James Edward Reid v. Page True, Warden, Sussex I State Prison, James Edward Reid v. Page True, Warden, Sussex I State Prison

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINS wrote the opinion, in which Judge GREGORY and Judge SHEDD joined.

*794 OPINION

James Edward Reid appeals a district court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp.2003), in which he challenged his conviction and death sentence for the murder of 80-year-old Annie Lester. 1 For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the rejection of Reid’s claims by the district court.

I.

Lester’s body was discovered on October 12, 1996. She had been brutally murdered; an autopsy revealed that Lester had suffered 22 stab wounds. Lester had also been beaten about her head with a blunt instrument, and a bone in her throat had been crushed by strangulation or being struck with a hard object. A trail of blood led from Lester’s kitchen to her bedroom, where her body was found. Lester’s clothing was in disarray, and the room had been ransacked. A bottle of wine was found on the floor at the foot of the bed.

Substantial evidence connected Reid to the murder. Reid was acquainted with Lester and had received an automobile ride to her house in the mid-morning of the day of the murder; on the way, he purchased a bottle of wine. Late in the afternoon, Reid was observed walking from the direction of Lester’s house, drunk and covered in blood. The blood on Reid’s clothing was later determined to be consistent with Lester’s DNA. Reid’s fingerprints were found in blood on the telephone in Lester’s bedroom, his saliva was found on a cigarette butt left in the room, and his handwriting was found on pieces of paper in the house.

Reid, who claimed to have no memory of Lester’s murder, subsequently entered an Alford plea to one count each of capital murder, attempted rape, and attempted robbery. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (holding that a defendant may plead guilty “even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime”). After a sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, finding that the murder satisfied the vileness predicate of Virginia law. See Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (Mi-chie 2000) (permitting imposition of the death penalty if the court determines that the defendant’s conduct in committing the murder “was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim”).

On direct appeal, Reid claimed that the trial court failed to consider uncontradict-ed mitigating evidence in reaching its sentencing determination. The Virginia Supreme Court characterized this argument as a “complaint that the trial court must not have considered [Reid’s] mitigating evidence since the court imposed the death penalty” and rejected it, concluding that “the trial court did, in fact, consider Reid’s mitigating evidence.” Reid v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 561, 506 S.E.2d 787, 792 (1998). The United States Supreme Court thereafter denied Reid’s petition for a writ of certiorari. See Reid v. Virginia, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 91, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999).

Reid subsequently sought habeas relief in the Virginia Supreme Court, contending, as is relevant here, that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and that counsel were constitutionally ineffective *795 for advising him to enter an Alford plea. The Virginia Supreme Court denied relief, ruling that the first claim was defaulted and that the second was without merit.

Reid filed this federal habeas petition on November 6, 2000, claiming that counsel were constitutionally deficient for advising him to enter an Alford plea, that his Alford plea was not knowing and voluntary, and that the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence. The district court denied Reid’s motions for discovery and to expand the record but conducted an evidentiary hearing to determine “what Reid’s trial counsel told him about the effect of his Alford pleas” and “Reid’s understanding about the effect of his Alford pleas.” J.A. 379. Following the hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that Reid’s claims regarding counsel’s ineffectiveness and the voluntariness of his plea were without merit and that Reid’s claim regarding consideration of mitigating evidence by the trial court was procedurally defaulted.

II.

Under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, an individual cannot appeal a denial of collateral relief without first obtaining a certificate of appealability (COA). See generally 28 U.S.C.A. § 2263(c) (West Supp.2003). A COA “may issue ... only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and must specify the issue or issues as to which the COA has been granted. Id. § 2253(c)(2); see id. § 2253(c)(3).

Prior to oral argument, we granted a COA as to all issues. Thus, the question of whether to issue a COA in this case is no longer before us. We nevertheless take this opportunity to explain procedures we have recently adopted for deciding when to certify issues for appeal in collateral review cases. These procedures were initially found in Standing Order 03-01, which this court adopted on May 9, 2003. On July 8, this order became new Local Rule 22(a). A copy of the new rule is appended to this opinion.

