United States v. Vincent A. Cianci, Jr., Frank E. Corrente, and Richard E. Autiello

Vincent A. Cianci was the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island; Frank E. Corrente was the City's Director of Administration; Richard E. Autiello was a member of the Providence City Towing Association, a private organization. Between April 23 and June 24, 2002, the three were jointly tried on a superseding indictment that charged them and others with forty-six violations of federal statutes prohibiting public corruption. The district court entered judgments of acquittal on eight of the charges but submitted the rest to the jury.

On June 24, 2002, the jury returned a total of eight guilty verdicts but acquitted on the remaining thirty counts. All three defendants were convicted on a single count charging a conspiracy to violate the RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Corrente and Autiello were convicted on a count charging a federal bribery conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 666(a)(1)(B). Corrente was convicted on a count charging a substantive RICO violation, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), two counts charging Hobbs Act extortion conspiracies, see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts charging Hobbs Act attempted extortions, see id. Autiello was convicted on an additional count charging a second federal bribery conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 666(a)(1)(B). The jury also answered "YES" to four of thirty-seven special interrogatories, which asked whether the government had "proven" the alleged predicate acts underlying the racketeering counts; all other special interrogatories were answered "NO" or not answered at all.

The district court subsequently granted a judgment of acquittal on one of the extortion conspiracy charges of which Corrente had been convicted; ordered the forfeiture of $250,000 in a campaign contribution fund controlled by Cianci and Corrente pursuant to RICO's forfeiture provisions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1); and sentenced the defendants to prison terms of sixty-four months (Cianci), sixty-three months (Corrente), and forty-six months (Autiello).

Cianci, Corrente, and Autiello appeal their convictions and sentences, and Cianci and the government cross appeals the district court's forfeiture ruling. We begin with challenges to defendants' RICO convictions.

Count One of the indictment charged Cianci, Autiello, and Corrente with conspiracy to operate the affairs of an enterprise consisting of the defendants themselves, the City of Providence, "various officers, agencies and entities of Providence" including thirteen specified agencies, Jere Realty, and Friends of Cianci, and others "known or unknown to the Grand Jury." The purpose of the enterprise "included the following: a. Enriching Defendant Vincent A. Cianci ... Friends of Cianci through extortion, mail fraud, bribery, money laundering, and witness tampering, and b. Through the same means enriching, promoting and protecting the power and assets of the leaders and associates of the enterprise." In a pre-trial motion, defendants moved to dismiss the RICO allegations, asserting that the enterprise as charged was improper in that it was overly broad, vague, and legally impossible.1 The district court denied the motion. The issues raised by this motion were revisited on motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. The court denied these motions as well.

Defendants argue that the enterprise charged in the indictment was purposefully obscure and did not provide adequate notice to defendants of the crimes for which they were charged and ultimately convicted. The argument is couched in two ways: that 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) is unconstitutional as applied for failure to provide "fair warning" of the alleged criminal conduct and that the charged enterprise failed to provide adequate notice against which the defendants could defend themselves. The government counters that, under the RICO statute, enterprise is defined broadly and that defendants were sufficiently apprised of the nature and extent of the charges.

RICO makes it unlawful "for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The statute also outlaws conspiracies to violate § 1962(c). See id. § 1962(d). As stated above, Corrente was convicted of a substantive violation of § 1962(c), and all three defendants were convicted of RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d).

A RICO "enterprise" "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). See United States v. DeCologero, 364 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir.2004). It is important to stress that the Supreme Court has admonished that RICO and the term "enterprise" be construed expansively. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); see also United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243-44 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., 652 F.2d 1313, 1318 (7th Cir.1981). The term's flexibility is denoted by the use of the word "includes" rather than "means" or "is limited to"; it does not purport to be exhaustive. See United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.1991) (Posner, J.); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 353 (D.C.Cir.1988). Accordingly, "enterprise" has been interpreted inter alia to include (1) legal entities such as legitimate business partnerships and corporations, and (2) illegitimate associations-in-fact marked by an ongoing formal or informal organization of individual or legal-entity associates, see London, 66 F.3d at 1243-44 (associations-in-fact may include legal entities such as corporations), who or which function as a continuing organized crime unit "for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct." Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-83, 101 S.Ct. 2524; see also United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 910, 122 S.Ct. 1215, 152 L.Ed.2d 152 (2002). The enterprise charged in this case is of the latter, associated-in-fact variety.

