U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd.

Respondent-Appellant Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., Ltd. (“Zhen Hua”) appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (William C. Conner, *138 Judge), entered October 7, 1998, upon an August 5, 1998 opinion and order, as amended September 25, 1998, granting the motion of Petitioner-Appellee to compel arbitration in London and denying the motion of Respondent-Appellant to dismiss on the grounds of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and improper venue, see U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 16 F.Supp.2d 326 (S.D.N.Y.1998), (“Titan I), and upon a September 29, 1998 opinion and order, clarifying the scope of arbitration, see U.S. Titan, Inc. v. Guangzhou Zhen Hua Shipping Co., 182 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y.1998), (“Titan II”).

On appeal, Zhen Hua contends principally that the district court exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, (the “FAA”) by compelling arbitration of the parties’ dispute pursuant to a charter party 1 allegedly negotiated by the parties in September 1995. More specifically, Zhen Hua argues that the court should not have determined whether the parties had formed a charter party because the parties had allegedly negotiated an “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate that issue and that the court erred in finding that no such “ad hoc” agreement existed. In addition, Zhen Hua asserts that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-1611, that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Zhen Hua, and that venue in the Southern District of New York was improper. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner-Appellee U.S. Titan, Inc. (“Titan”) is a corporation organized under the laws of Texas, with its principal place of business in Pelham, New York. Zhen Hua is a state-owned corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic of China, engaged primarily in the shipping industry, with its principal place of business in Guangzhou (also known as Canton), China.

A. The Negotiations

In August 1995, Titan and Zhen Hua began negotiating a time charter 2 of the M/T BIN HE (the “BIN HE”), a ship owned by Zhen Hua. The parties conducted negotiations through two shipbrokers in Connecticut, Seabrokers (representing Titan) and Seagos (representing Zhen Hua). The two Connecticut brokers served as conduits for the transmission of many of the communications from one party to the other. Most of the parties’ communications during the negotiations are memorialized in writings transmitted via facsimile or telex between and among the brokers and the parties. These communications establish the following chronology of the negotiations.

On September 22, 1995, Zhen Hua offered to charter the BIN HE to Titan for 12 months at $15,250 per day, with an option for an additional 12 months at $15,750 per day. The parties proceeded to negotiate different time periods and rates, as well as several other terms, the details of which are not relevant to the issues before us. On September 26, 1995, Zhen Hua sent Titan a “firm counter [offer]”:

Aeeept/Except:

Period— 6 mos. plus/minus 30 days at CHOPT

CHOPT next 12 mos.

Rates— $15,250 first period

Optional $15,750 second period.

*139 Upon receipt of this telex, Titan informed its broker, Seabrokers, that “Charterers are in agreement and accept Owner[’]s last offer.” Seabrokers then sent via fax to Seagos and Titan a fixture “recap,” confirming the “Owners and Charterers’ agreement.” The agreement was based on the “Shelltime 4 Time Charter,” a standard time charter, see Michael Wilford et. al., Time Charters 28-36 (4th ed.1995), containing an arbitration clause that provides for arbitration in London at the election of either party. 3 The recap from Sea-brokers to Seagos and Titan contained, in part, the following language:

WE ARE PLEASED TO RECAP OWNER[’]S AND CHARTERERS’ AGREEMENT AS FOLLOWS, FOR THE TIMECHARTER OF: VESSEL:

MT BIN HE ...

PERIOD— 6 MOS. PLUS/MINUS 30 DAYS AT CHOPT CHOPT NEXT 12 MOS. UNDERSTOOD e=/30 DAYS ONLY TO BE USED ONCE, DURING THE FINAL PERIOD.

RATES— $15,250 FIRST PERIOD. $15,750 FOR OPTIONAL PERIOD!.]

SUBJECTS— CP DET’LS, SATISFACTORY INSPECTION OF THE VSL AT DD, RELEASE BY OWNERS FROM CAMARO TC, THENCE U.S. TITAN BOD APPROVAL WITHIN 3 DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF THEIR DEN-HOLM INSPECTION REPORT. 4

After Zhen Hua dry-docked the BIN HE in Hong Kong, Denholm Ship Management (Overseas) Ltd. (“Denholm”)' conducted the inspection contemplated by the parties. Following a preliminary inspection, which revealed several problems with the ship, Zhen Hua apparently began considering a sale of the BIN HE.