A. PROVISIONS OF THE NEW RULE

Local Rule 22(a) divides appeals in collateral review cases into three categories. The first category includes all cases in which the appellant expressly requests a COA — or expansion of a COA, if the district court has already certified some issues for review — before this court enters its briefing order. In such cases, the court will review the request and (a) grant a COA and direct the parties to file briefs addressing the issues certified for review or (b) deny a COA and either dismiss the appeal — if the district court did not grant a COA — or direct the parties to file briefs regarding the issues certified by the district court (if the district court granted a COA). 2 See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(1)(A), (2)(A).

The second category consists of cases in which the district court did not issue a *796 COA and the appellant has not explicitly requested one from this court. In such cases, the notice of appeal will be treated as a request for a COA. See Fed. R.App. P. 22(b)(2). To guide its inquiry into whether to grant a COA, the court will enter a preliminary briefing order directing the appellant to file a brief addressing the merits of the claims the appellant wishes to raise. The court will then review that brief and determine whether to grant a COA as to any of the issues raised in the brief. Upon determining that the appellant has made the showing required by § 2253(c) as to any issue, the court will grant a COA as to that issue and enter a final briefing order directing the parties to complete the briefing process. If the appellant fails to make the required showing, the court will deny a COA and dismiss the appeal. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(1)(B).

The third category created by the new rule includes cases in which the district court granted a COA as to some issues and, as of the time for entering a briefing order, the appellant has not requested that the COA be expanded by this court. In such cases, the court will enter a standard briefing order directing the parties to brief the issues certified for review by the district court. The appellant may raise additional claims in his opening brief, but the court will not consider them unless the appellant files a separate statement noting that the brief contains claims beyond the scope of the COA issued by the district court. The statement need not be elaborate or contain any reasoning; its sole purpose is to notify this court of the appellant’s desire to expand the COA. Upon receipt of such a statement, the court will stay further briefing and decide whether to expand the COA. Once the court makes its decision, it will lift the stay and allow the parties to complete the briefing process (as to all issues certified for review by either this court or the district court). See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(2)(B).

Regardless of the category into which a ease falls, matters concerning the grant or expansion of a COA will be referred to a three-judge panel. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(3). The panel will review the request to determine whether the appellant has made the showing required by § 2253(c) but will not consider the ultimate question of whether the claim has merit. If any member of the panel determines that the appellant has made the requisite showing as to any issue, the court will grant a COA as to that issue. See id.

Finally, the rule authorizes the court to request additional materials from any party. See 4th Cir. R. 22(a)(4). The rule is silent on the question of whether the court may accept unsolicited materials; 3 in light of this silence, we conclude that the rule neither expands nor impairs the discretion that the panel would otherwise possess.

B. REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE NEW RULE

The primary impetus for the adoption of Rule 22(a) was the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003). The petitioner in Miller-El was a state prisoner seeking relief under § 2254. See id. at 1036. The district court denied the prisoner’s application and denied a COA, see id., and the court of appeals likewise denied a COA, stating that “ ‘the state court’s adjudication neither resulted in a decision that was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented nor resulted in a decision contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court,’ ” id. (quot *797 ing Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445, 452 (5th Cir.2001)). The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the court of appeals improperly conducted a full inquiry into the merits before deciding whether to grant a COA. See id. at 1042. The Court held that § 2253(c) permits only “a general assessment of the[ ] merits” of the claims in a habeas petition and admonished that “[w]hen a court of appeals side steps this process by first deciding the merits of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its adjudication of the actual merits, it is in essence deciding an appeal without jurisdiction.” Id. at 1039.

Prior to Miller-El, we did not have a mechanism for separating the COA determination from the decision on the merits, and it was our custom to undertake both inquiries simultaneously, after the case was fully briefed. This practice did not prejudice appellants; on the contrary, it is likely that we afforded full review in many appeals that should have been dismissed for failure to satisfy the threshold requirements of § 2253(c). Nonetheless, the practice was not in strict compliance with the statute. See In re Fowlkes, 326 F.3d 542, 546 (4th Cir.2003).

The new local rule brings our practice into conformity with § 2253(c). Under the rule, we will conduct the COA inquiry before completing the briefing process and deciding the ease on its merits. This remains true even though, in cases falling into the second and third categories described above, our decision respecting a COA will be informed by our review of the appellant’s brief on the merits, rather than a separate request for a COA. In examining these briefs at the COA stage, we will not engage in “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims,” Miller-El, 123 S.Ct. at 1039, but will instead conduct the cursory review necessary to identify “those appeals deserving of attention” while dismissing claims that “plainly do not” deserve further review, id. at 1040.

