Paolo Lo Duca v. United States

This appeal presents a novel challenge to the constitutionality of the United States extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994), which has governed the extradition of fugitives found in this country for nearly 150 years. Petitioner-appellant Paolo Lo Duca appeals from the July 24, 1995, judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (David G. Trager, Judge), dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lo Duca contends primarily that his extradition is unconstitutional because section 3184 violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Because we see no constitutional infirmity in the statute, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.

Background

In March 1993, Paolo Lo Duca was convicted by the Court of Palermo in Italy for various narcotics-related offenses after being tried in absentia. Although Lo Duca, an Italian citizen residing in Sands Point, New York, refused to appear for trial, he was represented by his attorney in all proceedings. The evidence showed that Lo Duca, as a member of the Sicilian Mafia, had conspired to import cocaine from Colombia through the United States to Italy. Lo Duca was sentenced by the Court of Palermo to nineteen years in prison.

The Republic of Italy subsequently submitted an application, in accordance with Article XII of the Italian-Ameriean extradition treaty, requesting that the United States provisionally arrest Lo Duca. See Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Italy, October 13,1983, U.S.Italy, art. XII, T.I.A.S. No. 10837 (“Extradition Treaty”). In May 1994, the Government, acting on behalf of the Republic of Italy, filed a complaint in the Eastern District of New York seeking an arrest warrant for Lo Duca. Then-Magistrate Judge Allyne R. Ross granted the request, and Lo Duca was taken into custody.

The Republic of Italy then made a formal request to extradite Lo Duca pursuant to Article X of the Extradition Treaty. In November 1994, Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold held a hearing in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3184 to review the evidence of criminality and determine whether Lo Duca could be extradited by the Secretary of State. Magistrate Judge Gold examined the appropriate documents required under Article X of the Extradition Treaty, including a text of the relevant Italian laws and a summary of the evidence against Lo Duca. He found probable cause to extradite.

Magistrate Judge Gold also considered a legal challenge to the extradition of Lo Duca for the Italian offense of “association of mafia type.” Lo Duca contended that the Italian statute criminalized conduct that was not punishable under the laws of the United States, and therefore failed to meet the dual-criminality requirement of the Extradition Treaty. See Extradition Treaty, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 10837. Magistrate Judge Gold rejected this argument, finding that the offense of “association of mafia type” applied to conspirators who “avail themselves of the power of intimidation and of the condition of subjection and conspiracy of silence deriving therefrom for the purpose of committing crimes.” He concluded that the Italian offense was similar to RICO and other conspiracy offenses that are well-recognized in the United States. Magistrate Judge Gold then *1103 certified Lo Duca to the Secretary of State for extradition.

Lo Duca subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus from the District Court arguing (1) that the documents submitted to the extradition officer were insufficient to comply with Article X of the Extradition Treaty, and (2) that the Italian offense of “association of mafia type” failed to meet the dual-criminality requirement. Judge Trager denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Lo Duca now appeals.

Discussion

I. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3184 1

The federal extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, was first enacted nearly 150 years ago to provide a legal framework for extradition proceedings involving fugitives found in the United States. Prior to 1848, extradition was largely a matter committed to the discretion of the Executive Branch. See Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 604 (2d Cir.1993) (“Congress reacted, in part, to ‘the public clamor for judicial involvement in the extradition process.’ ”) (quoting Jacques Semmel-man, Federal Courts, The Constitution, and the Rule of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings, 76 Cornell L.Rev. 1198, 1208 (1991)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1165, 114 S.Ct. 1192, 127 L.Ed.2d 542 (1994). The primary function of section 3184 is to “interpos[e] the judiciary between the executive and the individual.” Id. 2 To that end, the extradition statute requires the Government to submit a formal complaint setting forth the legal and factual bases for extradition. The complaint must be brought before an extradition officer — “any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized ... by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State_” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The extradition officer is then directed to hear and consider the “evidence of criminality.” Id. If the evidence is sufficient “to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention,” the extradition officer is instructed to issue a certificate of extraditability to the Secretary of State. Id. At that point, the Secretary of State has final authority to extradite the fugitive, but is not required to do so. Pursuant to its authority to conduct foreign affairs, *1104 the Executive Branch retains plenary discretion to refuse extradition.