Here, the superseding indictment delineated the members of the enterprise, the roles of the defendants in the enterprise, the purposes and goals of the racket, and the ways in which the defendants used other members of the enterprise — specifically, municipal entities that they controlled as part of the conspiracy — to further those purposes and goals. It alleged that defendants conspired to violate and did in fact violate RICO through their involvement in an associated-in-fact enterprise devoted to enriching and empowering defendants and others through unlawful means. The enterprise was alleged to have been comprised of the individual defendants; the City of Providence "including, but not limited to" many of its departments, offices, and agencies; the campaign contribution fund controlled by Cianci and Corrente; and others known and unknown to the grand jury. The enterprise allegations, which we reproduce as redacted following the district court's entry of the eight judgments of acquittal prior to the jury charge, read as follows:

Defendants VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR., a/k/a "Buddy"; FRANK E. CORRENTE; RICHARD E. AUTIELLO; the City of Providence ("Providence"), including, but not limited to, the Office of Mayor, the Office of the Director of Administration, the Providence City Solicitor's Office, the Department of Planning and Development, the Providence Redevelopment Agency, the Tax Collector's Office, the Tax Assessor's Office, the Board of Tax Assessment Review, the Finance Department, the Department of Public Safety, the Providence School Department, the Department of Inspection and Standards, and the Building Board of Review; Friends of Cianci, the political organization of Defendant VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR., a/k/a "Buddy"; and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, constituted an "enterprise" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), that is, a group of individuals and entities associated in fact. This enterprise, which operated in the District of Rhode Island and elsewhere, was engaged in, and its activities affected interstate commerce.

The purposes of the enterprise included the following:

a. Enriching Defendant VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR., a/k/a "Buddy" and Friends of Cianci through extortion, mail fraud, bribery, money laundering, and witness tampering; and

b. Through the same means enriching, promoting, and protecting the power and assets of the leaders and associates of the enterprise.

Defendants VINCENT A. CIANCI, JR., a/k/a "Buddy;" and FRANK E. CORRENTE were the leaders of the enterprise....

Defendant RICHARD E. AUTIELLO, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, were associated with, and conducted and participated, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, including but not limited to extortion, mail fraud, and bribery.

Superseding Redacted Indictment, ¶¶ 38-41. This enterprise was alleged to have existed "from in or about January 1991 through in or about December 1999."

The balance of the indictment (again, in the redacted form in which it went to the jury) also detailed the "pattern of racketeering activity" underlying the grand jury's RICO and RICO conspiracy allegations. The unlawful conduct comprising the alleged pattern was set forth in a section detailing the predicate RICO "Racketeering Acts" and in separate offense counts. The pattern was itself subdivided into nine alleged schemes:

1. A scheme, carried out between 1991 and late 1999, in which Corrente (with Autiello serving as his intermediary) pressured companies with whom the Providence Police Department contracted for towing services to make campaign contributions totaling some $250,000 to Friends of Cianci in order to remain on the tow list ("the Tow List scheme");

2. A scheme, carried out between 1991 and 1998, in which the owner of Jere Realty, a local real estate company, was alleged to have paid bribes and kickbacks which made their way to Corrente in order to secure a Providence School Department lease for one of the company's Providence buildings ("the Jere Lease scheme");

