Gore v. People's Savings Bank

The primary question on this certified appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that a landlord of a residential dwelling may be held strictly hable pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) §§ 47a-7, 47a-8 and 47a-54f (b)1 for personal injuries *363sustained by a minor tenant due to the minor’s exposure to lead-based paint in the landlord’s dwelling. The plaintiffs, Thomas Gore and Wanda Copeland, brought an action on behalf of their minor son, Kendall Copeland, claiming, inter alia, that the defendants, People’s Savings Bank and M.S.B. Real Estate Corporation, were strictly liable for the damages caused by their son’s exposure to lead-based paint in the defendants’ dwelling. The trial court, Thim, J., granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability count and, after the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants on the remaining counts, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court, concluding that “§§ 47a-7 and 47a-8, when read together, and § 47a-54f provide for civil damages pursuant to a claim of strict liability” and, therefore, that the trial court should not have directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability count. Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 35 Conn. App. 126, 644 A.2d 945 (1994). We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal; Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, 231 Conn. 923, 648 A.2d 163 (1994); and now reverse and remand the case to the Appellate Court for further proceedings.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 1984, the plaintiffs and Kendall Copeland moved into an apartment located at 400 Atlantic Street in Bridgeport. On May 22, 1985, Audrey Gaines, a program coordinator for the Bridgeport department of *364health, inspected the plaintiffs’ apartment for the presence of lead. Gaines tested the surfaces of the apartment using a portable X-ray machine, which measured the amount of lead within the paint on the surfaces. This testing revealed that some surfaces contained more than five tenths of 1 percent lead by weight, the federal statutory standard then codified in 42 U.S.C. § 48412 and incorporated by § 47a-8. On the basis of the results of this inspection, Gaines sent notification to the landlord3 and requested that it abate the lead in the plaintiffs’ apartment. On August 26, 1985, Gaines reinspected the apartment and determined that all lead hazards had been abated.

By amended complaint dated October 1, 1992, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendants for injuries that Kendall had suffered due to his exposure to the lead-based paint. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants negligently had failed to comply with certain state laws pertaining to the health and safety of tenants.4 The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants had failed to comply with the terms of their lease agreement requiring the defendants to comply with certain state laws pertaining to the health and safety of tenants.5 *365Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were strictly liable for the damages caused by the lead-based paint violations. On October 20, 1992, after the close of evidence, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability count against each defendant.

With regard to the negligence counts, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendants were liable if, inter alia: (1) there was a violation of a warranty of habitability or state statute;6 (2) the landlord had con*366stractive or actual notice of the violation;7 (3) the landlord had failed to repair the condition constituting the *367violation within a reasonable time after receiving notice of the violation;8 and (4) the landlord’s failure to repair was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries. The trial court also instructed the jury that it would have in the jury room, and would be required to answer, interrogatories corresponding to these four issues, and, further, that a negative answer to any one of them would establish that the defendants were not liable. Following the jury charge, the plaintiffs excepted to, inter alia, the lack of a charge on negligence as a matter of law as had been set forth in their request to charge. At that time, the plaintiffs also renewed their objection to the granting of the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict on the strict liability claim, and they excepted to the trial court’s instruction regarding the notice requirement and the landlord’s opportunity to repair within a reasonable period of time.

The jury found the defendants not liable, finding that there was a violation of a warranty or statute and that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the violation, but that the defendants had repaired the condition constituting the violation within a reasonable period of time. The plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the verdict, contending that the trial court had, inter *368alia, improperly: (1) directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability counts; (2) refused to give a negligence per se instruction regarding General Statutes §§ 47a-7 (a) (2), 47a-8, 47a-54f (b) and § 19-13-B1 (i) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies; (3) instructed the jury that the plaintiffs had the burden of proof with respect to actual or constructive notice; and (4) instructed the jury that the defendants had a reasonable time after notice to repair the conditions constituting the violation. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the verdict, concluding that §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 do not modify the common law requirement of notice and, therefore, do not impose strict liability on landlords.

