Valdez v. Cockrell

Janie Cockrell, Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division (“the Director”), appeals the district court’s grant of the writ of habeas corpus to the petitioner, Alberto Valdez (“Valdez”). We hold that a full and fair hearing is not a prerequisite to the application of 28 U.S.C. § 2254’s deferential scheme. Therefore, we vacate and remand to the district court for an assessment of Valdez’s claims applying the standards set forth in § 2254(d) and (e)(1). With respect to the Director’s appeal of the district court’s evidentiary rulings, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

I

A Texas jury found Valdez guilty of the capital murder of Police Sergeant J.D. Bock in May 1988.1 Following the sentencing phase, the jury answered the two special issue questions in the affirmative, finding that the act had been deliberate and that Valdez posed a future danger to society.2 The court then imposed a sen*943tence of death. Valdez’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc), cert. denied, Valdez v. Texas, 495 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 2575, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (mem.), 495 U.S. 963, 110 S.Ct. 2575, 109 L.Ed.2d 757 (1990).

Valdez filed a state habeas petition, raising twenty-four legal issues. The state habeas court held a two-day hearing in November of 1990. At this hearing, Valdez presented evidence of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.3 Valdez’s theory was that if his trial counsel had investigated his background, they would have found significant evidence that Valdez was mentally retarded, suffered abuse as a child at the hands of his father, and had behaved as a model prisoner during his previous periods of incarceration. Valdez argued that had the jury heard such evidence there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have answered one of the special questions differently, sparing his life. After the presentation of witnesses, the hearing recessed to allow both parties to secure additional witnesses if necessary.

On a motion by the parties to close the proceeding, the state habeas court held a final hearing on the proposed findings. During that hearing, counsel for Valdez and the State presented lengthy arguments as to those findings. One month later, the state habeas court issued findings of fact and law denying Valdez relief.

The state habeas court held that Valdez’s trial counsel was not deficient and that any deficiency did not prejudice Valdez. The habeas court found that the trial counsel’s lack of investigation into Valdez’s background was reasonable. School records, admitted into evidence during the hearing, indicated that Valdez had a full scale I.Q. of 73 and had been classified as educable mentally retarded. The court found that the fact that Valdez had dropped out of school did not put his counsel on notice to inquire into these school records because it found that it was common for Hispanic males in the Corpus Christi, Nueces County, Texas area to drop out of school. With regard to a conviction in Hockley County, trial counsel had received the penitentiary packet containing the conviction and judgment but had not requested the underlying pleadings. These pleadings contained a letter from his attorney in that case requesting a psychiatric evaluation of Valdez, and the resulting evaluation, which would have also shown that Valdez had a full scale I.Q. of 63 and was determined to be of borderline intelligence. The state habeas court concluded that the failure to request these pleadings did not fall beyond the professional standard of conduct for defense attorneys. Moreover, the state habeas court found that the defendant had knowledge of this psychological testing and had not made it known to his attorneys.

As for the presentation of witnesses regarding Valdez’s childhood background and other humanizing elements, the court also rejected the claim that counsel had been deficient. The habeas court found that Valdez’s “drug use, childhood abuse and hardship, creativity, artistic talent, kindliness towards family was known and available to the applicant at the time of trial.” Ex parte Valdez, No. 87-CR-1459-B at 10 (117th Dist. Ct., Nueces County, Tex., Mar. 31, 1997) (unpublished). Fur*944thermore, the court found that “evidence of kindness and family assistance was presented at the punishment phase by the testimony of applicant’s brother Daniel Valdez, Mary Jane Barrientes, Julie Salda-na, and Maria Saldana.” Id. In light of these facts, the habeas court concluded that the additional -witness testimony offered during the habeas hearing on these matters would have been cumulative and the failure to present this evidence was “a decision of trial strategy which was sound and reasonable as judged at the time of the trial.” Id. at 11. More generally, the state habeas court found that trial counsel “exercised reasonable and sound judgment in deciding which individuals to present as punishment witnesses.” Id. at 8. Finally, without specific findings of historical fact, the state habeas court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to present the mitigating evidence offered in the habeas hearing had not prejudiced Valdez. The state habeas court reached no conclusion as to whether Valdez was mentally retarded, noting that it rejected Valdez’s Eighth Amendment claim “without deciding the issue of Valdez’s mental retardation.” Id. at 19.

Based on these findings and conclusions, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of habeas relief in a one-page order. See Ex parte Valdez, Application No. 31,184-01 (Aug. 13, 1997) (unpublished order). The 117th District Court of Nueces County set Valdez’s execution for January 14, 1998. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted Valdez a stay of execution and appointed counsel.

