United States v. Thomas

We consider here the propriety of the district court's dismissal of a juror allegedly engaged in "nullification"--the intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge--during the course of deliberations. We address, in turn, (1) whether such alleged misconduct constitutes "just cause" for dismissal of a deliberating juror under Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 23(b)"),1 so that a jury of only eleven persons may continue to deliberate and return a verdict, and (2) what evidentiary standard must be met to support a dismissal on this ground.

The appellants are two sets of defendants convicted of violations of federal narcotics laws after two separate trials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief Judge ). We have decided the appeals of defendants convicted at the first of these trials in a summary order of this date. We write here to consider only the appeals of Grady Thomas, Ramse Thomas, Jason Thomas, Tracey Thomas, and Loray Thomas, all of whom were convicted in the second trial. On appeal, they argue, chiefly, that the district court abused its discretion when it ordered the dismissal of one of the jurors pursuant to Rule 23(b) during the course of jury deliberations. The court based its decision to remove the juror, in large part, on a finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law--in effect, that the juror intended to acquit the defendants regardless of the evidence of their guilt.

We consider below whether a juror's intent to convict or acquit regardless of the evidence constitutes a basis for the juror's removal during the course of deliberations under Rule 23(b). We also consider what constitutes sufficient evidence of that intent in light of the limitations on a presiding judge's authority to investigate allegations of nullification required by the need to safeguard the secrecy of jury deliberations. We conclude, inter alia, that--as an obvious violation of a juror's oath and duty--a refusal to apply the law as set forth by the court constitutes grounds for dismissal under Rule 23(b). We also conclude that the importance of safeguarding the secrecy of the jury deliberation room, coupled with the need to protect against the dismissal of a juror based on his doubts about the guilt of a criminal defendant, require that a juror be dismissed for a refusal to apply the law as instructed only where the record is clear beyond doubt that the juror is not, in fact, simply unpersuaded by the prosecution's case. We hold that the district court erred in dismissing a juror, based largely on its finding that the juror was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law, where the record evidence raised the possibility that the juror's view on the merits of the case was motivated by doubts about the defendants' guilt, rather than by an intent to nullify the law. Accordingly, we vacate the judgments of the district court and remand for a new trial.

We have before us the consolidated appeals of ten criminal defendants convicted of related conduct in two trials held in the Northern District of New York. The named defendants in this case, including those whose appeals we consider here, were arrested on May 5, 1994. In an indictment returned on May 13, 1994, they were charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and crack cocaine and actual possession and distribution of these substances. A 30-count, superseding indictment was returned on October 14, 1994, which added a series of forfeiture counts against the defendants.

Ceasare Thomas, Myron Thomas, Lamont Joseph, Santo Bolden, and Raymond Eaddy were tried on charges set forth in the superseding indictment beginning on November 22, 1994. After a Government witness apparently made certain prejudicial statements on the stand, a mistrial was declared on November 28, 1994. A second trial of the same defendants began two days later, on November 30, 1994, and the jury returned verdicts of guilty for all defendants but Raymond Eaddy on December 14, 1994. We affirm these convictions in a summary order filed today. See United States v. Thomas et al., Nos. 95-1337 et al. (2d Cir. May 20, 1997).

The remaining appellants, Grady Thomas, Ramse Thomas, Jason Thomas, Tracey Thomas, and Loray Thomas, along with Terrence Thomas, Shawne Thomas, Carrie Thomas, Stephon Russell, and Robert Gibson, were the subject of a separate trial, which began on January 18, 1995.2 Grady Thomas, Ramse Thomas, Jason Thomas, Tracey Thomas, and Loray Thomas appeal from judgments of conviction entered against them following this trial, and we consider their appeals here.3 We confine our factual discussion of this trial to the events leading up to and including the ultimate dismissal of one of the jurors. These events provide the basis for the appellants' primary challenge to the proceedings below.