The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s refusal to set aside the verdict, concluding that the trial court had improperly directed a verdict in favor of the defendants on the strict liability counts. Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 128-29. In doing so, the Appellate Court first determined that violations of §§ 47a-7 (a) (2), 47a-8 and 47a-54f (b)9 constitute negligence per se for the purposes of a claim brought on behalf of a minor injured by lead-based paint in the landlord’s apartment. Id., 132-34. In particular, the Appellate Court determined, on the basis of the language of these statutory provisions and their legislative history, that the provisions satisfied the two-prong test for negligence per se: (1) that the plaintiffs were within the class of persons protected by the statute; and (2) *369that the injury suffered is of the type that the statute was intended to prevent. Id., 130-34.10 The Appellate Court then concluded that “[bjecause we construe the statute as meeting the threshold dual criteria for imposition of statutory civil liability pursuant to negligence per se, but lacking any provision for an excuse for the violation, we conclude that the legislature intended that the statute provide for strict liability upon proof of a violation of the statute and proximate causation.” Id., 135-36.

The Appellate Court noted that its interpretation followed the analysis utilized in Housing Authority v. Olesen, 31 Conn. App. 359, 363-65, 624 A.2d 920 (1993), in which the Appellate Court had determined that § 47a-8 did not require notice to the landlord of the lead-based paint violation to trigger a defense to the landlord’s summary process action for nonpayment of rent. Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 135. Moreover, the Appellate Court recognized that the same conclusion regarding strict liability had previously been reached in the case of Hardy v. Griffin, 41 Conn. Sup. 283, 569 A.2d 49 (1989), although the Hardy court had analyzed the issue differently. Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 136 n.11 (“our analysis is independent of that set forth in Hardy”). As a result, it remanded the case for a new trial. Id., 137.11

*370After the Appellate Court heard oral argument, but before it released its decision in this case, the legislature repealed § 47a-8. See Public Acts 1994, No. 94-220, § 11. We granted the defendants’ petition for certification to appeal from the decision of the Appellate Court, limited to the following two issues: “1. Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendants’ violation of General Statutes §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 or § 47a-54f (b) imposed strict liability on the defendants for the minor plaintiffs injuries?” and “2. What is the effect of the enactment of Public Act No. 94-220 (11) on the liability of the defendants in this case?” Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 231 Conn. 923.12

Before further framing the questions at issue in this case, we first emphasize what is not at issue. From the jury’s answers to the interrogatories at trial following the trial court’s instructions, it is clear that the jury found the condition of the plaintiffs’ apartment to have been in violation of the defendants’ duty to maintain the property. The jury also found either that the defendants had received constructive notice of this violation *371prior to the plaintiffs’ occupancy or had received actual notice at some time after the plaintiffs had moved into the apartment. Although the defendants contested these issues at trial, they do not now contend that there had been insufficient evidence at trial such that the jury could not have reasonably decided these issues as it did.

I

In deciding whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that these statutes impose strict liability on landlords such as the defendants, we must examine two broad areas of the law implicated by the issue: landlord-tenant law and general tort law. The defendants contend that, under common law principles of landlord premises liability, the burden is on the plaintiffs to prove not only that a condition in their apartment violated some common law or statutory duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition, but also that the landlord had notice of the condition constituting the violation and had a reasonable time to repair the condition after receiving notice. In the defendants’ view, and that of the trial court, because the provisions of §§ 47a-7, 47a-8 and 47a-54f do not expressly modify common law principles, these elements are a part of the plaintiffs’ cause of action notwithstanding the statutory provisions.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, concur with the Appellate Court’s analysis of the case according to the general tort principles of negligence per se and strict liability. The Appellate Court concluded that a violation of §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f constitutes negligence per se, and that, because these statutory provisions do not expressly provide landlords the opportunity for proving the “excuse” of lack of notice, landlords are strictly liable for damages resulting from the violations upon proof of proximate causation. Gore v. People’s Savings *372Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 136. The plaintiffs agree with this analysis. In concluding as it did, however, the Appellate Court did not address the analysis of the trial court or otherwise reconcile the apparent conflict between its analysis premised on negligence per se and the trial court’s approach premised on the common law elements of landlord liability.