On October 19, 1995, Titan received from Denholm an initial summary report on the drydock inspection. On October 23, Titan informed Seabrokers that it had concerns about the seaworthiness of the BIN HE, but would await Denholm’s final report. Titan indicated also that it was interested in a “purchase option” and “would like to know what steps the Owner intends to take to bring the vessel up to an acceptable trading standard.” Seabrokers relayed this message to Seagos, which, acting through Henry Chen, responded later that day:

NOW OWNERS HAVE DECIDED TO SELL THE VESSEL ON CASH BASIS. THEY ARE ASKING $27 MILLION ON THE MARKET. BUT I RECKON WILL GO AT $26 MILLIONS [sic]. PROSPECTIVE BUYERS WILL BE INSPECTING THIS WEEK WHILE THE VSL IS STILL IN THE YARD.

OWNERS THANK TITAN’S INTEREST AND ADVICE. THEY ASK U.S. TO CONVEY THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ENTERTAIN FUTURE BUSINESS PROPOSALS AND LOOK FOR *140 WARD TO POSSIBLE COOPERATION.

On October 24, Titan faxed a message to Seabrokers, noting that the final inspection had not yet arrived and remarking:

It is encouraging that [Zhen Hua is] now in a position to sell the vessel if we do not exercise our option for the time charter. We assume therefore that the vessel has been successfully withdrawn from Camaro. We await Owners [sic] confirmation of this withdrawl [sic] per our % Agreement, so we can begin marketing the vessel for voyage and/or consecutive voyage charter.

Titan also asked Seabrokers to determine whether Zhen Hua would “provide a purchase option throughout the period of [its] charter.”

On October 25, 1995, Seagos, through Chen, faxed Seabrokers, stating in relevant part:

WE KNOW THAT AFTER THE VSL FAILED THE SUB WITH U.S. TITAN ON MONDAY, [ZHEN HUMS] PREFERENCE IS TO DO A STRAIGHT SALE ..., AND NOT TO GIVE PURCHASE OPTIONS. IF YOU THINK [TITAN] IS STILL INTERESTED IN THE TIME CHARTER OF THE VSL, PLEASE ASCERTAIN IF U.S. TITAN CAN TAKE [DELIVERY] OF THE VSL UPON OWNERS LIFT [sic] THEIR SUBJECT.

On the same day, Titan apparently became concerned that a misunderstanding might have developed between the parties. Consequently, Titan wrote again to Sea-brokers, 5 which, in relevant part, states:

FIRST, LET ME BE PERFECTLY CLEAR WITH HENRY/OWNERS, MY FAX OF OCTOBER 23 WAS NOT A REJECTION OF THE VESSEL. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THIS COULD BE SO INTERPRETED. IN FACT IT WAS CLEARLY STATED THAT THE INSPECTION REPORT WAS DUE WEDNESDAY (TODAY) AND ‘WE ARE SERIOUS ABOUT THIS VESSEL.” FRANKLY, OWNERS [sic] RECENT LACK OF RESPONSE CONVEYS THE IMPRESSION OF A RECENT DISINTEREST ON THEIR PART IN TRYING TO CONCLUDE THIS CHARTER....

WE RECEIVED THE FULL DEN-HOLM REPORT TODAY[, OCTOBER 25,] AND AFTER REVIEW AND ASSUMING OWNERS COOPERATION PER THE AGREED ELIGIBILITY CLAUSE, WE LIFT OUR INSPECTION SUBJECT.

WE NOW LOOK TO OWNERS TO LIFT THEIR CAMARO WITH-DRAWL [sic] SUBJECT. THE TITAN BOARD WILL MAKE ITS DECISION WITHIN THE 3 WORKING DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF THIS SUBJECT PER OU[R] 9/26 AGREEMENT. ...

Seabrokers forwarded the fax to Henry Chen of Seagos.

