United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross v. James Scott Mann William M. Moore, Defendants-Appellants-Cross

Appellants James Mann and William Moore were convicted on numerous counts relating to their dealings with Jefferson Savings and Loan Association, McAllen, Texas (Jefferson), and its successor institutions. They challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and raise numerous other grounds for reversal. The government cross-appeals on a sentencing issue. We affirm.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom and all credibility determinations, in the light most favorable to the verdict. 1 The verdict will be upheld if a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 With these standards in mind, we do not attempt a comprehensive recitation of the evidence, much of which was conflicting. We endeavor here only to explain, after a careful review of the evidence, our conclusions regarding the sufficiency points of error.

1. Count 1 and Related Counts

Mann and Moore challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on count 1 and related counts of the superseding indictment on which they were tried. These counts concern Jefferson’s purchase of oil and gas properties known as the Tartan properties in late 1982. Count 1 charged Peter Gallaher, Moore, Julian Alsup, Charles Christensen (GMAC), 3 and Mann with conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Generally, “[t]o establish guilt for conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that two or more people agreed to pursue an unlawful objective together, that the defendant voluntarily agreed to join the conspiracy, and that one of the members of the conspiracy performed an overt act to further the conspiracy.” 4 By its terms, § 371 provides that the unlawful objective of the conspiracy may be “to commit any offense against the United States,” i.e. to commit a federal crime, or “to defraud the United States.”

In order to convict a defendant of conspiracy, the prosecution must offer substantial evidence that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy. 5 However, each element of a conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. 6 An agreement may be inferred from a “concert of action.” 7 A conspiracy may exist by tacit agreement; an express or explicit agreement is not required. 8

Count 1 charged that GMAC and Mann conspired:

(a) to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful governmental functions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in the regulation, supervision, and examination of the affairs of Jefferson;

(b) to willfully misapply monies, funds, assets, and credits of Jefferson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657;

*848 (c) to make false entries in the records, reports, and statements of Jefferson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006;

(d) to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating the lawful governmental functions of the Internal Revenue Service in the ascertainment, computation, assessment, and collection of revenue, namely, income taxes; and

(e) to make and file with the Internal Revenue Service false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1).

Regarding the underlying substantive federal offenses referenced, establishing an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 657 requires proof that the accused was an officer, agent or employee of, or connected in some way with, a federally insured savings and loan association, he willfully misapplied funds of the association, and he acted with intent to injure or defraud the association. 9 To establish a false entry in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006, the government must prove that the accused was an officer, agent, or employee of a lending institution authorized by and acting under the laws of the United States, that he knowingly and willfully made, or caused to be made, a false entry concerning a material fact in a book, report, or statement of the institution, and that he acted with the intent to injure or defraud the institution or any of its officers, auditors, examiners, or agents. 10 A violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) is established by proof that the accused willfully made and subscribed to a tax return, the return contained a written declaration that it was made under penalties of perjury, and the accused did not believe that the return was true as to every material matter. 11

A rational jury could have found the following based on the evidence presented. Jefferson was a financially troubled institution, owied by Guillermo Cartaya. Mann and GMAC were interested in acquiring Jefferson. Mann and GMAC had become acquaintances through various business dealings. Mann dropped out of the acquisition group, in part because of concern that his prior bankruptcy might concern regulators. GMAC, principally through Moore, and Mann hatched a byzantine scheme to acquire Jefferson by stealing $4 million of the institution’s own assets. This fraud was effected when Mann purchased the Tartan properties for $9.6 million, and simultaneously sold the properties to Jefferson for $13.8 million, thus clearing a $4.2 million profit. Mann ultimately kept part of the profit, and transferred part of the profit to GMAC, who then used the funds to buy Jefferson.

Mann located the Tartan properties, which were for sale. In dealing with the sellers, Mann purported to be acting as an agent or “trustee” for Jefferson, even though GMAC had not yet acquired Jefferson. Mann used a company he had incorporated a few months earlier, Cameo Financial Corporation (Cameo), in the course of negotiations to buy the Tartan properties. Mann negotiated a $9.6 million purchase price with Forbes Gordon, acting on behalf of the owners of the properties. Mann testified in a civil deposition that he dealt exclusively with Moore in negotiating to sell the properties to Jefferson, and that Moore knew what Mann was paying for the properties. In December of 1982, Moore and Fred White, who wanted to remain as president of Jefferson, caused Jefferson to wire $13.8 million in cash from Jefferson to Mann’s Cameo “trustee account.” Of these funds, $9.6 million went to the sellers of the Tartan properties. The properties were assigned to Jefferson. In monthly and quarterly filings with the FHLBB, Jefferson reported assets based on the $13.8 million price it had paid for the Tartan properties, rather than the $9.6 million price Mann had paid.