3. A 1998 scheme in which Cianci was alleged to have been involved in extorting a $10,000 contribution from the estate of Fernando Ronci (which owed the City some $500,000 in back taxes) in exchange for his support in the estate's efforts to secure a tax abatement from the corrupt Board of Tax Assessment Review, which was chaired by co-conspirator Joseph Pannone and vice-chaired by co-conspirator David Ead ("the Ronci Estate scheme");

4. A 1996-97 scheme in which Cianci was alleged to have arranged for Christopher Ise to obtain a job in the City's Department of Planning and Development in return for a $5,000 contribution ("the Ise Job scheme");

5. A 1999 scheme in which Cianci was alleged to have supported the contemplated sale of two City lots to a City vendor, Anthony Freitas, in return for a $10,000 contribution ("the Freitas Lots scheme");

6. A 1998-99 scheme in which Corrente was alleged to have attempted to influence the Providence School Department to encourage a city contractor entitled to reimbursement from the City for its lease expenses to lease a building owned by Anthony Freitas in return for contributions totaling $2,000 ("the Freitas Lease scheme");

7. A 1998 scheme in which Corrente, acting through Joseph Pannone, was alleged to have facilitated prompt payments of invoices submitted to the City by a business owned by Anthony Freitas in return for contributions totaling $1,100 ("the Freitas Invoices scheme");

8. A 1998 scheme in which Cianci was alleged (a) to have attempted to influence the City's Building Board of Review to deny a request for construction variances made by the private University Club in retaliation for the Club's having refused to admit him as a member back in the 1970s and its continuing refusal to admit him, and (b) to have extorted a free honorary membership from the Club as the construction variance dispute was unfolding ("the University Club scheme"); and

9. A 1996 scheme in which Autiello conspired with an unnamed public official to facilitate the hiring of Joseph Maggiacomo as a Providence police officer in return for a $5,000 cash contribution by Joseph's mother, Mary Maggiacomo ("the Maggiacomo Job scheme").

"[A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). "It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as `those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.'" Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. McDonough, 959 F.2d 1137, 1140 (1st Cir.1992).

The indictment not only tracks the language of the RICO statute, but also goes into considerable detail with respect to the underlying factual allegations. Hence, we conclude that defendants were more than sufficiently apprised of the charges.

The defendants also argue that their RICO convictions cannot stand because there was insufficient evidence to ground the jury's foundational finding that the government had proved the existence of the RICO "enterprise" that the government charged.2 We begin our analysis by summarizing the relevant legal principles and the government's RICO theory and proof.

In cases involving an alleged associated-in-fact RICO enterprise, the existence of the charged enterprise does not follow, ipso facto, from evidence that those named as the enterprise's associates engaged in crimes that collectively may be characterized as a "pattern of racketeering activity":

While the proof used to establish these separate elements [i.e., the "enterprise" and the "pattern of racketeering activity"] may in particular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other. The "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering activity"; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government.

Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524. In other words, criminal actors who jointly engage in criminal conduct that amounts to a pattern of "racketeering activity" do not automatically thereby constitute an association-in-fact RICO enterprise simply by virtue of having engaged in the joint conduct. Something more must be found — something that distinguishes RICO enterprises from ad hoc one-time criminal ventures. See Bachman v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 178 F.3d 930, 932 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, C.J.) (noting that a contrary rule would erroneously make "every conspiracy to commit fraud ... a RICO [enterprise] and consequently every fraud that requires more than one person to commit ... a RICO violation").

Courts have divided over the legal standards that guide the drawing of this distinction. Some require proof that an alleged associated-in-fact enterprise have an "ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering activity ..., which might be demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or that it has an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary to perpetrate the predicate crimes." Patrick, 248 F.3d at 18 (quoting United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647, 664 (8th Cir.1982), and discussing cases from other circuits that have adopted Bledsoe's "ascertainable structure" standard) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts following the "ascertainable structure" approach do so out of concern that the factfinder not be misled into "collaps[ing] ... the enterprise element with the separate pattern of racketeering activity element of a RICO offense." Id. (quoting Bledsoe, 674 F.2d at 664) (internal quotation marks omitted).

