State v. Courchesne

*539 Opinion

Under our statutory scheme, a defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty if he is convicted of a capital felony for the “murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (8), as amended by No. 98-126, § 1, of the 1998 Public Acts (P.A. 98-126).1 One of the aggravating factors that permits the imposition of the death penalty is that “the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner . . . .” Gen*540eral Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (i) (4).2 Although *541in State v. Breton, 235 Conn. 206, 220 n.15, 663 A.2d *5421026 (1995), we had been asked to decide whether it was necessary for the state, in order to seek the death penalty based on that factor, to prove that the defendant had killed “both ... of the victims in an especially cruel manner,” rather than just one of the victims, we ultimately did not have to answer that question because the evidence was sufficient to show that he had done so with respect to both victims. The present case, however, requires us to decide that question.

Thus, the sole issue of this appeal is whether, when the defendant has been convicted of a capital felony for the murder of two persons in the course of a single transaction, in violation of § 53a-54b (8), the state, in order to establish the aggravating factor defined by § 53a-46 (i) (4), must prove that the defendant murdered both victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.3 We conclude that proof that the defendant committed at least one of the murders in the specified aggravated manner is sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling of the trial court to the contrary.

The state charged the defendant with capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (8) by murdering two persons, namely, Demetris Rodgers and Antonia Rodgers, in the course of a single transaction.4 The defendant waived *543a jury trial on the guilt phase, and elected to be tried by a three judge court.5 The trial court, West, Cofield and D’Addabbo, Js., found the defendant guilty. The defendant then moved to dismiss the aggravating factor and for the court to impose a life sentence without the possibility of release, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to justify holding a penalty hearing. The trial court, D’Addabbo, J., denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a prehearing determination by the court on the sufficiency of the evidence. In the course of its decision, however, the court also ruled that, as a matter of law, the state, in order to prove the noticed aggravating factor, would be required to prove at the penalty hearing that, as to the conviction of capital felony in violation of § 53a-54b (8), both murders were committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. This interlocutory appeal followed.

For purposes of this appeal only, the following facts may be considered as undisputed. In the late evening *544hours of December 15, 1998, the defendant stabbed Demetris Rodgers to death. At the time she was stabbed, she was pregnant with Antonia Rodgers. Although Demetris Rodgers was dead on arrival at the hospital, the physicians at the hospital performed an emergency cesarean section and delivered Antonia Rodgers, who lived for forty-two days before dying from global anoxic encephalopathy, or deprivation of oxygen to the brain.6

I

The state claims that, when a defendant has been convicted of capital felony for the murder of two persons in the course of a single transaction, the state, in order to prove the aggravating factor that the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, need only do so with respect to one of the murder victims. We agree.

This claim presents a question of statutory interpretation. “The process of statutory interpretation involves a reasoned search for the intention of the legislature. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 431, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of this case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. In seeking to determine that meaning, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. . . . Id.; Carpenteri-Waddington, Inc. v. Commis*545sioner of Revenue Services, 231 Conn. 355, 362, 650 A.2d 147 (1994); United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755-56, 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). . . . United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, 240 Conn. 422, 431-32, 692 A.2d 742 (1997).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bender v. Bender, 258 Conn. 733, 741, 785 A.2d 197 (2001).

We have interpreted the aggravating factor involved to mean that “the defendant engaged in intentional conduct that inflicted extreme physical or psychological pain [suffering] or torture on the victim above and beyond that necessarily accompanying the underlying killing, and that the defendant specifically intended to inflict such extreme pain [suffering or] torture ... or . . . the defendant was callous or indifferent to the extreme physical or psychological pain, suffering or torture that his intentional conduct in fact inflicted on the victim.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 66-67, 751 A.2d 298 (2002). We conclude that, under our death penalty statutory scheme, if the defendant’s mental state and conduct meet these requirements with respect to one of his victims, the aggravating factor is satisfied. Put another way, it is not necessary under that statutory scheme that the defendant in the present case intentionally, or callously or indifferently, inflicted extreme pain, suffering or torture on both of his victims, so long as he is shown to have done so with respect to one of his victims.

We begin our analysis with the language of the statutes presently at issue, namely, §§ 53a-46a (f) (2) and (i) (4) and 53a-54b (8). Both parties rely on what each claims to be the plain language of certain of these statutes to support their respective positions.