We conclude that, although the Appellate Court properly determined that the presence of lead paint in violation of §§ 47a-8 and 47a-54f constitutes negligence per se,13 these sections do not impose strict liability on landlords. Rather, because these sections do not modify the common law elements of landlord premises liability, notice is relevant to a tenant’s cause of action. Thus, we reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment and remand the case to that court for consideration of the plaintiffs’ other claims.14

A

In determining whether a violation of § 47a-8 constitutes negligence per se or provides a basis to subject *373the landlord to strict liability, we must first discuss traditional principles of landlord premises liability. We have recognized that, under the common law, landlords have a duty to use reasonable care to maintain in a reasonably safe condition those areas of their premises over which they exercise control. Cruz v. Drezek, 175 Conn. 230, 234, 397 A.2d 1335 (1978); Douglass v. 95 Pearl Street Corp., 157 Conn. 73, 82, 245 A.2d 129 (1968); Klahr v. Kostopoulos, 138 Conn. 653, 654, 88 A.2d 332 (1952); see State v. White, 204 Conn. 410, 427, 528 A.2d 811 (1987). We stated in Cruz v. Drezek, supra, 235: “There could be no breach of the duty resting upon the [landlords] unless they knew of the defective condition or were chargeable with notice of it because, had they exercised a reasonable inspection of their premises, they would have discovered it; Kirby v. Zlotnick, 160 Conn. 341, 344, 278 A.2d 822 [1971]; White v. E & F Construction Co., 151 Conn. 110, 112, 193 A.2d 716 [1963].” Thus, liability of a landlord for damages resulting from a defective condition in an area over which the landlord exercises control generally depends upon proof that the landlord received either actual or constructive notice of the condition prior to the time of the plaintiffs injuries. See, e.g., Cruz v. Drezek, supra, 235; McCrorey v. Heilpern, 170 Conn. 220, 221, 365 A.2d 1057 (1976); White v. E & F Construction Co., supra, 112-13. Liability also usually depends upon proof that the landlord failed to remedy the defective situation in a reasonable period of time after receipt of notice. See Sauro v. Arena Co., 171 Conn. 168, 170-71, 368 A.2d 58 (1976); Long v. Savin Rock Amusement Co., 141 Conn. 150, 153, 104 A.2d 221 (1954).

*374Furthermore, we have recognized that, at common law, “ ‘there is no implied warranty of habitability given to a tenant, but rather, he takes the premises as he finds them and bears the risk of any defective conditions which are within the area under his exclusive possession and control. . . . “This rule, however, does not apply to defects which are the result of faulty design or disrepair and which existed at the beginning of the tenancy, were not discoverable by the tenant on reasonable inspection, and were known, either actually or constructively, to the landlord.” ’ Thomas v. Roper, [162 Conn. 343, 349-50, 294 A.2d 321 (1972)].” Johnson v. Fuller, 190 Conn. 552, 558, 461 A.2d 988 (1983). Thus, as a matter of common law, although landlords owe a duty of reasonable care as to those parts of the property over which they have retained control, landlords generally “[do] not have a duty to keep in repair any portion of the premises leased to and in the exclusive possession and control” of the tenant. Thomas v. Roper, supra, 348; accord Pollack v. Gampel, 163 Conn. 462, 468, 313 A.2d 73 (1972); Dinnan v. Jozwiakowski, 156 Conn. 432, 434-36, 242 A.2d 747 (1968). Thus, as a matter of common law, a tenant’s claim for injuries caused by lead-based paint in the apartment would depend upon proof of control and actual or constructive notice of the conditions giving rise to the defective conditions caused by the lead-based paint. See Cruz v. Drezek, supra, 175 Conn. 235; McCrorey v. Heilpern, supra, 170 Conn. 221; White v. E & F Construction Co., supra, 151 Conn. 112-13. Other courts have similarly concluded that a landlord’s liability for damages caused by lead-based paint depends on proof of notice to the landlord. See, e.g., Garcia v. Jiminez, 184 Ill. App. 3d 107, 112, 539 N.E.2d 1356, appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 615, 545 N.E.2d 109 (1989) (“[landlord’s] actual or constructive knowledge of the [lead paint] is required to establish liability”); Brown v. Marathon Realty, Inc., 170 App. *375Div. 2d 426, 427, 565 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1991) (“incumbent on the plaintiffs ... to lay bare their proof as to the [landlord’s] actual or constructive notice of the [lead paint]”); Winston Properties v. Sanders, 57 Ohio App. 3d 28, 29-30, 565 N.E.2d 1280 (1989) (“must be shown that [landlord] had notice of the defective condition of the premises or that [tenant] attempted to notify appellee of the existence of lead-based paint”).