* * *

During jury selection, the Government attempted to exercise a peremptory challenge to a juror who would later be empaneled as "Juror No. 5." Because the juror was black--indeed, the only black person remaining as a potential juror in a case in which, as the record indicates, all of the defendants are black--defense counsel objected to the peremptory challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), as racially motivated. The Government responded that it wished to exclude the juror based not on his race, but on the fact that he failed to make eye contact with the Government's counsel during the voir dire. Although the district court explicitly found that the Government's peremptory challenge was not motivated by race, the court, in a misapplication of Batson,4 nevertheless denied the challenge on the ground that the juror's failure to make eye contact was an insufficient basis for his removal. The court would later explain that Juror No. 5's status as the only black juror in a case involving black defendants had motivated its decision to deny the Government's challenge.

Problems regarding Juror No. 5 did not end with his selection for the jury, however. During the course of defense summations on Friday, February 17, 1995, following several weeks of trial, a group of six jurors approached the courtroom clerk to express their concerns about the juror. The six jurors complained that Juror No. 5 was distracting them in court by squeaking his shoe against the floor, rustling cough drop wrappers in his pocket, and showing agreement with points made by defense counsel by slapping his leg and, occasionally during the defense summations, saying "[y]eah, yes."

Chief Judge McAvoy met with counsel in chambers to discuss the complaints about Juror No. 5. The judge raised the possibility of conducting interviews with each member of the jury to determine the extent to which Juror No. 5 was distracting them from their duties. Alternatively, he considered dismissing Juror No. 5 in favor of an alternate juror pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 24(c).5 While the Government approved of the idea of interviewing the jurors, and dismissing Juror No. 5 if the interviews revealed that his behavior was disturbing other members of the jury, defense counsel generally opposed both options, preferring that the court permit summations to continue with only a general instruction to the jurors that they were not to form any opinions before starting their deliberations. In the face of conflicting recommendations from counsel on how to proceed, the judge dismissed the jurors for the day, requesting that counsel submit memoranda of law over the three-day weekend on an appropriate course of action. The court did, however, instruct the jurors before dismissing them that they should not yet "form any opinions or conclusions about the case."

The court received letter briefs from the Government and from counsel for Ramse Thomas, dated February 17 and 20, 1995, respectively, on the proper course of action regarding Juror No. 5. The Government recommended in its brief that the court conduct in camera, on-the-record interviews with the jurors (outside the presence of counsel to promote candid responses) to determine whether there were grounds to dismiss Juror No. 5--specifically, to determine whether the juror "had been disruptive to the point where the other jurors don't believe that they can deliberate with him, ... has formed opinions about the case that he has communicated to the other jurors, or if there is some other misconduct found which establishes that he is unable to render a fair and impartial verdict." In his brief, counsel for Ramse Thomas argued that the court should refrain from conducting any juror interviews, urging that such an inquiry might bias members of the jury against the defendants. He also objected to the dismissal of Juror No. 5.

When the jury returned from the three-day weekend on Tuesday, February 21, the court followed the procedure recommended by the Government. Without counsel present, the court conducted in camera, on-the-record interviews with each juror to determine the extent of any distraction resulting from Juror No. 5's behavior in the jury box. Quite appropriately, the court began each interview with a general inquiry as to whether anything had happened during the course of trial that would interfere with the juror's ability to deliberate and decide the case properly; the court did not ask about Juror No. 5's behavior unless the interviewee first raised the issue. Although seven of the jurors indicated that Juror No. 5 was a source of some distraction, all but one, who "thought possibly" that she would experience problems during deliberations because of Juror No. 5, anticipated nothing that would interfere with their own ability to deliberate. For his part, Juror No. 5 explained to the court that he sometimes got "carried away" in listening to the attorneys' arguments, but he stated that he would have no difficulty in applying the law as set out by the court to the evidence presented at trial. He also assured the court that he would "restrain [him]self" from engaging in any further distracting behavior.