Valdez then filed the instant § 2254 petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and requested an evidentiary hearing. The district court granted Valdez an evidentiary hearing with regard to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. It did so because it determined that Valdez had not received a full and fair hearing before the state habeas court. Because Valdez had not received such a hearing, the district court concluded that, under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), an evidentiary hearing was mandatory.4

The district court determined that the state habeas court denied Valdez a full and fair hearing because the state habeas court lost the exhibits admitted into evidence during the hearing, and, as a result, excluded those exhibits from its resolution of Valdez’s case. These lost exhibits included: (1) the results of intelligence tests conducted on Valdez at age thirteen by the Corpus Christi School District; (2) the results of intelligence tests conducted on Valdez at age eighteen by the Big Spring State Hospital, and the accompanying psychiatric evaluation issued by the hospital; and (3) the fee applications submitted by Carl Lewis and David Gutierrez, his trial counsel. The district court also found that “it appear[ed] that other crucial evidence was excluded from proceedings,” namely, the trial transcript, as the state habeas judge informed the parties at the hearing on the proposed findings that he “had never read the record of the trial” and- that he “did not intend to” as he did not “have the time.” See Order for Evidentiary Hr’g (S.D.Tex. Jan. 13, 1999) (unpublished) at 10 n.8. (quoting State Habeas Hr’g on *945Proposed Findings Tr. at 144-45). Consequently, according to the district court, “the [state habeas] judge denied Valdez’s petition without seeing evidence which might have been favorable to Valdez, which the judge did not rule must be excluded, and which the judge even indicated had to be reviewed.” Valdez v. Johnson, 93 F.Supp.2d 769, 782 (S.D.Tex.1999).

The court found that the “exclusion” of exhibits also resulted in a failure to develop the state factual record, which Valdez had not caused. Hence, the district court concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)5 did not bar an evidentiary hearing.6 Moreover, as discussed above, Townsend required an evidentiary hearing. Alternatively, the district court found it had the discretion to order an evidentiary hearing under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.7

After the evidentiary hearing,8 the district court granted habeas relief concluding that Valdez’s attorneys were ineffective in their preparation for and presentation at sentencing. In reaching this conclusion, the district court reviewed Valdez’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo. The district court found that the deferential framework set forth at § 2254(d) and 2254(e)(1) “largely d[id] not apply” because it had held an evidentiary hearing to remedy the state’s denial of a full and fair hearing. Valdez, 98 F.Supp.2d at 777 (S.D.Tex.1999). Therefore, it applied the presumption of correctness only to the state habeas court’s specific findings of historical fact, namely: (1) “it is common in the Corpus Christi, Nueces County Texas area for Hispanic males to drop out of school”; (2) “[t]he fact that the applicant had dropped out *946of school did not put Carl Lewis on notice of any potential mental problem, if any”; and (3) “Carl Lewis’s failure to request the entire court jacket regarding the applicant’s burglary charge in Hockley County did not fall below the professional standard of conduct for defense attorneys.” See id. at 778 n. 20 (quoting Ex parte Valdez, No. 87-CR-1459-B at 7 (117th Dist. Ct., Nueces County, Tex., March 31, 1997)). The district court then applied a preponderance of the evidence standard to the remainder of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing and assessed Valdez’s ineffective assistance claim, a question of mixed law and fact, de novo.

The Director appeals the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the grounds that (1) the district court erred in finding that the state court denied Valdez a full and fair hearing; (2) even if Valdez was denied a full and fair hearing, such a hearing is not a prerequisite to the operation of the deference required under § 2254; (3) even under de novo review, Valdez received effective assistance of counsel; and (4) the district court exceeded its remedial powers by directing the State to resentence Valdez or to impose a sentence of less than death. Additionally, the Director appeals the district court’s exclusion of evidence offered by the Director at the evidentiary hearing.

II

In reviewing a grant of the writ of habeas corpus, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error. We review de novo the district court’s disposition of pure issues of law and mixed issues of law and fact. See Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 750 (5th Cir.2000); Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir.1999).

The Director disputes the district court’s finding that the state habeas court denied him a full and fair hearing, challenging both the legal conclusion and the conclusion’s factual underpinning. We need not address that dispute because we find that even if the state habeas court denied Valdez such a hearing, a full and fair hearing is not a prerequisite to the operation of AEDPA’s deferential scheme.9

AEDPA limits the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to those instances in which the state court’s adjudication on the merits “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under AEDPA, clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). We review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact under the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir.2000); Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir.1997).