The extradition hearing conducted pursuant to section 3184 “is not ... in the nature of a final trial by which the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him....” Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463, 8 S.Ct. 1240, 1243, 32 L.Ed. 234 (1888). Instead, it is “essentially a preliminary examination to determine whether a case is made out which will justify the holding of the accused and his surrender to the demanding nation.” Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 287 (D.C.Cir.1990) (citation omitted), cert. dismissed, 501 U.S. 1225, 111 S.Ct. 2844, 115 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1991). As the Supreme Court has stated, “The function of the committing magistrate is to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction.” Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S.Ct. 469, 472, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922). The judicial officer who conducts an extradition hearing “thus performs an assignment in line with his or her accustomed task of determining if there is probable cause to hold a defendant to answer for the commission of an offense.” Ward, 921 F.2d at 287; see also In re McMullen, 989 F.2d 603, 611 (2d Cir.) (in banc) (“What is at issue in the proceeding, therefore, ‘is not punishability but prosecutability.’ ”) (quoting M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 524 (1974)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913, 114 S.Ct. 301, 126 L.Ed.2d 249 (1993).

If the extradition officer issues a certificate of extraditability, the Secretary of State “may” order the fugitive to be delivered to the extraditing nation. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The Secretary of State, however, is under no legal duty to do so. See 6 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 1046 (1968) (“[T]he judicial branch cannot, as a matter of domestic law, bind the executive to grant extradition.”). On the other hand, if the extradition officer declines to issue a certificate of extraditability, the complaint is dismissed and the Secretary of State has no authority to order the surrender of the fugitive. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-28 (2d Cir.1981). While a new extradition complaint may be submitted, unless it leads to a certificate of extraditability, no extradition is allowed. See United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 495 (2d Cir.1986); cf. Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30, 43 S.Ct. 618, 619, 67 L.Ed. 1062 (1923) (successive complaints seeking extradition do not violate Double Jeopardy Clause).

In this ease, Lo Duca’s primary contention is that the legal framework established by the extradition statute is unconstitutional. We note at the outset that Lo Duca raises this argument for the first time on appeal. The general rule is that “a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). That rule, however, is one of prudence and not appellate jurisdiction. We retain broad discretion to consider issues not raised initially in the District Court. See Austin, 5 F.3d at 601. Since the argument proffered by Lo Duca involves constitutional notions of separation of powers, the Government’s response that Lo Duca has waived his claims “cannot be dispositive.” Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3257, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986). In this case, we think that the constitutional issues advanced by Lo Duca are sufficiently important that they should be assessed on their merits. 3

Lo Duca presents two alternative contentions, consideration of which depends upon our resolution of an initial question: do judicial officers acting pursuant to section 3184 exercise the “judicial power” of the United States under Article III of the Constitution? If an extradition officer does exercise Article III power, then Lo Duca contends that the statutory scheme is unconstitutional since it subjects Article III judgments to revision by the Executive Branch. On the other hand, if an extradition officer does not exercise Article III *1105 power, then Lo Duca contends that Congress has unconstitutionally authorized federal judges and magistrate judges to engage in extrajudicial activities.

This is not the first time that our Circuit has considered the question of whether extradition officers exercise Article III power. In Austin, we recently held that the function performed by an extradition officer is not an exercise of the judicial power of the United States. Austin, 5 F.3d at 603. This holding accords with the decisions of the First, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. See In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir.1993); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir.1993); Ward, 921 F.2d at 288 n. 2; see also In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 119, 14 L.Ed. 345 (1852) (Curtis, J., concurring). But see United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 53-54, 1 L.Ed. 502 (1795).

Lo Duca contends that our holding in Austin should be reconsidered, even though in this Circuit a subsequent panel may not overrule the decision of a prior panel. See Jones v. Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir.1995) (“A decision of a panel of this Court is binding unless and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”). Though Austin did not consider the same constitutional claims raised by Lo Duca, we see no reason to depart from our precise holding that extradition officers do not exercise Article III power. We believe nonetheless that some amplification of that holding may assist in assessing Lo Duca’s subsequent contentions.

Our holding in Austin derives primarily from the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176, 12 L.Ed. 104 (1847) (Little, Brown & Co. 1870), which held that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the judgment of an extradition officer. 4 The Court based its decision on the fact that “the ease ... was heard and decided by the district judge at his chambers, and not in court-” Id. at 191. Presumably, the Court was describing the role of the district judge rather than the place of his deeision-making, since the Court later noted that the judge was exercising “a special authority” for which no provision existed regarding the ap-pealability of his decision. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court held that it could not maintain appellate jurisdiction; moreover, since original jurisdiction was also lacking, it could not issue a writ of habeas corpus on Metz-ger’s behalf. Id. at 192; see Mackin, 668 F.2d at 125.