Of the $4.2 million profit Mann made on the purchase and simultaneous sale of the Tartan properties, Mann proceeded to funnel $4 million to GMAC, who ultimately used the funds to acquire Jefferson. The transactions that followed in the space of a few days could not have been less straightforward. Hitting the high points, Mann kept $200,000 of the *849 profit. Cameo paid off $4 million in debt on a shopping center owned by Parkway Square Joint Venture, in which Moore and Gallaher had an interest. The shopping center was transferred to Parkway South Development Corporation (PSDC), a company controlled by Moore and Gallaher. PSDC issued a $4 million promissory note to Cameo (the PSDC note). Jefferson paid PSDC approximately $6 million in cash and three parcels of land for the shopping center. PSDC transferred approximately $5 million in cash to GMAC, and GMAC executed a note to PSDC. The GMAC partners also individually signed $900,000 notes payable to PSDC. GMAC paid Cartaya, the owner of Jefferson,' $5 million in cash for his stock in Jefferson. Cartaya transferred $1.5 million in cash to PSDC and received three parcels of land. Mann later sold the $4 million PSDC note to Alsup and Christensen for approximately $1 million in cash, property and a note. Payments were not made on the PSDC note. For years after GMAC acquired Jefferson, PSDC filed tax returns identifying a $4 million “loan from stockholders,” rather than revealing $4 million in income to GMAC that was used to acquire Jefferson.

Two former members of the Jefferson board testified that the old board had not approved the acquisition of the oil and gas properties, and that a board resolution purporting to state otherwise was false. A rational jury could find that Moore or another conspirator fabricated the board resolution approving the transaction before GMAC acquired Jefferson.

A rational jury could find that the price Jefferson paid for the Tartan properties was grossly inflated. First, the very nature of the transactions support such a finding. Mann and Gordon, on behalf of the sellers, reached an arms-length price that was $4.2 less than the price Jefferson paid. The incentive on the part of those who controlled Jefferson to cause Jefferson to overpay is manifest: GMAC were thereby able to use Jefferson’s own federally insured deposits to acquire Jefferson; Mann personally profited by over $1 million; and Cartaya was able to unload his troubled institution and walk away with approximately $5 million in cash and real estate. The rank self-dealing, by itself, is compelling evidence that Jefferson paid too much. The complex nature of the transactions and appellants’ efforts to conceal them from federal regulators (discussed further below) casts further doubt on the legitimacy of the price Jefferson paid.

Other evidence, though conflicting, supports a finding that Jefferson paid far too much for the Tartan properties. Gordon testified that sophisticated parties almost always look to evaluation studies when buying oil and gas properties such as the Tartan properties. Mann and Gordon reviewed such a study prepared by Ron Lenser, and referred to that study in their purchase agreement. While the evaluation gives a discounted net future income figure of $13.5 million for the properties, Gordon was adamant at trial that this figure is not consistent with the fair market value of such properties. He testified that, in part because of the risk associated with such properties, as opposed to a safer investment, the $13.5 million figure “does not say they are worth 13.5 million dollars.... [Tjhere’s no way that anybody is going to pay you 13 million dollars, in my opinion for oil property, I don’t think.” Asked what he would say if such a price had been proposed, Gordon responded “I wouldn’t pay any attention to you. I would tell you to take a walk.” Lenser testified that the future net income figure was not the same as fair market value and that he so stated in his report. He calculated the fair market value of the properties at $9.2 million. Another expert at evaluating oil and gas properties testified that the net future income figure in the Lenser report does not correspond to fair market value, due to risk factors, and that the figures in the Lenser report indicate a fair market value of about $8.5 million for the Tartan properties. Jefferson tried to sell the properties in 1983. No formal offers were made, and the highest prices that potential purchasers “kicked around” were $3 to $3.5 million.

