Pam Taylor v. Vermont Department Of Education

We are presented with the question of who is entitled to exercise the rights afforded to a "parent" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g. Plaintiff-appellant Pam Taylor alleges that the defendants have violated statutory rights she possesses as the natural mother of a child who suffers from a disability. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Niedermeier, Mag. J.) granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiff, whose legal authority over the child had been curtailed by a state divorce decree, lacked standing to pursue an action under either statute.

On appeal, Taylor argues that a natural mother is entitled to exercise parental rights under the IDEA and FERPA, and that state law cannot abrogate these federal rights. We decline plaintiff's invitation to federalize the law of domestic relations and hold that the IDEA and FERPA leave intact a state's authority to determine who may make educational decisions on behalf of a child, so long as a state does so in a manner consistent with the federal statutes. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of the claims related to plaintiff's requests for an Individual Educational Evaluation and amendment of inaccurate information contained in her daughter's academic files. We also affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on FERPA, § 1232g(a), under the reasoning of Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002). Nevertheless, because plaintiff retains some important rights under the divorce decree — specifically the right to reasonable information regarding her daughter's health and progress in school — we vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it dismissed her IDEA claim that she was denied access to her child's educational records. We further hold that plaintiff was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies against the Addison Northeast Supervisory Union ("ANSU") defendants, because it would have been futile for Taylor to pursue her IDEA administrative remedies against the ANSU defendants and because it is improbable that she could have obtained relief from the administrative proceedings. Finally, we hold that the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself sua sponte was not fundamental error.

Plaintiff Appellant Pam Taylor has alleged the following facts. Taylor is the natural mother of L.D., who at the time of the complaint was a student at the Weybridge Elementary School in Vermont. Taylor obtained a divorce from L.D.'s father in February 1992 and moved to the U.S. Virgin Islands. The parents shared custody of L.D. for a two-year period after the divorce, after which time they returned to court, each seeking a greater role in L.D.'s parenting. The Vermont family court ultimately revoked the prior custody arrangement and awarded L.D.'s father full custody. The divorce decree entered by the Addison Family Court on July 26, 1994 provides:

The court allocates all legal rights and physical rights regarding the choice of schooling for the child ... to the father. Such rights shall include the right to choose the school location, and participate in all parent teacher conferences of decision making with full authority on behalf of the child.... [The father] shall have the right to make all decisions regarding the child's health and safety while in his care during the school year.

The mother shall have a right to reasonable information regarding the child's progress in school and her health and safety.

. . . .

The Court places the parental rights and responsibilities for the child ... both legal and physical fully with the defendant-father....

This ruling was affirmed by the Vermont Supreme Court.

From the fall of 1994 until June 1998, L.D. attended the Robinson Elementary School ("Robinson") in Starksboro, Vermont. Robinson is part of the Starksboro School District ("SSD") and the Addison Northeast Supervisory Union ("ANSU"). From February 1996 until June 1998, officials at Robinson assessed L.D. in connection with a suspected disability. In January 1998, the ANSU Evaluation and Planning Team determined that L.D. was not eligible for special education under the IDEA, but that she did have Attention Deficit Disorder. ANSU evaluated L.D. to determine what accommodations would be appropriate under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Plaintiff Taylor was not notified of any of the meetings or evaluations that were conducted as part of this assessment, nor was she informed that the school suspected that L.D. suffered from a disability. Moreover, although Taylor requested L.D.'s school records in June 1998, Robinson did not provide Taylor with L.D.'s special education records. Taylor eventually received the special education records from the Weybridge School District in 1999.