This circuit has cast its lot with courts that have declined to make Bledsoe's"ascertainable structure" criterion a mandatory component of a district court's jury instructions explaining RICO associated-in-fact enterprises. See id. at 18-19. Instead, we have approved instructions based strictly on Turkette's explanation of how a criminal association might qualify as a RICO enterprise. See, e.g., Patrick, 248 F.3d at 17-19. In doing so, we have read Turkette to impose a requirement that those associated in fact "function as an ongoing unit" and constitute an "ongoing organization." Id. at 19. Also important to such an enterprise is that its members share a "common purpose." See, e.g., id.; Ryan v. Clemente, 901 F.2d 177, 180 (1st Cir.1990) ("[A]lthough much about the RICO statute is not clear, it is very clear that those who are `associates' ... of a criminal enterprise must share a `common purpose' ....") (citations omitted).

We turn now to the particulars of the defendants' argument. First, they contend that the indictment charged a legal impossibility in alleging that municipal entities were themselves part of the unlawful purpose associated-in-fact enterprise. They base this argument on the requirement that members of such an enterprise share a common unlawful purpose and cases holding that municipalities cannot be found to have acted with unlawful intent. See, e.g., Lancaster Comm. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir.1991) ("[G]overnment entities are incapable of forming a malicious intent."); United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993, 1001 (6th Cir.1982) ("Criminal activity is private activity even when it is carried out in a public forum and even though the activity can only be undertaken by an official's use of a state given power[.]").

Defendants' argument misses the mark because neither the indictment nor the jury instructions compel the conclusion that the City itself had to have formed an unlawful intent. It is uncontroversial that corporate entities, including municipal and county ones, can be included within association-in-fact RICO enterprises. See, e.g., London, 66 F.3d at 1244; Masters, 924 F.2d at 1366. It is also beyond dispute, as the Supreme Court held in Turkette, that "the term `enterprise' as used in RICO encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises." 452 U.S. at 578, 101 S.Ct. 2524. As the D.C. Circuit elucidated:

[A restrictive] reading of 1961(4) would lead to the bizarre result that only criminals who failed to form corporate shells to aid their illicit schemes could be reached by RICO. [Such an] interpretation hardly accords with Congress' remedial purposes: to design RICO as a weapon against the sophisticated racketeer as well as (and perhaps more than) the artless.

Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353. Municipal entities can be part of an unlawful purpose association-in-fact enterprise so long as those who control the entities share the purposes of the enterprise. "RICO does not require intentional or `purposeful' behavior by corporations charged as members of an association-in-fact." United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 657 (9th Cir.1988). A RICO enterprise animated by an illicit common purpose can be comprised of an association-in-fact of municipal entities and human members when the latter exploits the former to carry out that purpose. Cianci, Corrente, and Autiello — those who wielded influence, exerted pressure, and effectively controlled the City's various components — are the criminals here. Defendants' legal impossibility argument holds water only had the government sought prosecution of the City itself. The City and its component agencies are not the defendants in this case; they were deemed members of the enterprise because without them, Cianci, Corrente, and Autiello would not have been able to even attempt to perpetrate the charged racketeering schemes. Indeed, this is not the first time an association-in-fact enterprise composed in this manner has been found to exist. See, e.g., Masters, 924 F.2d at 1362; United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.1994) (upholding association-in-fact enterprise consisting of congressman, his two offices, and congressional subcommittees that he chaired); United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir.1992) (upholding association-in-fact enterprise consisting of municipal officials, office of mayor, and department of public works); United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 31-33 (2d Cir.1981) ("We view the language of § 1961(4), ... as unambiguously encompassing governmental units, ... and the substance of RICO's provisions demonstrate a clear congressional intent that RICO be interpreted to apply to activities that corrupt public or governmental entities."). In each of these cases, the groupings of individuals and corporate or municipal entities were sufficiently organized and devoted to the alleged illicit purposes that the resulting whole functioned as a continuing unit. The common purpose was dictated by individuals who controlled the corporate or municipal entities' activities and manipulated them to the desired illicit ends.

