In re C.S.

{¶ 1} Forty years after the Supreme Court’s watershed ruling in In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, we address important questions concerning the scope of a juvenile’s right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding and the waiver of that right. We hold that the juvenile’s right to counsel is a right that he may waive, subject to certain conditions.

Relevant Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, C.S., was brought before the Juvenile Division of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas on August 9, 2005. At that time, he was almost 14 years old.

A. The Incidents

{¶ 3} C.S.’s appearance in court was for purposes of two cases. The first, No. A2005-0616, charged C.S. with two counts of grand theft, felonies of the fourth degree if committed by an adult. The second, No. A2004-0329, alleged that C.S. had violated conditions of his probation, which had been imposed in an earlier, unrelated assault case.

*269{¶ 4} The facts of the theft case are largely undisputed; C.S. and one of his friends waived their rights to an attorney and made admissions to the police. Those admissions included statements that they had stolen two cars and had used them to traverse three central Ohio counties while committing various criminal acts from August 3, 2005, through August 7, 2005. Indeed, the magistrate hearing the case initially termed the boys’ activities “a regular crime spree.” The crime spree allegedly included the theft of the cars and the destruction of one, the repeated burglarizing of a trailer (stealing electronic equipment and a firearm from it), the procurement and use of alcohol and cocaine-laced marijuana, engaging in sexual relations with an adult woman, and cruelty to animals (shooting a cow and a horse multiple times).

B. The Hearing

{¶ 5} At some point prior to an initial hearing held on August 9, 2005, C.S. and his mother received the common pleas court’s notice and order to appear. The document, entitled “Order to Appear and Explanation of Rights,” sets forth seven pages of information.

{¶ 6} Included on the first page of the document is a section captioned “Your Right to an Attorney.” That section clearly states that “[y]ou have the right to be represented by an attorney at all stages of this proceeding” and that an attorney will be appointed if “you cannot afford an attorney and you qualify under State guidelines.”

{¶ 7} The document further states, “You should contact the Clerk’s Office seven (7) days in advance of your scheduled hearing and the Clerk will advise you how to apply for a Court-appointed attorney.” Given that C.S. does not appear to have been taken into custody until August 7 or August 8 and that his hearing was held on August 9, he could not have complied with that notice provision.

{¶ 8} On the page that follows, after a section that sets forth “Your Rights in Court,” the papers contain a section entitled “Waiver of Attorney.” That section states, “The undersigned have read the instructions concerning our right to an attorney and the right to a Court-appointed attorney, if applicable. Knowing and understanding these rights, we hereby waive our right to be represented by an attorney or Court-appointed attorney. We further understand that we can be represented by an attorney in the future simply by advising the Court of our intention to do so.” Ms. S. and C.S. signed the lines designated for “parent” and “juvenile” in that section.

{¶ 9} At the hearing, the magistrate stated in open court that he had “two sets of rights papers” — an apparent reference to the notice to appear and its explanation of rights. The magistrate verified that C.S. had received the papers, read *270them, and understood the rights set forth on them and that C.S. and his mother had signed the papers.

{¶ 10} The magistrate also inquired of C.S. and his mother as follows:

{¶ 11} “THE COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to be represented by an attorney at today’s hearing?

{¶ 12} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 13} “THE COURT: If you cannot afford an attorney and you qualify under state guidelines, I will appoint an attorney to represent you. Do you understand that?

{¶ 14} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 15} “THE COURT: Do you wish to go forward with today’s hearing without an attorney?

{¶ 16} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 17} “THE COURT: Ms. S., do you agree with C.S.’s decision today to go forward without an attorney?

{¶ 18} “MS. S.: Yes, sir.”

{¶ 19} The magistrate then explained the charges against appellant, including the degree of the offenses charged. After each offense was stated, the magistrate asked C.S. whether he understood the charge. Each time, C.S. answered that he did.

{¶ 20} After each affirmative response, the magistrate asked whether C.S. admitted or denied the charge. C.S. admitted every charge. The magistrate then continued:

{¶ 21} “THE COURT: If you admit these charges today, C.S., that’s basically the same as pleading guilty. Do you understand that?