L.D. and her father moved to Weybridge, Vermont in the summer of 1998. That September, L.D. commenced fourth grade at the Weybridge Elementary School, which is part of the Addison Central Supervisory Union ("ACSU"). The Weybridge School District formed an Education Support Team to evaluate L.D. for disabilities. In October and November 1998, Taylor traveled to Weybridge to attend what she believed were parent-teacher conferences to discuss L.D.'s academic and social difficulties. She was not informed that, in fact, these meetings were being conducted in order to complete L.D.'s preliminary disability evaluation. Throughout the remainder of the academic year, meetings and assessments of L.D. continued and a "Notice and Consent for Special Education Evaluation" was issued by the Weybridge School District, without any notice to the plaintiff.

In May 1999, in response to letters Taylor had sent to both the ANSU and ACSU, the Weybridge Elementary School finally sent her complete copies of L.D.'s educational records. It was after reviewing these records that Taylor first realized that the school district suspected that L.D. suffered from a disability.

During that same month, Weybridge psychologist Patricia Messerle began her disability evaluation. Messerle contacted the plaintiff, explaining that she had been hired by ACSU to help L.D. become more successful in school, and that she needed information on L.D.'s "actual temperament from birth." Messerle issued her completed report on July 2, 1999, in which she concluded that L.D. qualified for special education due to her emotional-behavioral problems. Taylor received a copy of Messerle's evaluation on July 19, 1999. On August 25, 1999, she wrote to Weybridge with concerns regarding the accuracy of the report and asked for certain factual corrections. Some, but not all, of the requested changes were made.

On July 9, 1999, an Individualized Education Program ("IEP") team consisting of L.D.'s father, stepmother, Messerle, Weybridge Elementary School principal Christina Johnson, ACSU Learning Specialist Amy Brown, and L.D.'s fourth grade teacher determined that L.D. suffered from an emotional-behavioral disability under Vermont Department of Education Regulation 2362.1(h). On August 30, 1999, the IEP team met to create L.D.'s first IEP, and on September 7, they sent L.D. for a neuropsychological evaluation at the Dartmouth Medical School. Although Taylor was later sent copies of the minutes from the August 30 meeting and the report issued by the Dartmouth Medical School, she was not informed in advance that any of these meetings or evaluations were to take place.

On September 3, 1999, Taylor wrote to James Lombardo, an ACSU official, alleging forty-five violations of her rights under federal and state law. Taylor asked to be included as a member of L.D.'s IEP team, for access to L.D.'s educational records, and to be allowed input into the content of those records. She sent a courtesy copy of this letter to the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Education ("VDOE"), the federal Department of Education, and various ANSU and ACSU officials. On September 10, 1999, Taylor sent a follow-up letter to ACSU, which she again copied to the federal and state Departments of Education.

On October 1, Weybridge's legal counsel informed Taylor that the school would provide her with information on L.D.'s progress, that it would consider information and input from her that did not contradict input received from L.D.'s father, and that she would be given notice of and allowed to attend future meetings. Taylor did participate in subsequent meetings by phone, although she contends that she did not receive the background information she needed in order to take part in them fully.

On October 31, 1999, Taylor demanded an Independent Educational Evaluation ("IEE"), pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1), 34 C.F.R. § 300.5021 and Vermont Special Education Rule 2364.3.4. The federal regulations permit "a parent" who disagrees with a public agency's evaluation either to initiate a hearing in which the agency must show that its initial evaluation was appropriate or to obtain a second IEE at public expense. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2). This request was discussed at a subsequent IEP meeting in November. As L.D.'s father opposed further evaluation, and the team likewise concluded that further evaluation would impact L.D. negatively, Taylor's request was denied. Taylor then filed a Request for a Due Process Hearing with the Commissioner of the VDOE to compel Weybridge to substantiate its determination that L.D. was "seriously emotionally disturbed." A VDOE hearing officer dismissed the petition on the ground that, as a result of the Addison Family Court's custody order, plaintiff lacked legal standing to pursue any claim under the IDEA.