On October 26, Chen informed Seabrok-ers that the BIN HE had been WITHDRAWN FROM CAMARO,” and stated that “[TITAN] APPROVED THE VSL BELATEDLY. HOWEVER, IF TITAN IS STILL SERIOUS WITH [sic] THE VSL, OWNERS CAN CONSIDER A [TIME CHARTER] ARRANGEMENT FOR THE TIME BEING.” In response, on October 26 Titan advised Seabrokers that it was “PLEASED TO FINALLY Learn ... that [the] vessel [HAD BEEN] OFFICIALLY WITHDRAWN FROM THE CAMARO CHARTER AND [THAT] OWNERS [HAD] LIFTED THIS SUBJECT.” Titan stated further that it would respond with its board’s approval by the close of business on October 30. In fact, Titan’s board of *141 directors approved the charter party on October 27.

On October 30, Titan sent a telex direct to Chen, as well as to Seabrokers, stating, in part, as follows:

CLEARLY, TITAN’S POSITION IS THAT IT HAS DONE WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO CONCLUDE THE 6 MONTH, OPTION 12 MONTH T/C CONTRACT WHICH IT HAD NEGOTIATED, IE. THE %e AGREEMENT....

THEREFORE, TITAN REQUESTS THAT OWNERS RECONSIDER THEIR WITHDRAWAL OF THE BIN HE AND ADVISE WHEN SHIP WILL BE AVAILABLE IN ITS NEXT POSITION. (REPORTED TO BE HONG KONG).

In response to a suggestion by Chen that the parties pursue expedited resolution of the apparent dispute, Titan faxed Chen directly on November 1,1995:

Since we firmly believe that we entered into a binding fixture with Owners and therefore have a valid claim, we agree with your suggestion to seek an expedited resolution of this claim. We would suggest submitting this matter to three arbitrators in New York who would have 45 days to take evidence and issue a ruling on the threshold issue of whether the parties entered into a binding agreement on September 26 subject to conditions that were subsequently fulfilled.

Chen faxed Seabrokers on November 2: PER OUR TELECON THIS MORNING AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH SOUTHERN SHIPPING’S CLAIM DEPT SOUTHERN WILL RESPOND TO U.S. TITAN’S COMMENCEMENT OF ARBITRATION REQUEST. BUT PLS DO NOT DEVIATE BY INTRODUCING NEW FORUM SELECTION. SHELL TIME 4 CA-MARO PROFORMA IS VERY CLEAR ON THE SIMPLIFIED ARBITRATION WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED BY U.S. TITAN AND AGREEABLE TO SOUTHERN SHIPPING AS WELL. THERE IS NO NEED FOR A SEPARATE [sic] ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AT AL [sic]

Later that day, Titan gave Seagos “formal written notice of Arbitration pursuant to the Shell Time 4 clause 41(c) of Cama-ro/Titan Charter Party.”

Titan apparently found the references to Southern Shipping in Seagos’s November 2 fax confusing, writing on November 7:

We refer to our fax of November 2 commencing arbitration pursuant to Clause 41(c) of the Camaro/Titan Charter Party. We want to make clear that Titan has agreed to arbitrate with [Zhen Hua], with whom the Camaro/Titan fixture was negotiated, and not with any other party, including Southern Shipping. Please therefore confirm immediately that [Zhen Hua] has agreed to arbitrate Titan’s claims against it in accordance with Clause 41(c) of the Charter.

Replying that same day, Chen faxed Seabrokers:

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF U.S. TITAN’S FAX OF YESTERDAY. HEREWITH CONFIRM THAT ARBITRATION WILL BE BETWEEN ... TITAN ... AND ... ZHEN HUA ... NOT ANY OTHER PARTY INCLUDING SOUTHERN SHIPPING. ACCORDINGLY, LONDON ARBITRATION SHUD [sic] BE COMMENCED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CLAUSE 41(C) OF THE SHELL TIME 4 CA-MARO PROFORMA.

On November 9, Titan requested that Seagos, “FOR THE SAKE OF GOOD ORDER, ... CONFIRM THAT THE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS IN LONDON ARE TO COMMENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CLAUSE 41(C) OF THE SHELL TIME 4 [ZHEN HUA]/TITAN PROFORMA, WHICH IS BASED ON *142 THE ‘CAMARO’ CHARTER.” The same day, Chen responded:

THANX JOHN’S FAX TO WHICH OWNERS REPLY THAT THEY CAN REITERATE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE IN LONDON VIA SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO SHELL TIME 4 CLAUSE 41(C) CAMARO PROFORMA TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THERE IS A CHARTER BETWEEN GUANGZHOU ZHEN HUA AND U.S. TITAN. GUANGZHOU ZHEN HUA WILL WORK WITH U.S. TITAN IN THE ARBITRATOR NOMINATION PROCESS TO EXPEDITE THIS ARBITRATION PROCEDURE.