After completing his in camera interviews, Chief Judge McAvoy met with counsel in chambers. He explained that he had interviewed the jurors, briefly summarized the testimony he had received in the interviews, and expressed his intention, based on these interviews, to remove Juror No. 5 in favor of one of the alternate jurors. The judge indicated that he was concerned that Juror No. 5's behavior, especially in light of the court's own inquiries of the jurors, might place him in an adversarial relationship with his fellow jurors as they began deliberations. The judge then sought comments from each of the parties' counsel. The Government agreed with the court's proposal to remove Juror No. 5, but the proposed dismissal met with unanimous opposition from defense counsel. Apparently persuaded by the defense's vigorous objections, the judge reconsidered the matter and decided to retain Juror No. 5 on the panel. Following the court's meeting with counsel, summations concluded, and the court charged the jury that same day.

The jury deliberated throughout the day on February 22. On February 23, the courtroom clerk reported to the court, and then on the record to all counsel, that she had been approached on two separate occasions earlier in the day by jurors expressing concern over the course of their deliberations. Juror No. 1 reportedly had indicated to the clerk that deliberations were likely to continue beyond February 23 because of a "problem with an unnamed juror." That same morning, Juror No. 12 had also reported to the clerk "that there was a problem ... in the jury room [with] one of their number, and specifically ... indicated [that] juror number five, had, at each time a vote was taken, voted not guilty and had indicated verbally that he would not change his mind." The court concluded, after hearing argument from counsel for the parties, that no action was immediately necessary; the court would "give it a little more time to see what develops."

Troubles in the jury room seemed to escalate rapidly, however. On the following morning, February 24, the court received a note from Juror No. 6, apparently written only on his own behalf. The note indicated that, due to Juror No. 5's "predisposed disposition," the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Following an off-the-record conversation with counsel for the parties, the court again conducted in camera, on-the-record interviews with each of the jurors outside the presence of counsel. This time, jurors focused their comments more directly on Juror No. 5. Several mentioned the disruptive effect he was having on the deliberations. One juror described him "hollering" at fellow jurors, another said he had called his fellow jurors racists, and two jurors told the court that Juror No. 5 had come close to striking a fellow juror. The judge was also informed by a juror that, at one point, Juror No. 5 pretended to vomit in the bathroom while other jurors were eating lunch outside the bathroom door. The jurors, however, were not unanimous in identifying Juror No. 5 as a source of disruption in the jury room. One juror informed the judge that friction among the jurors had been "pretty well ironed out," and another indicated that the other jurors were in fact "picking on" Juror No. 5.

Although the district court did not specifically inquire into any juror's position on the merits of the case, at least five of the jurors indicated that Juror No. 5 was unyieldingly in favor of acquittal for all of the defendants. The accounts differed, however, regarding the basis for Juror No. 5's position. On the one hand, one juror described Juror No. 5 as favoring acquittal because the defendants were his "people," another suggested that it was because Juror No. 5 thought the defendants were good people, two others stated that Juror No. 5 simply believed that drug dealing is commonplace, and another two jurors indicated that Juror No. 5 favored acquittal because he thought that the defendants had engaged in the alleged criminal activity out of economic necessity. On the other hand, several jurors recounted Juror No. 5 couching his position in terms of the evidence--one juror indicated specifically that Juror No. 5 was discussing the evidence, and four recalled him saying that the evidence, including the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, was insufficient or unreliable. As for Juror No. 5, he said nothing in his interview with the court to suggest that he was not making a good faith effort to apply the law as instructed to the facts of the case. On the contrary, he informed the court that he needed "substantive evidence" establishing guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to convict.

After interviewing the jurors, the judge met in chambers with counsel for the parties. He had the record of the interviews read aloud and permitted counsel to comment on the appropriate course of action. The Government argued that the jurors' responses indicated that there was "almost a jury nullification issue pattern with [Juror No. 5]," and urged the court to order the juror's dismissal, while defense counsel unanimously opposed his removal. Having heard argument from counsel, the judge rendered his decision to remove Juror No. 5. He believed that Juror No. 5 had become a "distraction" and a "focal point" for the jury's attention, and that his removal might "allow [the jury] to deliberate in a full and a fair fashion." The court cited Juror No. 5's failure to live up to his assurances regarding proper conduct, referring in particular to the allegation that he nearly struck another juror and to his feigned vomiting. Most importantly, however, the court found that Juror No. 5 was ignoring the evidence in favor of his own, preconceived ideas about the case:

I believe after hearing everything that [Juror No. 5's] motives are immoral, that he believes that these folks have a right to deal drugs, because they don't have any money, they are in a disadvantaged situation and probably that's the thing to do. And I don't think he would convict them no matter what the evidence was.