The statement in Metzger that extradition officers exercise “a special authority” implies that their adjudicatory powers do not derive from Article III. Rather, extradition officers have been said to act in a “non-institutional capacity.” See Austin, 5 F.3d at 603 (quoting Howard, 996 F.2d at 1325). Although Lo Duca asserts that Metzger was overruled when Congress enacted section 3184, this Court in Mackin reached a different conclusion. Judge Friendly wrote that “[njothing on the face of the statute or in its legislative history shows an intention to alter the Supreme Court’s ruling [in Metzger ] with respect to appealability.” Mackin, 668 F.2d at 126. “During the floor debates of the proposed extradition act Senator Dayton referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Metzger case, but did not intimate that the bill would alter the result of that case.” Id. at 126 n. 7 (citing Cong.Globe, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 868 (1848)). Thus, the rule in Metz-ger remains viable, and the fact that decisions of extradition officers are non-appeal-able strongly indicates that such officers do not exercise Article III power.

This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, although direct judicial review of an extradition proceeding is not available, there is the possibility for what has been called “executive revision,” pursuant to the discretionary authority of the Executive Branch to refuse extradition. See generally Paul M. Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 95-97 (3d ed. 1988). The first ease involving executive revision arose in a different context in Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408, 1 L.Ed. 436 *1106 (1792) (Little, Brown & Co. 1855). Congress had provided that the circuit courts should decide in the first instance whether individual veterans were eligible for disability pensions. These determinations, however, were subject to revision by the Secretary of War. Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing, sitting as members of the Circuit Court of the District of New York, held that “the [pension adjusting] duties assigned to the Circuit Courts ... are not of [judicial] description ...; inasmuch as [the statute] subjects the decisions of these courts ... to the consideration and suspension of the Secretary at War ” Id. at 410 n. 1. Similar statements regarding the non-judicial nature of the power granted by Congress were made by Justices Wilson, Blair, and Iredell in their capacities as circuit judges. Id. Thus, the various Justices held that the statute failed to accomplish a grant of judicial power under Article III, and in that regard, the fact that the statute contemplated executive revision was dispositive.

' Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing additionally explained that the statute could be considered, not as a grant of Article III power, but “as appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it-” Id. (emphasis added). “[T]he Judges of this Court regard themselves as being the commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or decline that office.” Id. The Justices concluded that “the Judges of this Court will ... adjourn the court from day to day ... and ... proceed as commissioners to execute the business of this act in the same court room, or chamber.” Id. Notably, the Justices found no constitutional impediment to their rendering adjudicatory decisions under the statute, as long as those decisions were distinct from their judicial functions regarding eases and controversies under Article III.

In United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 14 L.Ed. 40 (1852) (Little Brown & Co. 1870), the Supreme Court considered a similar statute authorizing federal district judges in Florida to adjust certain claims made by the Spanish inhabitants of that state against the United States. Id. at 45. Those determinations were subject to approval by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id. The Supreme Court held that “such a tribunal is not a judicial one_ The authority conferred on the respective judges was nothing more than that of a commissioner....” Id. at 47. As the Supreme Court elaborated:

The powers conferred by these acts of Congress upon the judge ... are, it is true, judicial in their nature. For judgment and discretion must be exercised by both of them. But it is nothing more than the power ordinarily given by law to a commissioner appointed to adjust claims to lands or money under a treaty.... [It] is not judicial ..., in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the constitution to the courts of the United States.

Id. at 48. Thus, the Supreme Court found it unexceptional that the judges, as commissioners, acted in an “adjudicatory” capacity. 5

Instead of focusing on the misleading distinction between adjudicatory and non-adjudicatory functions, Ferreira relied on the fact that the decisions of the district judges were subject to executive revision. The Supreme Court found it “too evident for argument” that the statute did not confer Article III power since

neither the evidence, nor [the judge’s] award, are to be filed in the court in which he presides, nor recorded there; but he is required to transmit, both the decision and the evidence upon which he decided, to the Secretary of the Treasury; and the claim is to be paid if the Secretary thinks it just and equitable, but not otherwise.