This procedure advances the goals of the AEDPA more effectively than either requiring a separate request for a COA or acting without any request other than the notice of appeal. The purpose of the AEDPA was “to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases.” Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 1401, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003). Requiring a separate request for a COA before ordering briefing would add delay to habeas litigation. Moreover, such delays would not be offset by the benefit of clearer guidance for our COA inquiry; in our experience, few appellants file separate requests for a COA, and those who do generally rely on their briefs with little or no embellishment. 4 And, while we could examine the record ourselves without any indication of what claims the appellant desires to present to us, doing so would add to our own burdens and would not give effect to the requirement that “the applicant [make] a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added). For these reasons, we have adopted the rule described above, which allows us to use a single document as both the appellant’s request for a COA and the appel *798 lant’s brief on the merits, even as we maintain a clear distinction between the COA and merits phases of the appeal.

III.

We first consider Reid’s claim that his Alford plea was invalid due to the ineffectiveness of defense counsel. Reid maintains that counsel were ineffective for (1) failing to investigate and advise Reid concerning a defense of voluntary intoxication; (2) failing to investigate and advise Reid regarding a defense of insanity; and (3) failing to advise Reid concerning the nature and consequences of an Alford plea.

In order to establish that his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated, Reid must make a twofold showing. See Wiggins v. Smith, — U.S.-,-, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2535, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). First, he must demonstrate that his attorneys’ “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the [challenged] conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Reid must also demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, i.e., “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In the context of a guilty plea, a demonstration of prejudice requires Reid to establish “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In Hill, the Supreme Court explained that this prejudice inquiry is quite similar to the inquiry for prejudice under Strickland, in that the question of whether counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced a petitioner’s guilty plea will often turn on an assessment of the likelihood of success of a particular investigation or strategy. See id. at 59,106 S.Ct. 366.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because this claim was adjudicated on the merits by the Virginia Supreme Court, our review is limited to determining whether the decision of that court “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). 5 As is particularly relevant here, a state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent in either of two situations: (1) when “the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,” or (2) when “the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor *799 (Williams II), 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

Reid maintains that the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court on his ineffective assistance claim was contrary to Supreme Court precedent because it must be presumed that the state court applied its ruling in Williams v. Warden (Williams I), 254 Va.16, 487 S.E.2d 194 (1997). In Williams I, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a habeas petitioner cannot prevail on an ineffective assistance claim simply by making the showing required under Strickland; rather, the court held that the petitioner must additionally demonstrate that “ ‘the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’ ” Williams I, 487 S.E.2d at 198 (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993)). The Supreme Court subsequently declared that this standard was contrary to the clearly established law of Strickland. See Williams II, 529 U.S. at 393-95, 397, 120 S.Ct. 1495; id. at 413,120 S.Ct. 1495 (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he Virginia Supreme Court’s decision was contrary to ... clearly established federal law to the extent it held that our decision in [Lock-hart] somehow modified or supplanted the rule set forth in Strickland”).

As noted above, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected Reid’s ineffective assistance claim summarily, without providing any reasoning for the decision. Reid maintains that because this decision was made after the Virginia Supreme Court decided Williams I, but before the United States Supreme Court decided Williams II, it must be presumed that the state court applied an incorrect standard.

It is not at all clear that this is a tenable assumption. During the interim between Williams I and Williams II, the Virginia Supreme Court decided at least two published opinions regarding claims of ineffective assistance without referring to Lock-hart. See Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 479, 527 S.E.2d 419, 423, 425-26 (2000); see also Curo v. Becker, 254 Va. 486, 493 S.E.2d 368, 370-71 (1997) (not mentioning Lockhart when setting forth standard for ineffective assistance claim). But see Pender v. Angelone, 257 Va. 501, 514 S.E.2d 756, 757 (1999) (citing Lockhart for the proposition that “[t]he [Strickland ] prejudice analysis includes a focus on whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