{¶ 22} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 23} “THE COURT: As a result then we would not have an adjudicatory hearing or trial in either of these eases. Do you understand that?

{¶ 24} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 25} “THE COURT: Instead we would proceed directly to disposition, that is, for me to decide what punishment or conditions if any that should be imposed upon you. Do you understand that?

{¶ 26} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 27} “THE COURT: By entering that plea you will be — well, first of all, that disposition in your case in A2005-0616 could include a commitment to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum period of six months or *271twelve months and a maximum period not to exceed age twenty-one. Do you understand that?

{¶ 28} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 29} “THE COURT: Do you understand what the Ohio Department of Youth Services is?

{¶ 30} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 31} “THE COURT: What is it?

{¶ 32} “C.S.: Juvenile prison, sir.

{¶ 33} “THE COURT: That’s correct. By entering that plea of admit you will be waiving or giving up certain Constitutionally guaranteed rights that you would otherwise enjoy. Among the rights that you will be giving up is the right to remain silent. Do you understand that?

{¶ 34} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 35} “THE COURT: You will also be giving up the right to call witnesses and to present evidence in your defense. Do you understand that?

{¶ 36} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 37} “THE COURT: And you’ll be giving up the right to question and to cross-examine prosecution witnesses. Do you understand that?

{¶ 38} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 39} “THE COURT: Ordinarily, C.S., the State of Ohio would be required to prove these cases against you beyond a reasonable doubt. If you enter a plea of admit, however, the State of Ohio will not have to prove anything at all. Do you understand that?

{¶ 40} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 41} “THE COURT: Have there been any promises or threats of any sort to cause you to enter these pleas?

{¶ 42} “C.S.: No, sir.

{¶ 43} “THE COURT: Ms. S., do you agree with C.S.’s decision today to enter pleas of admission to these charges?

{¶ 44} “MS. S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 45} “THE COURT: Then, C.S., I’ll accept the pleas of admission. Is there any statement about this situation that you wish to make?

{¶ 46} “C.S.: No, sir.

{¶ 47} “THE COURT: Have you talked with your mother since you got arrested?

{¶ 48} “C.S.: No, sir.

*272{¶ 49} “THE COURT: Ms. S., did you have an opportunity to read the police report?

{¶ 50} “MS. S.: No, sir.

{¶ 51} “THE COURT: I think it’s safe to say, Ms. S. and C.S. * * * — it’s safe to assume that there will be more * * * felony charges coming. I — I don’t know when. It’ll — it’s going to be in the jurisdiction of Perry County. They’ll transfer those cases up here so we’ll deal with them, but in terms of the filing the complaints, it’ll be the Perry County Prosecutor that has to file those complaints. But we’ll cross that bridge when we come to it. I just wanted you to know that because of the burglaries, the firearm thefts, the discharging of the firearm, animal cruelty, underage consumption, drug — felony drug possession charges— what else? What am I missing? That’s probably it. Underage alcohol, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, burglary, animal cruelty, theft of a firearm. That pretty much covers it, doesn’t it?

{¶ 52} “C.S.: Yes sir. B and E, sir.

{¶ 53} “THE COURT: And the B and E. Well, burglary. It’ll be a burglary because it’s a home. Did you do — oh, well, the trailer, was it — someone living in that trailer too?

{¶ 54} “C.S.: It — it was a camper, sir.

{¶ 55} “THE COURT: Okay. So that’d probably be a B and E so you’d get a B and E and a burglary. So all together, once those all get filed, you’re probably looking at another three years on top of that once you add all those together. So that — that’ll be coming at some time, Ms. S. A regular crime spree. Steals two cars. Basically totals them both. Shoots a cow. Shoots a horse. Steals a gun. Breaks into a house. Smokes dope. Has sex with an adult woman. Alcohol. Cocaine. Hope it was worth it. Ms. S., is there anything that you wish to say?

{¶ 56} “MS. S.: No, sir.

{¶ 57} “THE COURT: Do you know what I think, C.S., is the biggest injustice in this whole situation? Do you know?

{¶ 58} “C.S.: No, sir.