The state points to the language of § 53a-46a (f) (2), namely, that if “one or more of the aggravating factors *546set forth in subsection (i) exist”; (emphasis added); the death penalty may be imposed, provided, of course, that the other requirements of the statute are met.7 Thus, the state contends, “the torture of one victim of a capital felony satisfies the plain language of § 53a-46a (f) (2), which demands proof of but one aggravating factor.”

The defendant contends, to the contrary, that the plain language of §§ 53a-46a (i) (4) and 53a-54b (8) compels the conclusion that both murders must be committed in the manner proscribed by the aggravating factor in order for the factor to be established. The defendant points to the language of § 53a-46a (i) (4): “[T]he defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner . . . .” (Emphasis added.) He then points to the language of § 53a-54b (8) defining the relevant capital felony as the “murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the defendant argues, “the essential gravamen of the offense set forth at § 53a-54b (8) that must be ‘especially heinous’ is the ‘murder of two or more persons,’ not the murder of one person.”

We acknowledge that, if we were to apply the applicable language literally, as a purely linguistic matter the defendant’s contention probably carries more weight than that of the state. It would be linguistically appealing to adopt the syllogism embodied in the defendant’s contention, namely, that: (1) § 53a-46a (i) (4) requires that “the offense” be committed in the aggravated manner; (2) the likely referent of “the offense” is the capital felony of which the defendant has been convicted; (3) that capital felony at issue in the present case is the *547“murder of two or more persons,” as defined in § 53a-54b (8); and (4) therefore, the murder of two persons must be committed in the aggravated manner. Thus, under the defendant’s position, there is a direct linguistic line between the language, “the offense,” contained in § 53a-46a (i) (4), and the definition of the capital felony as the “murder of two . . . persons,” contained in § 53a-54b (8).

The state’s plain language argument is not as linguistically appealing. There is no direct linguistic line between the language, “one or more aggravating factors set forth in subsection (i) [of § 53a-46a],” contained in § 53a-46a (f) (2), and the definition of the capital felony, contained in § 53a-54b (8). Subsection (i) of § 53a-46a lists seven potential aggravating factors, of which the commission of the offense in a cruel manner is only one. The likely reference of “one,” in the language, “one or more of the aggravating factors,” contained in § 53a-46a (f) (2), is to that set of seven factors, and provides no more than that the state must prove at least one, and may prove more than one, of those factors in order to meet its initial burden in seeking the death penalty following a conviction of an underlying capital felony. Linguistically, however, that reference offers little, if any, help in deciding the question posed by this appeal, namely, the meaning of the language, “the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-46a (i) (4); as applied to the capital felony of the “murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction . . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (8), as amended by P.A. 98-126, § 1.

The conclusion that would flow from the linguistic analysis suggested by the defendant, however, cannot withstand further scrutiny. Although the language of the statute, viewed literally and in isolation, suggests *548a conclusion consistent with the interpretation offered by the defendant, when viewed in its context and history leads us to conclude, to the contrary, that when § 53a-46a (i) (4) refers to “the offense,” as applied in the circumstances of the present case, it means the murder of either of the “two” persons referred to in § 53a-54b (8), and does not mean both murders.

First, as our case law demonstrates, the “constituent parts” of the capital felony involved here are two murders that are committed in the course of a single transaction. See State v. Solek, 242 Conn. 409, 423, 699 A.2d 931 (1997) (“constituent parts” of capital felony under § 53a-54b [7] are murder and sexual assault in first degree). Thus, the reference in § 53a-46a (i) (4) to “the offense” must be read as referring to those constituent parts. This reading permits the interpretation that the aggravating factor may be satisfied by proof of its existence with respect to at least one of those constituent parts. See State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 264, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S. Ct. 1133, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1095 (1995) (aggravating factor satisfied by proof of existence “beyond the elements of the [capital felony] charged”). Put another way, it would permit the interpretation that the language, “the offense,” refers to either of those parts, and does not necessarily refer to both, and only both, of those parts.