The plaintiffs do not dispute this analysis. Instead, they contend that § 47a-8 creates a standard the violation of which constitutes negligence per se. Moreover, they contend that, because this statutory provision does not provide for any excuses, landlords are strictly liable for any violations of that provision. Thus, we must next examine the doctrine of negligence per se and that doctrine’s connection to traditional principles of landlord premises liability.

B

Although the common law imposes on landlords only a duty to maintain in a reasonably safe condition those areas of their premises over which they exercise control, statutes may impose on landlords additional duties or obligations. See Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 102, 256 A.2d 246 (1969) (New Haven housing code obligated landlord to maintain outside stairway in sound condition or good repair); Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 628-29, 169 A. 912 (1933) (legislature may change common law rules of landlord liability to impose new obligations on landlords). Indeed, under general principles of tort law, a requirement imposed by statute may establish the applicable standard of care to be applied in a particular action. It is well established that “[i]n order to establish liability as a result of a statutory violation, a plaintiff must satisfy two conditions. ‘First, the plaintiff must be within the class of persons protected by the statute. [Coughlin v. Peters, *376153 Conn. 99, 101, 214 A.2d 127 (1965)]; Hassett v. Palmer, 126 Conn. 468, 473, 12 A.2d 646 [1940]; Monroe v. Hartford Street Ry. Co., 76 Conn. 201, 207, 56 A. 498 [1903]. Second, the injury must be of the type which the statute was intended to prevent. Toomey v. Danaher, 161 Conn. 204, 212, 286 A.2d 293 [1971]; Longstean v. McCaffrey’s Sons, 95 Conn. 486, 493, 111 A. 788 [1920]. See Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 36; Restatement (Second), 2 Torts §§ 286, 288 [1965].’ Wright v. Brown, 167 Conn. 464, 468-69, 356 A.2d 176 (1975).” Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 274-75, 464 A.2d 1 (1983).15

“Negligence per se operates to engraft a particular legislative standard onto the general standard of care imposed by traditional tort law principles, i.e., that standard of care to which an ordinarily prudent person would conform his conduct. To establish negligence, the jury in a negligence per se case need not decide whether the defendant acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. They merely decide whether the relevant statute or regulation has been violated. If it has, the defendant was negligent as a matter of law. See Prosser, [supra] § 36.” Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178, 439 A.2d 954 (1981).

In cases involving the doctrine of negligence per se, however, the defendant ordinarily may avoid liability upon proof of a valid excuse or justification. 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A (1965);16 see also *377Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enterprises, Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 150, 491 A.2d 389 (1985). In particular, even if a defendant has contravened a statute the violation of which constitutes negligence per se, that defendant usually may avoid liability by showing that “he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance.” 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A. The commentary to the Restatement explains that “[w]here the actor neither knows nor should know of any occasion or necessity for action in compliance with the legislation or regulation, his violation of it will ordinarily be excused.” Id., comment (f). The Restatement provides the following example: “A statute provides that no vehicle shall be driven on the public highway at night without front and rear lights. While A is driving on the highway at night his rear light goes out because of the failure of an electric bulb. A has used all reasonable diligence and care in the inspection of his car, and is unaware that the light has gone out. Before he has had any reasonable opportunity to discover it, the absence of the light causes a collision with B’s car, approaching from the rear, in which B is injured. A is not liable to B on the basis of the violation of the statute.” Id., illustration (3).