David Thornberry, an attorney, testified that his firm was approached by Mann, Moore, Christensen and Gallaher in September of 1982. They represented to Thornberry that they were in the process of *850 acquiring Jefferson. At the outset Thornberry thought he was representing both Moore and Mann. Thornberry met with Moore and Mann regarding the Tartan properties. Thornberry’s notes indicate that “we’ve agreed to purchase [the Tartan properties], probably a ten million-dollar transaction.” Thornberry drafted legal documents pertaining to the sale of the Tartan properties. He understood that “nine-point-something million dollars was the ... final negotiated price.” Mann never explained to Thornberry that he was “going to have Cameo resell the oil and gas properties over to Jefferson Savings for 13.8 million dollars,” or hand over $4 million of excess funds Jefferson paid for the oil and gas to GMAC to buy the institution.

GMAC and Mann did not reveal the true nature of the transactions to regulators. Attorney Ben Plotkin 12 and his firm prepared the notice of change in control for Jefferson that was required by the FHLBB. The notice, signed by each of the GMAC partners, required answers to pre-printed questions. The notice was prepared based on information provided by GMAC. Plotkin spoke with Moore several times. Moore never told Plot-kin that the oil and gas transaction was part of the financing for the acquisition of Jefferson. The notice asked the source of funds for the acquisition and whether “any part of such funds is to be borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of making the acquisition.” GMAC did not indicate that any of the funds had come from Jefferson itself or from Cameo, or that GMAC and PSDC had signed the related promissory notes described above. David Cockcroft, the FHLBB official who reviewed the notice, testified that it did not disclose that the acquirers intended to cause Jefferson to pay $13.8 million cash for the Tartan properties, and that $4 million of this amount would be used to acquire Jefferson. In Cockcroft’s opinion, the failure to disclose these transactions meant that GMAC had not acquired the institution under the terms and conditions stated in the notice. If these transactions had been disclosed, “we would have looked with suspicion or with great concern about any significant assets going out of the institution,” which had a net worth of only $4 million at the time.

The FHLBB conducted an examination of Jefferson in 1983 that lasted several months. The assigned agents met with Moore and White, and focused on the oil and gas properties, among other things. They requested documentation underlying the investment. Jefferson provided them a copy of the purchase agreement between Cameo and Jefferson whereby Jefferson paid Cameo $13.8 million for the properties. They were not told or provided documentation that Mann had paid only $9.6 million for the properties. One of the agents testified that if they had been told that the acquisition of GMAC depended on the purchase of the oil and gas properties, “[i]t would have been a big red flag as far as the examiners were concerned.”

In 1985, in the course of an IRS examination of GMAC, Jefferson, and other entities, Gallaher told the agent performing the examination that the funds for the acquisition of Jefferson had come from InterFirst Bank, Alsup and Christensen, rather than from Jefferson itself. Moore told the agent that the acquisition funds came from loans from PSDC. In 1988, after agent Burns concluded that each of the GMAC individuals “had received one million dollars of income from Jefferson Savings and Loan through the Cameo entity for the purchase of the stock of Jefferson,” the IRS sent deficiency notices to GMAC. GMAC responded with a tax suit claiming that “these dollars were loans,” rather than taxable income. In March 1987 depositions before the FHLBB, Gallaher denied knowing where Mann got the money for the $4 million PSDC loan, and denied knowledge of who had sold the Tartan properties to Jefferson. Christensen denied knowing the identity of the seller of the Tartan properties. Moore denied knowing that Mann was the seller of the properties.

In summary, a rational jury could find that Mann and Moore participated in a conspiracy *851 whereby: (1) Mann sold the Tartan properties to Jefferson at an inflated price; (2) Mann, for personal financial gain, and GMAC used the profits from the sale of the Tartan properties to transfer ownership of Jefferson to GMAC, in effect misapplying Jefferson’s own assets to acquire Jefferson, at a time when the institution was already in poor financial shape; and (3) the conspirators concealed the true nature of the acquisition scheme from federal banking authorities; (4) overstated the assets of the institution to perpetuate GMAC’s control of it; and (5) filed false returns with the IRS to conceal the nature of them transactions and avoid taxes. The evidence is sufficient on count 1.

The evidence was also sufficient on count 2, which charged that GMAC, aided and abetted by Mann, 13 made a false entry on the books of Northwest Savings Association (Northwest) by overstating the value of Jefferson Energy Corporation, which held the Tartan properties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. Jefferson changed its name to Franklin Savings Association-MeAIlen, and was merged into Northwest in December 1983. Northwest remained under the control of GMAC. The evidence showed that Jefferson continued to carry the value of Tartan properties at an inflated priced derived from the original purchase price to Jefferson.

