United States v. Rudolph Keszthelyi

On July 5, 2000, Keszthelyi entered into a plea agreement, whereby he pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly engaging in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count Two) and one count of distributing cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Count Forty-Two). In exchange, the United States dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment. The plea agreement contained no agreement as to the quantity of drugs involved in Keszthelyi's criminal conduct. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Keszthelyi reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during three searches of his residence.

Keszthelyi migrated from South Africa to the United States in October of 1992 on a work visa. Keszthelyi settled in Chattanooga, Tennessee, where he began employment with a company called E & R Products. This company produced various woodwork products, including customized van interiors. In 1994, Keszthelyi purchased E & R Products and obtained a business license, which was in effect from 1994 to 1995. There is no record of E & R Products operating after 1995. Keszthelyi's visa expired in 1995, but he continued to remain in the United States illegally.

In December of 1998, the Chattanooga Police Department ("CPD"), the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") initiated an undercover investigation to identify individuals selling cocaine in Chattanooga night clubs. Keszthelyi, a suspected cocaine dealer, was the primary target of this investigation. ATF Special Agent Jeff Harwood worked undercover, posing as a successful Nashville businessman named Jeff Harris who was on probation for prior drug arrests. Harwood frequented night clubs in Chattanooga in an effort to befriend targets of the investigation. Harwood was wired and monitored by a control agent during these activities. Over the course of the investigation, Harwood made a number of controlled purchases of cocaine from the defendant Keszthelyi. Sometime after July 18, 1999, Harwood returned to Nashville and ceased to be involved in the investigation.

On October 8, 1999, law enforcement authorities obtained a warrant to search Keszthelyi's home from a magistrate judge. The warrant instructed the officers to search the home "on or before October 18, 1999 (not to exceed 10 days)." Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 60. Agent James Isom of the DEA submitted an affidavit in support of the warrant. A substantial portion of the affidavit described a number of controlled purchases of cocaine from the defendant made by a confidential informant identified as CI-4. The affidavit explains that in August of 1999, CI-4 was apprehended leaving Keszthelyi's residence, at which time he informed law enforcement officials that he had just purchased a gram of cocaine from the defendant and had been buying one to two grams per week from Keszthelyi for approximately one year. CI-4 agreed to cooperate with the investigation at that time. In August, September, and October of 1999, CI-4 engaged in six controlled purchases of cocaine from the defendant in quantities ranging from one to five grams. These transactions were electronically monitored and observed by law enforcement agents. Three of these purchases occurred at Keszthelyi's residence. The final purchase at his residence occurred on October 7, 1999, the day before the warrant was issued.

In addition to the information concerning CI-4, Agent Isom's affidavit described two controlled purchases of cocaine made by Agent Harwood while working undercover. The affidavit also noted the statements of three other confidential informants, identified as CI-1, CI-2, and CI-3, describing Keszthelyi's cocaine distribution activities. Finally, the affidavit described the results of an extensive financial investigation of Keszthelyi, which revealed that the defendant had made cash deposits into multiple bank accounts totaling $240,034 over five years and had made a number of very expensive purchases despite having no appreciable legitimate income.

Law enforcement agents arrested Keszthelyi at approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 8, 1999. On that day, agents waited for Keszthelyi to leave his residence and arrested him in his vehicle as he was driving away from his home. Agents searched the vehicle at that time and found four grams of cocaine hidden inside the defendant's garage door opener. Shortly after arresting the defendant, agents commenced a search of Keszthelyi's home pursuant to the search warrant obtained earlier that day. Agents found a loaded semi-automatic pistol inside a night table in Keszthelyi's bedroom and a loaded pistol-gripped shotgun in the bedroom closet. Agents discovered approximately $1000 cash in the pocket of a jacket hanging in the bedroom closet. Agents also found a digital scale, electronic surveillance equipment set up to monitor the exterior of the house, business records, several boxes of ammunition, a digital pager, numerous bottles of pills, a box of syringes, and various other items. No cocaine was found on the premises. The agents concluded their search and left the property at approximately 5:00 p.m.

On October 9, Agent Isom, who had not participated in the initial search of Keszthelyi's residence, telephoned the U.S. Attorney's office about returning to the residence to continue the search. Isom stated that he "felt very strongly that there was something there that had not been located" during the initial search. J.A. at 309 (Suppression Hrg. at 22). The decision was made to re-enter the residence and continue the search without obtaining a new search warrant. During the second search of defendant's residence, Isom noticed that the oven in defendant's kitchen was moveable. He moved the oven and discovered a plastic bottle containing approximately one ounce of cocaine.