{¶ 59} “THE COURT: Well, I’ll tell you what I think is the biggest injustice in the whole situation. The biggest injustice * * * is that I can only give you a year in prison. Based on what you’ve done over the past week, you ought to stay in prison until you’re twenty-one years of age in my opinion, but I can’t do that. To me, that’s wrong. That’s a disservice to every other taxpaying, law-abiding citizen of the state of Ohio that I can’t lock you up [until you turn] twenty-one based on what you’ve been doing for the past week. The biggest injustice in this case is that I can only give you a year in prison. * * * [T]he way this commitment works is I’m going to commit you to [DYS] today for a minimum of a *273year. Okay. But at the end of that year, however, that doesn’t mean you automatically get out. The end of that year means simply that your case goes before the review authority to decide whether or not you should get out on parole. They don’t have to let you out. So based on the nature of the offense, based on the opinion of our probation director * * * and based on your conduct in [DYS], it’s entirely possible that you will do more than a year. But the only thing that I can guarantee that you’ll do is a year. * * * So you’re lboking at another two and a half years on top of that once those charges are filed by Perry County. C.S., based upon your pleas of admission and the facts contained in the report in A2004-0329, I’ll adjudicate you a probation violator as alleged in the motion. I’ll order that you be released unsuccessfully in that — in that and all other cases. I’ll order that you be released from probation unsuccessfully in all cases. Do you understand that?

{¶ 60} “C.S.: Yes, sir.

{¶ 61} “THE COURT: In A2005-0616, based upon your pleas of admission and the facts contained in the report, I’ll adjudicate you delinquent on both counts. * * * On both counts, I’ll order you committed to the custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum period of six months and a maximum period not to exceed your twenty-first birthday. I’ll order that those two counts run consecutive to each other for an initial minimum commitment of twelve months. And * * * the Department of Youth Services is to ensure that [C.S.’s older brother] and C.S. are not in the same facility. I know that was your plan. Your plan was that they be in — you were — you were anxious to be arrested on these felonies so that you could go to [DYS] and be with your brother again. You’re going to [DYS] but I’ll ensure you’re not in the same facility.”

{¶ 62} C.S. and his mother were informed of their right to object to the magistrate’s decision, see Juv.R. 40, and acknowledged receipt of the magistrate’s decision. They waived objections and consented to the magistrate’s decision.

{¶ 63} After the trial court accepted the magistrate’s decision, C.S. appealed on various grounds. One of those claims is pertinent here. C.S. argued that the trial court violated his rights to counsel and due process as those rights are conferred by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections 10 and 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, R.C. 2151.32, and Juv.R. 4 and 29.

{¶ 64} After the court of appeals rejected that claim of error, we accepted C.S.’s discretionary appeal, In re C.S., 111 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2006-Ohio-5083, 854 N.E.2d 1090, to address two propositions of law. First, we address the meaning and effect of the portion of R.C. 2151.352 that states, “Counsel must be provided for a child not represented by the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian,” whether the right to counsel conferred on a juvenile can be waived, and, if so, what *274constitutes a valid waiver. Second, we decided whether strict compliance with Juv.R. 29 is required or whether substantial compliance is sufficient.

Analysis

{¶ 65} Our analysis here must be placed in the context of the juvenile courts, which occupy a unique place in our legal system.

{¶ 66} Juvenile courts are legislative creations, see In re Agler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 72, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808, “rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus juris,” Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 554, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. The juvenile courts were premised on profoundly different assumptions and goals than a criminal court, United States v. Johnson (C.A.D.C.1994), 28 F.3d 151, 157 (Wald, J., dissenting), and eschewed traditional, objective criminal standards and retributive notions of justice. Instead, a new civil adjudication scheme arose, with a focus on the state’s role as parens patriae and the vision that the courts would protect the wayward child from “evil influences,” “save” him from criminal prosecution, and provide him social and rehabilitative services. In re T.R. (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 15, 556 N.E.2d 439; Children’s Home of Marion Cty. v. Fetter (1914), 90 Ohio St. 110, 127, 106 N.E. 761; Ex parte Januszewski (C.C.Ohio 1911), 196 F. 123, 127.

