Robert v. Baer v. David Chase Chase Films Inc., a Delaware Corporation John Does A-Z

This matter comes on before this court on Robert V. Baer’s (“Baer”) appeal from an order of the district court entered February 20, 2004, granting summary judgment to the defendants, David Chase and DC Enterprises, Inc. (together called “Chase”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). This dispute centers on the creation and development of the well-known television series, The Sopranos. Through this action, Baer seeks compensation for what he perceives was his role in the creation and development of the popular and financially successful television series.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Chase, who originally was from New Jersey, but relocated to Los Angeles in 1971, is the creator, producer, writer and director of The Sopranos. Chase has numerous credits for other television productions as well. Before Chase met Baer, Chase had worked on a number of projects involving organized crime activities based in New Jersey, including a script for “a mob boss in therapy,” a concept that, in part, would become the basis for The Sopranos.

In 1995, Chase was producing and directing a Rockford Files “movie-of-the-week” when he met Joseph Urbancyk who was working on the set as a camera operator and temporary director of photography. Chase mentioned to Urbancyk that he was looking for new material and for writers who could develop feature film screenplays that Chase later might rewrite and direct. Urbancyk also overheard Chase say that the creators of The Rockford Files were looking to assign additional writers for their “movie of the week” project.

Urbancyk became the connection between Chase and Baer as a result of Ur-bancyk’s long-time friendship with Baer and his knowledge of Baer’s interest in pursuing a career in writing, directing and producing. Baer, who was a New Jersey attorney, recently had left his employment in the Union County Prosecutor’s Office in Elizabeth, New Jersey, where he had worked for the previous six years.

*613 Urbancyk urged Baer to write a script for The Rockford, Files. Baer did so and gave it to Urbancyk who passed it on to Chase. Chase considered Baer’s work “interesting” and asked Urbancyk if Baer had any plans to be in Los Angeles. Upon hearing of Chase’s interest, Baer flew to Los Angeles to meet with Chase.

Chase, Urbancyk and Baer met for lunch on June 20, 1995. At that time Chase informed Baer that he would be unable to use Baer’s screenplay, as the remaining slots in The Rockford Files had been filled. The lunch continued, however, with Baer describing his experience as a prosecutor. Baer also pitched the idea to shoot “a film or television shows about the New Jersey Mafia.” App. at 40. At that time Baer was unaware of Chase’s previous work involving mob activity premised in New Jersey. At the lunch there was no reference to any payment that Chase might make to Baer for the latter’s services and the parties agree that they did not reach any agreement on that day.

In October 1995, Chase visited New Jersey for three days. During this “research visit” Baer arranged meetings for Chase with Detective Thomas Koezur, Detective Robert A. Jones, and Tony Spirito who provided Chase with information, material and personal stories about their experiences with organized crime. Koezur served as a tour guide and drove Chase and Baer to various locations in northern New Jersey. Koezur also arranged a lunch between Chase and Spirito. Spirito told true and sometimes personal stories involving loan sharking, a power struggle with two uncles involving a family business, and two individuals, Big Pussy and Little Pussy Russo. 1 Chase also met with Jones, a detective with the Union County Prosecutor’s office who had experience investigating organized crime. Baer does not dispute that virtually all of the ideas and locations that he “contributed” to Chase existed in the public record.

After returning to Los Angeles, Chase sent Baer a copy of a draft of a Sopranos screenplay that he had written, which was dated December 20, 1995. Baer asserts that after he read it he called Chase and made various comments with regard to it. Baer claims that the two spoke at least four times during the following year and that he sent a letter to Chase dated February 10, 1997, discussing The Sopranos script. Baer ensured that Chase received the letter by confirming its arrival with Chase’s assistant. On this appeal we accept Baer’s allegations regarding his input into The Sopranos draft.

Notwithstanding his February 10, 1997 letter, at his deposition Baer claimed that he last rendered services to Chase in 1995. Thus, Baer’s testimony included the following:

Q. During any of those conversations after October of 1995, [when Chase visited New Jersey] did you provide any further information to Mr. Chase other than in relation to the sexual assault?

A. Not really.

Q. No?

A. Not really. The screen play was done and there wasn’t really any need for it at that point as far as I knew. Q. So everything that you had done and to which you claim entitlement was done by the end of October 1995?

