Mx Group, Inc. v. City of Covington

*328 OPINION

Defendants, the City of Covington, Kentucky, the Covington Board of Adjustment, Marc Tischbein, and the Covington Station Council of Co-Owners, Inc., appeal the judgment of the district court, after a bench trial, in favor of Plaintiff pursuant to claims brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. Plaintiff, MX Group, Inc., alleged that Defendants discriminated against it because of Plaintiffs association with its potential clients, who are drug addicted persons, by refusing to issue a zoning permit to Plaintiff so that it could open a methadone clinic in the City of Covington. Plaintiff claims that Defendants further discriminated against it by amending the city’s zoning ordinance to completely prohibit the clinic from opening anywhere in the city. The district court found that Plaintiffs clients or potential clients were persons with a disability and that . Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of Plaintiffs association with its clients/potential clients. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

BACKGROUND

Procedural History

On January 16, 1998, Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in the district court, alleging violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. On July 21,1998, Plaintiff amended its complaint, adding as a third cause of action denial of substantive due process. According to the district court’s opinion, Plaintiff also asserted a constitutional equal protection claim. Defendants filed an answer on August 20, 1998. Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 2, 1999. The district court held a hearing on the motion and denied it on December 17, 1999. The district court also set a date of January 8, 2000 for a bench trial. At the close of all the evidence, the district court asked the parties to file memoranda in support of their positions. Plaintiff filed its memorandum on March 6, 2000, and Defendants filed their memorandum/brief on April 5, 2000. On August 8, 2000, the district court entered an opinion and order in favor of Plaintiffs ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. See MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 106 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Ky.2000). The district court also entered an order and injunction, which provided that Defendants’ ordinance, essentially banning Plaintiffs proposed methadone clinic from operating anywhere in the City of Coving-ton, violated the ADA. The order also enjoined Defendants from withholding the necessary permits and permission from Plaintiff for a methadone clinic. Defendants moved to alter and amend the order; after oral arguments were heard on that motion, the district court denied Defendants’ motion on September 8, 2000. Defendants thereafter filed this timely notice of appeal.

Facts

The parties agree that the facts are essentially undisputed. Plaintiff, MX Group, is in the business of providing drug treatment through the use of methadone. 1 In 1997, Plaintiff began the process of locating a site to open a methadone clinic in Covington, Kentucky. The proposed purpose of the clinic was to provide methadone treatment, counseling, medical exami *329 nations, and other services for recovering opium addicts.

Melissa Fabian and Edith McNeill, both of whom were then affiliated with Plaintiff, contacted Chuck Eilerman, a realtor, who provided them with a list of properties in Covington that met the needs of the facility. Fabian testified that in searching for a location, affordability was important as was location. She testified that she was not looking in residential areas, but only business or commercial areas. Further, it was important that the location be accessible to clients. After looking at several potential sites, Plaintiff found a suitable location at 200 West Pike Street. The building was divided into office condominiums and used to serve as a train station. Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with one of the owners of office space in the building, and contacted Covington’s Zoning Administrator Ralph Hopper to apply for a zoning permit for that location.

After he was first contacted by Plaintiff regarding the permit but before Plaintiff actually sought a zoning permit for the clinic, Hopper contacted his superiors about the methadone clinic. Although this was not normal procedure, Hopper thought the clinic would be “potentially controversial.” Hopper completed the application for the zoning permit and issued the permit on the day Plaintiff applied for it, August 19,1997.

After the zoning permit was issued, town residents expressed their displeasure regarding the proposed clinic at a City Commission meeting. As a result, on September 8, 1997, the city held a hearing chaired by Assistant City Manager Tom Steidel regarding Plaintiffs application for a zoning permit. Steidel testified at trial that the hearing was informational in nature, and was intended to provide information for and against the establishment of the clinic. Steidel testified that the meeting was intended to provide Plaintiff and concerned Covington citizens an opportunity to air their concerns regarding the clinic. The meeting lasted two to three hours, and was not transcribed or recorded. Steidel also testified that there was a wide range of reaction and emotion at the meeting, ranging from “proper decorum” to anger regarding the proposed clinic.