{¶ 67} Not surprisingly then, the juvenile courts adopted proceedings that were less formal and more inquisitorial than adversarial, In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d at 15, 556 N.E .2d 439, and a new lexicon that denoted differences between the two court systems, cf. State v. Hanning (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (noting that “delinquency” does not equate to “criminal” and that “respondents” are not “defendants”). As one Ohio court explained, “Delinquency has not been declared a crime in Ohio, and the Ohio juvenile act is neither criminal nor penal in its nature, but is an administrative police regulation of a corrective character; and while the commission of the crime may set the machinery of the juvenile court in motion[,] the accused was not tried in that court for his crime but for incorrigibility.” State v. Joiner (C.P.1917), 28 Ohio Dec. 199, 20 Ohio N.P.(N.S.) 313, 319, 1917 WL 1173, *2, citing Ex parte Januszewski, 196 F. at 127-128.

{¶ 68} Considered “a monument to the enlightened conviction that wayward boys may become good men,” In re Agler (1969), 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 71, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808, juvenile courts were lauded as “ ‘one of the most significant advances in the administration of justice since the Magna Carta.’ ” Cox v. Turley (C.A.6, 1974), 506 F.2d 1347, 1354, quoting Roscoe Pound, Guide for Juvenile Court Judges (1957) 127. They were widely left to operate without legal oversight for the first half of the 20th century. See, e.g., Mark R. Fondacaro, Christopher Sloggin, and Traci Cross, Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science (2006), 57 Hastings L.J. 955, *275956. But with time, much of the beneficence that underlay the genesis of juvenile courts eroded. And with that erosion came increased constitutional oversight.

{¶ 69} By midcentury, it was clear that the juvenile courts not only had the authority to impose significant penalties but that they frequently did so. Amid increasing disaffection with juvenile courts and some of their judges during the 1960s and 1970s, see, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania (1971), 403 U.S. 528, 534, 543-544, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (plurality opinion), came increasing recognition of due process rights and constitutional scrutiny of police action.

{¶ 70} By that era, the Supreme Court recognized that a juvenile could “receive[] the worst of both worlds” in the juvenile court system by being provided “neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.” Kent, 383 U.S. at 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In a series of cases, the court addressed that concern.

{¶ 71} Although the court had recognized a due process interest in juvenile court proceedings as early as 1948, see Haley v. Ohio (1948), 332 U.S. 596, 601, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224, the understanding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied to juvenile proceedings because of the juvenile’s liberty interests was more fully developed in Kent (recognizing that “the admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness” and holding that a juvenile is entitled to a hearing on the issue of whether juvenile court jurisdiction should be waived before being released to a criminal court for prosecution), and crystallized in In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.

{¶ 72} Gault approvingly quoted the report of the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) 86-86, which recommended that counsel be appointed to juveniles “ ‘as a matter of course’ ” and observed that “ ‘[t]he most informal and well-intentioned of judicial proceedings are technical; few adults without legal training can influence or even understand them.’ ” 387 U.S. at 38-39, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, fn. 65. The court held that a juvenile and his parents must be informed of certain rights, including the juvenile’s right to be represented by counsel and to have counsel appointed if his family cannot afford an attorney, the right not to be forced to incriminate himself, the right to written notice of the specific charges against him, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 31-56, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. Soon thereafter, the court also recognized that the Due Process Clause required the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the charges against a juvenile. In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 367-368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.

{¶ 73} In the wake of Gault and its progeny, we also found that “numerous constitutional safeguards normally reserved for criminal prosecutions are equally *276applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings,” State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 26, and overruled prior decisions that held to the contrary, see In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d at 76, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808.

{¶ 74} As a result of those cases, juveniles secured more of the rights afforded to adults, and juvenile court proceedings became more formal. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d at 89, 728 N.E.2d 1059. Although some suggest that those changes, and the revisions to the juvenile delinquency laws themselves, indicate a criminalization of juvenile law, see, e.g., In re Anderson (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 63, 66, 748 N.E.2d 67, fn. 2, we have found, see, e.g., Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d at 89-90, 728 N.E.2d 1059, that the General Assembly has adhered to the core tenets of the juvenile system even as it has made substantive changes to the Juvenile Code in a get-tough response to increasing juvenile caseloads, recidivism, and the realization that the harms suffered by victims are not dependent upon the age of the perpetrator. Schall v. Martin (1984), 467 U.S. 253, 264-265, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207; Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 536, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346.