After Keszthelyi's arrest, law enforcement agents interviewed a number of additional witnesses, including three confidential informants identified as W-1, W-2, and W-3. Witnesses W-1, W-2, and W-3 were known to the police before October 8, 1999, but the investigation team waited to interview them until after Keszthelyi was in custody in order to ensure that Keszthelyi would not influence them. These witnesses informed the agents that they had purchased cocaine from Keszthelyi, and stated that Keszthelyi had buried money on his property.

On October 11, Agent Isom obtained a new warrant to search defendant's property once again. The affidavit in support of the new warrant summarized the information contained in the first affidavit, and added information concerning the cocaine and other evidence seized from the defendant's car and home on October 8 and 9, as well as the information obtained from W-1, W-2, and W-3. Pursuant to the warrant, agents searched Keszthelyi's home again on October 11, 1999, but no money or drugs were found.

In the district court, Keszthelyi moved to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the three searches of his home. Keszthelyi argued that the affidavit in support of the first warrant was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause, and that the affidavit contained material omissions concerning allegations of misconduct on the part of Agent Harwood. Keszthelyi further objected that the search of October 9, 1999, could not be permitted under the auspices of the initial warrant, and that the search of October 11, 1999, was not supported by new probable cause.

A suppression hearing was held on March 20, 2000. Defense counsel called Agent Harwood and questioned him about allegations that Harwood became involved in a sexual relationship with Kim Brogdon, a target of the investigation and ex-girlfriend of the defendant, during his participation in the undercover investigation. Harwood testified that he was not sexually involved with Brogdon during the investigation, but that he did begin a sexual relationship with her after his involvement in the investigation ended. Harwood stated that Brogdon spent the night at his undercover apartment several times, but Harwood denied having sexual intercourse with her on any of those occasions.1

Defense counsel also asked Harwood whether he had ever used drugs while working undercover. In particular, defense counsel cited suspicious circumstances surrounding a drug purchase made by Harwood on February 13, 1999, at the South Beach Nightclub. Evidence surrounding that transaction showed that Harwood paid $300 for a quantity of cocaine. Although $300 would have been the normal price for one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine, Harwood only turned over one-sixteenth of an ounce to his control agents. Law enforcement records also showed that the cocaine was not turned over to the DEA until several days after it was purchased. Harwood testified that he did not use any of the cocaine, and that it would have been his normal practice immediately to turn the drugs over to his control agent.

According to Harwood, an internal affairs investigation concerning charges of his drug use and improper relationship with Brogdon was launched in January 2000. Harwood denied any wrongdoing and was unaware of the current status of the investigation.

Agent Isom also testified at the suppression hearing. Isom testified at length about the information gathered in support of the warrant affidavit, including the investigation surrounding the confidential informant identified as CI-4 and the alleged improprieties of Agent Harwood. Isom stated that he personally observed the controlled purchases made by CI-4. Isom also stated that Agent Harwood had no connection to any activities involving CI-4. Isom testified that he did not know whether Brogdon and Harwood became involved romantically before Harwood's undercover assignment ended.

The district court denied Keszthelyi's motion to suppress. The court concluded that Agent Isom's affidavit was sufficient to provide probable cause to support the issuance of the October 8 warrant. The court found that Keszthelyi had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that Agent Harwood had engaged in any misconduct during the investigation. The court also concluded that even if the affidavit contained material omissions about the conduct and credibility of Agent Harwood, the unaffected portions of the affidavit, particularly those involving the controlled purchases by CI-4, would have been sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. The court further concluded that the October 9 search was a valid continuation of the October 8 search and did not require the issuance of a separate warrant. Finally, the court found that the October 11 search warrant was supported by new probable cause arising after the first two searches, and was therefore valid.

A sentencing hearing was held on November 6, 2000. At the hearing, the government attempted to prove the quantity of drugs sold by the defendant by extrapolating from unexplained cash deposits made into Keszthelyi's various bank accounts between 1994 and 1999. IRS Agent Lynn Barker testified concerning the results of a detailed investigation of Keszthelyi's finances. Barker testified that net deposits in Keszthelyi's bank accounts between 1994 and 1999 totaled approximately $374,000. Of these, $232,000 were cash deposits and an additional $13,430 could be attributed to checks written to the defendant by Herman Stout, who identified the checks as payments for cocaine. Barker conceded that Keszthelyi earned some legitimate income during the relevant time period. The total deposits that could be traced to legitimate income, however, amounted to no more than $35,000. The government also introduced evidence tending to show that Keszthelyi very rarely worked, and spent the vast majority of his time at a local health club where he would receive and make calls concerning cocaine transactions. The government also offered testimony to show that Keszthelyi only sold cocaine in single gram quantities at a price of approximately $100 per gram. Combining defendant's cash deposits and those checks identified as payments for cocaine, the government contended that at least $245,000 of the deposits made into defendant's bank accounts represented the proceeds of cocaine sales. Assuming that defendant sold cocaine at a constant price of $100 per gram, therefore, the government argued that Keszthelyi was responsible for 2.45 kilograms of cocaine.