The court found that Juror No. 5 was refusing to convict "because of preconceived, fixed, cultural, economic, [or] social ... reasons that are totally improper and impermissible."

The court then called Juror No. 5 into chambers to inform him of his dismissal and, that afternoon, announced the dismissal to the remaining jurors. Jurors were instructed that they were "to draw no inferences or conclusions whatsoever" from the removal and told that they were to start over in their deliberations.

On the afternoon of the following Monday, February 27, 1995, the remaining eleven jurors returned a verdict. They found the defendants Grady, Ramse, Tracy, and Terrence Thomas guilty on all counts, Jason Thomas guilty on three of the four counts against him, and Carrie and Loray Thomas each guilty on a conspiracy count. The jury deadlocked on the fourth count against Jason Thomas and acquitted Carrie and Loray Thomas of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Stephon Russell was acquitted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute, the only count with which he had been charged.

Ramse, Tracey, Loray, Grady, and Jason Thomas here appeal from the judgment of conviction. As their chief argument on appeal, each of these defendants challenges the dismissal of Juror No. 5.

The district court dismissed Juror No. 5 pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 23(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that where "the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors." We review the district court's exercise of this authority for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1092, 115 S.Ct. 756, 130 L.Ed.2d 655 (1995); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1187 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990).

To determine whether the court erred in dismissing Juror No. 5, we must first decide whether the district court's primary basis for the dismissal--the juror's intention to disregard the applicable criminal laws--constitutes "just cause" for his removal under Rule 23(b). In holding that a presiding judge has a duty to dismiss a juror who purposefully disregards the court's instructions on the law, we briefly review the factors that courts have traditionally considered to be "just cause" for dismissal pursuant to Rule 23(b), and discuss the dangers inherent in so-called "nullification." Having concluded that a deliberating juror's intent to nullify constitutes "just cause" for dismissal, we next consider whether the district court in this case had a sufficient evidentiary basis for concluding that Juror No. 5 was purposefully disregarding the court's instructions on the law.A. Dismissal of a Juror During Deliberations: Rule 23(b) and Factors that Traditionally Constitute "Just Cause"

In evaluating the district court's decision to remove Juror No. 5 pursuant to Rule 23(b), we must first decide whether the reasons that the court cited as grounds for the removal constitute "just cause" as that term is employed in the rule. We consider, in particular, the district court's primary ground for dismissal--that Juror No. 5 refused to apply the law as set out in the court's instructions.6 Whether a juror's defiance of the court's instructions on the law constitutes "just cause" for that juror's removal under Rule 23(b) is apparently a question of first impression in this Circuit.

Language was added in 1983 to Rule 23(b) to provide a court with the unilateral authority to remove jurors during the course of deliberations. Prior to that time, Rule 23(b) required the consent of all parties in order for the trial court to dismiss one or more jurors, and to allow the remaining jurors to proceed to a verdict.7 As explained in the Note of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Advisory Committee"), the 1983 amendment was a response to cases in which, after a trial of significant length and involving substantial expense, a juror became "seriously incapacitated or [was] otherwise found to be unable to continue service upon the jury." FED.R.CRIM.P. 23(b) Advisory Committee's Note ("Advisory Committee Note"); see United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1543 (11th Cir.1991) (noting that, in that case, "a mistrial would have necessitated a second expenditure of substantial prosecution, defense and court resources ... the outcome Rule 23(b) was designed to alleviate"). The amendment provides an alternative short of mistrial in such cases, and it does so without calling for the use of alternate jurors once deliberations have begun, an option that the Advisory Committee expressly rejected. Advisory Committee Note; see also United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 948-49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 98, 93 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).