In October and December 1999, plaintiff again notified the school that she believed that L.D.'s educational file contained inaccurate information and asked that the file be amended. Specifically, Taylor sought to eliminate any reference to L.D.'s stepmother as the child's "mother" or "parent," among other changes. Weybridge did not respond to Taylor's letters but on February 4, 2000, Taylor received a copy of a letter addressed to L.D.'s father. The letter stated that the school had removed certain letters written by Taylor from L.D.'s files but, pursuant to the father's written request, would not amend the school records further. Taylor's petition for a hearing to challenge the content of L.D.'s records was denied by ACSU on the ground that, as Taylor lacked decision-making authority for L.D., there were "no justiceable [sic] issues to be heard by a Hearing Officer."

Taylor brought suit pro se in federal court against (1) the VDOE and the VDOE Commissioner; (2) ANSU, the SSD, and SSD officials ("the ANSU defendants"); and (3) ACSU, the Weybridge School District, and Weybridge school officials ("the ACSU defendants").2 In count one, Taylor sought an order compelling the Weybridge School District to demonstrate the appropriateness of its disability determination pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 300.502, as well as compensatory and punitive damages for defendants' IDEA violations. In count two, Taylor asked that the Weybridge School District be compelled to ensure that L.D.'s educational records contain accurate information pursuant to the procedures set forth in FERPA, the IDEA, and the implementing regulations; that the Weybridge School District be compelled to supply Taylor with all of L.D.'s educational records; and that the Court award Taylor compensatory and punitive damages for the violations of her rights under FERPA and the IDEA with respect to record access and record content. Although FERPA does not contain an implied direct cause of action, pursuant to Fay v. S. Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir.1986), Taylor brought her FERPA action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Taylor also claimed that the VDOE failed to adjudicate her administrative complaint, in violation of 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.600-662 and 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3, and made numerous accusations that the ANSU defendants also violated FERPA and the IDEA, but did not seek a specific order as to either the VDOE or the ANSU defendants.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties consented to have the case heard before Magistrate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier. Defendants thereafter filed motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7). The magistrate judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), holding that, as a non-custodial parent, Taylor lacked standing under the IDEA and FERPA. Taylor v. Vt. Dep't of Educ., No. 2:00-CV-143 (D.Vt. Apr. 4, 2001). Five days after the entry of judgment, however, the magistrate judge notified the parties that his daughter had been employed since January 1, 2001 as a teacher at defendant Robinson Elementary School. Her supervisor, Mary Heins, and her ultimate employer, ANSU, were also named defendants. Judge Niedermeier admitted that he had been aware that his daughter had been hired by Robinson Elementary School, but "did not focus on that fact in relation to this case until yesterday." Taylor did not move for recusal or for reconsideration of the judgment. Instead, on May 3, she noticed her appeal.

Taylor has brought three general types of claims under the IDEA and FERPA. First, she demands that the ACSU defendants perform an Independent Educational Evaluation of L.D. Second, she asks to be given access to all of her daughter's educational records. Third, she seeks to challenge the content of her daughter's education records pursuant to 34 C.F.R. § 99.21. She also requests compensatory damages for violations of her rights under the IDEA and FERPA, including defendants' previous and continuing refusal to give her access to her daughter's records or other information regarding her daughter's education and health. We address each claim in turn.

We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir.2001). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir.2001). Our consideration is generally limited to the facts as presented within the four corners of the complaint, to documents attached to the complaint, or to documents incorporated within the complaint by reference. Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir.1999). We may also look to public records — such as the state court's divorce decree, which we note was also incorporated in complaint by reference — in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir.1998); Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47-48 (2d Cir.1991).

"Since most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements, we must construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency than we would when reviewing a complaint submitted by counsel.... In order to justify the dismissal of the plaintiffs' pro se complaint, it must be beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his [or her] claim which would entitle him [or her] to relief." Lerman v. Bd. of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 139-40 (2d Cir.2000) (internal citations, quotation marks and footnote omitted), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 915, 121 S.Ct. 2520, 150 L.Ed.2d 692 (2001).