In any event, Reid’s position cannot be squared with the way this court applies the § 2254(d)(1) standard when the state court has not articulated the rationale for its decision. “In such cases, we conduct an independent examination of the record and the clearly established Supreme Court law, but we must still confine our review to whether the court’s determination resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law....” Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir.2000) (en banc) (citations & internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, when the state court does not articulate a rationale for its decision, our analysis focuses solely on the result reached, and application of the “contrary to” prong is necessarily limited to determining whether the state court decision is contrary to a decision reached by the Supreme Court on indistinguishable facts. Cf. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (holding that failure to cite federal law does not mean that state court decision was contrary to established federal law; state court need not even be aware of Supreme Court precedents, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them”). Reid does not contend that the state court rejection of his ineffective assistance claim is “contrary *800 to” Supreme Court precedent in this way. Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether the denial of relief by the state court on this claim is consistent with a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

B. MERITS

1. Voluntary Intoxication

Reid first contends that counsel failed to adequately investigate, consider, and advise him concerning a defense of voluntary intoxication. Under Virginia law, voluntary intoxication does not excuse any crime. See Wright v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 627, 363 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Va.1988). “However, when a person voluntarily becomes so intoxicated that he is incapable of deliberation or premeditation, he cannot commit a class of murder that requires proof of a deliberate and premeditated killing.” Id. In determining whether the evidence supports a voluntary intoxication defense, Virginia courts look to the defendant’s behavior before and after the offense. See, e.g., Giarratano v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 266 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1980). Relevant behaviors include attempts to conceal the crime, see id. at 100 (noting that defendant killed second person in order to conceal first murder); a lapse of time between ingestion of intoxicants and the crime, see Hedrick v. Warden, 264 Va. 486, 570 S.E.2d 840, 851 (2002); whether the conduct of the defendant was “planned and purposeful,” id.; and whether the defendant was able to engage in complex behaviors such as operating an automobile, see Lilly v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 558, 499 S.E.2d 522, 536 (1998), rev’d on other grounds, 527 U.S. 116, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999).

Reid correctly points out that some of these factors support a claim of voluntary intoxication in his case. For example, Reid’s consumption of alcohol was contemporaneous with the crime. According to Reid’s recollection of events, while visiting with Lester he periodically went outside to smoke, and while outside he drank from the bottle of wine he purchased on the way to Lester’s home. And, the bottle was found near Lester’s body. Additionally, Reid made no attempt to conceal the fact that he had been involved in some kind of violent incident. He emerged from Lester’s house covered in blood, staggering and obviously drunk. 6 He approached George Eanes and Eanes’ father, 7 who were complete strangers to him, and asked for a ride to his house. Such behavior arguably indicates that Reid was so intoxicated as to be unaware of what had happened in Lester’s home, a finding that would, in turn, support a determination that Reid had been too drunk to premeditate or act deliberately. 8

Two experts who examined Reid (and who later testified during the sentencing phase) provided reports to counsel indicating that Reid may have been too intoxicated to form the necessary intent to commit premeditated murder. Doctor Pogos Vos-kanian concluded that Reid’s history of brain injury, 9 combined with various other *801 ailments suffered by Reid and “exacerbated by an acutely intoxicated state[,] is likely to have a devastating effect on one’s judgment, appreciation of reality, ability to resist impulses, ability to form rational decisions and perform intentional acts.” J.A. 72. More specifically, Dr. Voskanian asserted that “Reid’s functioning and ability to act intentionally at the time of the alleged offense[ were] markedly impaired” and that “Reid’s capacity to form an intent for a criminal act was substantially compromised.” Id. at 72-73. Doctor Stephen Herrick reached a similar conclusion, stating that Reid’s “behavior following the crime would suggest[] he did not understand the nature, character, or consequences of the alleged offense” and that “[i]n general the description of his behavior suggests extreme cognitive impairment.” Id. at 104.

On the other hand, there is strong evidence that Reid was capable of planned and purposeful conduct. Forensic evidence indicated that Reid first bludgeoned Lester with a milk can in the kitchen. He then dragged her to the bedroom, where he stabbed her with a pair of sewing scissors (which he apparently obtained from the living room) and strangled her with the cord of a heating pad. Reid’s selection of three different weapons indicates a capacity for coherent, deliberative thought that is inconsistent with a voluntary intoxication defense. Also, Reid wrote “I’ve gotta kill you” on a card while he was in Lester’s house. J.A. 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reid apparently told the probation officer who wrote his presen-tence report that his last memory from Lester’s house was of writing something on the card. 10

According to affidavits submitted by trial counsel, several strategic considerations played into the decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. First, counsel’s experience indicated to them that a jury would not be receptive to such a defense. And, after consultation with others experienced in capital litigation, counsel determined that Reid should avoid a jury if at all possible because, given the facts of the crime, a jury was likely not to be favorable to Reid. Since the prosecutor indicated that he would refuse to waive a *802 jury trial if Reid pleaded not guilty, the only way to accomplish this goal was to enter some form of guilty plea. And, the judge to whom Reid’s case was assigned had previously imposed a life sentence in a capital murder prosecution that involved facts that were, in counsel’s view, more egregious than those here.