Mann and Moore argue that the acquisition of the Tartan properties was a “value for value” transaction that cannot be considered criminal, under the reasoning of United States v. Beuttenmuller, 14 In Beuttenmul-ler, Shamrock Savings wanted to sell unproductive real estate known as the Tanglewood property. Defendant Gill and his partner Billings wanted additional financing for a real estate development known as the Mansfield property. Through a complex transaction, (1) a subsidiary of Shamrock purchased an interest in the Mansfield property, (2) a newly created entity controlled by Gill and Billings bought the Tanglewood property from Shamrock, (3) proceeds from the sale of the Mansfield property interest were used to make the down payment on the Tanglewood property, (4) the remaining balance due on the sale of the Tanglewood property was financed through a non-recourse loan from Shamrock, and (5) Shamrock recorded a profit on its books as a result of the sale of the Tanglewood property. 15

We reversed the convictions of the Shamrock president, Gill and Beuttenmuller, an attorney who documented the transactions, on all bank fraud counts, including a conspiracy count alleging a conspiracy to make false entries and misapply funds. We found nothing illegal per se when a savings association sells its own real estate and loans money for the purchase price, or when a borrower uses the proceeds from a separate sale of property to the lender as the down payment. We held that the transactions amounted to a “cash for trash” transaction in violation of the bank fraud statutes, rather than a legitimate “value-for-value” transaction, only “(1) if the Mansfield property had no value; or (2) if the value of the Mansfield property was so low that the transaction was essentially a sham designed to cover the fact that Shamrock Savings was gratuitously providing Gill and Billings with the down payment money for the purchase of [the Tanglewood property].” 16 Because the government could not prove either condition, we reversed the convictions. We concluded that “no criminality can be attached to [defendants] because the bottom dropped out of the real estate markets.” 17

We believe that Beuttenmuller is factually so different from the pending case that it cannot control the result here. The nature of the alleged fraud in Beuttenmuller was that the defendants employed a “cash for trash” scheme to avoid regulations requiring *852 a down payment for real estate. “A ‘cash for trash’ scheme is an illegal scheme that allows an institution to sell [real estate owned] that has been wholly financed in violation of banking regulations that require at least a twenty percent down payment.” 18 In the pending case the government proved a far more sinister conspiracy. The conspiracy was not merely one to avoid regulations requiring a down payment. The rankest form of self-dealing was demonstrated. As explained above, the government proved that Mann purchased the properties for $9.6 million, and in concert with Moore, caused Jefferson simultaneously to pay $13.8 million for the property. On the difference in price, Mann pocketed $200,000 up front, and was later rewarded with another $1 million when he sold the PSDC note. The remainder of Mann’s initial profit was funneled to Moore and others in an elaborate scheme that allowed them to take over Jefferson. In effect, appellants stole millions of dollars from Jefferson to enrich themselves and take over Jefferson. This is a more egregious form of fraud, in our view, than simply trying to skirt regulations requiring a down payment on real estate loans. On these facts, we do not read Beuttenmuller to hold that appellants escape liability as long as the oil and gas properties had some value. Further, this is not a case where defendants are being judged with hindsight because “the bottom dropped out of the real estate markets.” 19 The essence of the fraud here was that Mann negotiated an arms-length price, and then simultaneously sold at a much higher price to personally profit and provide funds for the purchase of Jefferson by GMAC. This case is more akin to “land flip” cases where a single property is bought and sold simultaneously, and the difference in price is diverted to illicit purposes. 20 In such cases, criminality is not avoided merely by showing that the property that was “flipped” had some value.

Moore argues that the evidence was insufficient on counts 26 and 27. These counts charged that Moore filed 1987 and 1988 corporate tax returns for PSDC, falsely claiming a $4 million “loan from stockholders,” in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206. The returns also had corresponding or related line items for “loans to stockholders.” The government’s theory was that the PSDC loan was a sham because it was never intended to be repaid, and that the tax returns were an effort to characterize funds traceable to Mann’s sale of the Tartan properties as a loan, rather than income to GMAC, allowing GMAC to avoid personal income taxes. It offered evidence, described above, that the “loan” funds originated with Mann’s sale of the Tartan properties to Jefferson, which were used to pay off the shopping center which was then bought by Jefferson. The proceeds of the sale of the shopping center to Jefferson were then used by GMAC to buy Jefferson, consistent with the government’s theory that GMAC used Jefferson’s own money to acquire it. Moore’s own accountant was confused by the supposed loans and was concerned that there was no documentation to support them. The PSDC loan was not repaid. In filings with the FHLBB, Mann did not include the PSDC note as an asset on Cameo’s financial statements. A rational jury could find that the loan was a sham, and that the entries on the tax returns were part of an effort to allow GMAC to avoid declaring millions of dollars in income. More specifically, the jury could find that instead of having PSDC report millions of dollars in dividends to GMAC, or payments to GMAC via 1099 forms, the conspirators treated the $4 million transfer from Cameo as a loan in the PSDC tax returns. We find the evidence sufficient on counts 26 and 27.