II. Taylor's Standing to Request an Independent Educational Evaluation

It is uncontested that one of the primary purposes of the IDEA is to "to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected," 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B), including a parent's right to demand an IEE, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.502. Yet the invocation of this general statutory purpose is of little assistance in helping us determine whether Taylor is entitled to exercise parental rights under the statute. Whether Taylor may avail herself of the IDEA's procedural protections in this case depends upon whether Taylor is considered a "parent" within the meaning of the Act. Unfortunately, neither the IDEA nor its federal regulatory scheme are models of clarity.

The IDEA was enacted to assist states in providing special education and related services to children with disabilities, see 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1), by adopting an approach that has been termed "cooperative federalism." See, e.g., Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir.1999); Bernardsville Bd. of Educ. v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir.1994). Under the IDEA, a participating state is entitled to receive federal funding if it has in effect policies and procedures designed to ensure, among other things, that children with disabilities are "identified and evaluated," that "a free, appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities," that the state is working towards "providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities," and that "children with disabilities and their parents are afforded the procedural safeguards" provided under the Act. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.

The Act does not usurp the state's traditional role in setting educational policy, however. Rather, it is left to the individual states to determine how to implement the statute's goals. Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 784 (1st Cir.1984) ("`Cooperative federalism' in this context, then, allows some substantive differentiation among the states in the determination of which educational theories, practices, and approaches will be utilized for educating disabled children with a given impairment."), aff'd sub nom. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). The statute "incorporates state substantive standards as the governing federal rule" if they are consistent with the federal scheme and meet the minimum requirements set forth by the IDEA. Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.1990); see also Antkowiak v. Ambach, 838 F.2d 635, 641 (2d Cir.1988) (same). "It seems plain that the Congress drew the procedural and substantive contours of education for disabled children, but left the shading and tinting of the details largely to the states. States are responsible for filling in the numerous interstices within the federal Act through their own statutes and regulations." Burlington, 736 F.2d at 785.

Consistent with this broad-outline approach, prior to 1997 the IDEA did not contain any definition of the term "parent." The statute was amended by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub.L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37, to include the following provision:

The term "parent" —

(A) includes a legal guardian; and

(B) except as used in sections 1415(b)(2) and 1439(a)(5) of this title, includes an individual assigned under either of those sections to be a surrogate parent.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). By its terms, this statutory provision is not exhaustive. Clearly, legal guardians and educational surrogates are not the only persons entitled to the IDEA's procedural protections. Even if the use of the expansive term "includes" did not carry with it the strong implication that the statute's definition of parent encompassed more than the two categories specifically referenced, we would find it difficult to credit a reading that excluded natural parents from the list of persons who could exercise parental rights under the statute.3 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that this definition was added merely so that "most references to `guardian' [could be] deleted throughout the act when accompanied by the term `parent.'" S. Rep. 104-275, at 32 (1996) (explaining a proposal to enact an identical amendment in S. 1578).4 Thus, the statutory language provides us with little assistance.

The Department of Education's current set of regulations implementing the IDEA, effective since 1999, contains a more comprehensive definition of parent:

(a) General. As used in this part, the term parent means —

(1) A natural or adoptive parent of a child;

(2) A guardian but not the State if the child is a ward of the State;

(3) A person acting in the place of a parent (such as a grandparent or stepparent with whom the child lives, or a person who is legally responsible for the child's welfare); or

(4) A surrogate parent who has been appointed in accordance with § 300.515.

(b) Foster parent. Unless State law prohibits a foster parent from acting as a parent, a State may allow a foster parent to act as a parent under Part B of the Act if —

(1) The natural parents' authority to make educational decisions on the child's behalf has been extinguished under State law; and

(2) The foster parent —

(i) Has an ongoing, long-term parental relationship with the child;

(ii) Is willing to make the educational decisions required of parents under the Act; and

(iii) Has no interest that would conflict with the interests of the child.

