers do could very well lead to perverse and anomalous results: Campaign committee officers and members could incur personal liability for campaign committee debts by assenting to or ratifying such debts but the candidate, for whose election the officers and members labor, could not. Although we, recognize that Congress has constructed a somewhat analogous — and anomalous 59 — legal regime to shield candidates from liability for violations of FECA, absent express direction from that branch, we decline to extend further such an apparently inequitable rule.

As the district court concluded that a candidate qua candidate does have the capacity to incur personal liability, the court was not required to make — and thus did not make — a specific ruling whether Thornburgh was a “member” of the Committee. We agree with the district court’s conclusion of law as to a candidate’s capacity to incur liability, but we also are satisfied that, as a matter of fact, Thornburgh was a “member” of the Committee. At the very least, Thornburgh’s active participation in the Committee’s activities es-tops him from denying membership in the Committee.

The record contains no Committee membership roster or list, a fact we do not find particularly surprising in light of the nature of political campaign committees. Although the Indiana legislature enacted a provision specifically stating that a candidate' is an “ex officio member” of his own campaign committee, 60 neither Congress nor Pennsylvania or Texas lawmakers have been so accommodating. 61 Neither are we aware of any other such legislation. 62 Finding little guidance from the Committee’s documents or applicable state statutes, we next examine state common law to determine whether Thornburgh was a member of his own principal campaign Committee. 63 Under both Texas and Pennsylvania law, an “unincorporated association” is defined generally as “a body of individuals acting together for the prosecution of a common enterprise.” 64 As such entities typically are loosely organized, written formalities are not required for member *1290 ship; a person joins an association when— either expressly or tacitly — he is accepted as, and agrees to become, a member. 65 The intent of both parties, the putative member and the association, is what governs. 66 Whether a person is a member of an association is a question of fact. 67

Thornburgh testified conclusion-ally that he was not a member of the Committee. Circumstantial evidence, however, may be considered to determine whether a person acted in a manner evincing membership. 68 In the instant case, we are satisfied that such evidence compels the conclusion that both Thornburgh and the Committee contemplated his membership.

The Committee was formed for the sole purpose of promoting Thornburgh’s senatorial candidacy during Pennsylvania’s 1991 special election — obviously an objective shared by Thornburgh himself. As Thornburgh and the Committee shared this common goal, the only open question remaining is what was the intent of each party, i.e., did Thornburgh intend to associate voluntarily with the Committee and did the Committee approve of his affiliation, either expressly or implicitly. Based on the record before us, we believe that the evidence strongly supports affirmative answers to both questions. 69

We note initially that a candidate is not necessarily a member of any committee established to promote his election. We are aware of two instances — and there are likely more — in which candidates were completely uninvolved with, and in one case even opposed to, the efforts of committees ostensibly organized to support their candidacy for federal office. 70 In both cases, however, the candidates made clear that they had no intention of affiliating with the committees. 71 This, however, is not such a ease.

The instant record is replete with evidence that Thornburgh and the Committee voluntarily chose to associate with one another. Thornburgh designated the Committee as his one and only “principal” campaign committee. By doing so, Thornburgh expressly sanctioned the Committee as the only organization authorized to receive and expend contributions on his behalf. 72 He campaigned extensively in concert with employees of the Committee; spoke almost daily with Committee employees who were supporting his *1291 candidacy; and actively facilitated contracts entered into by the Committee (as noted, for example, Thornburgh reviewed and approved several vignettes appearing in fundraising letters for the September Contract, and facilitated its performance by providing a signature exemplar and his personal mailing lists). And — in the words of Mason — Thornburgh was “ultimately in control” of the entire campaign, including all activities undertaken by the Committee. For any reasonable finder of fact, these would establish Thornburgh’s membership in the Committee beyond cavil.

Even absent a finding that Thorn-burgh’s activities with the Committee were sufficient to evince his intent to affiliate with that organization as a “member,” based on these same interactions Thornburgh would have to be estopped from now denying his membership in the Committee. “[A] person may be estopped from denying membership in an association, particularly where there has been active participation in its activities.”