United States v. Smithfield Foods, Incorporated

Smithfield Foods, Inc. ("Smithfield") appeals a grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States finding Smithfield liable for multiple Clean Water Act violations. Smithfield also challenges the court's imposition of a corresponding $12.6 million civil penalty.

Smithfield alleges that the court committed two errors with respect to liability. First, Smithfield claims that the district court erred when it found that Orders issued by the Virginia State Water Control Board did not condition, revise, or supercede Smithfield's obligations under its 1992 water discharge permit. Second, Smithfield asserts that the district court erred in its finding that this suit was not (1) precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), or § 510 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1370 (West 1986); or (2) barred by § 309 (g)(6)(A)(ii) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999). On the penalty issue, Smithfield contends that the district court erred in calculating the penalty, especially with respect to its determination of economic benefit and the denial of "good-faith" credit to Smithfield for its compliance efforts.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on liability. We remand the penalty determination to the district court with instructions to recalculate the civil penalty as directed by this opinion.

The facts of this case are undisputed and are comprehensively set out in the district court's published opinion, United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 769, 772-81 (E.D. Va. 1997). To properly analyze this case, however, the major events bear repeating. Smithfield owns and operates two swine slaughtering and processing plants, Smithfield Packing Co. and Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. Both plants are located on the Pagan River, a tributary of the James River, in Isle of Wight County, Virginia. The wastewater discharged from these plants is treated in two of Smithfield's facilities, Outfall 001 and Outfall 002. From at least August 1991 to August 1997, treated wastewater was discharged from Outfall 001 into the Pagan River. From at least August 1991 until June 1996, treated wastewater was discharged from Outfall 002 into the Pagan River. Smithfield stopped discharging wastewater into the Pagan River when it successfully connected its plants to the Hampton Roads Sanitation District ("HRSD") system.

Smithfield's wastewater discharges contained numerous pollutants that were regulated under the CWA and thus, could not be discharged into the waters of the United States unless specifically authorized by permit. Permits are governed by the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"), under which polluters obtain an NPDES permit to discharge lawfully certain pollutants in specific amounts. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (West 1986 & Supp. 1999). Regulation of NPDES permits is overseen by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), see 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a), but locally administered by the Commonwealth of Virginia through its agent, the Virginia State Water Control Board ("the Board"). See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251(b), 1342(b) (West 1986 & Supp. 1999). The Board is authorized to enforce the CWA subject to the guidance and approval of the EPA. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319.

Smithfield's discharges were authorized by an NPDES permit ("the Permit") issued in 1986, modified in 1990, and reissued in 1992. The Permit placed restrictions on the amount and concentration of certain pollutants allowed in wastewater released to the Pagan River and required Smithfield to monitor, sample, analyze, and issue reports concerning its discharges. The results of Smithfield's wastewater sampling program were periodically compiled into Discharge Monitoring Reports ("DMRs") and submitted to the Board.

In response to elevated levels of nitrogen and phosphorus in the Chesapeake, the Commonwealth of Virginia promulgated regulations requiring, among other things, that NPDES permits for facilities discharging into nutrient-rich waters like the Pagan River be modified to allow a monthly average phosphorus effluent limitation of 2.0 mg/l. The new regulations represented a considerable reduction in the amount of phosphorus permittees like Smithfield could discharge. To comply, Smithfield would have had to upgrade significantly its wastewater treatment facilities, which the company contended was an insurmountable obstacle under the required deadline. As a result, on June 3, 1988, Smithfield filed suit challenging Virginia's new phosphorus limitation as technologically infeasible.

Notwithstanding the pending legal challenge, the Board reopened Smithfield's Permit on January 4, 1990 and modified it to apply the new, more restrictive phosphorus limitation. The modified Permit ("1990 Permit") also contained a compliance schedule requiring Smithfield to take steps to comply with the new phosphorus limitation within three years of the Permit modification. Smithfield contested this action by appealing the modification. Because these new phosphorus limitations were not required in other states, Smithfield also began to talk publicly about moving its operations out of Virginia rather than complying.