On the other hand, some statutes that create a standard of care the violation of which constitutes negligence per se do not permit a defendant to avoid liability on the basis of an excuse. “Such statutes in reality result in strict liability, although the courts have continued to speak of liability for negligence. When they are adopted by the court as defining a standard of conduct for a tort action, the standard adopted is one of strict liability, *378and the statute is still construed to permit no excuse.” Id., comment (c). Nonetheless, “[m]ost legislative enactments . . . receive no such strict construction.” Id., comment (d).

Before applying these principles to the present situation, we first acknowledge that this court has not often construed a statutory provision in the landlord-tenant context as creating a standard the violation of which constitutes negligence per se. The majority of cases concluding that a statutory provision implicates the doctrine of negligence per se have arisen in the context of motor vehicle regulation. See, e.g., Velardi v. Selwitz, 165 Conn. 635, 639, 345 A.2d 527 (1974); Busko v. DeFilippo, 162 Conn. 462, 466, 294 A.2d 510 (1972); Bailey v. Bruneau’s Truck Service, Inc., 149 Conn. 46, 54, 175 A.2d 372 (1961). Such a history, however, should not be read to suggest that the negligence per se doctrine is relevant only in the context of statutes pertaining to motor vehicles. Indeed, in Panaroni v. Johnson, supra, 158 Conn. 100-102, we concluded that the trial court had not improperly charged the jury that certain provisions of the New Haven housing code imposed an affirmative duty on the landlord, beyond the requirements of the common law, the violation of which gave rise to civil liability. Although the defective part of the premises at issue in the case was an outside stairway leading to the tenant’s apartment, this court approved a charge that had authorized the jury to consider whether the landlord had breached a common law duty to repair an area under his dominion and control or, in the event that the jury concluded that the stairway had not been under the landlord’s control, whether the landlord had breached a duty created under the provisions of the housing code.17

*379In doing so, the Panaroni court reasoned that “[t]he violation of an ordinance enacted for the protection of the public is negligence as a matter of law. . . . From a review of the housing code in its entirety, it is apparent that the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose protection the housing code was enacted. . . . This is evident from the design of the code as enacted and particularly from a review of the preamble wherein it is stated, inter alia, that it establishes minimum standards governing the condition and maintenance of dwellings and conditions essential to make dwellings safe and fit *380for human habitation; that it fixes certain responsibilities and duties of owners and occupants because there is or may be dilapidated, unsafe, and dangerous structures, among others, constituting amenace to the health and safety of the people of the city; and that a housing code is essential to establish these responsibilities and to set minimum standards sufficient to protect public health and safety. The owner, under the code, either as occupant or landlord has the obligation to maintain and keep every outside stair in sound condition or good repair. New Haven Housing Code, ¶ 302 (c) (1954, as amended). The violation of a city ordinance which provides for a criminal penalty may be found to be the proximate cause of an injury which will support recovery in an action in negligence.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 101-102. Thus, Panaroni makes clear that a statutory provision may impose on landlords additional duties the violation of which constitutes negligence per se.

In the specific circumstances of a case such as this, in which the plaintiffs claim that the landlord’s violation of § 47a-8 caused damages resulting from their minor son’s ingestion of lead-based paint in the apartment, we believe that the policies underlying the negligence per se doctrine apply and, therefore, we agree with the Appellate Court’s conclusion that § 47a-8 imposes on landlords a standard of care the violation of which constitutes negligence per se. In deciding whether the legislature intended to provide for such statutory liability, we look to the language of the statute and to the legislative history and purposes underlying the provision’s enactment. See, e.g., Connecticut National Bank v. Giacomi, 233 Conn. 304, 318-19, 659 A.2d 1166 (1995); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hillcrest Associates, 233 Conn. 153, 163, 659 A.2d 138 (1995); Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991). In determining whether a particular statutory provision imposes on landlords a duty such that a violation of *381that provision supports an action in negligence, we review the statutory scheme in its entirety, including the design of the scheme as enacted. See Panaroni v. Johnson, supra, 158 Conn. 101.