The government also offered some direct evidence of defendant's cocaine transactions. Thomas Steffner testified that he purchased cocaine from Keszthelyi between 150 and 200 times. Steffner stated that he typically purchased one-sixteenth of an ounce and occasionally purchased one-eighth of an ounce (approximately 3.3 grams) during these transactions. Dr. David Lewis testified that he purchased cocaine from the defendant between 15 and 20 times, and that he usually purchased one gram at a time. Roger Moss testified that he purchased cocaine from defendant at least 100 times in quantities slightly larger than one gram. Stout testified that he bought cocaine from the defendant as often as several times a week for a period of a year, and that he generally purchased cocaine in quantities of approximately one-and-a-half grams at a time.

Keszthelyi disputed the government's extrapolation theory. He called a number of witnesses who testified that Keszthelyi regularly received parcels containing American currency from his father and a friend in South Africa. At a deposition, Keszthelyi's father testified that he sent his son between $70,000 and $84,000 over seven years. A friend of defendant's, Les Chapman, stated that he had mailed Keszthelyi $40,000, mailed in $5000 monthly increments, during 1995. Keszthelyi also attempted to show that Agent Barker had underestimated his income from E & R Products.

The government presented evidence to rebut Keszthelyi's claims that he received money from friends and family in South Africa. Agent Barker testified that defendant's bank records did not show deposits consistent with the amounts he claimed were sent to him. Barker also testified that agents did not find any magazines or letters from South Africa during the search of Keszthelyi's home, despite the defendant's claim that Chapman sent him money hidden in between the pages of magazines from home. Theo Hollamby, a police officer from South Africa, also testified that Chapman had admitted to lying about sending money to Keszthelyi during an interview with the South African police.

The district court adopted the government's extrapolation theory, and concluded that the $245,000 in unexplained deposits demonstrated that Keszthelyi had distributed at least 2.45 kilograms of cocaine. Based upon this type and quantity of drugs, the court determined Keszthelyi's base offense level to be twenty-eight. The court applied a two-level enhancement for defendant's possession of firearms in connection with the cocaine offenses. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1998). The district court applied another two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Finally, the district court granted a two-level downward adjustment for defendant's acceptance of responsibility in accordance with terms of the plea agreement. Consequently, the court determined the defendant's total offense level to be thirty, and the applicable sentencing range to be between 97 to 121 months' imprisonment. The court sentenced Keszthelyi to 120 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Keszthelyi filed a timely notice of appeal.

Keszthelyi's first assignment of error alleges that Agent Isom's affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant issued on October 8, 1999. The defendant alleges that Agent Isom omitted material facts concerning Agent Harwood's misconduct from the affidavit in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the claim to be without merit. On appellate review of the district court's ruling on a Franks challenge, we review de novo the district court's legal conclusions, and we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 505 (6th Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1625, 152 L.Ed.2d 636 (2002).

In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a search warrant "must be voided" if, after a hearing, the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that "a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit," and (2) that "with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause." Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674. We have held that Franks challenges may be based on the omission of material facts from the warrant affidavit that would, if known to the issuing magistrate, dispel probable cause. United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir.1997). We have cautioned, however, that "an affidavit which omits potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false information[,]... because an allegation of omission potentially opens officers to endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter that might, if included, have redounded to defendant's benefit." Id. (quotation omitted). After reviewing the record, we conclude that Keszthelyi's Franks challenge is without merit.