2. Count SO and Related Counts

Mann and Moore challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on count 30. This count alleged a conspiracy whereby GMAC and Mann caused Northwest, the successor institution of Jefferson, to swap the stock in the subsidiary holding the Tartan properties for a piece of real estate owned by Mann. *853 The property swap was part of an alleged conspiracy to “willfully misapply money, funds, assets, and credits of Northwest Savings,” and “to fraudulently make and cause false entries in the records, statements, and reports of Northwest Savings.” The alleged objectives of the conspiracy were “to fraudulently maintain the inflated net worth of Northwest Savings Association and to prevent regulatory intervention by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board,” and “to transfer ownership and control of Northwest Savings to Defendant Mann by fraudulent means.”

A rational jury could find the following. In 1984, Northwest still owned the Tartan properties and was still controlled by GMAC. Northwest was a financially troubled institution. In October 1984, the FHLBB informed Northwest that it was insolvent and that the directors should make efforts to infuse capital or otherwise increase the institution’s net worth. GMAC responded with a letter to the FHLBB, informing it that it intended to increase its net worth by swapping its oil and gas properties for a tract of land known as Bridgepoint. The letter states that the real estate to be acquired “would have an appraised value equal to or greater than the present book value of’ the oil and gas investment. Bridgepoint was part of a larger tract Mann had purchased through Cameo from Pinnacle/Affiliated Joint Venture (Pinnacle). For business reasons unrelated to this case, Pinnacle had released its vendor’s lien on the rest of the tract, leaving Bridgepoint saddled with $7.1 million in debt. Mann, by way of a guaranty, was personally liable for $1 million of this debt.

Mann told Dick Matz, who had helped Mann with financing on the Bridgepoint property, that he was purchasing Northwest and that the swap was part of the consideration. In December 1984, Northwest, through GMAC, swapped the Tartan properties (through a transfer of stock in Northwest’s energy subsidiary) for Bridgepoint. Northwest assumed Mann’s personal guaranty and Cameo’s $7.1 million debt on the Bridgepoint property. Northwest paid $1.1 million in principal and interest due to Pinnacle on December 30.

A rational jury could find that while the Tartan properties were worth millions of dollars, Bridgepoint had a negative net worth, due to the $7.1 million debt on the property. In late 1983, Patrick McClusky, an MAI appraiser, had appraised Bridgepoint at $3.2 million if it was sold separately. Eve Williams, another MAI appraiser, worked for First Franklin Appraisal Company, a subsidiary of Franklin Savings, which was controlled by GMAC. In early 1985 she appraised the property at $4.5 million. These appraisals did not consider debt on the property. Williams’ boss asked her to “to keep looking at the lot values and the absorption to make sure that [she] had taken into consideration how good, how nice this piece of property was.” Frustrated and confused, she asked her boss, “you know, what’s the magic number?” Her boss, “who didn’t look like he was real serious about it,” said the magic number was $19 million. Williams testified there wasn’t any way she could come up with that evaluation.

In 1986, the FHLBB conducted an examination that included an investigation of the Bridgepoint swap. One examiner was concerned that the swap “didn’t make any sense,” and another, Steven Taylor, “couldn’t understand the economic justification for Northwest’s part of the deal.” An appraisal for the Bridgepoint property could not be located in the institution’s records. Written inquiries were sent to Northwest’s directors and Mann. A response from GMAC claimed that they had reviewed a December 9, 1983 appraisal, and that they had placed a value of $4 million on the oil and gas properties. The appraisal, however, placed a $3.2 million market value on Bridgepoint. GMAC conceded that Bridgepoint was encumbered with $7.1 million in debt and that Northwest had had to pay $781,000 in accrued interest. Based on these figures, Taylor concluded that Northwest had swapped a property worth $4 million for a property with a negative worth of approximately $5 million, resulting in a loss to the institution of approximately $9 million.