Id. at 46-47. Thus, the fact of executive revision led the Supreme Court in Ferreira *1107 to hold that those judges, acting as commissioners, did not exercise Article III power. Similarly, in this case, it is dispositive that, since the decisions of extradition officers are subject to revision by the Secretary of State, those officers do not exercise judicial power within the meaning of Article III. See Doherty, 786 F.2d at 499 n. 10 (“The ... function of issuing the certificate [of extraditability is] nonjudieial because ... the Secretary of State is not bound to extradite even if the certificate is granted.”). 6

Lastly, we point out that, as a matter of statutory language, section 8184 closely tracks the holdings of Metzger, Haybum’s Case, and Ferreira by granting jurisdiction over extradition complaints not to “courts” but to individual enumerated “justices,” “judges,” and “magistrates,” including judges of state courts of general jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Thus, by its terms, “§ 3184 vests individual judges with jurisdiction over extradition requests.” Mackin, 668 F.2d at 130 n. 11 (emphasis in original). This distinction between “courts” and “judges” in the context of extradition proceedings has been long recognized. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 n. 3 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 290 F.2d 106, 107 (5th Cir.1961). 7 We note that, traditionally, it is “courts” and not “judges” that exercise Article III power. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”). The use of the word “judges” in section 3184 is more consistent with a statute appointing commissioners “by official, instead of personal descriptions.” Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n. 1. 8

*1108 Having examined the text of the statute, its structural correlation with Article III, and the relevant historical precedents, we conclude that our holding in Austin was correct — extradition officers do not exercise judicial power under Article III of the Constitution. Austin, 5 F.3d at 603. We therefore turn to Lo Duca’s following arguments, which contend that section 3184 is unconstitutional precisely because it does not confer Article III power.

A. Tidewater Claim

Lo Duea first argues that section 3184 violates the doctrine of separation of powers insofar as it seeks to require Article III courts to conduct non-Article III extradition proceedings. See National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. 1556 (1949). In Tidewater, the Supreme Court confronted the question whether Congress could expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the class of cases and controversies enumerated in Article III. In three separate opinions, six Justices reaffirmed the traditional view that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whose judicial powers are bounded by Article III. See id. at 607, 69 S.Ct. at 1185 (Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 635, 69 S.Ct. at 1204 (Vinson, C.J., joined by Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 647, 69 S.Ct. at 1196 (Frankfurter, J., joined by Reed, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson expressed a contrary view in his plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court. Id. at 583, 69 S.Ct. at 1173 (Jackson, J., joined by Black and Burton, JJ.). He wrote that, under Article I, Congress could grant jurisdiction for federal courts to hear non-Article III cases. See Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 592-93, 69 S.Ct. at 1178. Justices Rutledge and Murphy, who “strongly dissent[ed]” from that reasoning, nonetheless concurred in the result on other grounds. See id. at 604, 626, 69 S.Ct. at 1184, 1195 (Rutledge, J., concurring in the judgment) (calling the opinion of Justice Jackson a “dangerous doctrine”). See generally Bator et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System, supra, at 474-75.

In cases reaching as far back as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), the Supreme Court has held that Congress may not expand the jurisdiction of federal courts beyond the limits established by Article III. Id. at 174; see Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234-35, 43 S.Ct. 79, 83, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922) (“[Congress] may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850) (“The Constitution has defined the limits of the judicial power of the United States-”); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304, 3 L.Ed. 108 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“Turn to the article of the constitution of the United States, for the statute cannot extend the jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution.”). Most recently, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, — *1109 U.S. --, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the Supreme Court stated that “Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III.” Id. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 1128 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60). Lo Duca relies on these cases to contend that the Constitution prevents Congress from vesting federal courts with jurisdiction over non-Article III extradition complaints.

Without questioning these cases, the Government responds that federal courts are not the subject of section 3184. Rather, “§ 3184 vests individual judges with jurisdiction over extradition requests.” Mackin, 668 F.2d at 130 n. 11. This distinction between “courts” and “judges” is dispositive. As Judge Friendly noted, section 3184 forbids “courts” to issue certificates of extraditability. Doherty, 786 F.2d at 499. “We thus need not consider whether ... Congress could constitutionally vest an Article III court with the nonjudicial function of issuing the certificate_” Id. at 499 n. 10 (emphasis in original). Only individual justices, judges, and magistrate judges are authorized to act under the statute. Since they function, as in Haybum’s Case and in Ferreira, as commissioners, they are not bound by the limits of Article III.

B. Mistretta Claim

Lo Duca next argues that, insofar as section 3184 requires judges to act in an extrajudicial capacity, the statute runs afoul of Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). In Mistretta, the Supreme Court was concerned with the possibility that Congress might compromise the independence of Article III judges by requiring them to participate in extrajudicial activities. This concern, however, does not apply with equal force to those who are not Article III judges. Thus, Lo Duca’s claim founders at the outset since his extradition proceedings were conducted solely by federal magistrate judges. Then-Magistrate Judge Ross issued the warrant under which Lo Duca was arrested. Magistrate Judge Gold conducted the subsequent extradition hearing and granted the certificate of extraditability. Since federal magistrate judges are not Article III judges, the Constitution does not accord them the same protections against Congressional expansion of their duties. See Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,