A. Yes in terms of assisting him in helping with this project that would be true.

App. at 343-44. 2 Notwithstanding this testimony, in Baer’s later certification dated October 3, 2003, in opposition to Chase’s motion for summary judgment he sought to clarify his deposition testimony, stating:

*614 117. I also sent him a letter dated February 10, 1997 discussing the Sopranos script prior to making a trip to Los Angeles. After sending the letter, I spoke with Chase’s assistant, Kelly Kockzak, who confirmed that Chase had received it. This letter represents the last services I provided to Defendants. Most of my services were provided in 1995.

App. at 69.

Baer asserts that he and Chase orally agreed on three separate occasions that if the show became a success, Chase would “take care of’ Baer, and “remunerate [Baer] in a manner commensurate to the true value of [his services].” App. at 113. According to Baer, he and Chase first made this oral agreement on the telephone during one of their first two or three conversations during the summer of 1995. The second occasion was on the telephone and occurred immediately prior to Chase’s October 1995 visit to New Jersey. The third time the parties reached the agreement was in person when they met in New Jersey in October 1995.

Baer claims that on each of these occasions the parties had the same conversation in which Chase offered to pay Baer, stating “you help me; I pay you.” App. at 112-13. Baer always rejected Chase’s offer, reasoning that Chase would be unable to pay him “for the true value of the services [Baer] was rendering.” Id. Each time Baer rejected Chase’s offer he did so with a counteroffer, “that I would perform the services while assuming the risk that if the show failed [Chase] would owe me nothing. If, however, the show succeeded he would remunerate me in a manner commensurate to the true value of my services.” Id. at 113. Baer acknowledges that this counteroffer, which in these proceedings we treat as having become the parties’ agreement, always was oral and did not include any fixed term of duration or price. There is no other evidence in the record of any other discussion between Baer and Chase regarding the terms of the contract. For purposes of the motion for summary judgment, Chase accepts Baer’s version of the events as true and thus concedes there was an oral agreement to the extent that Baer sets it forth. Notwithstanding this agreement, insofar as we can ascertain, other than Baer’s calls to Chase after he received the Sopranos script, the next time Baer heard anything from or about Chase was when he received a phone call from Detective Koczur telling him that Chase was in Elizabeth shooting The Sopranos. In fact, Chase has not paid Baer for his services.

On or about May 15, 2002, Baer filed a verified complaint against Chase in the district court and thereafter on May 2, 2003, Baer filed an amended verified complaint. Baer’s amended complaint advanced ten claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied contract; (3) breach of quasi-contract; (4) common law fraud; (5) equitable fraud; (6) negligent misrepresentation; (7) breach of fiduciary duty; (8) unfair competition under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125; (9) unfair competition and misappropriation under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:4-1 (West 2001); and (10) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. App. at 137-48. Baer subsequently withdrew the federal unfair competition claim. 3 Eventu *615 ally Chase brought a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) alleging that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and: he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Chase claimed that the, alleged contract and implied contract were too vague, ambiguous and lacking in essential terms to be enforced and the statute of frauds barred the actions based on them. Moreover, Chase claimed that the statute of limitations barred the breach of quasi-contract quantum meruit claim. Finally, Chase alleged that each of Baer’s six remaining claims was lacking in merit. Baer did not file a cross-motion for complete or partial summary judgment.

The district court granted Chase’s motion, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to any of Baer’s claims. The district court held with respect to the claims raised on this appeal that: the contract claims were unenforceable due to vagueness, uncertainty, and the lack of essential terms in the contract; the statute of limitations barred the quasi-contract claim; and the misappropriation tort claim was without merit due to a lack of novelty. In addition, the district court made certain rulings with respect to evidence that we describe below which Baer challenges.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court exercised diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in that the parties were of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. Our jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as this timely appeal is from a final order of the district court granting Chase’s motion for summary judgment. We make a plenary review of the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Chase. See Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 566 n. 3 (3d Cir.2002)). Insofar as the case involves 'state law, New Jersey law is applicable.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Baer’s Implied-In-Fact Contract Claim

Baer predicates his contract claim on this appeal on an implied-in-fact contract rather than on the oral agreement he reached with Chase. The issue with respect to the implied-in-fact contract claim concerns whether Chase and Baer entered into an enforceable contract for services Baer rendered that aided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. In the district court Baer offered two alternative theories in which a purported contract was formed: the “oral agreement/success contingency” and an implied-in-fact contract.