Since the adoption of the 1983 amendment, federal courts have exercised their unilateral authority to dismiss jurors during the course of deliberations for a variety of reasons. Often, courts employ Rule 23(b) in cases, like those described in the Advisory Committee Note, where a juror is incapacitated or has otherwise become unavailable during the course of deliberations. See, e.g., Reese, 33 F.3d at 172-73 (juror leaving for business trip); United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1249-51 (11th Cir.) (juror became ill), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1029, 110 S.Ct. 3284, 111 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990); United States v. Armijo, 834 F.2d 132, 134 (8th Cir.1987) (juror in car accident), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990, 108 S.Ct. 1297, 99 L.Ed.2d 507 (1988); United States v. Molinares Charris, 822 F.2d 1213, 1222-23 (1st Cir.1987) (juror was "nervous and upset," had been crying during deliberations, and had taken tranquilizer); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 830-31 (2d Cir.1985) (juror unable to deliberate on religious holiday), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1162, 106 S.Ct. 2285, 90 L.Ed.2d 726 (1986).

"Just cause" is not limited to instances of juror illness or unavailability, however. Courts have also found "just cause" to dismiss jurors who, although available and physically capable of serving, are nonetheless found to be unable to perform their duties properly. In particular, Rule 23(b) dismissals have been upheld repeatedly in cases where the trial court found that a juror was no longer capable of rendering an impartial verdict. These cases have involved instances of jurors who felt threatened by one of the parties, see United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1300 (2d Cir.) (juror "disabled by fear" after receiving what he thought was threat from defendant), cert. denied sub nom. Gotti v. United States, 502 U.S. 938, 112 S.Ct. 372, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991); Casamento, 887 F.2d at 1186-87 (juror fearful after daughter received threatening phone call), who are discovered to have a relationship with one of the parties, see United States v. Barone, 846 F.Supp. 1016, 1018-19 (D.Mass.1994) (juror who was informed that defense attorney had represented his cousin deemed unable to "render a fair and impartial verdict"), or whose life circumstances otherwise change during the course of deliberations in such a way that they are no longer considered capable of rendering an impartial verdict, see United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 762-63 (9th Cir.1992) (juror "might not be able to be fair to both parties" after learning that girlfriend had been arrested and mistreated by police).

B. Nullification as "Just Cause" for Dismissal

Here, Chief Judge McAvoy identified a different form of bias as the primary ground for dismissing Juror No. 5--one arising not from an external event or from a relationship between a juror and a party, but rather, from a more general opposition to the application of the criminal narcotics laws to the defendants' conduct. In the court's view, Juror No. 5 believed that the defendants had "a right to deal drugs." Based on what the court described as the juror's "preconceived, fixed, cultural, economic, [or] social ... reasons that are totally improper and impermissible," the court concluded that Juror No. 5 was unlikely to convict the defendants "no matter what the evidence was." Essentially, the judge found that Juror No. 5 intended to engage in a form of "nullification," a practice whereby a juror votes in purposeful disregard of the evidence, defying the court's instructions on the law.

We take this occasion to restate some basic principles regarding the character of our jury system. Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court--in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to "render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence." FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 225 (4th ed. 1996) (emphasis supplied).8 We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent. Accordingly, we conclude that a juror who intends to nullify the applicable law is no less subject to dismissal than is a juror who disregards the court's instructions due to an event or relationship that renders him biased or otherwise unable to render a fair and impartial verdict.

We are mindful that the term "nullification" can cover a number of distinct, though related, phenomena, encompassing in one word conduct that takes place for a variety of different reasons; jurors may nullify, for example, because of the identity of a party, a disapprobation of the particular prosecution at issue, or a more general opposition to the applicable criminal law or laws. We recognize, too, that nullification may at times manifest itself as a form of civil disobedience that some may regard as tolerable. The case of John Peter Zenger, the publisher of the New York Weekly Journal acquitted of criminal libel in 1735, and the nineteenth-century acquittals in prosecutions under the fugitive slave laws, are perhaps our country's most renowned examples of "benevolent" nullification. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Leventhal, J.); see also SHANNON C, STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 52-55 (1990) (describing Zenger trial). We are also aware of the long and complicated history of juries acting as judges of the law as well as the evidence, see, e.g., John D. Gordan III, Juries as Judges of the Law: The American Experience, 108 LAW Q. REV. 272 (1992); Mark De Wolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939), and of the theoretical underpinnings of this practice in the United States, in which legal decisions by juries were sometimes regarded as an expression of faithfulness to the law (regardless of the authority of institutions or officeholders), rather than defiance of the law or "nullification."More generally, the very institution of trial by jury in a criminal case, as Judge Learned Hand observed, "introduces a slack into the enforcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions." U.S. ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). This is so because, as Judge Hand explained, "[t]he individual can forfeit his liberty--to say nothing of his life--only at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anonymously in the community from which they came.... [S]ince if they acquit their verdict is final, no one is likely to suffer of whose conduct they do not morally disapprove...." Id. at 775-76.