The indictment and jury instructions are consistent with this framing of the enterprise. The district court instructed the jury, without objection from either party, that "the Government must prove that the alleged enterprise had an ongoing organization, whether it be formal or informal, and that its various associates functioned together as a continuing unit to achieve common goals." The court continued, "It is not necessary in proving the existence of an enterprise to show that each member of the enterprise participated in or even knew of all of its activities, but it is necessary to show that all members of the alleged enterprise shared a common purpose." Requiring the government to prove that all members named in the enterprise shared a common purpose of illegality did not compel the government to show that the City itself had the mens rea to seek bribes and to extort. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits articulated what in some sense is the obvious: that a corporate or municipal entity does not have a mind of its own for purposes of RICO. Lancaster Comm. Hosp., 940 F.2d at 404; Thompson, 685 F.2d at 1001. Unlawful common purpose is imputed to the City by way of the individual defendants' control, influence, and manipulation of the City for their illicit ends. Whether the defendants did exercise sufficient control over the City for purposes of the enterprise is one of fact for the jury and evidentiary sufficiency.

It follows that the defendants also have an evidence-based argument. They contend that their RICO convictions must be reversed because the evidence introduced at trial in support of the alleged schemes set forth above — the only proof from which the jury might have inferred that the schemes were carried out, or were intended to be carried out, by means of a RICO enterprise, see Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (observing that proof of the pattern of racketeering activity may in particular cases also constitute the proof of the enterprise itself) — was insufficient to ground a finding that the schemes were conducted through the specific entity alleged in the indictment to have constituted a RICO enterprise. Defendants base this argument on an assertion that there was no evidence from which the jury might have inferred a shared purpose between defendants and the municipal entities named as associates of the enterprise and through which many of the schemes were conducted. In support of this argument, the defendants point to specific statements by the district court that "there is no evidence that the [City] departments and/or agencies, themselves, shared [the enterprise's] purposes," United States v. Cianci, 210 F.Supp.2d 71, 73 (D.R.I.2002) (denying defendants' motions for judgments of acquittal), and that "none of [defendants'] acts ... resulted in any significant disruption of a Governmental function." Id. The defendants also emphasize that, even if we were to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the RICO convictions by construing the entire record in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence is insufficient.

As set forth above, we have identified Turkette's "ongoing organization," "continuing unit," and "common purpose" requirements as the principal tools a factfinder should use to distinguish a RICO enterprise from an ad hoc criminal confederation. We have applied these requirements to unlawful purpose associations-in-fact involving corporate legal entities. See London, 66 F.3d at 1243-45. The district court adequately set out these requirements to the jury; hence, we see no basis for disregarding the court's instructions in the course of our sufficiency review. See, e.g., United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79-80 (1st Cir.1999) (an unchallenged jury instruction that is faithful to the indictment and "not patently incorrect or internally inconsistent" becomes the standard by which evidentiary sufficiency is to be measured) (citing United States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1294 (1st. Cir.1992)).

After careful scrutiny of the record and setting the evidence against the jury instructions, we conclude that the jury could have found the above requirements, specifically that the defendants and others named as enterprise members comprised an ongoing organization that functioned as a continuing unit and was animated by common purposes or goals.