Titan replied on November 10:

ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR FAS OF 9TH NOVEMBER.

WE CONFIRM ARBITRATION IN LONDON IS ACCEPTABLE PER THE AGREEMENT.

WE LIST BELOW OUR NAMES OF THREE ARBITRATORS AND REMIND [ZHEN HUA THAT IT] NEED ONLY AGREE ON ONE. SHOULD NONE BE ACCEPTABLE, PLEASE HAVE OWNERS ADVISE U.S. SOONEST [sic] OF THEIR LIST OF THREE ALTERNATIVES.

IF WE ARE UNABLE TO COME UP WITH A SOLE ARBITRATOR THROUGH THIS PROCEDURE, WE RECOMMEND THAT EACH PARTY NOMINATE A SOLE ARBITRATOR AND THEN THEY WOULD AGREE ON A THIRD.

Titan also listed its three nominees in the fax.

On November 24, Zhen Hua sent a fax directly to Titan stating, “WE, AS PRIOR DISOPPONENT OWNER OF BIN HE, HEREBY AGREE TO SUBMIT THIS MATTER TO LONDON ARBITRATOR PURSUANT TO THE SHELL TIME 4 CLAUSE 41. NO DOUBT THIS DISPUTE WILL BE GOVERN [sic] BY ENGLISH LAW.” Zhen Hua then listed three nominees of its own, apparently indicating that Titan’s nominees were unsatisfactory.

On November 28, 1995, Titan acknowledged that the parties had not reached agreement on a sole arbitrator and suggested a procedure for appointing a panel of three arbitrators. Titan added, “PLEASE ADVISE IF THIS PROCEDURE IS AGREEABLE. WE WILL THEN NOTIFY YOU OF OUR APPOINTED ARBITRATOR.” Zhen Hua responded,

AS TO THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE, WE PERFER [sic] TO MAINTAIN THAT ONLY ONE LONDON ARBITRATOR WOULD BE APPOINTED BY BOTH PARTIES ACCORDING TO THE AD HOC ARBITRATION CLAUSE. OBVIOUSLY THIS PROCEDURE WILL SAVE YOUR AND OUR TIME AND COST. WE THEREFORE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE ANOTHER LIST OF ARBITRATORS] FOR OUR ELECTION.

Titan never submitted another list of arbitrators. Instead, more than two months later on February 7, 1996, Titan sent a fax to the attention of Chen at Seagos:

AFTER A REVIEW OF OUR FILE INCLUDING THE RECENT CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN U.S. ON THE ISSUE OF ARBITRATION IN LONDON, IT APPEARS TO U.S. THAT WE DO NOT HAVE:

1.) YOUR CLEAR AGREEMENT THAT [ZHEN HUA] IS THE APPROPRIATE PARTY IN DISPUTE WITH U.S. TITAN. OTHERWISE, WHY THE CORRESPONDENCE TO U.S. BY THE “FORMER DISPONENT OWNERS” SOUTHERN SHIPPING WHICH IS IRRELEVANT.

2.) AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY YOU THAT WE HAVE A BINDING CHARTER PARTY AGREEMENT; RATHER, WE 'HAVE OBLIQUE *143 REFERENCES TO THE “PRO FOR-MA CAMARO CHARTER” AND AN AD HOC ARBITRATION CLAUSE. WE WILL NOT AGREE TO ARBITRATION OUTSIDE OF THE BINDING TITAN/[ZHEN HUA] CHARTER. GIVEN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, WE SEE NO REASON TO CONCLUDE THAT LONDON IS THE JURISDICTION FOR THIS DISPUTE, AND WE ARE INITIATING LITIGATION AGAINST [ZHEN HUA] IN NEW YORK COURTS.

Later that day, Zhen Hua responded:

1. IT IS VERY CLEAR FROM THE ALLEGED C/P AND THE CORRESPONDENCE REGARDING THE ARBITRATION THAT THE PARTY INVOLVED ON THE PART OF “OWNER” IS [ZHEN HUA], PLEASE CLARIFY WHY YOU REFER TO “SOUTHERN SHIPPING” MANY TIMES.