Assuming that Keszthelyi could show that Agent Isom intentionally or recklessly omitted facts relating to Agent Harwood's misconduct, the unaffected portions of the affidavit were more than sufficient to establish probable cause. See Graham, 275 F.3d at 506. As the Supreme Court has explained, the standard for probable cause is "whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before [the magistrate], including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). At most, inclusion of information about Agent Harwood's alleged misconduct would have undermined the reliability of the information generated by Harwood himself. Thus, the magistrate may have disbelieved the information provided in paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12 of the affidavit, which relate to two controlled purchases by Agent Harwood and Harwood's account of various statements made by others implicating Keszthelyi in cocaine trafficking. Harwood's misconduct would not discredit information relating to the six controlled purchases made by CI-4, three of which occurred at Keszthelyi's residence. The uncontradicted evidence at the suppression hearing established that Harwood played no role in the development of CI-4. The controlled purchases by CI-4 were electronically monitored and recorded by the police. Such evidence offers strong support for a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Harris, 255 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir.) (noting that two controlled purchases by confidential informant with history of reliability played key role in establishing probable cause), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 378, 151 L.Ed.2d 288 (2001); United States v. Murphy, 241 F.3d 447, 458 (6th Cir.) (finding probable cause to search defendant's hotel room where police observed controlled purchase of crack cocaine made by confidential informant outside hotel room, observed defendant return to hotel room after the transaction, and overheard telephone conversation between informant and defendant arranging the purchase), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1044, 121 S.Ct. 2013, 149 L.Ed.2d 1014 (2001). The magistrate judge's probable cause determination was further supported by the statements of CI-1, CI-2, and CI-3, as well as the independent investigation of Keszthelyi's finances. Taken together, this untainted information was sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in Keszthelyi's home. We therefore affirm the district court's decision denying Keszthelyi's motion to suppress the fruits of the search on October 8, 1999.

Keszthelyi next challenges the constitutionality of the second entry into and search of his home on October 9, 1999. Keszthelyi argues that once the police terminated their search on October 8, any return to the premises constituted a new search and required officers to obtain a new warrant. The government contends that the second search was a reasonable continuation of the October 8 search, and therefore was authorized by the October 8 warrant. In the alternative, the government contends that even if the October 9 search was invalid, the evidence discovered during that search should not be suppressed because it would have been discovered inevitably during the third search of defendant's residence on October 11, 1999. We agree with the defendant that the October 9 search was not a reasonable continuation of the October 8 search. We nevertheless agree with the government that the cocaine inevitably would have been discovered during the October 11 search and should not be suppressed.

a. The Reasonable Continuation Rule

Most of the federal courts of appeals to have considered the question, including the Sixth Circuit, have held that a single search warrant may authorize more than one entry into the premises identified in the warrant, as long as the second entry is a reasonable continuation of the original search. United States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241 (6th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908, 86 S.Ct. 888, 15 L.Ed.2d 663 (1966); United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 557 (4th Cir.2000); United States v. Gerber, 994 F.2d 1556, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 623 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir.1988). In Bowling, the police executed a warrant to search the defendant's home for stolen business machines. During the search, the police identified a large number of machines they suspected to have been stolen in the defendant's basement. The police recorded the serial numbers of the machines, left the house without seizing the items, and checked the serial numbers overnight. Upon discovering that the serial numbers matched those of the stolen goods, the police returned the next day and seized the machines. Bowling, 351 F.2d at 240-41. We held that the second entry into the defendant's home was authorized by the original warrant, observing that "the mere fact that the time of its first use was promptly noted [on the warrant] did not vitiate its powers as of the following morning." Id. at 241. Thus, Bowling establishes that police may sometimes make more than one entry into a residence during the execution of a single warrant without violating the Fourth Amendment.

Our decision in Bowling, however, does not permit the police unlimited access to the premises identified in a warrant throughout the life of the warrant. Courts have long recognized the dangers of official abuse that inhere in such a rule. As one state supreme court in our circuit explained nearly fifty years ago:

If for no other reason than that the officer still has it in his possession, a search warrant once served, but not returned, can be used a second time within [the life of the warrant] for the purpose of a second search of the premises described, then, logically, it would seem to follow that such officer, with his squad of assistants, may use it to make an indefinite number of such searches during that [time period]. Thus, the warrant could become a means of tyrannical oppression in the hands of an unscrupulous officer to the disturbance or destruction of the peaceful enjoyment of the home or workshop of him or her against whom the efforts of such officer are directed.

McDonald v. State, 195 Tenn. 282, 259 S.W.2d 524, 524-25 (1953). Our decision in Bowling did not reject the general rule that a warrant authorizes only one search. See United States v. Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766, 769 (10th Cir.1980) ("We agree that once a search warrant has been fully executed and the fruits of the search secured, the authority under the warrant expires and further governmental intrusion must cease."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 3008, 69 L.Ed.2d 390 (1981); Wayne R. LaFave, 2 Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.10(d) (3d Ed. 1996) ("[A] warrant may be executed only once, and thus where police unsuccessfully searched [the] premises for a gun and departed but then returned an hour later and searched further because in the interim an informant told the police of the precise location of the gun, the second search could not be justified as an additional search under the authority of the warrant."). Bowling merely recognized that, under certain circumstances, police may temporarily suspend the initial execution of a search warrant and continue the search at another time.