The parties agree for purposes of the summary judgment motion that there was a contingent oral agreement providing for Chase to compensate Baer, depending on Chase’s “success,” in exchange for the aid Baer provided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. As we noted above, the parties reached the oral agreement in three exchanges in which Baer proposed: “that I would perform the services while assuming the risk that if the show failed [Chase] would owe me nothing. If, however, the show succeeded he would remunerate me in a manner commensurate to the true value of my services.” App. at 113. As we have indicated, for purposes of the summary judgment motion only, Chase accepts this version of the events so we will regard the existence of the oral agreement as not in dispute.

*616 The district court held, and Baer concedes on appeal, that this oral agreement was “too vague to be enforced” as an express contract. Appellant’s br. at 30-31; see Baer v. Chase, 2004 WL 350050, at *6 (Feb. 20, 2004) (“The contract as articulated by the Plaintiff lacks essential terms, and is vague, indefinite and uncertain; no version of the alleged agreement contains sufficiently precise terms to constitute an enforceable contract.”). This description of the oral agreement leaves at issue Baer’s contention that the district court overlooked the existence of an enforceable implied-in-fact contract, rendering Chase liable for the services that Baer provided.

1. The Distinction Between Express And Implied-In-Fact Contracts

The distinction between express and implied contracts rests on alternative methods of contract formation. Contracts are “express” when the parties state their terms and “implied” when the parties do not state their terms. The distinction is based not on the contracts’ legal effect but on the way the parties manifest their mutual assent. In re Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d 1221, 1228 (3d Cir.1987) (“An implied-in-fact contract, therefore, is a true contract arising from mutual agreement and intent to promise, but in circumstances in which the agreement and promise have not been verbally expressed. The agreement is rather inferred from the conduct of the parties.”); see Baltimore O.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597, 58 Ct.Cl. 709, 43 S.Ct. 425, 426-27, 67 L.Ed. 816 (1923). In other words, the terms “express” and “implied” do not denote different kinds of contracts, but rather reference the evidence by which the parties demonstrate their agreement. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 N.J. 17, 158 A.2d 825, 828 (N.J.1960).

Baer’s attempt to find an implied-in-fact contract in his dealings with Chase does not strengthen his claim that Chase breached his contract with him. There is only one contract at issue, Chase’s promise to compensate Baer for services he rendered which aided in the creation and production of The Sopranos. Chase’s stipulation that there was such a contract has the consequence of making Baer’s attempts to label this agreement “implied” rather than “express” to advance a distinction without a difference as the mode of contract formation, as we will explain, is immaterial to the disposition of the breach of contract claim. In other words, inasmuch as the parties agree for purposes of these summary judgment proceedings that there was an agreement, the manner in which they formed the contract is immaterial because different legal consequences do not flow from analyzing the alleged contract as implied-in-fact rather than express. See Saint Barnabas Med. Ctr. v. Essex County, 111 N.J. 67, 543 A.2d 34, 39 (1988) (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 158 A.2d at 828 (“[A] true contract implied in fact ‘is in legal effect an express contract,’ and varies from the latter only insofar as the parties’ agreement and assent thereto have been manifested by conduct instead of words.”)). The district court was therefore correct in its holding that “[bjecause the Defendants have assumed the existence of a contract as the Plaintiff has described it for the purposes of the motion there is no issue regarding formation of the contract or assent, and the Plaintiffs distinction between express and implied contracts is irrelevant.” Baer, 2004 WL 350050, at *5 (citations omitted).

Moreover, Baer’s claim of an implied-in-fact contract, in the face of an express agreement governing the same subject matter, is legally untenable. There cannot be an implied-in-fact contract *617 if there is an express contract that covers the same subject matter. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d at 1229-30; see Klebe v. United States, 263 U.S. 188, 191-92, 44 S.Ct. 58, 58-59, 68 L.Ed. 244 (1923). In other words, express contract and implied-in-fact contract theories are mutually exclusive.