Second, the context and legislative genealogy of § 53a-54b (8) strongly support the conclusion that the aggravating factor involved here need only attach to one of the murders. When this state’s death penalty legislation was first reenacted in 1973; Public Acts 1973, No. 73-137, § 3; following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972), invalidating all states’ death penalty statutes, the list of capital felonies included murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping, but did not *549include either § 53a-54b (7) (“murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree”), or § 53a-54b (8) (“murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction”). See General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54b.8 In addition, under that original statutory scheme, the aggravating factor involved in this case was the same as it is today. See General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-46a (g) (4).9 Both subdivision (7), namely, murder committed in the course of a sexual assault, and subdivision (8), namely, murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction, were added to § 53a-54b in 1980 by Public Acts 1980, No. 80-335 (P.A. 80-335).10

*550Thus, in 1973, the original death penalty legislation contained at least one capital felony that involved a murder in the course of another serious felony, namely, murder in the course of a kidnapping, and contained the same aggravating factor involved in the present case. Under that statutory scheme, there were six forms of capital felony, designated in general terms as follows: (1) murder of certain law enforcement, corrections or firefighting officials; (2) murder for hire; (3) murder by a previously convicted murderer; (4) murder by one under a life sentence; (5) murder by a kidnapper during the course of a kidnapping; and (6) death directly resulting from the illegal sale of cocaine, heroin or methadone by a person who is not drug-dependent. General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54b. Subdivisions (1) through (4) and (6) of § 53a-54b involved only one underlying offense. For subdivisions (1) through (4), that offense was murder, which was then further defined either by the motive for the murder, such as *551murder for hire, by the prior criminal status of the defendant, namely, murder by a convicted murderer or by one under a life sentence, or by the status of the victim, namely, murder of a law enforcement, corrections or firefighting official. As to subdivision (6), the underlying offense was death resulting from the specified illegal drug sales. Subdivision (5) of § 53a-54b, however, involved two underlying offenses, namely, murder and kidnapping.

It cannot be disputed that, with respect to all of the capital felonies that involved only one underlying offense, the aggravating factor at issue in the present case need only have applied to that sole underlying offense. We can conceive of no rationale for the legislature to have set a higher bar to the imposition of the death penalty when the underlying capital felony involved, not one, but two underlying serious felonies, namely, kidnapping and murder. We are constrained to conclude, therefore, that when our statutory scheme was first enacted in 1973, the aggravating factor, as applied to the capital felony of “murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such person is able to return or be returned to safety”; General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 53a-54b (5); did not have to apply to both the underlying felonies, namely, kidnapping and murder.

In 1980, the legislature added to the capital felony statute two offenses that were similar in nature; they both involved two underlying felonies, namely, murder in the course of a sexual assault in the first degree, and two or more murders committed either at the same time or in the course of a single transaction. See P.A. 80-335. Therefore, after the enactment of the 1980 legislation, our death penalty statutory scheme contained three capital felonies that involved murder plus another serious felony: (1) murder plus kidnapping; (2) murder plus sexual assault in the first degree; and (3) murder *552plus murder. General Statutes (Rev. to 1981) § 53a-54b. Both before and after the 1980 legislation, the aggravating factor remained the same, namely, that the offense was committed in a heinous, cruel or depraved manner. On the basis of this history, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we conclude that the legislature intended all three of these capital felonies to be treated the same with respect to the unchanged aggravating factor of heinous, cruel or depraved conduct.11

We can conceive of no reason why the legislature, in adding the two additional capital felonies that it did in 1980, would have intended that, with respect to a murder committed in the course of a kidnapping or sexual assault, it would be sufficient, with regard to the imposition of the death penalty, for the state to prove the aggravating factor with respect to just one of the underlying felonies, but with respect to the murder of two persons in the course of a single transaction, the state would be required to prove the aggravating factor with respect to both of the underlying felonies. Indeed, to attribute such an intent to the legislature, or, to put it another, more accurate way, to attribute such a meaning to the legislative language, would be to attribute to that language a perverse result.12

*553It would mean that when, in the course of a single transaction, a capital felon committed two felonies of unequal seriousness on one victim—unequal because one of those felonies does not involve the death of the victim—the aggravating factor need only apply to one of the underlying felonies; but when, in the course of a single transaction, a capital felon committed the most serious felony on two victims, each resulting in the death of the victim, the aggravating factor must apply to both of the underlying felonies. A capital felon who murdered two persons in the course of a single transaction must be regarded, under any rational system of deterrence and moral hierarchy, as at least equally subject to deterrence and at least equally morally blameworthy to one who murders and either kidnaps or sexually assaults only one victim in the course of a single transaction. We cannot conceive of any legislative rationale pursuant to which the legislature would have intended, when it added multiple murder to the definition of capital felony, to set a higher bar to the imposition of the death penalty on multiple murder in a single transaction than it would have for murder-kidnap or murder-sexual assault in a single transaction. “The legislature cannot have intended such an interpretation when it enacted P.A. 80-335 . . . because it would lead to bizarre results.” State v. Solek, supra, 242 Conn. 423.