2. YOU ARE NOT ALLOWED TO BE IN BREACH OF THE AD HOC ARBITRATION CLAUSE WHICH IS ACTUALLY RUNNING.

3. WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR YOUR ANOTHER [sic] LIST OF LONDON ARBITRATOR[S].

B. The Proceedings Below

On February 7, 1996, Titan filed a petition to compel arbitration pursuant to section 4 of the FAA in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Titan requested “a summary determination of the making of a binding charter party contract between Titan and respondent [Zhen Hua] and to compel [Zhen Hua] to arbitrate Titan’s claim for breach of that charter party.” In its petition, Titan argued:

Since the charter contract between [Zhen Hua] and Titán is a condition precedent to the arbitration agreement incorporated into that contract, the Court must determine the threshold issue whether the parties entered into that contract. Therefore, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, Titan requests that the Court proceed summarily to try the question of whether [Zhen Hua] and Titan agreed to a binding charter contract. Titan further requests that the Court, upon finding that [Zhen Hua] entered into a binding contract with Titan, pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4 and § 206, forthwith direct [Zhen Hua] to arbitrate any remaining issues including damages in accordance with the charter party arbitration agreement.

On October 29, 1996, Zhen Hua gave notice of its motion to: (1) dismiss the petition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), based on lack of personal jurisdiction over Zhen Hua; (2) dismiss the petition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603-1611, (the “FSIA”), and based on the existence of an “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate whether the parties had formed a binding charter party; (3) in the alternative, dismiss the petition pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) for improper venue; and (4) in the alternative, stay the proceedings pursuant to section 3 of the FAA and section 208 of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, (the “Convention”).

On August 5, 1998, the district court issued its first of two opinions, holding that the parties had not formed an “ad hoc” arbitration agreement but that they had formed a binding charter party, granting Titan’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause contained in the charter party, and denying Zhen Hua’s cross-motion to dismiss the petition. See Titan I, 16 F.Supp.2d at 330, 340. The court also stayed the proceedings pending arbitration in London. See id. at 330, 330 n. 1, 340.

Subsequently, Zhen Hua moved to alter or amend the opinion and order pursuant *144 to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3, on the ground that the court’s opinion “did not fully identify the issues left open for consideration by the arbitrators in London.” Titan II, 182 F.R.D. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted). Zhen Hua argued that Titan I made “unclear to the arbitrators whether they may excuse the parties’ performance under the charter if respondent can prove that the ‘subjects’ or conditions were not satisfied.” Id. at 101. In opposition, Titan argued that the opinion “unambiguously and correctly limited the scope of the arbitrators’ authority.” Id. at 99.

In its second opinion, the district court noted first that “[t]he pivotal issue is whether the arbitrators may excuse the parties from their obligations under the charter in the event that one of the subjects, or conditions!,] has not been satisfied.” Id. at 99-100 (internal quotation marks omitted). Id. Having characterized the issue as such, the district court then held:

We grant respondent’s motion to the extent of specifying that the parties must arbitrate in London all disputes arising under the charter party. Thus, the arbitrators may determine whether the actions of either party, subsequent to the formation of the charter party, have vitiated the agreement. Any parts of our prior Opinion which suggested otherwise are hereby withdrawn.

Id. at 101. 6

An amended judgment was entered on October 7, 1998. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Zhen Hua argues that the district court erred in several regards. First, Zhen Hua asserts that in November 1995 the parties reached an “ad hoc” agreement, separate and distinct from the provisions of the charter party, for the purpose of arbitrating whether the parties had entered into a charter party. If so, contends Zhen Hua, the FAA cloaked the district court with jurisdiction only to order arbitration in accordance with that agreement, leaving the issue of charter party formation to the arbitrator. Second, Zhen Hua contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. Third, Zhen Hua asserts that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over Zhen Hua because Zhen Hua did not have “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with the United States. Finally, Zhen Hua claims that venue in the Southern District of New York was improper. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with Zhen Hua and affirm the decision of the district court.