In In re Penn Central Transportation Company, 831 F.2d 1221, we addressed the relationship between express and implied contracts. In that case the government sought recovery under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act for funds it paid to Penn Central in an attempt to sustain routine operations at the financially ailing railroad company. The government and the railroad had entered into a number of express agreements pursuant to the Act to effectuate these loans. The government later claimed that Penn Central performed unauthorized work, resulting in the overpayment of $22.3 million to it. The government argued that the Act dictated the specific and limited manner in which the government loan money could be utilized, and, accordingly, sought return of its funding expended on “unauthorized” activities.

In response, Penn Central put forth an . interpretation of the Act in which the alleged unauthorized activities would have been acceptable under its requirements. In the alternative, it maintained that it had an entered into a separate and enforceable implied-in-fact contract with the government to continue using these funds for the activities in which it was engaged, even if they were deemed outside the scope of the Act. Id. at 1225.

We focused on and disallowed the railroad’s attempt to prove the existence of both express and implied-in-fact agreements dealing with the same subject. We stated, “no implied-in-fact contract may be found when, as here, the parties have an express agreement dealing with the same subject.” Id. at 1229. The operative principle here and in Penn Central Transportation Company is the same. As noted above, there is only one agreement at issue in the present case, Chase’s promise to pay Baer for the services he rendered. Chase concedes the existence of the oral express agreement as alleged by Baer. Consequently, the fundamental contract law principle that implied and express contacts are mutually exclusive forecloses Baer’s attempt to establish that there was an implied-in-fact contract.

New Jersey law, applicable here, recognizes the mutual exclusivity of express and implied contracts. Roselle Park Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Friedlander, 116 N.J.L. 32, 181 A. 316, 317 (1935) (“[I]t is axiomatic that a contract cannot arise by implication in fact where there is an express contract between the parties relating to the same subject matter....”). The existence of an express contract, however, does not preclude the existence of an implied contract if the implied contract is distinct from the express contract. Atlas Corp. v. United States, 895 F.2d 745, 754-55 (Fed.Cir.1990); see Chase Manhattan Bank v. Iridium Africa Corp., 239 F.Supp.2d 402, 409 (D.Del.2002) (“A party may assert the existence of an express contract and implied-in-fact contract only if the terms of the contracts alleged differ in some manner.”); ITT Fed. Support Servs., Inc. v. United States, 209 Ct.Cl. 157, 531 F.2d 522, 528 n. 12 (1976) (“The implied contract, if it is to be valid, must be entirely unrelated to the express contract. The existence of an express contract precludes the existence of an implied contract dealing with the same subject.”).

Baer’s alleged implied-in-fact contract, however, rather than being distinct from or unrelated to the express oral contract is identical to it. The stipulated oral agreement included Chase’s promise to compensate Baer for the services and *618 ideas that Baer provided Chase. Baer now asks that we find an implied-in-fact contract that subjects Chase to liability for the very same undertaking. Baer provides a litany of facts which indicate that Chase may have used his services or prospered from his ideas. Nevertheless, in light of Chase’s stipulation to the existence of an agreement governing this subject matter, this evidence is immaterial to the issues raised by the summary judgment motion with respect to Baer’s attempt to establish that there was an implied-in-fact contract between the parties.

The question is not whether Chase entered into an agreement with Baer or whether Chase utilized his ideas. We already deem these matters, for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment and this appeal, as established. The question is whether Chase’s nonverbal actions prove there was a contract distinct from the express agreement or expanding on the terms of the agreement to make it enforceable. The answer is clearly that the actions do not do so. The alleged implied-in-fact contract completely mirrors the acknowledged express contract’s subject matter. Baer nowhere demonstrates that the subject matter of the alleged implied-in-fact contract is distinct, more definite in terms of price and duration, or covers a subject matter divergent from the oral agreement. The district court, therefore, would have erred if it had analyzed this case on the basis that there was a separate implied-in-fact contract distinct from the express contract that governed the identical subject matter.