Indeed, as part of his plain language argument, the defendant posits that, “[i]f the legislature had intended the essential gravamen [of the offense set forth at § 53a-*55454b (8)] to have been only one of the murders, it would have said that it was a capital felony to commit murder during the commission of another murder,” as the legislature did say with respect to both sexual assault-murder and kidnap-murder.13 Thus, the defendant implicitly concedes that, with respect to both sexual assault-murder and kidnap-murder, the aggravating factor need not apply to both of the underlying offenses,14 and, if the statutory formulation were as he posits with respect to a double murder, namely, “murder committed in the course of the commission of another murder,” the aggravating factor would apply to either murder.

This argument poses the wrong question. The question of statutory interpretation is not, as the defendant’s argument suggests, if the legislature meant that, why did it not say so? The question is, what did the legislature mean by what it did say? Furthermore, with regard to the question posed by the present case, we see no substantive difference between the two formulations: (1) what the legislature did say in § 53a-54b (8), namely, the “murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction”; and (2) what the defendant contends the legislature would or should *555have said if it meant something different, namely, “murder committed in the course of the commission of another murder.” In short, we cannot place on these two differing linguistic formulations the weight that the defendant would attribute to them.

The defendant also relies on the rules of strict construction and lenity in interpreting criminal statutes, and emphasizes their special pertinence to death penalty statutes. See, e.g., State v. Harrell, 238 Conn. 828, 832-33, 681 A.2d 944 (1996) (statutory construction implicating death penalty must be based on conclusion that legislature has clearly and unambiguously made intention known, and rules of strict construction and lenity especially pertinent to death penalty statute); see also State v. Rawls, 198 Conn. 111, 121, 502 A.2d 374 (1985) (fundamental tenet to resolve doubts in enforcement of Penal Code against imposition of harsher punishment). We are unpersuaded, however, that these rules require a different conclusion in the present case.

First, those rules apply when “a contrary interpretation would [not] frustrate an evident legislative intent”; State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. 200; and when, after the court has engaged in the full process of statutory interpretation, there is nonetheless a reasonable doubt “about [the] statute’s intended scope . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sostre, 261 Conn. 111, 120, 802 A.2d 754 (2002). Second, the rules of strict construction and lenity, like all such axioms of construction, are “important guideline[s] to legislative meaning, but [they] cannot displace the result of careful and thoughtful interpretation.” United Illuminating Co. v. New Haven, supra, 240 Conn. 460. After engaging in the full process of statutory construction, we are not left with a reasonable doubt about the statute’s intended *556scope.15 Furthermore, those rules cannot be applied so as to yield a bizarre result. State v. Solek, supra, 242 Conn. 423. In the present case, in our view, the interpretation offered by the defendant: would frustrate the legislature’s intent; would displace the result of careful and thoughtful interpretation; and would yield a bizarre result. We decline, therefore, to apply those rules so as to yield the result that the aggravating factor must apply to both murders.

The defendant also relies on what he characterizes as the structure of the capital felony statute, namely, that it divides capital felonies into two categories: one, focusing on the culpability of the defendant;16 and the other, focusing on the status of the victim.17 He contends that the capital felony in the present case falls into the former category, because “[t]he defendant’s contemporaneous behavior in murdering a second person is like the prior conduct specified in sub [division] (3) of the *557capital felony statute (a prior murder conviction) and that in sub [division] (4) (a conviction resulting in a life sentence). It is also like the contemporaneous behavior of contracting to kill in subdivision] (2).” This, he asserts, supports the conclusion that the legislature intended the aggravating factor to apply to both murders. This argument is unconvincing.