{¶ 75} Despite the inherent tension in the juvenile court system between the goals of juvenile rehabilitation and protection of society, the Supreme Court has suggested that the system should remain. “[0]ur decisions in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities. * * * That the system has fallen short of the high expectations of its sponsors [however] in no way detracts from the broad social benefits sought or from those benefits that can survive constitutional scrutiny.” Breed, 421 U.S. at 528-529, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346. Contemporary juvenile courts thus remain “ ‘an uneasy partnership of law and social work.’ ” In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d at 73, 48 O.O.2d 85, 249 N.E.2d 808, quoting Whitlatch, The Juvenile Court (1967), 18 W.Res.L.Rev. 1239, 1244-1245. We, too, abide by the principles that underlie the founding of the juvenile courts, but we do so with pragmatism and an understanding of modern realities.

{¶ 76} For example, although we often characterize juvenile proceedings as civil rather than criminal, Cope v. Campbell (1964), 175 Ohio St. 475, 26 O.O.2d 88, 196 N.E.2d 457, paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 25, we recognize that “[w]hatever their label, juvenile delinquency laws feature inherently criminal aspects that we cannot ignore,” id. at ¶ 26, citing Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d at 65-66, 748 N.E.2d 67. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 23-25 and 50, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (noting the term “delinquent” offers only slightly less stigma than the term “criminal” and that a “commitment” is an incarceration regardless of what it is labeled); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365-366, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (“civil labels and *277good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts”). “[Jjuvenile delinquency laws feature inherently criminal aspects,” and the state’s goals in prosecuting a criminal action and in adjudicating a juvenile delinquency case are the same: “to vindicate a vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.” (Emphasis sic.) Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 26.

{¶ 77} Given the state’s valid interests in enforcing its criminal laws against juveniles and, in at least some cases, in requesting that the juvenile court impose significant penalties in their dispositions, we must also remain cognizant of the nature of the juvenile’s right to representation by counsel.

{¶ 78} In declaring that the juvenile facing commitment to an institution has a right to counsel “ ‘at every step in the proceedings against him,’ ” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, quoting Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, the Supreme Court reinforced its belief that the appointment of counsel for a juvenile is not a mere formality or “a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement”; it is a venerable right at the core of the administration of justice and due process. Kent, 383 U.S. at 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.

{¶ 79} Indeed, it was the understanding of the right to due process that drove the court’s holdings in Kent, Gault, and Winship. Those cases make clear that the right to counsel in a juvenile case flows to the juvenile through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment. Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. And although modern juvenile proceedings share some indicia of the criminal courts, juvenile proceedings are not considered criminal prosecutions for purposes of Sixth Amendment analyses. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647.

{¶ 80} Because the juvenile’s right to counsel is predicated on due process, it is malleable rather than rigid. As the Supreme Court has explained, “For all its consequence, ‘due process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined. * * * [D]ue process ‘is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ Cafeteria [& Restaurant ] Workers [Union] v. McElroy [1961], 367 U.S. 886, 895 [81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230]. Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what ‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.” Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., North Carolina (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640.

*278{¶ 81} The flexibility of due process lies in its scope after it has been determined that some process is due, and due process doctrine recognizes that “not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.” Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484. A court’s task is to ascertain what process is due in a given case, McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, while being true to the core concept of due process in a juvenile case — to ensure orderliness and fairness. We proceed in our analysis with that understanding at the fore.

{¶ 82} The fact that the right to counsel in a juvenile case arises from due process does not diminish its importance. A juvenile typically lacks sufficient maturity and good judgment to make good decisions consistently and sufficiently foresee the consequences of his actions. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005), 543 U.S. 551, 569-570, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1; Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 102, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, “[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.” (Footnote omitted.) Gault, 387 U.S. at 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527.

{¶ 83} Given the importance of counsel in juvenile proceedings, the General Assembly codified a juvenile’s constitutional right to appointed counsel in the wake of Gault. Indeed, through R.C. 2151.352, the legislature provided a statutory right to appointed counsel that goes beyond constitutional requirements. In re Williams, 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 15, citing State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 46,