Section 2254(d)’s deference operates when the state court has adjudicated the petitioner’s claim on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). An “adjudication *947on the merits” occurs when the state court resolves the case on substantive grounds, rather than procedural grounds. See Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 273 (5th Cir.1999) (holding that whether an adjudication on the merits has occurred is whether the state court disposed of the case on substantive or procedural grounds); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir.1999) (finding that where a state habeas court decided the habeas applicant’s claim on procedural grounds, there had not been an “adjudication on the merits”).

In Terry Williams, 529 U.S. at 408, 120 S.Ct. at 1521, the Supreme Court found that a state court’s adjudication falls under the “unreasonable application” prong when it “unreasonably applies the law of th[e Supreme] Court to the facts of a prisoner’s case.” The Court held that the test for whether a state court has unreasonably applied clearly established federal law is an objective one, which it framed as:

Stated simply, a federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. The federal habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a subjective one by resting its determination instead on the simple fact that at least one of the Nation’s jurists has applied the relevant federal law in the same manner the state court did in the habeas petitioner’s case.

Id. at 409-10, 120 S.Ct. at 1521-22. Thus, it is not enough that a single reasonable jurist may agree with the application.10

While the Court did not fully elucidate the meaning of unreasonable, it carefully distinguished an unreasonable application from an erroneous application of federal law. According to the Supreme Court, a state court’s erroneous or incorrect application per se is insufficient to allow issuance of the writ. Id. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. at 1522. The Court stated:

Under § 2254(d)(l)’s “unreasonable application” clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. at 1522.

Thus, a state court application may be incorrect in our independent judgment and, yet, reasonable. See Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir.2001). In Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir.2001), we explored the level of deference to be accorded a state court decision under this standard and found that “we must reverse when we conclude that the state court decision applies the correct legal rule to a given set of facts in a manner that is so patently incorrect as to be ‘unreasonable.’ ”

Finally, AEDPA requires us to presume state court findings of fact to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

A

The district court found that the AEDPA standards of review “largely did not apply” because it “held an evidentiary hearing in order to consider evidence improperly excluded from consideration by the state habeas court.” See Valdez, 93 *948F.Supp.2d at 777. The district court applied a presumption of correctness only to the specific findings of fact made by the state habeas court, namely: it is common for Hispanic males in the Corpus Christi, Nueces County, Texas area to drop out of school; the fact that Valdez “dropped out of school did not put [trial counsel] on notice of any potential mental problem”; and trial counsel’s “failure to request the entire court jacket for the Hockley County charge did not fall below standard of conduct for defense attorneys.” Id. at 778 n. 20. It declined to review the state habeas court’s conclusions of mixed law and fact under § 2254(d)(l)’s unreasonable application prong. Additionally, it did not apply § 2254(e)(l)’s presumption of correctness to those findings of fact implicit in the habeas court’s mixed law and fact conclusions.11 Thus, the district court selectively applied the presumption of correctness, and did not apply § 2254(d)’s standards.12

The Director asserts that while the district court had the discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing, the district court’s finding of the denial of a full and fair hearing and holding of a plenary hearing does not permit the district court to avoid the application of deference to the state court’s adjudication on the merits.13 In response, Valdez contends that a determination that a petitioner has received a full and fair hearing before the state court is a prerequisite to a finding that the state court reached an adjudication on the merits, and, thus, a prerequisite to the application of § 2254(d)’s deference as well as the presumption of correctness under § 2254(e)(1). We disagree with Valdez’s contention and conclude that a full and fair hearing is not a prerequisite to the application of AEDPA’s deferential framework.

Prior to the AEDPA amendments, § 2254(d) provided in relevant part:

a determination ... made by a State court ... evidenced by a written finding ... or other reliable and written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall *949otherwise appear, or the respondent shall admit—

(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; ...

(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (repealed 1996). Once a petitioner established one of the situations set forth under § 2254(d)(1)-(7), such as the denial of a full and fair hearing, the presumption no longer operated14; instead, the district court reviewed the claim de novo and reached its own independent factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (repealed 1996) (providing where one of the situations in (d)(l)-(7) was not shown “the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous”); Salazar v. Johnson, 96 F.3d 789, 791 (5th Cir.1996) (“ ‘[A] federal court is to accord a presumption of correctness to findings of state court proceedings unless particular statutory exceptions to § 2254(d) are implicated.’” (quoting Williams v. Collins, 16 F.3d 626, 631 (5th Cir.1994))). Thus, this pre-AEDPA presumption “merely erect[ed] a starting place or presumption, that [was to] be examined in light of the state court record.” Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 603 (5th Cir.1999).