An accountant and acting controller of Northwest, on instructions from Moore or Plotkin, booked Bridgepoint on Northwest’s *854 books at $18.8 million. This figure was the sum of the overstated value of the Tartan properties and the outstanding debt on Bridgepoint Northwest had assumed. Northwest had not had an appraisal done on the property prior to the swap. In 1985 FHLBB reports, Northwest reported that Bridgepoint was worth $19.18 million in March, and $19,354 million in April. The accountant testified that when she showed Moore the Eve Williams appraisal, he “threw it across the room.” Audie Pete, a CPA with Ernst and Whinney, became Northwest’s controller in May 1985. He was concerned about accounting for the Bridgepoint property because it was such a large part of Northwest’s total assets. He asked for an appraisal on more than one occasion. Eventually he ordered an appraisal. Marcella Pardo, another MAI appraiser with First Franklin Appraisal Company, appraised the market value of the property, as of December 31, 1984, at $4.8 million.

In 1985 Mann acquired Northwest Savings from GMAC. He merged it with Equitable Savings and created CreditBanc Savings and Loan Association (CreditBanc). At first he had proposed using Northwest’s own money to buy out his partner in Equitable. After this proposal was rejected, the FHLBB reluctantly accepted a later proposal, in part because the FHLBB was of the view that “Northwest is insolvent and we have no other option currently available.” At the time fed-ex-al takeovers of insolvent institutions were limited to those institutions that were “desperately insolvent,” according to the official who reviewed the proposed merger. The merger application included a pro forma balance sheet for Northwest, Equitable and the proposed merged institution. The line item for Northwest’s real estate owned reflected a value of $18-19 million for the Bridgepoint property.

Prior to the merger Audie Pete believed that “mark to market” accounting would be required, appraising assets as of the date of the merger. He received an oral preliminary appraisal of $5-6 million for the Bridgepoint property. He adjusted the value of Bridge-point on Northwest’s books downward by $14.8 million, an adjustment he believed “would have a very significant impact on the operations.” Mann instructed Pete to cancel the appraisal. Pete then “whited-out” the $14.8 million adjustment.

In summary, a rational jury could find that GMAC and Mann swapped the Tartan properties for the Bridgepoint property in an effort to falsely inflate the reported assets of Northwest. This effort forestalled the FHLBB from declaring Northwest insolvent, allowed Mann to personally unload a property with a negative net worth for valuable oil and gas properties, and allowed for the planned transfer of Northwest to Mann. The swap also removed the oil and gas properties from the books of Jefferson, and the jury could reasonably find this swap as a further effort to delay or hinder regulatory investigation of the earlier transaction made the basis of count 1. We find the evidence sufficient on count 30.

The evidence was also sufficient to convict Moore and Mann on related counts 31 and 32. Count 31 charged that GMAC and Mann with the substantive count of misapplying Northwest’s funds in connection with the land swap. A rational jury could find that Moore, as a director of Northwest, grossly misapplied the institution’s funds in connection with the swap, and that Mann aided and abetted this misapplication. Count 32 alleged that GMAC, aided and abetted by Mann, made a false entry by booking the Bridgepoint property at almost $19 million. As explained above, a rational jury could conclude that this value was grossly overstated.

Appellants again argue that, under Beut-tenmuller, the Bridgepoint swap cannot be criminal because it was a value-for-value transaction. Under Beuttenmuller, the property swap is considered value-for-value unless the property acquired had no value, or had “a value so low that the transaction was essentially a sham to cover the fact that” the institution was providing “the down payment money for the purchase of’ the institution’s real estate. 21 Again, we think the conspiracy here went far beyond a mere subterfuge to *855 avoid regulations requiring a down payment. Further, even under the Beuttenmuller test, the jury could easily find that the Bridge-point property was burdened with so much debt that it had a negative net worth.