Negotiations between Smithfield and Virginia ensued and to settle the dispute, each of the parties agreed to various accommodations. The agreement was documented in an Order issued by the Board on March 21, 1990 ("the 1990 Order"), in which Smithfield agreed to study the costs and feasibility of solving its wastewater treatment problem by connecting its present wastewater treatment system to the HRSD. In addition, Smithfield pledged to report the results of these studies to the Board by November 13, 1990, by which time Smithfield would decide whether it intended to connect to HRSD or to upgrade its own facilities to comply with the new phosphorus limitations. In return, the Board resolved to defer the commencement of the 1990 Permit compliance schedule until December 1, 1990.

On November 6, 1990, the Board amended the 1990 Order by extending by three months the date by which Smithfield was to report its decision whether to connect to HRSD. The Board also agreed to further defer commencement of the compliance schedule for the new phosphorus limitations.

On May 9, 1991, the Board amended the 1990 Order a second time ("May 1991 Order") granting Smithfield another extension. The May 1991 Order included the following amendments:

(1) Smithfield now had until June 15, 1991 to notify the Board of its commitment to connect to HRSD or upgrade its own facilities to comply with the new phosphorus discharge standard. If Smithfield decided to connect to HRSD, it was required to do so within three months of notification by HRSD that the necessary sewer line was completed and operational. If Smithfield decided not to connect to HRSD, it was required to upgrade its own treatment facilities to comply with all discharge limitations according to the scheduled deadline.

(2) Smithfield had to comply with the interim effluent limitations listed in Appendix A of the May 1991 Order until it connected to HRSD or completed the necessary upgrades to its facilities. Appendix A set out new discharge limitations and monitoring requirements for a pollutant other than phosphorus, but reiterated that required effluent limitations for all other substances remained as listed in the 1990 Permit.

(3) Smithfield was required to dismiss its legal challenge to the phosphorus standard pending in Virginia state court.

At the end of the May 1991 Order, the Board stated that "[n]othing herein shall be construed as altering, modifying, or amending any term or condition contained in the [1990] Permit." Within a month of receiving the May 1991 Order, Smithfield determined that connecting to HRSD would be the best long-term solution and notified the Board of its decision on June 7, 1991.

In the meantime, in May 1991, Smithfield's original Permit, issued in 1986 and modified in 1990, expired. The Board submitted a draft permit ("Draft Permit") for Smithfield's facilities to the EPA for review and public comment. Part I.B. of the Draft Permit contained the same compliance schedule as in the modified 1990 Permit, giving Smithfield until January 4, 1993 to comply with the phosphorus discharge limitations. Part I.C. of the Draft Permit listed the effluent limitations that would be in effect after the completion of the compliance schedule in Part I.B. The EPA approved the Draft Permit.

Smithfield submitted comments on the Draft Permit to the Board. In its comments, Smithfield expressed concern that the Draft Permit contained the same effluent requirements as in the 1990 Permit, which it believed were inconsistent with the terms of the May 1991 Order. Smithfield asked the Board for clarification of this alleged discrepancy, suggesting that the Board agree that "alternate compliance will be maintained with Smithfield's agreement to connect to HRSD as soon as it becomes available regardless of the time frame in which this occurs." Debra Thompson, an environmental engineer with the Board, responded to Smithfield's concerns in an October 10, 1991 letter stating that "[a]ny special order agreements relative to compliance with water quality standards, the Permit regulation and associated studies that have been approved by the Board take precedence over the . . . Permit." The EPA received a copy of this letter.

Despite Smithfield's comments and concerns, on January 3, 1992, the Board finalized and issued Smithfield's new permit ("1992 Permit"). Part I.C. of the 1992 Permit retained the phosphorus discharge limitations listed in the 1990 Permit, and Part I.B. contained the same deadline for achieving phosphorus compliance, January 4, 1993. Smithfield never challenged the 1992 Permit conditions nor sought a modification.

In response to a February 1992 letter from Smithfield to the Board indicating that Smithfield intended to comply with effluent limitations for substances other than phosphorus as listed in the 1992 Permit by connecting to the HRSD system, the Board responded as follows:

These "plans" are acceptable as submitted. The remainder of the schedule requires submittal of quarterly progress reports. These reports should indicate construction progress and other issues which may effect completion of the project. Also note that the deadline for achieving final effluent limitations [for substances other than phosphorus] is May 13, 1994. Should construction be delayed such that this deadline may be missed, a modification to the existing Consent Order should be requested.