Another owner of an office in the budding where the clinic was to be located appealed Hopper’s decision to issue the permit. On December 17, 1997, the Cov-ington Board of Adjustment held a hearing on the matter. Numerous persons testified at the hearing for and against Hopper’s decision. Covington Assistant Police Chief William Dorsey testified that from a police officer’s perspective, he saw no need for a methadone clinic in Covington. Dorsey testified that based on his research, he found that for-profit methadone clinics spawn criminal activity. He contacted other clinics in other towns and was told about trouble outside of clinics, such as drug use and/or trafficking and drug trade, violence, shootings and death. He testified that there is a large number of burglaries at methadone clinics as a result of people breaking in to steal drugs. He also testified that the town should be concerned about the safety of the neighborhood children inasmuch as there is a school near the proposed site. Further, he added that “addicts” generally find a way to wean themselves from the drugs and then sell the take-home dosages they are provided. Dorsey did not provide any statistics or other specifics regarding these alleged ill effects. Apparently under the impression that Plaintiff operated a clinic in Green-tree, Pennsylvania, as part of Dorsey’s research, he contacted the Greentree police department, which told him there had been increased police runs to the clinic. However, the security officer in the building *330 where Plaintiff is located in Greentree told him that he had experienced no problems. (J.A. at 234.) Dorsey admitted that he told the Board of Adjustment about the police statements but not about the statements of the security officer. Other residents also testified for, but mostly against, allowing the facility to open.

Sergeant John Burke, commander of the Pharmaceutical Diversion Squad of the Cincinnati Police Division testified that he had experienced problems regarding criminal activity, such as drug dealers preying on those using drugs outside of methadone clinics in his town. He testified that he had no direct experience with for-profit clinics, but he had received reports from a nearby clinic in Indiana with which he was familiar. He testified that that clinic also had experienced problems relating to drug activity.

One person who spoke in support of the facility had herself been a heroin addict for ten years, and testified that she would travel to Covington to pick up her drugs. She testified that in April 1996, she entered a clinic located in Indiana, and was stabilized and able to obtain a job in a school. She testified that she was able to resume her life after a 60-day “detox,” and was able to completely “detox” after a year and a half. As a result of her methadone treatment, she testified that she was drug free. Plaintiff also put on videotape evidence of Wayne Crabtree, a program director of a methadone clinic in Louisville. Crabtree testified that his clinic had experienced no acts of violence committed against anyone in the community, although he stated that there once had been a problem between two clients. Essentially, he stated that his clinic operated without incident.

The Board of Adjustment voted to overrule Hopper’s decision and revoked the zoning permit. Plaintiff appealed the Board of Adjustment’s decision to the state circuit court. However, the appeal was dismissed for failure to name a necessary party.

During the spring of 1998, Plaintiff contacted Hopper again about obtaining another location in the city, at 1 West 43rd Street. The site had been a doctor’s office, and it was located in a shopping center zone. The site was in front of the City’s trash compacting station, bordering an industrial zone, and separated from housing by a four-lane highway. The building was in a location with good public transportation, was affordable and was available. Hopper again thought this use would be a permitted use under the zoning code, and told McNeil so. However, recognizing the controversy concerning the clinic, Hopper also informed the city manager, Greg Jarvis, of Plaintiffs latest request. In response, on March 17, 1998, the city solicitor sent a letter to Hopper, which according to Hopper, basically stated that as the zoning ordinances then stood, a methadone clinic, such as Plaintiffs, was not a permitted use in any zone in the city.