3. Other Counts against Mann

Mann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on counts 34, 35, 36, 37, and 39. After Mann traded Bridgepoint to Northwest in exchange for the Tartan properties, he placed the latter into Trilex Energy Corporation (Trilex). Mann was chairman and sole shareholder of Trilex. Pete advised Mann that for tax reasons he needed to sell the oil and gas properties in the fiscal year ending November 1985. Mann learned that Chapman Energy Company (Chapman) was interested in buying oil and gas properties. Mann pressed Chapman to buy the properties by the end of November. The properties were sold to Chapman for $3.5 million. According to Chapman’s chairman, to secure the deal, Mann promised (1) to repurchase the properties if there was a discrepancy in the quality or quantity of the properties (since Chapman had not had time to complete its due diligence), (2) to purchase one million shares of Chapman stock from Roger Chapman, and (3) to provide Chapman with a $20 million line of credit from CreditBanc. The Chapman chairman described the line of credit as “important to us as part of the whole deal,” and “an integral part of’ the deal.-

Mann was convicted on count 34, alleging that he violated 18 U.S.C. § 215(a) by representing to Chapman that CreditBanc would provide $20 million in financing to Chapman and purchase Chapman stock to entice Chapman to buy Mann’s oil and gas properties. Mann argues that at most there were some separate discussions about the line of credit and stock purchase unrelated to the Trilex sale, and that in any event the discussions went nowhere. However, a bank officer of a federally insured institution violates § 215 if he “endeavored to procure or procured” a loan from the institution for another in exchange for something of value from that other. 22 We conclude that the evidence is sufficient on this count.

In March 1986, Mann sold one of his companies, T-L Drilling, to Mirlex Corporation for a $2.5 million note payable to the parent of T-L Drilling, Trilex, in which Mann was sole shareholder, and Mirlex’s assumption of $1 million of T-L Drilling debt. The note was later distributed to Mann as a dividend. Mann was convicted on counts 35 and 36, alleging that Mann violated 18 U.S.C. § 215(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 1006, by securing the sale of T-L Drilling and the note in exchange for causing CreditBanc to make a $250,000 loan to Jack Curtsinger, one of Mir-lex’s principals, and representing that Credit-Banc would fund real estate acquisition loans to Curtsinger. The evidence established that CreditBanc made a $250,000 loan to Curt-singer on the same day that Trilex received the $2.5 million note from Mirlex. Curtsinger testified that the loan was working capital needed to “keep the doors open” at T-L Drilling, and that the loan was made “in relation to” the purchase of T-L Drilling. He testified that Mann told him CreditBanc would consider financing Mirlex’s real estate investments, but no such investments were ever financed by CreditBanc. We find the evidence sufficient on count 35, since a rational jury could conclude that Mann both procured and endeavored to procure loans from CreditBanc to Curtsinger in exchange for Mirlex’s purchase of T-L Drilling. This same evidence also supports Mann’s conviction on count 36, alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006. 23

Mann was convicted on count 37, alleging that he violated by 26 U.S.C. § 7206 by claiming a fraudulently large loss on the 1985 corporate tax return of Trilex. A loss of $4.2 million was the claimed loss on Tri *856 lex’s sale of the oil and gas properties to Chapman. This loss offset Trilex’s substantial taxable gains realized from the Bridge-point swap. The government offered evidence that the sale to Chapman did not close until after the end of tax year 1985, and that Mann fraudulently moved this loss to the prior tax year to avoid taxes. We find the evidence sufficient on this count.

Mann was convicted on count 39, alleging that he understated his income on his 1986 income tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206. Mann had borrowed millions of dollars from Trilex. The government claims that Trilex was liquidated, in which case the amount due on the loan as well as all assets distributed to Mann count as income to him. Mann does not dispute this theory legally, 24 but claims that Trilex Corporation was not liquidated but was merged into another company. The government offered evidence that Trilex was in fact liquidated, including a written liquidation plan, adopted by the company and calling for the complete liquidation of the company and distribution of all assets to the sole shareholder, Mann, and evidence that the Mirlex note held by Trilex had been dividended to Mann. In January of 1987 the Texas Secretary of State declared the corporate charter of Trilex forfeited, after receiving notification from the state Comptroller that Trilex had failed to file a franchise tax report. The government further argues that even if Trilex was not liquidated, Mann still committed tax fraud because Mann caused Trilex to dividend to him the $2.5 million Mirlex note, discussed above, and he did not report that dividend as taxable income. 25 Under either theory we find the evidence sufficient on this count.

B. Limitations

Mann and Moore argue that the count 1 conspiracy count was barred by limitations, and that allowing evidence on this time-barred count prejudiced the jury’s consideration of the other counts. The limitations period runs from the last overt act of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment and proved at trial. 26

As explained above, count 1 alleged a conspiracy (1) to defraud the United States by impairing the functions of the FHLBB, (2) to violate 18 U.S.C. § 657 (misapplication of bank funds); (3) to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (false entry in bank records); (4) to defraud the United States by impeding the lawful governmental functions of the Internal Revenue Service; and (5) to file false income tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206.