Apart from simply establishing a starting place, the pre-AEDPA presumption of correctness was of limited application and it was § 2254’s only source of deference to state court adjudications. The presumption applied only to findings of fact. See Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir.1999); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 722 (5th Cir.1976). It did not apply to mixed questions of law and fact nor did it apply to pure questions of law. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111—12, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (holding that questions with a “uniquely legal dimension” were outside § 2254(d)’s presumption of correctness). Under the now repealed version of § 2254, we reviewed such questions de novo, granting no deference to state court adjudications. See, e.g., Muniz v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 214, 219 (5th Cir.1998) (reviewing questions of law de novo); Lee, 499 F.2d at 461 (finding that the district court “was under no constraint to defer to the state [court’s] conclusions” as to mixed questions of law and fact).

In 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), amending § 2254. These amendments jettisoned all references to a “full and fair hearing” from the presumption of correctness accorded state court findings of fact, along with the other situations which previously swept aside the presumption. The presumption of correctness erected in its place at § 2254(e)(1), now simply provides that unless the petitioner can rebut the findings of fact through clear and convincing evidence, those findings of fact are presumed to be correct.15 To reintroduce *950a full and fair hearing requirement that would displace the application of § 2254(e)(l)’s presumption would have the untenable result of rendering the amendments enacted by Congress a nullity. See, e.g., Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247, 263, 112 S.Ct. 2465, 2475, 120 L.Ed.2d 201 (1992) (a “change in statutory language is to be read, if possible, to have some effect”).

Furthermore, as discussed above, AED-PA put into place a deferential scheme, under which we must defer to a state court adjudication on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).16 In the prefatory paragraph to (d)(1) and (d)(2), the statute provides that an application for a writ of habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” The word “shall” is mandatory in meaning. See, e.g., In re Armstrong, 206 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir.2000); City of Dallas, Tex. v. FCC, 165 F.3d 341, 358 (5th Cir.1999). Thus, we lack discretion as to the operation of this section. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 240-41, 121 S.Ct. 714, 722, 148 L.Ed.2d 635 (2001); Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772-77, 104 S.Ct. 2105, 2110-2113, 80 L.Ed.2d 753 (1984). The use of “any” makes clear that this section applies to all cases adjudicated on their merits in state court. The term “adjudication on the merits,” like its predecessor “resolution on the merits,” refers solely to whether the state court reached a conclusion as to the substantive matter of a claim, as opposed to disposing of the matter for procedural reasons. See Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686-87 (5th Cir.2001); Mercadel, 179 F.3d at 274 (5th Cir.1999). It does not speak to the quality of the process. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir.1997) (rejecting pre-AEDPA contention that “the resolution on the merits prerequisite is a proxy for the quality of the legal process resolving a dispute”); Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 813 (5th Cir.2000) (applying Green to “adjudication on the merits”). This mandatory and all-encompassing language combined with the meaning of “adjudication on the merits” leaves no room for judicial imposition of a full and fair hearing prerequisite.

Moreover, casting aside AEDPA’s standards of review in the fashion urged by Valdez has another untenable result. Valdez asks us to inject a full and fair hearing as a prerequisite to the new deferential scheme applied to conclusions of law and mixed law and fact, which Congress put in place of our de novo review. In asking us to read the statute in this manner, Valdez would have us ignore the fact that Congress has excised this prerequisite from § 2254’s presumption of correctness, and apply it to a deferential scheme which did not exist prior to AEDPA. The plain meaning of the text simply will not bear *951such a reading. Therefore, we hold that a full and fair hearing is not a precondition to according § 2254(e)(l)’s presumption of correctness to state habeas court findings of fact nor to applying § 2254(d)’s standards of review.17

In response, Valdez attempts to undercut this statutory interpretation with three contentions. First, Valdez contends that this reading of the statute renders an evi-dentiary hearing in eases like his a useless exercise. Second, Valdez asserts that this holding overrules our Circuit’s precedent. Third, he urges us to adopt the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit.

First, Valdez asserts that our view of the statute renders impotent an evidentia-ry hearing held where the petitioner received an adjudication on the merits after a state hearing that was less than full and *952fair. We disagree. Where a district court elects, in instances not barred by § 2254(e)(2), to hold an evidentiary hearing, the hearing may assist the district court in ascertaining whether the state court reached an unreasonable determination under either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). An evidentiary hearing is not an exercise in futility just because §§ 2254(d) and (e)(1) require deference.