After the Board of Adjustment hearing, the Covington General Affairs Committee and Hopper met, and issued a report entitled “Preventing the Proliferation of Addiction Treatment Facilities in Covington.” The report included a proposed amendment to the zoning code, which was adopted by Covington in June 1998. The amendment expanded the definition of “addiction treatment facility” in the zoning code to include any place whose primary function is to care for the chemically dependent. The zoning code previously only used the term to apply to programs that provided overnight or housing accommodations. The ordinance limited the number of all such facilities to one facility for every 20,000 persons in the city. The amend *331 ment completely foreclosed Plaintiffs opportunity to locate in the city.

Hopper testified that one residential treatment facility had previously wanted to locate in the city, but at that time the business did not fit into a category as listed in the zoning code. The facility, the Women’s Residential Assistance Treatment Program (“WRATP”), requested an amendment and both it and another facility, operated by the same group that operates the WRATP, were allowed to locate in the city as a result of the ordinance amendments. In the March 17,1998 letter that the city solicitor sent to Hopper, the city solicitor indicated that in the future if Hopper received an application for a narcotics treatment program, he may want to conduct a study to determine the best zone for the location of an out-patient treatment program. Hopper explained at trial that he interpreted this to mean that a text amendment to the ordinance may be sought, much like that which occurred with the WRATP.

Fabian testified at trial that the program MX intended to establish would not only provide methadone treatment, but also offer other services, such as counseling. She testified that often a drug addiction affects a person’s life in numerous ways, including loss of employment, spouses and children. She testified that the addiction affects a person’s ability to hold a job, to engage in parenting, or to function socially. To enter the program and qualify as a client, an individual had to show that he or she had been an addict for at least one year. Such a showing could be made by way of letters from an employer, parent, parole or probation officer, or another provider.

McNeil testified at trial that the clinic in Erie, Pennsylvania had experienced none of the problems Dorsey raised at the Board of Adjustment hearing. She testified that she had experienced no trouble with robberies, murders, arrests or diversion at the Erie facility.

At trial, Mark Caverly of the Drug Enforcement Agency also testified. He testified about concern regarding drug diversion at methadone programs, but stated that such concern arises anywhere that drugs are present, such as pharmacies or doctors’ offices.

DISCUSSION

I.

The district court’s findings of fact will be set aside only for clear error. See Burzynski v. Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 616 (6th Cir.2001); AM Intern., Inc. v. Int’l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 998 (6th Cir.1993); Fe&R.Civ.P. 52(a). “This standard does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse a district court’s findings of fact because the reviewing court is convinced it would have decided the case differently.” Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Yenkin-Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir.1996). Further, where there are two permissible ways to view the evidence, the district court’s decision to view the evidence in one of those ways as opposed to the other cannot be clear error. Id. (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). The district court’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Burzynski, 264 F.3d at 616.

II.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks “prudential” standing to bring this suit under either Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Defendants argue that Plaintiff may not seek redress under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act without an individualized inquiry into whether at least *332 one of its clients or potential clients is disabled. Defendants contend that Plaintiff was required to join as a plaintiff, a client, or potential client so that an individualized inquiry could be made to determine whether the client or potential client is disabled. We will address each of these contentions below.

As a preliminary matter, we note that Plaintiff asserts claims under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court analyzed Plaintiffs claims under both acts together, and referred only to the ADA in its analysis, “since the results are the same under both Acts.” MX Group, Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d at 915. We will do the same inasmuch as both acts are interpreted consistently with one another. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (ADA is not to “be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under ... Rehabilitation Act of 1978 .... ”); Andrews v. State of Ohio, 104 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir.1997) (explaining that because “standards under both of the acts are largely the same, cases construing one statute are instructive in construing the other”); see also Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that Congress has instructed that both ADA and Rehabilitation Act are to be interpreted consistently); Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 44-46 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that language under ADA and Rehabilitation Act similarly ban discrimination by a public entity and such discrimination includes a public entity’s zoning decisions).