The regulation does not purport to list all those who are granted rights under the statute. In fact, by using the disjunctive, it indicates exactly the opposite — that the listed persons may or may not be entitled to exercise parental rights under the statute. Hence, the natural reading is that the federal regulation establishes a range of persons who may be considered a parent for purposes of the IDEA, but does not require that any and all such persons must be granted statutory rights.

Plaintiff nonetheless claims that, under § 300.20, natural parents retain their IDEA rights unless the state brings a proceeding to terminate their parental status.6 We cannot accept such a reading of the regulation. Section 300.20 does not state, for example, that all the persons listed as possible parents possess standing to bring a claim under the IDEA until their parental rights are permanently revoked. Indeed, such a construction of the regulation would lead to the absurd result that natural parents, guardians, and persons acting in the place of a parent may all exercise the same rights under the IDEA simultaneously. Cf. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) ("[I]nterpretations... which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available."). The Department of Education could not have intended that there would be a superfluity of parties able to exercise authority over the child under the regulation simultaneously, each of whom may have conflicting ideas with respect to the child's education, with no means of choosing among them.

Nor is this problem solved if we assume that the regulation sets up a hierarchy, so that natural parents presumptively enjoy privileges under the statute while the other persons listed in § 300.20(a) may exercise IDEA rights only when there has been a complete termination of a natural parent's status or when the natural parents are deceased. Not only is such a reading contrary to a literal reading of the regulation, this interpretation would also create internal inconsistencies. Cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 98 (2d Cir.2001) ("[W]hen determining which reasonable meaning [of ambiguous text] should prevail... absurd results are to be avoided and internal inconsistencies ... must be dealt with.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Section 300.20(b), for example, imposes additional conditions that must be met before foster parents may exercise parental rights. Among them is the requirement that "[t]he natural parents' authority to make educational decisions on the child's behalf has been extinguished under State law." 34 C.F.R. § 300.20(b)(1). The regulation therefore allows a foster parent to exercise parental rights under the IDEA when both parents have lost rights over educational decision-making, even if this has been accomplished by something less than an irrevocable termination of the parent-child relationship. We find it improbable that the regulation would permit foster parents to exercise rights over children in the absence of a complete termination of parental rights, yet mandate that guardians, grandparents, stepparents or other persons could act in a parent's stead only when the parent-child relationship has been annulled.

The only way to read the regulation so that it is intelligible is with reference to state law. The regulation does not establish a method for choosing which of the possible parents is entitled to exercise rights under the statute. Given the nature of the statutory scheme, we look to state law to fill this gap and to establish which potential parent has authority to make special education decisions for the child. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the regulation refers to adoptive parents, legal guardians, and other persons "legally responsible for the child's welfare." None of these concepts is given content in federal law; rather, state domestic law assigns these rights. Thus, the regulation explicitly relies upon the state to assign parental rights.

We acknowledge that the federal regulations are inartfully drafted. To the extent that there is ambiguity, we may look to how the federal Department of Education has construed its own regulation. An agency's consistent interpretation of its regulations is to be given controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945); Levy v. Southbrook Int'l Inv., Ltd., 263 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1911, 152 L.Ed.2d 821 (2002); Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir.2000).7 In a 1987 policy letter, the Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs ("OSEP") stated:

The question of which divorced parent should be allowed to perform parental functions under the [IDEA] is not properly a matter for OSEP to decide. Rather, this is a matter for State or local divorce courts. Just as these courts deal with matters of custody, they can appropriately deal with matters related to the responsibility for making educational decisions on behalf of the child. OSEP would not seek to create a rule intruding on the jurisdiction of the courts and State family law in this area.