A. The Purported Agreements

The district court held that the parties did not enter into an “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate whether they had formed a charter party, but did conclude that the parties had formed a charter party that included an arbitration clause requiring the parties to submit charter-related disputes to arbitration in London. As a result, the court granted Titan’s motion to compel arbitration pursuant to the charter party and stayed the litigation pending such arbitration. On appeal, Zhen Hua argues that, as a matter of law, the parties’ communications established an “ad hoc” arbitration agreement that, under the FAA and the Convention, delegated authority to an arbitrator in London to determine whether the parties had formed a charter party. We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

Before addressing the merits of Zhen Hua’s argument, we must resolve the parties’ dispute over the standard of review applicable to the district court’s conclusions about the existence, or lack thereof, *145 of the two purported agreements. According to Zhen Hua, the district court decided the contractual formation issues as a matter of summary judgment and therefore our review is de novo. In response, Titan contends that the district court appropriately made findings of fact based on the parties’ evidentiary submissions and that we review such findings, including the court’s factual findings on formation, for clear error.

The determination of whether there was a meeting of the minds sufficient to constitute a contract is one of fact. See Interocean Shipping Co. v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 584 (2d Cir.1975). This remains true regardless of whether the contract at issue is an arbitration agreement, see Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir.1987) (“Based on [written] exchanges and after a detailed review of the voluminous evidentiary submissions, the district court found that [plaintiff] had agreed to arbitrate its disputes under both the signed and unsigned agreements with ... defendants. We see no reason to disturb this factual finding.”), or á charter party, see Great Circle Lines, Ltd. v. Matheson & Co., 681 F.2d 121, 125 (2d Cir.1982) (“Whether there was a meeting of the minds resulting in a charter party is a question of fact.”).

When parties disagree about whether they entered into an arbitration agreement subject to the FAA, the FAA directs that the “court shall proceed summarily to ... trial” of the issue. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Contrary to Zhen Hua’s characterization of the proceedings below, the district court’s opinion and the record make clear that the district court did try the issue of whether the parties formed an agreement to arbitrate. Although the district court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, the parties filed multiple briefs and extensive evidence with the court over a two-year period. Most significantly, the parties submitted the telex and facsimile communications that were alleged to have formed the “ad hoc” arbitration agreement (according to Zhen Hua) and the charter party (according to Titan). No dispute existed as to the authenticity of these communications. Instead, the parties disagreed over the meaning of the communications.

In addition, Zhen Hua did not and does not now seek an evidentiary hearing. Nowhere in its briefs does Zhen Hua assert that it requested the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, Zhen Hua does not contest (or even address) the district court’s statement in footnote twelve of its first opinion that notwithstanding “[s]ection 4 of the FAA ..., no such hearing [was] required.” See Titan I, 16 F.Supp.2d at 337 n. 12 (internal citation omitted). Finally, Zhen Hua explicitly disclaims that the case should be remanded to the district court for such a hearing:

Neither Titan nor Zhen Hua seeks remand for a factual trial, nor is a trial appropriate when the sole issue is whether, as a matter of law and through application of the presumption favoring arbitration, the parties’ communications reflect an enforceable agreement to arbitrate the issue of charter formation.

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 12-13 (emphasis added). Consequently, under the circumstances of the matter sub judice, we hold that the district court tried the issue of formation (of both purported agreements) on the papers and that Zhen Hua has waived any right under the FAA to an evidentiary hearing.

The correct standard of review of the facts found by the trial court is contained in Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.... ” As stated in the rule, the “clearly erroneous” standard of review controls our’ consideration of the factual findings of the district court even though based upon a documentary record. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, *146 North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). We are not permitted to find the district court’s findings of fact to be clearly erroneous if the findings are one of two permissible views of the evidence. See id.

2. Formation of the Purported Agreements

“The Federal Arbitration Act creates a ‘body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.’ ” PaineWebber Inc. v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1198 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Arbitration agreements subject to the Convention are enforced in accordance with Chapter 2 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 201. An agreement to arbitrate exists within the meaning of the Convention and the FAA if: (1) there is a written agreement; (2) the writing provides for arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the convention; (3) the subject matter is commercial; and (4) the subject matter is not entirely domestic in scope. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. Partnership, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1999); see also 9 U.S.C. § 202. Upon finding that such an agreement exists, a federal court must compel arbitration of any dispute falling within the scope of the agreement pursuant to the terms of the agreement.