Plaintiff also asserted claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the denial of a permit to operate the methadone clinic violated its rights to substantive due process and equal protection. The district court did not reach those claims inasmuch as it found Plaintiff prevailed on its ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. MX Group, Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d at 915. Plaintiff does not raise its constitutional claims on appeal or otherwise challenge the district court’s disposition of those claims.

A. STANDING UNDER THE ADA AND REHABILITATION ACT

Whether a party has standing under Article III of the Constitution to bring a claim “involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Standing is a threshold inquiry in every federal case and it involves an inquiry into whether “a plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Aside from the minimal standing requirements under Article III, however, prudential considerations may bar a person or entity from asserting standing on behalf of the rights of others. Id. at 500-01, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Prudential barriers do not apply in all cases. “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules,” although Article Ill’s requirements remain. Id. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197.

[S]o long as this requirement [Article III] is satisfied, persons to whom Congress has granted a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, may have standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of others, and indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support of their claim.

Id.

An association or organization may assert standing in one of two ways: (1) on *333 its own behalf because it has suffered a palpable injury as a result of the defendants’ actions; or (2) as the representative of its members. Id. at 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197; Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 341-42, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Of course, as stated, an entity may sue in its own right for injuries sustained as a result of a defendant’s actions, without prudential standing concerns, where Congress has provided the entity such a right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 378-79,102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (holding that non-profit organization had standing to bring suit on its own behalf under Fair Housing Act, where organization alleged that defendant’s steering practices impaired its ability to perform its goal of providing “counseling and referral services to low and moderate income homeseekers”).

Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reasons of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The federal courts have addressed the issue of whether an entity such as MX Group has standing to sue under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act when it has suffered an injury as a result of discrimination against its clients. See e.g., Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 46-48; Oak Ridge Care Ctr., Inc. v. Racine County, 896 F.Supp. 867, (E.D.Wis.1995). The Second Circuit has engaged in an extensive analysis on this issue in Innovative. A brief factual background of that case before discussing the standing analysis would be helpful.

In Innovative, Innovative or “IHS,” an outpatient drug and alcohol treatment center, began efforts to relocate to downtown White Plains, New York. Innovative, 117 F.3d at 40. More than a year after seeking a permit to relocate into that area, IHS was denied the necessary building permit by the city’s zoning board of appeals. Id. IHS and five individuals brought suit against several defendants, including the City of White Plains, the mayor and the zoning board of appeals. Id.

IHS had originally sought a building permit for the downtown site which had previously been a retail space. Id. at 41. The deputy commissioner of buildings determined that the IHS’s proposed use for the facility constituted a business or professional office under the applicable zoning ordinance. Id. However, because the IHS application for the permit requested a change of use from “retail” to “office,” the application was referred to a planning board. Id. The application created controversy. At public meetings held by the planning board, members of the community expressed concerns about the appearance of the people who attend alcohol and drug-dependence programs and the effect such a program would have on property values. Id. After the meetings, because of continued opposition, IHS withdrew its application and reapplied for a permit to renovate the. site, which would not have required the planning board’s approval. However, the community still opposed IHS’s proposed use. Id. The commissioner reaffirmed his position that the use was allowed and that decision was affirmed by White Plains’ corporate counsel. Id. However, on appeal, the zoning board of appeals voted to reverse the commissioner’s decision, and IHS and several of its clients instituted suit. Id. at 42.