Two aspects of the reasonable continuation rule must therefore be observed. First, the subsequent entry must indeed be a continuation of the original search, and not a new and separate search. Thus, other courts that have followed Bowling have appropriately cast the legal question as whether subsequent entries ostensibly carried out under a single warrant are properly characterized as reasonable continuations of the original search or as separate searches requiring separate warrants. Gerber, 994 F.2d at 1559 ("We view the opening of the hood on the following Monday as the continuation of the search for which the agents had a valid warrant on the preceding Friday."); Kaplan, 895 F.2d at 623; Carter, 854 F.2d at 1107 ("[T]he question is not whether there were two entries pursuant to the warrant, but rather, whether the second search was a continuation of the first."); United States v. Huslage, 480 F.Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.Pa. 1979) ("The question is not whether the police went through the door of the vehicle twice, but rather, whether the search conducted at 10:00 A.M. was a continuation of the search that had been initiated at 4:10 A.M."). Second, the decision to conduct a second entry to continue the search must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. See Gerber, 994 F.2d at 1559; see also Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1996) ("It is well established that those who execute lawful search warrants must do so in a reasonable manner.").

A review of the relevant case law offers us guidance in the proper application of the foregoing principles. In Bowling, for example, the police worked until midnight to copy all the serial numbers of the suspect items, and then checked the serial numbers overnight to determine whether the property was stolen. 351 F.2d at 240-41. When they left the suspect's home, the police possessed a basis for believing that contraband remained in the residence, but chose to suspend the search until those suspicions could be confirmed. It seems apparent from these facts that the original search was not completed until the police were able either to dispel or confirm their suspicions about the equipment following a check of the serial numbers. Thus, the second entry was properly characterized as a continuation of the original search. Moreover, the decision to suspend the search and return later if the equipment proved to be stolen was unquestionably reasonable. A more intrusive alternative existed that could have obviated the need for multiple entries — i.e., the police could have seized all of the equipment in the defendant's residence at the time of the initial search and checked it at their leisure. Nevertheless, when presented with circumstances which complicated their ability to execute fully the warrant at the time of the initial entry, the police in Bowling made a reasonable decision to execute the warrant in a manner that required two entries, but also minimized the risk of undue interference with any legitimate property interest that the defendant may have had in the equipment.

In Gerber, officers executed a warrant to search the defendant's vehicle on a Friday, but did not look under the hood on that day because they were unable to locate the lever to open the hood. 994 F.2d at 1558. Instead, the officers waited until the following Monday, at which time they were able to secure the assistance of a mechanic in opening the hood without damaging the vehicle. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the search under the hood of the vehicle performed on the following Monday — at which time the original warrant had expired — was a reasonable continuation of the original search. The court emphasized the fact that the decision to suspend temporarily the search until a mechanic was available was a reasonable one in the face of an "unexpected obstacle" to the completion of their search. Id. at 1561. The court explained:

[T]he agents reasonably decided to wait until the following Monday, when they could acquire the assistance of an automobile mechanic in opening the hood rather than damage the car, a reasonable rationale. Clearly, a more intrusive alternative existed: they legitimately could have pried the hood open and damaged the car on Friday to complete the search.

Id. at 1559. Gerber is an excellent illustration of the kind of situation in which a second entry is properly characterized as a continuation of an earlier search. The officers in Gerber knew before postponing the initial search that they wanted to look under the vehicle's hood, and had probable cause to believe that evidence would be found there. Id. In attempting to complete this aspect of their search, however, they encountered an obstacle that impeded their access to an area which the officers had a legal right to examine. Although they could have gained access to the area at the time of the initial execution, the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable decision to postpone the search until a later time when the search could be accomplished in a less intrusive manner.

In Gagnon, 635 F.2d 766, a group of hunters discovered a remote warehouse containing what appeared to be marijuana. They notified the police, who obtained a warrant to search the warehouse. Upon execution of the warrant, the police discovered a large volume of marijuana being dried on several large tarpaulins. The police were unable to transport all of the marijuana in their cars at that time, so several of the officers remained on the property to secure the premises until a vehicle capable of transporting the marijuana arrived the following day. Id. at 768. The Tenth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that the police exceeded the authority of the warrant by remaining on the premises. The court noted its agreement with the general rule that a warrant expires once it has been fully executed. Id. at 769. Nevertheless, the court "conclud[ed] that exigent circumstances in this case prevented full execution of the warrant" at the time of the initial entry. Id. The court explained that the decision to remain on the property was reasonable, given the need to secure the evidence and the fact that the police took steps, such as sleeping in their vehicles, to minimize the intrusiveness of their continued presence of the property. Id.