We agree with the government's assertion that the jury's enterprise finding is sustainable because there was sufficient evidence that Cianci and Corrente exercised substantial control over the municipal entities named as members of the enterprise. Cianci was the City's mayor and Corrente its chief of administration. They were alleged and were shown to have used their positions and influence to sell municipal favors on a continuing basis. The evidence indicates a close relationship "in fact" among them, the City they managed, and Cianci's political organization. Cianci, as mayor, and Corrente and Autiello, as city officials, were strongly connected to and had considerable influence over the various City employees and departments. Their illegal schemes could function only with the cooperation, witting or unwitting, of certain City agencies and officials. Insofar as Cianci's and the other defendants' criminal schemes were or would be carried out by themselves and others acting in their municipal roles, the City — if only to that extent — did share in the same common criminal purpose.3 The defendants were not only human members of the enterprise, but were the City's official leaders with considerable express and implicit authority over its departments and employees. Moreover, the enterprise's corrupt purposes were aimed at exploiting the City's resources. It is because of this control and these close connections that the jury could have imputed the enterprise's common purpose to the City. See Masters, 924 F.2d at 1366 ("Surely if three individuals can constitute a RICO enterprise, ..., then the larger association that consists of them plus entities that they control can be a RICO enterprise too.").

Evidence of defendants' control, both titular and actual, was sufficient to deem the enterprise a "continuing unit" and "ongoing organization." The jury could easily glean from taped conversations and the trial testimony of David Ead — a co-conspirator and vice-chair of the Board of Tax Assessment Review — that there existed an organized structure with Cianci at the top, Corrente as a middle man facilitating and often initiating transactions, and others, including Autiello, Ead, and Pannone, that fed deals into the organization (or in Ead's case, sometimes tried to replace Corrente as the middle man). The defendants attempted to use, to varying degrees of success, various municipal agencies in committing a series of related bribes and extortions. These agencies were used in this manner on an ongoing basis from 1991 through 1999. The fact that other persons and entities were used in some transactions but not in others does not matter; the jury instructions reflected this flexibility.4

There was detailed evidence, moreover, placing Cianci, the City's mayor, in the middle of at least four of the enumerated racketeering acts. With regard to the Ronci Estate scheme, David Ead testified at trial that he suggested to Ronci's attorney that the estate settle its tax claim with the City for $100,000 in exchange for a $10,000 contribution to the Friends of Cianci. Ead met with Cianci and discussed the proposed deal. The settlement was approved by the City's Board of Tax Assessment Review. Ead testified that shortly thereafter, he was contacted by Corrente, who told him that Cianci wanted Corrente to collect the money. Ead responded that he was waiting for the Ronci attorney, to which Corrente replied, "Well you know that the Mayor he's on my back — do your best." After receiving the money from Ronci's attorney, Ead brought the money to Corrente who put his finger on his lips and took the envelope. A tape-recorded conversation between Joseph Pannone and Anthony Freitas provided additional evidence.5 Our dissenting brother recognizes that there was enough evidence for the jury to conclude that defendants functionally controlled the Board of Tax Assessment Review, often for criminal purposes.

With regard to the Ise Job, Ead again testified that he served as a middleman for Mayor Cianci, this time arranging a $5,000 bribe in exchange for a municipal job. According to Ead, Cianci asked during their conversation about Ise, cautious about whether "he's alright" and looking for assurances that "he's not going to say nothing." Upon learning that the City's Department of Planning and Development had no positions available, Cianci ordered the Department to "make one." Upon receiving the $5,000 "contribution," Cianci told Ead, "Don't get nervous."

In their trial testimony, which closely tracked taped conversations among Freitas, Pannone, and other City officials, both Freitas and Ead implicated Cianci in the Freitas Lots scheme, in which Cianci pressured the Providence Redevelopment Authority, the entity empowered to sell the lots, to expedite the sale of two City-owned lots to Freitas in exchange for a $10,000 "contribution" by Freitas to the Cianci political fund. Finally, with regard to the Tow List scheme, Dorothy Deveraux — Corrente's assistant and the Friends' bookkeeper — wrote a note to Corrente which implicated all three defendants in that scheme.6 Moreover, as Judge Howard concedes, the jury could have found, based primarily on taped statements and the trial testimony of towing association chairman Kenneth Rocha, that Corrente effectively controlled who made it onto the police department's tow list.

We recognize that the defendants did not always get their way with municipal departments and employees.7 B