2. Definitiveness As To Price and Duration In An “Idea Submission” Case

Even assuming that Baer had been able to demonstrate that he had an implied-in-fact contract with Chase, his contention that an implied-in-fact contract claim in an idea submission case need not be definite as to price and duration, would be incorrect. Baer asserts that the district court’s holding “that the absence of a price and duration term render[s] an implied contract in an idea submission scenario too vague to be enforced ... is contrary to the law in virtually every jurisdiction that has ever considered the issue.” Appellant’s br. at 34. Baer’s claim fails on three grounds: (1) there is no distinction between express and implied contracts, aside from issues of contract formation; (2) definiteness with respect to price and duration is necessary for idea submission cases under New Jersey contract law; and (3) the district court was correct in holding that the contract Baer alleges existed was too ambiguous and indefinite to be enforceable.

a. An Implied-In-Fact Contract Has The Same Legal Consequences As An Express Contract.

In fact there are no distinctions in legal effect, at least in the context of this case, when a promise is implied rather than express. See Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., 123 F.Supp.2d 802, 816-17 (2001) (“The only difference between an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract is that the parties’ agreement has been manifested by conduct instead of words.”). No rationale exists to conclude that definiteness as to the essential terms of a contract could be an exception from this fundamental principle. We therefore determine if in any “idea submission case,” whether predicated on an express or implied contract, definiteness is a requirement to create an enforceable contract.

b. A Contract Involving An Idea Submission Must Be Definite With Respect To All Essential Terms To Be Enforceable Under New Jersey Contract Law.

In fact “[a] contract arises from offer and acceptance, and must be suffi *619 ciently definite so ‘that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.’ ” Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 N.J. 427, 608 A.2d 280, 284 (1992) (citing West Caldwell v. Caldwell, 26 N.J. 9, 138 A.2d 402, 410 (1958); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 22 N.J. 523, 126 A.2d 646, 650-51 (1956); Leitner v. Braen, 51 N.J.Super. 31, 143 A.2d 256, 259-60 (1958)). Therefore parties create an enforceable contract when they agree on its essential terms and manifest an intent that the terms bind them. West Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 410; see Johnson & Johnson v. Charmley Drug Co., 11 N.J. 526, 95 A.2d 391, 397 (1953); California Natural v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 465, 470 (D.N.J.1986). If parties to an agreement do not agree on one or more essential terms of the purported agreement courts generally hold it to be unenforceable. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284 (citing Heim v. Shore, 56 N.J.Super. 62, 151 A.2d 556, 561-62 (1959) (holding agreement unenforceable because parties did not agree on terms of payment; principal amount of mortgage, due date, and interest rate)).

New Jersey contract law focuses on the performance promised when analyzing an agreement to determine if it is too vague to be enforced. “An agreement so deficient in the specification of its essential terms that the performance by each party cannot be ascertained with reasonable certainty is not a contract, and clearly is not an enforceable one.” Lo Bosco v. Kure Eng’g Ltd., 891 F.Supp. 1020, 1025 (D.N.J.1995) (citing Malaker Corp. Stockholders Protective Comm. v. First Jersey Nat’l Bank, 163 N.J.Super. 463, 395 A.2d 222, 227 (1978)). A contract, therefore, is unenforceable for vagueness when its essential terms are too indefinite to allow a court to determine with reasonable certainty what each party has promised to do. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284; see West Caldwell, 138 A.2d at 410 (“To be enforceable as a contractual undertaking, an agreement must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.”).

New Jersey law deems the price term, i.e., the amount of compensation, an essential term of any contract. MDC Inv. Prop., L.L.C. v. Marando, 44 F.Supp.2d 693, 698-99 (D.N.J.1999) (citing Weichert, 608 A.2d at 287). An agreement lacking definiteness of price, however, is not unenforceable if the parties specify a practicable method by which they can determine the amount. Moorestown Mgmt., Inc. v. Moorestown Bookshop, Inc., 104 N.J.Super. 250, 249 A.2d 623, 628 (1969). However, in the absence of an agreement as to the manner or method of determining compensation the purported agreement is invalid. Weichert, 608 A.2d at 287. Additionally, the duration of the contract is deemed an essential term and therefore any agreement must be sufficiently definitive to allow a court to determine the agreed upon length of the contractual relationship. Lo Bosco, 891 F.Supp. at 1026 (“With regard to contracts for services in return for a percentage of some yet-to-be-determined number, such as profits, sales, etc., the courts [of and in New Jersey] look to whether there are certain dates of commencement and termination.”).