In short, the evidence to support a voluntary intoxication defense was, at best, conflicting, and sound strategic considerations weighed against presenting such a defense. In view of these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to conclude that counsel were not ineffective for advising against a defense of voluntary intoxication.

2. Insanity

Reid next contends that counsel failed to adequately investigate and advise him regarding an insanity defense. “Virginia law recognizes two tests by which an accused can establish criminal insanity, the M’Naghten Rule and the irresistible impulse doctrine.” Bennett v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 261, 511 S.E.2d 439, 446 (1999). In either case, the defendant bears the burden of proving that he was insane at the time of the offense. See Vann v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 304, 544 S.E.2d 879, 882-83 (2001). “When the corpus delicti has been established and proof adduced that the accused committed the act, it is not sufficient for the accused to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity; he must go one step further and prove to the satisfaction of the jury that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act.” Wessells v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 664, 180 S.E. 419, 422 (1935).

The M’Naghten Rule requires the defendant to prove that, because of a disease of the mind, he either did not know the nature and quality of his act or did not know that the act was wrong. See Price v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 452, 323 S.E.2d 106, 108-09 (1984); see also id. at 110 (noting that “the actual M’Naghten test for insanity, stated in the disjunctive, is the rule in Virginia” (emphasis added)). As the Virginia Supreme Court explained in Price,

The first portion of M’Naghten relates to an accused who is psychotic to an extreme degree. It assumes an accused who, because of mental disease, did not know the nature and quality of his act; he simply did not know what he was doing. For example, in crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar, he believed that he was smashing a glass jar. The latter portion of M’Naghten relates to an accused who knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew what he was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar. However, because of mental disease, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for example, that he was carrying out a command from God.

Id. at 110 (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The irresistible impulse defense is available when the accused’s mind has become so impaired by disease that he is totally deprived of the mental power to control or restrain his act.” Bennett, 511 S.E.2d at 447 (internal quotation marks omitted). Impulsivity is the essence of this definition of insanity; planning or deliberative conduct is inconsistent with the defense. See Vann, 544 S.E.2d at 883.

Reid argues that the reports of Drs. Herrick and Voskanian should have alerted counsel to the viability of an insanity defense. We disagree. It is true, as Reid notes, that both doctors concluded that Reid suffered from a mental defect in the form of brain damage stemming from the automobile accident and ensuing coma *803 in 1968 and the seizure disorder. However, neither doctor reached conclusions that would support a finding of insanity under the M’Naghten Rule or the irresistible impulse test. In fact, Dr. Herrick concluded that, while Reid’s “behavior following the crime ... suggested he did not understand the nature, character, or consequences of the alleged offense,” J.A. 104, Reid’s inability to remember the offense and the lack of an eyewitness resulted in “insufficient evidence” to support a conclusion that Reid was legally insane at the time of the murder, Supp.App. to State’s Br. at 51. Likewise, neither doctor concluded that Reid had totally lost the ability to control his actions, as required by the irresistible impulse test. They merely opined that his ability to do so was impaired. While such impairment is a mitigating factor for sentencing, it does not establish the existence of insanity under Virginia law.

8. Nature of an Alford Plea

Finally, Reid contends that counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to ensure that he understood the nature of an Alford plea. 11 The district court held a hearing on this portion of the ineffective assistance claim. During the hearing, Reid testified that trial counsel urged him to make the Alford plea, telling him that the worst sentence he could receive under such a plea would be life without parole and that he might even be eligible for “geriatric parole.” J.A. 395. Reid further asserted that counsel failed to explain to him that an Alford plea was a guilty plea and that counsel told him he would be ineligible for the death penalty under such a plea. This testimony was contradicted by one of Reid’s attorneys, 12 who testified that he and his co-counsel explained the nature of an Alford plea to Reid and member