Smithfield met neither the January 4, 1993 compliance deadline for phosphorus discharges, nor the May 13, 1994 compliance deadline for the other regulated substances. There is no evidence that Smithfield sought or received a permit modification challenging these deadlines before failing to adhere to required compliance schedules.

In November 1994 the Board amended the May 1991 Order, stating that Smithfield could achieve compliance with the final effluent limitations for the substances other than phosphorus by connecting to HRSD and agreed to hold the compliance deadline scheduled for May 13, 1994 in abeyance. In addition, however, the Board and Smithfield agreed that the amendment did not alter, modify, or amend any other term or condition of the May 1991 Order or of the 1992 Permit.

Before Smithfield could connect to HRSD, three things needed to occur: (1) Smithfield needed to upgrade its own wastewater treatment system to pre-treat its waste before discharging it to HRSD, (2) a new pipeline had to be built to connect Smithfield with HRSD, and (3) HRSD needed to upgrade its facilities to treat Smithfield's wastewater. HRSD's original completion schedule was February 1995 for the pipeline, and December 1996 for the facility upgrade. The pipeline was not completed until March 1996 and Smithfield's Outfall 002 was connected to HRSD in June 1996. Outfall 001 could not be connected until HRSD completed its facility upgrades. The facility upgrades were not completed until June 1997 and Outfall 001 was connected to HRSD in August 1997.

Under the NPDES program as administered by EPA, permit holders who are not in compliance with the terms of their permits are listed in the EPA's Quarterly Noncompliance Report ("QNCR"). Although it had been out of compliance for months, Smithfield's Permit violations did not appear in the QNCRs until the third quarter of 1994. The EPA cited Smithfield's false and inaccurate reporting and the Board's willingness to permit Smithfield to continue to exceed its 1992 Permit limits as the reason why Smithfield's violations did not appear in the QNCRs. If a state does not achieve compliance, the CWA authorizes the EPA to step in and initiate its own enforcement action. Once Smithfield appeared in the QNCR, EPA began to closely track Virginia's efforts to bring Smithfield into compliance.

In 1995 state and federal agencies began a criminal investigation into the illegal activities of Terry Rettig ("Rettig"), chief operator of Smithfield's wastewater treatment plant. Rettig was charged with falsifying records and DMRs submitted to both state and federal regulatory agencies. When Rettig's actions came under suspicion, he destroyed presumably incriminating records from Smithfield's wastewater treatment operations. At the beginning of the criminal investigation, federal investigators asked Virginia authorities to refrain from pursuing an enforcement action against Smithfield for its Permit violations until after the criminal investigation into Rettig's conduct was underway. In February 1996, the United States notified Virginia that there was no longer any need to delay pursuing an enforcement action against Smithfield, but the Commonwealth took no action.

In April 1996, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality informed the Board that it had evidence of Smithfield's numerous CWA violations and recommended that legal action be initiated. At their meeting in May 1996, the Board decided to do nothing until it was sure Smithfield was aware of the violations.

When it became apparent to the EPA that Virginia did not intend to initiate legal action against Smithfield for its CWA violations, the EPA filed its own action. The EPA invited Virginia to join the suit, but the Commonwealth declined, electing instead to file its own enforcement action in the Circuit Court of the County of Isle of Wight. Virginia's enforcement action alleged that Smithfield violated its 1992 Permit discharge limits on other substances, but did not include claims for violations of the phosphorus limitations, false reporting, or late reporting.

The government filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on December 16, 1996, seeking injunctive relief and penalties for a range of effluent limit violations, submission of false DMRs, submission of late reports, and destruction of records. On March 10, 1997, the United States moved for summary judgment on liability arguing that there were no disputes of material fact and the evidence proved that Smithfield had (1) violated the CWA by discharging pollutants into the Pagan River at levels above the allowable limits of its 1992 Permit, and (2) submitted false DMRs late on numerous occasions.

Smithfield countered that it did not violate the phosphorus limitations in the 1992 Permit because the Board's Orders superseded and revised the 1992 Permit limitations. In the alternative, even if it violated the terms of its 1992 Permit, Smithfield argued that the EPA's claim was barred by § 309(g)(6)(A) of the CWA and the doctrines of estoppel and waiver. The district court granted summary judgment for the United States on liability and claims of false reporting and document destruction, but decided to calculate the exact number of violations and the penalty amount at trial.