Zhen Hua and Titan argue over whether the first requirement, i.e., the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, has been met with regard to the “ad hoc” agreement and the charter party. Under the Convention a written agreement “include[s] an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.” 9 U.S.C. § 201, Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitra-ble Awards, Art. 11(2). 7 Notwithstanding the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution, see David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir.1991), courts must treat agreements to arbitrate like any other contract, see Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n. 12, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967). A contract is formed when there is a meeting of the minds of the parties on the essential terms of an agreement. See Interocean Shipping, 523 F.2d at 534. A court must therefore examine the parties’ written communications to determine whether they have formed an agreement to arbitrate enforceable under the FAA and the Convention.

a. The “Ad Hoc” Arbitration Agreement

The district court considered Zhen Hua’s argument that in November 1995 the parties reached a separate, “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate whether the parties had formed a binding charter party. Preliminarily, the court noted that “the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is a threshold question for a court to resolve, absent a clear and unmistakable delegation of that authority to an arbitrator.” Titan I, 16 F.Supp.2d at 337 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). The court also observed that “where the parties contest the formation of an agreement, ‘any silence or ambiguity about whether such a question is arbitra-ble reverses the usual presumption that issues should be resolved in [arbitration’s] favor.’ ” Id. at 338 (quoting Abram Landau Real Estate v. Bevona, 123 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir.1997) (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 943, 115 S.Ct. 1920)). The court *147 then found that although the parties had begun negotiating such an “ad hoc” agreement around November 1, Zhen Hua cut off such negotiations on November 2 when it stated, “There is no need for a separate arbitration agreement.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded, the parties never formed a separate agreement to arbitrate whether they had formed a charter party.

On appeal, Zhen Hua argues that the district court erroneously relied on First Options to require evidence that the parties had “elear[ly] and unmistakabl[y]” delegated authority to an arbitrator to decide the question of charter formation. Instead, Zhen Hua contends, the district court should have applied the contract formation standards articulated by the Convention to find that the parties had formed an “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate formation of the charter party.

In First Options, the Supreme Court addressed, inter alia, the “narrow” issue of the appropriate “standard of review applied to an arbitrator’s decision about arbi-trability.” 514 U.S. at 942, 115 S.Ct. 1920. In defining this issue, the Court delineated the three types of disagreement between the parties: (1) whether the defendants were liable to the plaintiffs; (2) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of liability; and (3) whether the courts or the arbitrators possess the primary power to decide the second question. See id. The issue presented to the Supreme Court was the third question, which the Court reformulated as “Does that power belong primarily to the arbitrators (because the court reviews their arbitrability decision deferentially) or to the court (because the court makes up its mind about arbitrability independently)?” Id. Answering this question, the Supreme Court held that “[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakable] evidence that they did so,’ ” id. at 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (second and third alterations in the original), and that any silence or ambiguity about whether such a question is arbitrable reverses the usual presumption that issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, see id. at 944-45, 115 S.Ct. 1920; Abram, Landau, 123 F.3d at 72-73 (citing, inter alia, First Options, 514 U.S. at 943,115 S.Ct. 1920).

Zhen Hua is correct that the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in First Options is not apposite to the precise • question presented to the district court. Unlike First Options, the instant ease required the district court to determine whether the parties formed an “ad hoc” agreement to arbitrate whether they had formed a charter party — an issue analogous to the second of the three disagreements between the litigants in First Options. On appeal, neither Zhen Hua nor Titan contends that an arbitrator should resolve this question; instead the parties disagree as to whether the court below correctly answered this question.

Zhen Hua errs, however, in asserting that the district court applied the First Options standard in deciding whether the parties had formed an “ad hoc” arbitration agreement. When read in context, the passage of the district court’s opinion relying on First Options (and Abram Landau) makes clear that the district court invoked the standard only to note preliminarily that the dispute over formation was properly before it rather than an arbitrator. See Titan I, 16 F.Supp.2d at 337-38. Furthermore, the ensuing analysis by the district court reveals that the district court correctly evaluated the written communications under general principles of the law of contract formation (consistent with the Convention) in finding that Zhen Hua had terminated negotiations over an “ad hoc