Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Derryl Franklin Rozier

                                                                  [PUBLISH]

              IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                     FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                  FILED
                                                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                       ________________________         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                                            October 28, 2003
                              No. 03-12685               THOMAS K. KAHN
                         Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
                       ________________________
                 D. C. Docket Nos. 02-00167-CV-2-CDL-4
                            02-41915 BKC-JT

IN RE: DERRYL FRANKLIN ROZIER,

                                                                       Debtor.

MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION,

                                                           Plaintiff-Appellant,

     versus

DERRYL FRANKLIN ROZIER,

                                                          Defendant-Appellee.

                       ________________________

                Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Middle District of Georgia
                     _________________________
                            (October 28, 2003)


Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:
      CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
      APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME
      COURT OF GEORGIA, PURSUANT TO O.C.G.A. § 15-2-9.

      TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA AND ITS HONORABLE
      JUSTICES:

      Motors Acceptance Corporation (“Motors Acceptance”) appeals the district

court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s grant of Derryl Franklin Rozier’s

(“Rozier”) motion for contempt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. In affirming

the bankruptcy court’s order holding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to

return to the debtor an automobile repossessed prior to the filing of the Chapter 13

petition, the district court construed Georgia law as providing that both legal title and

right of redemption of a vehicle remain with a debtor, after a creditor’s repossession

of that vehicle.

      There appears to be no issues of fact. The parties agree that the case turns on

state law. Having found no case law addressing this exact issue of Georgia law, we

certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Georgia and postpone

any further consideration of this appeal until we receive an answer from that court.

      Rozier purchased an automobile in the State of Georgia, with financing which

was assigned to Motors Acceptance. On August 8, 2002, Motors Acceptance

repossessed the vehicle due to Rozier’s failure to make installment payments as set



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forth in the sales contract. A few days later, on August 12, Rozier filed a petition

under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Soon after filing his petition,

Rozier requested that Motors Acceptance return possession of the vehicle back to

him, which Motors Acceptance declined to do. He then filed a motion for contempt

against Motors Acceptance for its refusal to return the vehicle. Although possession

was relinquished under a Temporary Turnover Order, the parties reserved their right

to pursue the issue. The bankruptcy court ultimately granted Rozier’s motion for

contempt, holding Motors Acceptance in willful contempt of the automatic stay under

11 U.S.C. § 362 by refusing to return the automobile. The district court affirmed the

bankruptcy court’s contempt order, holding that because, under its interpretation of

Georgia law, both the right of redemption and legal title of a vehicle remain with a

debtor even after a creditor’s repossession of that vehicle, Rozier’s automobile should

have been relinquished by Motors Acceptance to him as part of his Chapter 13

bankruptcy estate during the pendency of his bankruptcy petition. See Motors

Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier, 290 B.R. 910, 913 (M.D. Ga. 2003).

      Under the Bankruptcy Code, a court may order a third party to turn over to the

debtor’s bankruptcy estate property in its possession if, among other things, such

property is considered “property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542. “Property of

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the estate” includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the

commencement of the case.” Id. § 541(a)(1); see also Bel-Tel Fed. Credit Union v.

Kalter, 292 F.3d 1350, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002).

      The dispositive question on this appeal is whether a vehicle repossessed prior

to the filing of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition is in fact the property of the debtor’s

bankruptcy estate. The answer to this question turns on whether, under Georgia law,

legal ownership passes to a creditor at the time of repossession. See Bel-Tel Fed.

Credit Union, 292 F.3d at 1353 (noting that “the nature and existence of the

[debtor’s] right to property is determined by looking at state law”) (internal quotation

and citation omitted).

      This Court has held that under Florida and Alabama law a defaulted vehicle

debtor has no ownership rights, other than a right of redemption, which is an

insufficient ownership interest for that vehicle to be considered part of the debtor’s

bankruptcy estate. See Bel-Tel Fed. Credit Union, 292 F.3d at 1360 (interpreting

Florida law); Lewis v. Charles R. Hall Motors, Inc., 137 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.

1998) (interpreting Alabama law). The district court held, and appellee Rozier

argues, that Georgia law is different from Florida and Alabama law, and that in

addition to a right of redemption, the debtor had ownership rights entitling him to

possession of the automobile.

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      If, as the district court held, both legal title and the right of redemption of a

vehicle remain with a defaulted debtor even after his creditor’s repossession of the

vehicle, then the vehicle remains part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate under §

541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, and the district court properly affirmed the

bankruptcy court’s order holding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to

relinquish the vehicle back to Rozier after he had filed his bankruptcy petition. If, as

Motors Acceptance contends on appeal, Georgia law affords a debtor no right in a

repossessed vehicle other than a right of redemption, then the district court erred by

concluding that the repossessed vehicle was part of the bankruptcy estate and thus

abused its discretion by finding Motors Acceptance in contempt for failure to

relinquish the same.

      To answer these questions, this Court now certifies the following question of

Georgia law to the Supreme Court of Georgia:


      DOES LEGAL TITLE, OR ANY OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST
      THAT WOULD GIVE A RIGHT OF POSSESSION, PASS TO THAT
      CREDITOR UNDER GEORGIA LAW UPON REPOSSESSION OF
      AN AUTOMOBILE SUBSEQUENT TO A DEBTOR’S DEFAULT
      ON AN AUTOMOBILE INSTALLMENT LOAN CONTRACT, OR
      DOES SUCH LEGAL TITLE OR OTHER OWNERSHIP INTEREST
      REMAIN IN THE DEBTOR?




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      We certify the above-styled question to the Supreme Court of Georgia. The

phrasing used in this certified question should not restrict that court’s consideration

of the problems of state law posed by this case.

      QUESTION CERTIFIED.




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