The New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly has held that an implied-in-fact contract “must be sufficiently definite [so] that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” Weichert, 608 A.2d at 284 (citations and internal quotations omitted). If possible, courts will “attach a sufficiently definite meaning to the terms of a bargain to make it enforceable[,]” Paley v. Barton Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 82 N.J.Super. 75, 196 A.2d 682, 686 (1964), and in doing so may refer to “commercial practice *620 or other usage or custom.” Lynch v. New Deal Delivery Serv. Inc., 974 F.Supp. 441, 458 (D.N.J.1997). But the courts recognize that a contract is “unenforceable for vagueness when its terms are too indefinite to allow a court to determine with reasonable certainty what each party has promised to do.” Id. at 457.

Baer premises his argument on his view that New Jersey should disregard the well-established requirement of definiteness in its contract law when the subject-matter of the contract is an “idea submission.” He cites extensively to a string of cases from various jurisdictions which he urges support his contention. See, e.g., Wrench L.L.C v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir.2001); Nadel v. Play-by-Play Toys & Novelties, Inc., 208 F.3d 368 (2d Cir.2000); Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d 802. Baer contends that these cases support the proposition that “[ejvery Circuit that has published on the issue, has upheld implied contract claims where price and duration were absent and a price term was implied as the reasonable value of the ideas conveyed.” Appellant’s br. at 34.

Baer’s argument is inaccurate and misleading. He attempts to transform cases where the issues raised pertain to adequacy of consideration and discrepancies over the use of submitted facts, into the proposition that implied-in-fact contracts involving idea submissions need not be sufficiently definite. For example: Wrench, 256 F.3d at 459-63, reversed a summary judgment disposition that held that novelty was required to prove consideration and sustain an implied-in-fact contract claim; Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 816-19, held that a plaintiff must prove that an idea disclosed to the defendant was novel in order to find consideration for the alleged contract and denied summary judgment because a material issue existed over novelty and use; Nadel, 208 F.3d at 374, reversed a summary judgment granted “only on ground that [the plaintiffs] idea lacked general novelty and thus would not suffice as consideration” and remanded for the district court to determine “whether the other elements necessary to find a valid express or implied-in-fact contract are present here.” Id. at 382. None of the cases Baer cites holds that there is not a definiteness requirement necessary to create an enforceable contract in idea submission cases. Duffy’s holding is helpful in summarizing the actual law to be derived from the above cited cases: “The existence of novelty to the buyer only addresses the element of consideration necessary for the formation of a contract. Thus, apart from consideration, the formation of a contract will depend upon the presence of other elements.” Duffy, 123 F.Supp.2d at 818 (citing Nadel, 208 F.3d at 377 n. 5).

New Jersey precedent does not support Baer’s attempt to carve out an exception to traditional principles of contract law for submission-of-idea cases. The New Jersey courts have not provided even the slightest indication that they intend to depart from their well-established requirement that enforceability of a contract requires definiteness with respect to the essential terms of that contract. Accordingly, we will not relax the need for Baer to demonstrate definiteness as to price and duration with respect to the contract he entered into with Chase.

3. The Alleged “Contract” Regardless Of Labels Is Too Vague To Be Enforced.

The final question with respect to the Baer’s contract claim, therefore, is whether his contract is enforceable in light of the traditional requirement of definitiveness in New Jersey contract law for a contract to be enforceable. A contract may be expressed in writing, or orally, or in acts, or partly in one of these ways and partly in others. Troy v. Rutgers, 168 *621 N.J. 354, 774 A.2d 476, 482-83 (2001). There is a point, however, at which interpretation becomes alteration. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 831 F.2d at 1226 (citing Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.1980)). In this case, even when all of the parties’ verbal and non-verbal actions are aggregated and viewed most favorably to Baer, we cannot find a contract that is distinct and definitive enough to be enforceable.

Nothing in the record indicates that the parties agreed on how, how much, where, or for what period Chase would compensate Baer. The parties did not discuss who would determine the “true value” of Baer’s services, when the “true value” would be calculated, or what variables would go into such a calculation. There was no discussion or agreement as to the meaning of “success” of The Sopranos. There was no discussion how “profits” were to be defined. There was no contemplation of dates of commencement or termination of the contract. And again, nothing in Baer’s or Chase’s conduct, or the surrounding circumstances of the relationship, shed light on, or answers, any of these questions. The district court was correct in its description of the contract between the parties: “The contr