The defendants moved for dismissal on several grounds, including that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Specifically, the defendants argued that IHS lacked prudential standing to assert a claim under either *334 the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 46. The defendants argued that Title II and the Rehabilitation Act both only conferred rights on a narrow class of people, i.e., “qualified individuals] with a disability.” Id. at 46. The Second Circuit, however, noted that it had to determine “whether the statutes !grant[ ] persons in [IHS’s] position a right to judicial relief,’ ” Id. at 47 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197), in order to determine whether IHS had standing. Although 42 U.S.C. § 12132 of the ADA states that no qualified individual with a disability shall be denied benefits by a public entity, § 12133, ADA’s public entity enforcement provision, states that the statute extends its remedies to “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability.” Id. Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act protects “any person aggrieved” by the discrimination of a person on the basis of his or her disability. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2)). According to the court, “such broad language in the enforcement provisions of the statutes evinces a congressional intention to define standing to bring a private action ... as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Second Circuit held that as Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, respectively, provide relief to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of a disability (ADA), or any person'aggrieved by the discrimination of a person on the basis of his or her disability (Rehabilitation Act), IHS could institute an action because it had a right to judicial relief. Id.; see also Liberty Resources, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Auth., 155 F.Supp.2d 242, 249 (E.D.Pa.2001) (“[T]he enforcement provision of the ADA ... broadly refers to any person, not solely disabled individuals.”).

In addition, the Second Circuit reasoned that as to Title II of the ADA, specifically, the regulations implementing the ADA allow entities such as IHS to bring a right of action because of their association or dealings with disabled persons. The ADA is divided into several sections' — proscribing discrimination in employment (Title I); discrimination by public entities (Title II) and discrimination in public transportation (Title III) — and Congress granted authority to the Department of Justice to implement regulations pertaining to Title II. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-79, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). According to the regulations implementing Title II,

A public entity shall not exclude or oth- ' erwise deny equal services, programs, or activities to an individual or entity because of the known disability of an individual with whom the individual or entity is known to have a relationship or association.

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g).

In adopting these regulations, the Department of Justice was following congressional intent, in that Congress directed that Title II should be read to incorporate the provisions of Titles I and III, which expressly “define discrimination to include conduct directed at an entity based on its relationship or association with disabled persons.” Innovative, 117 F.3d at 47 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(b)(4), 12182(b)(1)(E)). In addition, the appendix to the regulations explain that “the individuals covered under this paragraph are any individuals who are discriminated against because of their known association with an individual with a disability.” Id. It states, “[fjor example, it would be violative of this paragraph for a local government to refuse to allow a theater company to use a school auditorium on the grounds that the company had recently performed for an audience of individuals with HIV disease.” 28 C.F.R., pt. 35, App. A to 28, § 35.130(g). *335 In such circumstances, the theater company would have a right of action because of the wrong done to it. The rule is therefore intended to encompass “entities that provide services to or are otherwise associated with” individuals with disabilities. Id. “The provision was intended to ensure that entities such as health care providers, employees of social service agencies, and others who provide professional services to persons with disabilities are not subjected to discrimination because of their professional association” with them. Id. Thus, under the statute and by virtue of the regulations, IHS had standing.

We find the Second Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. Because Plaintiff has presented evidence that it was denied a zoning permit because it cares for and/or associates with individuals who have disabilities, Plaintiff has standing to bring this suit on its own behalf. Innovative, 117 F.3d at 47. To that end, Defendants’ reliance on Hunt, 432 U.S. 333, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383, is misplaced. As explained above, in that case, the Supreme Court outlined specific factors that a plaintiff who is suing on behalf of its members must show in order to assert standing. Id. at 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434. However, in the instant case, Plaintiff is not an association suing solely on behalf of its members. Instead, it is an entity suing primarily on its own behalf, because of injury it suffered as a result of its association with individuals with disabilities. Pathways Psychological Support Center v. Town of Leonardtown, No. Civ.A. DKC 99-1362, 1999 WL 1068488, at *3 n. 4 (D.Md. July 30, 1999) (rejecting similar argument and holding that mental rehabilitation facility that was refused permission to operate in town had standing to sue where the denial allegedly was based on the facility’s association or relationship with its clients).