Three different limitations periods apply to count 1. The general criminal limitations statute of five years applies to the first object. 27 The fourth and fifth objects, alleging a conspiracy to commit tax fraud and to defraud the IRS, are subject to a six-year limitations period. 28 Conspiracies to violate §§ 657 or 1006 are governed by a ten-year limitations period, 18 U.S.C. § 3293, but this statute applies to offenses occurring prior to its passage only if the previous limitations period (5 years) had not run on the date of enactment of the statute, August 9, 1989. 29 The indict *857 ment issued on June 30, 1993. So to fall within the applicable limitations periods, the last act in furtherance of a conspiracy to impede the FHLBB had to occur after June 30, 1988, the last act in furtherance of a conspiracy to impede the IRS or violate the tax laws had to occur after June 30, 1987, and the last act in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate §§ 657 and 1006 had to occur after August 9,1984.

Moore argues that if any one of the alleged objectives of the conspiracy is barred by limitations, the conviction on count 1 must be reversed. We cannot agree. If any one of the five alleged violations was proven, then the government proved a violation of § 371. “The general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” 30 Moore relies on Yates v. United States. 31 In Yates, the defendant was convicted on a conspiracy count alleging two objectives. The Court held that one of the objectives was barred by limitations, and that the conviction therefore required reversal, since “it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.” 32

However, in Griffin v. United States 33 the Court restricted the holding of Yates to cases where one of the alleged objects of the conspiracy is legally defective. “Legal error” is not insufficiency of evidence, but “means a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or factual import of the evidence.” 34 In cases where the evidence of one of the alleged objectives of the conspiracy is factually insufficient, the Court in Griffin held that the verdict should stand so long as there is sufficient evidence on another alleged object of the conspiracy. 35 Moore does not demonstrate that one of the alleged objects of the conspiracy was “legally defective,” in the Griffin sense; he argues only that there was insufficient evidence of acts committed within the limitations period as to some of the alleged objects of the conspiracy.

Moore alternatively argues that the government failed to prove any act in furtherance of any objective of the conspiracy within the applicable limitations period. We agree with the government that there was sufficient evidence of numerous overt acts in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy occurring within the limitations periods. There was evidence that in 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990, Moore caused the filing of corporate tax returns for PSDC, showing a $4 million “loan” from stockholders. A rational jury could find that this loan, discussed further above, was a sham, and that the tax filings allowed the GMAC partners to avoid taxes and conceal the fact that Mann and GMAC had used Jefferson’s own funds to acquire Jefferson. 36 A rational jury could find that *858 these filings were acts in furtherance of concealing the first, fourth and fifth objects of the conspiracy. 37 As to the third object of the conspiracy — the making of false records and reports of Jefferson — there was evidence that Northwest continued to overstate the value of the Tartan properties to the FHLBB until the time of the swap of these properties for the Bridgepoint Residential property in late 1984. A rational jury could find that these filings were in furtherance of the conspiracy to make false statements. Moore argues that filings with the FHLBB in 1984 could not have related to Jefferson, since Jefferson did not even exist at the time. However, Jefferson’s successor entity, Northwest, continued to operate after Jefferson was merged into Northwest. Examination of the affairs of Jefferson by the FHLBB, including examinations that might, and did, lead to the pursuit of criminal sanctions, did not end with the merger. 38

Relying on Grunewald v. United States, 39 Mann and Moore argue that the overt acts on which the government relied were at most acts to conceal an already completed conspiracy, and that such acts are not acts in furtherance of the conspiracy for limitations purposes. The conspiracy count in Grüne-wald concerned efforts by the defendants to obtain “no prosecution” rulings in two tax cases by bribing an IRS official. The Court reversed the conspiracy conviction on limitations grounds, reasoning that “after the central criminal purposes of a conspiracy have been attained, a subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment.” 40 The Court’s concern was that holding otherwise “would for all practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases, as well as extend indefinitely the time within which hearsay declarations will bind co-conspirators.” 41 Appellants argue that under Grünewald all of the alleged acts in furtherance of the conspiracy within the limitations periods were no more than efforts to conceal *859 the alleged central purpose of the conspiracy — the 1982-83 purchase of the oil and gas properties and takeover of Jefferson by GMAC.

We cannot agree with appellants that the count 1 conspiracy convictions must be reversed under Grünewald. As quoted above, the Cou