Second, Valdez maintains that we have elsewhere held that a full and fair hearing is a prerequisite to a determination that a state court has adjudicated a habeas applicant’s petition on the merits. In support of this contention, Valdez directs us to Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581 (5th Cir.2000); Singleton v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 381 (5th Cir.1999); and Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607 (5th Cir.1999). Valdez is correct that we stated in Monis that a full and fair adjudication of a petitioner’s claims in state court is a prerequisite for the application of AEDPA’s standards of review. See 186 F.3d at 584. Additionally, we used similar language in Corwin v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.1998) (“In this Circuit, provided the state court conducted a full and fair adjudication of the petitioner’s claims, pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1).”).

To the extent that these references to a “full and fair” adjudication refer to a full and fair state court hearing, they were dicta. Neither in Morris nor in Corwin were we confronted with a claim that the petitioner had been denied a full and fair hearing. See Morris, 186 F.3d at 584 (“In this appeal, [the petitioner] argues that the state court’s unreasonable instruction led to his conviction under a standard contrary to settled federal law”); Corwin, 150 F.3d at 472 (“Corwin argues that ... all state court determinations of federal constitutional issues in habeas proceedings should be subject to de novo review by the federal courts”). In Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir.1997), on which Morris relies for the “full and fair adjudication” proposition, we evinced concern that the state court had not adequately adjudicated the petitioner’s claim. While we stated our concern, we resolved the petitioner’s claim on other grounds and did not delve further into the possible import of the way in which the state habeas court adjudicated the petitioner’s claim.18

Apart from being dicta, these references also appear to conflate the adjudication on the merits requirement with a full and fair hearing requirement, referring to the adjudication on the merits as a “full and fair adjudication on the merits.” Morris, 186 F.3d at 584; Corwin, 150 F.3d at 472. Where we have conducted an examination of whether an “adjudication on the merits” occurred, we have looked at whether the state court reached the merits of the petitioner’s claim rather than deciding it on procedural grounds. See Murphy, 205 F.3d at 813 (finding that there was an adjudication on the merits because the state court reached the merits of the petitioner’s claim); Fisher, 169 F.3d at 300 (concluding a state court’s denial of relief on waiver grounds constituted a procedural, rather than a substantive, resolution of the case, and as such was not an adjudication on the merits). In short, we find that Moms and Corwin give us no guidance as to whether a full and fair hearing is a precondition to the operation of the AED-PA standards of review.

*953Furthermore, Valdez’s reliance on Hughes is misplaced. In Hughes, we did not address the applicability of the AED-PA standards where a full and fair hearing had been denied. Instead, we addressed solely the question of whether Hughes was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See 191 F.3d at 630. Thus, Hughes offers Valdez no support.

Valdez’s reliance on Singleton is likewise misplaced. In Singleton, the trial court granted the petitioner habeas relief in part and, in so doing, issued findings of fact. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and denied Singleton relief without issuing an opinion. See 178 F.3d at 384. Concluding that there were no findings of fact to which the presumption of correctness could attach, we remanded the case to the district court for a de novo evidentiary hearing. See id. at 385. While we found that Singleton was entitled to a “full and fair evidentiary hearing,” we did not pass upon the question as to whether the absence of such a hearing precluded the operation of § 2254(d). Id. More importantly, we rejected Singleton’s assertion that in the absence of any factual findings, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had not reached an adjudication on the merits, rendering § 2254(d) inoperative. See id. at 384. In doing so, we implied that § 2254(d) applied to such a summary disposition, even where the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, as with Morris and Hughes, we find that Singleton offers Valdez no support.

Third, Valdez urges us to adopt the approach of the Tenth Circuit. In Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.1998), the state habeas court denied the petitioner relief on the merits of his claim without an evidentiary hearing. See id. at 1253. Our sister circuit found that in the absence of a state hearing the petitioner was entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing. See id. More importantly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court should not afford AEDPA’s deference to the state court’s mixed law and fact conclusions. See id. at 1254. For this conclusion, the court rested solely on Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1359 (10th Cir.1997). See Miller, 161 F.3d at 1253. The Nguyen court, however, did not apply AEDPA to the petitioner’s claims because he had filed before the Act’s effective date, rendering AEDPA’s standards inapplicable. See Nguyen, 131 F.3d at 1345. Thus, in reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit did not ground its decision on a reading of the statute, but in reliance on a case applying pre-AEDPA § 2254. Because of the rather tenuous footing of the Tenth Circ