As OSEP's interpretation is perfectly consistent with both the gap left in the regulations and the strong presumption that issues of domestic relations fall within the traditional sphere of state authority, cf. Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987), we accord deference to the Department of Education's decision that the allocation of parental rights under the IDEA is best left to local domestic law.8

Our conclusion is further reinforced by caselaw. The only other circuit court decision to have addressed this precise issue has likewise held that the extent of a natural parent's rights under the IDEA must be determined with reference to state law. See Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir.2001). In Navin, the natural father of a child with a disability sought to bring a due process challenge to the school district's IEP. In analyzing whether the non-custodial father had standing to bring an action under the IDEA, the Seventh Circuit looked to the rights that the father retained under a state custody decree. Id. ("If the divorce decree had given [the mother] not only custody but also every instrument of influence over [the child's] education, then [the father would have no claim under the IDEA]. Although the IDEA grants rights to `parents,' ... nothing in the IDEA overrides states' allocation of authority as part of a custody determination."). Finding that, although the mother had authority to make final educational decisions, the father nonetheless retained the right under the custody decree to be involved in and to influence his son's education, the Navin court remanded for the district court to determine whether the father's wishes were incompatible with the mother's.9

Having determined that state law will inform our resolution of the standing issue, we now look to Taylor's parental rights under Vermont law. Vermont's implementing regulations comport with the requirements set forth in the IDEA, and in fact substantially mirror the federal regulations:

Whenever the words "parent" or "parents" appear in these rules, the words shall mean, as appropriate:

(a) A biological or adoptive parent;

(b) A legal guardian, but not the state if the student is in the custody of the Commissioner of Social and Rehabilitative Services;

(c) A person who is acting as a parent, such as a grandparent or stepparent with whom the child lives and who is legally responsible for the child;

(d) A foster parent who has been appointed the educational surrogate parent by the Vermont Educational Surrogate Parent Program; or

(e) Educational surrogate parent.

Vermont Board of Education Rule 2360.3 (emphasis added). In applying this regulation, Vermont looks to its domestic law in deciding when it would be "appropriate" to allow a natural parent to exercise rights granted by the IDEA. Vermont therefore does not allow natural parents whose legal authority to make educational decisions on behalf of a child has been terminated by operation of local domestic law to challenge an IEP determination. See, e.g., In re T.C., 25 I.D.E.L.R. 1245 (Vt. SEA 1997); In re Randolph Sch. Dist., E.H.L.R. 509:183 (Vt. SEA 1987). This potion is consistent with the implementation of 34 C.F.R. § 300.20 by other states. See, e.g., In re N. Allegheny Sch. Dist., 26 I.D.E.L.R. 774 (Pa. SEA 1997); In re Andalusia City Bd. of Educ., 22 I.D.E.L.R. 666 (Ala. SEA 1995).

In contrast to the facts of the Navin case, here Taylor's parental right to participate in her daughter's education has been revoked by a Vermont family court. Moreover, the father, upon whom Vermont has bestowed this legal authority, has opposed the due process hearing requested by Taylor as against the child's best interests. As Taylor does not have the authority to make educational decisions on behalf of L.D., we agree that she lacks standing to demand a hearing under the IDEA on the appropriateness of defendants' IEP evaluation.10

Taylor next appeals from the district court's ruling that she lacks standing to pursue her record-access claims under FERPA and the IDEA. FERPA commands that a parent must be permitted to review and inspect a child's educational records.11 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A). The IDEA similarly allows parents access to records collected or maintained pursuant to that statute. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1); 34 C.F.R. § 300.562. Taylor alleges that the ACSU and ANSU defendants violated these provisions, and she seeks an order compelling the Weybridge School District to provide her "with copies of all of L.D.'s educational records requested by Plaintiff." She also requests monetary damages for violations of her FERPA and IDEA record-access rights by the ACSU and ANSU defendants.

Before considering the merits of Taylor's FERPA claim, we must first determine whether Taylor may bring a § 1983 action for an alleged violation of FERPA's record-access provisions. At the time Taylor filed her complaint, it was settled law in this Circuit that FERPA's record-access provisions created rights enforceable through a § 1983 action. See Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist.,