As courts have long recognized, several features of our jury trial system act to protect the jury's power to acquit, regardless of the evidence, when the prosecution's case meets with the jury's "moral[ ] disapprov[al]." Since the emergence of the general verdict in criminal cases and the famous opinion in Bushell's Case, 124 Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P.1670), freeing a member of the jury arrested for voting to acquit William Penn against the weight of the evidence, nullifying jurors have been protected from being called to account for their verdicts. Moreover, and in addition to the courts' duty to safeguard the secrecy of the jury deliberation room (discussed in greater detail below), the several rules protecting the unassailability of jury verdicts of acquittal--even where these verdicts are inconsistent with other verdicts rendered by the same jury in the same case, United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 423 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.) (recognizing link between upholding inconsistent verdicts and protecting juries' power of lenity), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 242, 19 L.Ed.2d 262 (1967)--serve to "permit[ ] juries to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they were disposed through lenity." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1999, 2007, 64 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But as the quotation from the Supreme Court's opinion in Standefer indicates, in language originally employed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to "nullify" or exercise a power of lenity is just that--a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent. It is true that nullification has a long history in the Anglo-American legal system, see Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130-33, and that the federal courts have long noted the de facto power of a jury to render general verdicts "in the teeth of both law and facts," Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S.Ct. 53, 54, 65 L.Ed. 185 (1920); see, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 714 F.2d 102, 105-06 (11th Cir.1983). However, at least since the Supreme Court's decision in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895) (holding that, while juries are finders of fact, "it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them"), courts have consistently recognized that jurors have no right to nullify. See Gordan, supra, at 272, 277 (noting that, with Sparf, the Supreme Court "fixed the law where Lord Mansfield had left it" in King v. Shipley ("The Dean of St. Asaph's Case"), 4 Doug. 73 (K.B. 1784), in which Mansfield had written that jurors have the power, but not the right, to decide the law); Howe, supra, at 589 (referring to Sparf as "the Supreme Court's final and authoritative denial of the [jury's] right" to serve as judges of the law); see, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir.1988) ("[J]ury nullification is just a power, not also a right ...."). As a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit--composed of Chief Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Judge George E. MacKinnon, and then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg--explained:

A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant guilty, and the fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized power.

United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C.Cir.1983) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Indeed, as we noted above, the exercise of this de facto power is a violation of a juror's sworn duty to "apply the law as interpreted by the court." United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110, 116 (1st Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 991, 90 S.Ct. 1124, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970).9

Moreover, although the early history of our country includes the occasional Zenger trial or acquittals in fugitive slave cases, more recent history presents numerous and notorious examples of jurors nullifying--cases that reveal the destructive potential of a practice Professor Randall Kennedy of the Harvard Law School has rightly termed a "sabotage of justice." Randall Kennedy, The Angry Juror, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 1994, at A12. Consider, for example, the two hung juries in the 1964 trials of Byron De La Beckwith in Mississippi for the murder of NAACP field secretary Medgar Evers, or the 1955 acquittal of J.W. Millam and Roy Bryant for the murder of fourteen-year-old Emmett Till, see DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE FIFTIES 431-41 (1993); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 60-63, 250 (1997); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-1965, at 38-57, 221-25 (1987)--shameful examples of how nullification has been used to sanction murder and lynching.

Inasmuch as no juror has a right to engage in nullification--and, on the contrary, it is