The district court held a bench trial on the remaining issues in July 1997. The court reviewed evidence and heard from both sides' experts who opined on the proper calculations for each of the factors to be considered under the CWA's penalty statute. In the end, the district court found Smithfield liable for 6,982 days of violations and, after weighing the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, assessed a penalty of $12.6 million.

Meanwhile, the Commonwealth's enforcement action against Smithfield continued to proceed in state court. On July 9, 1997, the state court declared that Smithfield's obligations under the 1992 Permit were circumscribed by the May 1991 Order, and therefore Smithfield was required to comply with the phosphorus limits only by connecting to HRSD within three months of availability.

Based on this decree, Smithfield filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment in this federal action. Arguing that the imposition of the phosphorus limitation was imposed solely as a matter of state law, Smithfield contended that the federal court must give substantial weight to the Virginia court ruling in a state enforcement action. On that basis, Smithfield asked the district court to reverse its liability finding. The district court declined to do so.1 Smithfield now appeals the district court's ruling.

Smithfield's initial challenge is to the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States on the issue of liability. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo , viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. See Sempione v. Provident Bank of Maryland, 75 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1996). The district court allegedly made three distinct errors.

First, Smithfield contends that the district court erred in finding that the May 1991 Order did not take precedence over or alter the terms of the 1992 Permit. Smithfield admits that the May 1991 Order explicitly states that "[n]othing herein shall be construed as altering, modifying, or amending any term or condition contained in [the] Permit," but argues that the May 1991 Order was incorporated into, and therefore took precedence over, the 1992 Permit. In the alternative, Smithfield insists that the EPA was bound by the terms of the May 1991 Order when it failed to object to it during the permitting process.

The district court rejected these arguments, holding that the 1992 Permit could not have incorporated any of the Board's Orders. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 790. After an extensive analysis of the Board's post-1992 Permit correspondence, the court reasoned that "because [Smithfield] did not follow the procedures required for the modification of a permit, and none of the Board's Special Orders and letters were issued in accordance with the permit modification procedures, [Smithfield] cannot support [its] argument that the Special Orders or letters issued by the Board after the 1992 Permit modify the terms of the Permit . . . ." Id. at 787-88.

With respect to the Board's Orders pre-dating the 1992 Permit, the court found it illogical that correspondence written before the 1992 Permit was finalized could change the terms of a subsequently-issued document. See id. at 788. Finally, regarding Smithfield's assertion that the EPA was bound to abide by the Board's Orders because the agency failed to object contemporaneously, the court found that the agency's "silence with regard to the agreement between Smithfield and the Board does not indicate its approval, especially when the EPA was not asked to review and approve of Smithfield's agreement with the Board." Id.

Second, Smithfield argues that the district court erred when it found that the EPA's suit was not barred by CWA§ 309(g)(6)(A)(ii). See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). Section 309(g)(6) of the CWA provides in part that any violation of the CWA "which a State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action under a State law comparable to this subsection" shall not be the subject of a federal civil enforcement action. See id. Because Smithfield believes that since 1990 Virginia has been diligently prosecuting Smithfield through the issuance of Orders and enforcing a state statutory scheme that is sufficiently comparable to the CWA, Smithfield asserts that the EPA's enforcement action should have been barred.

Examining this argument, the district court found that Virginia's enforcement scheme was not sufficiently comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA's suit. Because Virginia's enforcement scheme did not give the Commonwealth authority to assess administrative penalties without the violator's consent,2 and did not provide adequate procedures for notice and public participation,3 the district court found that the Commonwealth's statutory structure was not sufficiently comparable to CWA § 309(g). See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 795.4

Third, Smithfield challenges the district court's finding that this suit was not precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60-61. In Gwaltney, the Court recognized that there would be cases under the CWA in which it would be counter-productive to assess penalties against violators who had agreed to take corrective actions not otherwise required. See id. Smithfield asserts that is exactly what happened here. The Board and Smithfield reached a compromise in which Smithfield agreed to take non-mandatory corrective actions, and the company argues that for the district court to allow the EPA to assess administrative penalties after the fact violates Gwaltney.

For the same reasons, Smithfield contends, the EPA's enforcement action violates CWA § 510, which allows states to adopt more stringent effluent limits than those required under the CWA. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1370. Smithfield argues that the Commonwealth's ability to adopt more stringent standards as provided by§ 510 is rendered useless if it cannot implement those effluent limits in the manner it finds most directly serves the public interest. On these two grounds, Smithfield asserts that the district court erred in failing to hold that the EPA's enforcement action was precluded.