The language of § 47a-8 provides: “The presence of paint which does not conform to federal [lead paint] standards ... or of cracked, chipped, blistered, flaking, loose or peeling paint which constitutes a health hazard on accessible surfaces in any dwelling unit, tenement or any real property intended for human habitation shall be construed to render such dwelling unit, tenement or real property unfit for human habitation and shall constitute a noncompliance with subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of section 47a-7.” This language makes clear that the legislature intended to make a per se violation of § 47a-7 the presence of paint in violation of either the federal lead-based paint standards or the health hazard standards of § 47a-54f (b). The legislature’s adoption of these specific hazards as per se violations of § 47a-7 suggests that the legislature considered the various risks and benefits associated with the continued use of lead-based paints and meant to hold landlords to a particular standard of conduct.

The purposes underlying the adoption of these per se violations are reflected in the provision’s legislative history. Indeed, the Appellate Court aptly noted that “the legislative history reflects that a clear purpose of the act was to end the health problems arising specifically from the presence of lead-based paint. 14 H.R. Proc., Pt. 4, 1971 Sess., pp. 1766-69; 14 S. Proc., Pt. 4, 1971 Sess., p. 1533.” Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 134. Children are those most likely to incur health problems as a result of exposure to lead-based paints. Consequently, we believe that the legislature intended to include children such as Kendall Copeland within the class of plaintiffs protected by the statute and that it intended to protect such plaintiffs *382from the hazards of lead poisoning. As a result, we agree with the Appellate Court that a violation of § 47a-8 constitutes negligence per se for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ action.18

We disagree, however, with the Appellate Court’s further conclusion that the legislature intended not to permit excuses or justifications for such a per se violation. More specifically, we disagree that a landlord’s lack of notice is not related to a cause of action based on § 47a-8. Moreover, we believe that the Appellate Court misconstrued the relationship between common law premises liability and the doctrine of negligence per se in resolving the question of the availability of excuses in this case. The Appellate Court, after first concluding that the defendants’ violation of § 47a-8 constituted negligence per se for the purposes of the plaintiffs’ action, determined that it provided for strict liability because the statutory provision was “lacking any provision for an excuse for the violation . . . .” Gore v. People’s Savings Bank, supra, 35 Conn. App. 136. This analysis presumes that, if a statute is construed as providing for negligence per se, then that statute should be further construed as providing for no excuses unless the statute itself expressly provides for such excuses. The Appellate Court cited no authority for such a presumption in this context. A court’s interpretation that a statute provides for negligence per se ordinarily does not lead to the further conclusion that the statute prohibits excuses. See 2 Restatement (Second), Torts § 288A, comment (d). Indeed, “[n]o statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its words import [and a statute] is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it does not fairly express.” (Internal quotation *383marks omitted.) Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 172, 530 A.2d 596 (1987); State v. Sanchez, 204 Conn. 472, 479, 528 A.2d 373 (1987); Dennis v. Shaw, 137 Conn. 450, 452, 78 A.2d 691 (1951); 2A J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed. Sands 1986 Rev.) § 50.05. Thus, the Appellate Court should have reasoned that notice was relevant to the plaintiffs’ action unless the legislature had expressly removed notice considerations from the action.

Examining § 47a-8 under this framework, we are unpersuaded that the legislature intended to create a standard the violation of which establishes a landlord’s strict liability for injuries sustained by a minor plaintiff due to exposure to lead-based paint. Although the plaintiffs point to the language of §§ 47a-7 and 47a-8 and their legislative histories as indicating a legislative intent to p