Defendants, however, contend that Plaintiff still lacks standing to bring this suit because it failed to join a member or potential member of the clinic. Defendants argue that the Supreme Court has held that an individual inquiry is necessary in order to determine whether an individual has a disability. See e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (“the definition of disability ... requires that disabilities be evaluated with respect to the individual and be determined based on whether an impairment substantially limits ... major life activities”). Sutton involved an employment discrimination case where the plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against because of their poor eyesight. Id. at 475, 119 S.Ct. 2139. The plaintiffs argued that their claims of disability, which resulted from extreme myopia, should be analyzed regardless of whether their glasses or contact lenses mitigated the effects on their disability. Id. Rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court held that “if a person is taking measures to correct for, or mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures — both positive and negative — must be taken into account when judging whether that person is ‘substantially limited’ in a major life activity and thus disabled under the [ADA]” Id. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139. In its analysis, the Supreme Court also noted that the ADA defines disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities” Id. citing (42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). The Court stated that “because the phrase ‘substantially limits’ is presented in the present tense, it must be read as requiring a person to be presently — not potentially or hypothetically — substantially limited in order to demonstrate disability.” Id. In addition, “[t]he definition of disability also requires that disabilities be evaluated with respect to an individual.” Id. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139. *336 Thus, whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry. Id.

Based on Sutton’s holding that an individual’s disability requires an individualized inquiry, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim fails because it failed to join one of its potential clients in order that such an individual could be assessed to be disabled. If no individual client can be assessed based on his or her disability, then Defendants contend that they cannot be held to have discriminated against Plaintiff because it associated with disabled persons. Defendants acknowledge that the Second Circuit in Innovative held that the plaintiff organization in that case had standing to bring claims based on the discrimination it faced, but Defendants here assert that the case is distinguishable because in Innovar tive the IHS joined opiate addicts in its complaint. However, Innovative is distinguishable in that the plaintiff in that case was not attempting to establish a completely new clinic in a new area but rather was attempting to relocate its existing clinic to a new site.

Under the facts of this case, we believe that to overturn the district court’s disposition in Plaintiffs favor on the basis that an individualized inquiry of a client is needed would defy reason as Plaintiff has presented evidence that it was altogether foreclosed from opening its clinic in the first place because of the substance abuse services it planned to offer to its potential clients and that Defendants discriminated against it on that basis. To that end, as explained below, Plaintiff has submitted sufficient proof that its potential clients qualify as disabled under the ADA. See Regional Econ. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 281 F.3d 333, 344-46 (2d Cir.), opinion corrected and superseded, 2002 WL 449493 (2d Cir. Feb.19, 2002) (reversing grant of summary judgment as to organization’s ADA claims, after it presented evidence that defendants denied it a permit to open halfway houses for its proposed clients, recovering alcoholics, whom evidence showed were disabled under ADA).

Plaintiffs Potential Clients Are Disabled under the ADA

The ADA provides that

The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual'—

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;

(B) á record of such an impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such impairment.

42 U.S.C. § 12102.

To determine whether an individual is disabled under subsection A, the Supreme Court has stated that courts should determine whether an individual has a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). Drug abuse can constitute such an impairment. Id. at 632-33, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (explaining that commentary accompanying the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act includes drug addiction and alcoholism as a physical impairment); Regional Econ., 281 F.3d at 344 (collecting cases that hold alcoholism and drug addiction constitute a mental and physical impairment under both ADA and Rehabilitation Act). As the Second Circuit pointed out, “[(legislative history supports this conclusion.” Id. at 345 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(11), at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338 (physical or mental impairment includes drug addiction)).

*337 In the instant case, Plaintiff presented evidence that its potential clients are recovering drug addicts. Plaintiff further submitted evidence that to become a member of its program, individuals had to show they had been addicts for at least a year. They could go about this by presenting letters from employers, a parent, or a parole or probation officer or through blood tests. (J.A. at 180.)

However, merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA; a plaintiff must also show the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Toyota Motor Manuf., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). Such an inquiry must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 691-92. In Williams, the Court stated that it is not enough that someone presents evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. Id. at 691. ADA requires those “claiming the Act’s protection ... to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience ... is substantial.