Acknowledging the Supreme Court's holding in Gwaltney, the district court found that Smithfield's alleged corrective actions did not preclude the EPA's enforcement action here because the chosen enforcement methods were not achieving compliance. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 790 n.29 (citing Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61). Further, the court found that the text of CWA § 510 did not support Smithfield's argument. Besides allowing states to enforce more stringent standards, the CWA act also provides that the EPA has the authority to enforce these more stringent state effluent standards once they are incorporated into a polluter's permit. See CWA §§ 309(a)(1), (3), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1319(a)(1), (3). The district court agreed that Virginia adopted more stringent phosphorus standards than under the CWA and that these elevated standards were included in Smithfield's 1992 Permit. Once incorporated into the Permit, however, the district court found that the CWA requires the EPA to enforce a state's more stringent effluent standards. On that basis, the court ruled that § 510 did not preclude the EPA's enforcement action.

Having had the benefit of oral argument and the parties' briefs, and after careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the district court correctly decided the issue of liability. We concur with the district court that (1) the Board's Orders were not incorporated into nor changed the terms of the 1992 Permit;5 (2) Virginia's enforcement scheme is not sufficiently comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA from bringing its own independent penalty action; and (3) neither the Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney, nor § 510 of the CWA preclude the EPA from bringing this enforcement action. Rejecting Smithfield's claims of error, we affirm the district court's reasoning and ruling on liability. See Smithfield, 965 F. Supp. at 78496.

Smithfield's second major challenge is to the district court's assessment of a $12.6 million penalty. We review the factual findings that formed the basis of the district court's penalty calculation for clear error, see Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 573 (5th Cir. 1996), but the highly discretionary calculations necessary to award civil penalties are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See id. See also Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 316-17 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).

The CWA sets out six factors intended to assist courts in determining the appropriate civil penalty. See CWA§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (Supp. 1999). Section 309(d) provides that "the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as justice may require." Id.

These factors are designed to give district courts direction in fashioning penalties for CWA violations, but once applied in a specific case, we have given and will continue to give the district court's final penalty calculation wide discretion. See Stoddard v. Western Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The amount of the penalty to be levied is, of course, discretionary with the court."); Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142 (11th Cir. 1990) (same). Because of the difficulty of determining an appropriate penalty in a complex case such as this one, we give deference to the "highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors [that] are necessary in order to setcivil penalties under the Clean Water Act." Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 427 (1987).

Although Smithfield contests several of the district court's discretionary decisions, such as the method used to count each violation and the alleged trebling of the penalty, Smithfield's major allegations of error relate to the court's economic benefit calculation and its refusal to grant Smithfield good-faith credit for its compliance efforts. We consider each of these arguments in turn.

Smithfield argues that the district court "double counted" its violations by counting separately its exceedances of daily maximum limits when it had already imposed thirty days of violations for exceedances of the monthly average limit for the same substance. In the opinion below, the district court reaffirmed our holding in Chesapeake Bay Found., 791 F.2d at 313-15, that each violation of a monthly average limit shall be treated as a violation for every day in the month in which the violation occurred, rather than as a single violation for that month. See United States v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 338, 340 (E.D. Va. 1997). The court went on to hold, however, that "if multiple violations of the Permit occur on the same day, defendants are liable for a separate day for each violation of the Permit, including the daily maximum, monthly average concentration, and monthly average loading limits for each pollutant." Id. at 340.

In coming to this conclusion, the district court reasoned that the two limits are included in the Permit for different reasons and serve distinct purposes: daily maximum effluent limits protect the environment from the acute effects of large, single releases, and monthly averages protect against chronic effects occurring at lower levels. See id. at 340-42. Acknowledging that there was no Fourth Circuit precedent for this counting method, the district court found that the different pollutants and their daily maximum and monthly average loading limits are separate requirements listed in the Permit and therefore represent distinct violations. See id. at 341.

We find the district court's opinion persuasive here. It is clear from the language of § 309(d) of the CWA that such a penalty structure was anticipated. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(d) (providing for a "civil penalty not to exceed $25,000 per day for each violation" rather than a statutory maximum of $25,000 per day) (emphasis added). The specific limitations of Smithfield's 1992 Permit support this conclusion as well. The daily maximum limits in the 1992 Permit were set at double its monthly average limits. As a result, a violation of one did not automatically result in the violation of the other, further supporting the notion that the different limits were included in the Permit to protect against distinct environmental effects. See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 340-41.

Far from double counting, the district court's decision to treat each violation of the 1992 Permit as a separate infraction for purposes of penalty calculation makes sense. This structure gives courts considerable flexibility to tailor penalties to the unique facts of each case. As noted by the district court, a permittee who violates a single effluent limit one time is less culpable than one who violates the limits of several different pollutants in one day. See id. Such a structure is reasonable considering the first violator causes less overall harm to the environment. In the same vein, a permittee who violates a monthly average limit is less culpable and causes less harm than a permittee who violates daily maximum and monthly average limits in the same month. See id.

Furthermore, this method of counting violations creates the proper incentives for polluters to comply. For example, if the maximum penalty that could be levied against a violator on a single day was $25,000, no matter how many different Permit effluent limitations were violated, the permittee would have a strong disincentive to comply with the other permit limitations. Once one effluent limit was violated, there would be no reason for the permittee to heed the rest of the permit limits for that day.

We agree with the district court's decision to treat each of Smithfield's permit violations as a separate and distinct infraction for purposes of penalty calculation. We feel this approach is consistent with the language of § 309(d) of the CWA and Smithfield's 1992 Permit and join the other courts which have interpreted the CWA in the same manner.6

Smithfield next argues that the district court erred as a matter of law by allegedly calculating the penalty by trebling the amount of economic benefit calculated. Pointing to the text of the Act, Smithfield contends that, unlike other federal statutes, the CWA does not provide for trebling and therefore the court committed reversible error by assessing a penalty equal to exactly three times the amount of economic benefit calculated. We see no indication that the district court "simply trebled the amount of economic benefit." Appellant's Br. at 42. On the contrary, we find that the district court correctly applied the CWA in assessing Smithfield's penalty.

In calculating the penalty, the district court properly began by determining that the statutory maximum based on Smithfield's violations was $174.55 million. See Smithfield, 972 F. Supp. at 353. Thereafter, the court evaluated two different methods used to assess penalties -the top-down method and the bottom-up method -and to Smithfield's advantage, chose the bottom-up method.7 Under the bottom-up method, the court begins with the violator's estimated economic benefit from non-compliance, which here was $4.2 million, and then adjusts up or down based on the court's evaluation of the six factors set out in § 309(d). See id. at 353-54. After evaluating and discussing the effect of each of the factors, the court found a $12.6 million penalty appropriate. See id. at 354.

When calculating Smithfield's penalty, the district court took into account all six of the statutorily mandated factors and sufficiently detailed its findings as to whether the evidence in each area had a mitigating or aggravating impact on the total penalty. See id. at 354. The court properly exercised its discretion in weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of key witnesses and, in doing so, made several decisions that were highly favorable to Smithfield. In the end, however, the court found that Smithfield's thousands of CWA violations warranted a penalty far in excess of the economic benefit calculation.

We find that the court's analysis was complete and in line with what is required under the statute. It is clear from its opinion that the court's exhaustive examination of the facts formed the basis of its final penalty calculation, rather than simply multiplying the economic benefit by three as Smithfield contends.

But even if the court had simply trebled the economic benefit to determine the appropriate penalty, that was within its discretion, as long as it was below the statutory maximum of $174.55 million. As mentioned, the Supreme Court has emphasized that under the CWA, the highly discretionary calculations necessary to assess civil penalties are particularly within the purview of trial judges, see Tull, 481 U.S. at 426-27, and we have continually given these determinations wide deference, reviewing them only for abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109, 1116 (4th Cir. 1988). The government asked for a $20 million penalty, but based on its analysis of the relevant factors, the district court determined that $12.6 million was more appropriate, which is approximately 7.2% of the maximum penalty that could have been assessed. Finding that the court did not abuse its discretion in calculating the penalty, we reject Smithfield's contention that the district court erred as a matter of law in determining the penalty. Accord Dean Dairy , 150 F.3d at 265 (affirming a penalty that was calculated by doubling the economic benefit amount and intended to serve the goal of punishment and deterrence).