First, the defendant’s classification is arbitrary, at least when applied to the offense in the present case. It is difficult to see why a capital felony defined as the murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction focuses more on the defendant’s conduct than on the status of the victims. In our view, the fact that there are two victims of the defendant’s murderous conduct in the present case, rather than one, is as much a focus on the victims as it is on the defendant’s conduct. Indeed, other capital felonies in the defendant’s proffered classification of capital felonies based on the status of the victim could just as easily be put in the category of culpability based on the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (7), as amended by P.A. 98-126, § 1 (“murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree”). Second, we simply fail to see how such a classification, if it were employed, illuminates the meaning of the statutory language at issue in the present case. Moreover, there is nothing in the language or structure of the statute to suggest that the legislature intended any such classifications to yield significantly different results with respect to eligibility for the death penalty.

The defendant also argues that the “legislature knew how to define a capital offense so that the cruel aggravating factor would apply to only one of [the] two murders,” because when it did so it used the language “in the course of,” such as “murder committed in the course of’ a sexual assault, or murder of a kidnapped person *558“during the course of’ the kidnapping. This argument ignores, however, the fact that this capital felony also uses that language, namely, “murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction . . . .” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a-54b (8), as amended by P.A. 98-126, § 1. It cannot be, moreover, that the legislature intended the aggravating factor to apply differently, depending on whether the two murders were committed “at the same time” or “in the course of a single transaction,” as the defendant’s argument suggests.

Finally, the defendant draws support for his position from the fact that our statutory scheme uses language that differs from that used in other states, and also differs from that used by certain proposed model statutes, such as the Model Penal Code and a proposed 1973 federal death penalty statute. See S. Rep. No. 93-721 (1974). Certain of those other statutes and statutory proposals use language similar to that suggested previously by the defendant, namely, “murder in the course of another murder.” According to the defendant, those other statutory formulations do permit the death penalty to be imposed in multiple murder situations without their analogs to our aggravating factor being applied to both murders. Thus, the defendant suggests that we should infer a legislative intent to embrace a different result based on our language, because it differs from the language of those formulations.

Suffice it to say that, in the absence of some strong indication that, when the legislature added the murder of two persons to the list of capital felonies in 1980, it specifically intended a result different from that yielded by those other statutes or statutory proposals, we are not inclined to draw such an inference. There is no such indication in the legislative history. Simply because our legislature did not use precisely the same language as that used or proposed for use by other legislative bodies *559to address a similar situation, namely, multiple murders as laying the basis for a potential death penalty, does not require a conclusion that it also intended a different result, especially when, as in the present case, we can see no substantive difference between our language and those other statutory formulations. We, therefore, conclude that the state need only prove that the defendant killed one of the victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner, pursuant to § 53a-46 (i) (4), in order to seek the death penalty based on that factor.

II

We take this opportunity to clarify the approach of this court18 to the process of statutory interpretation.19 *560For at least a century, this corut has relied on sources beyond the specific text of the statute at issue to determine the meaning of the language as intended by the legislature. See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 161 Conn. 283, 288-90, 287 A.2d 369 (1971); Muller v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 325, 329, 142 A.2d 524 (1958); Connecticut Rural Roads Improvement Assn. v. Hurley, 124 Conn. 20, 25, 197 A. 90 (1938); Corbin v. Baldwin, 92 Conn. 99, 105, 101 A. 834 (1917); Seidel v. Woodbury, 81 Conn. 65, 71-74, 70 A. 58 (1908). For that same period of time, however, this court often has eschewed resort to those sources when the meaning of the text appeared to be plain and unambiguous. See, e.g., State v. Simmons, 155 Conn. 502, 504, 234 A.2d 835 (1967); Niedzwicki v. Pequonnock Foundry, 133 Conn. 78, 82, 48 A.2d 369 (1946); O'Brien v. Wise & Upson Co., 108 Conn. 309, 318-19, 143 A. 155 (1928); Bridgeport Projectile Co. v. Bridgeport, 92 Conn. 316, 318, 102 A. 644 (1917); Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 437-38, 28 A. 540 (1893).

In 1994, however, we noted a dichotomy in our case law regarding whether resort to extratextual sources was appropriate even in those instances where the text’s meaning appeared to be plain and unambiguous. In Frillici v. Westport, supra, 231 Conn. 430-31 n.15, we stated: “It is true that, in construing statutes, we have often relied upon the canon of statutory construction that we need not, and indeed ought not, look beyond the statutory language to other interpretive aids unless the statute’s language is not absolutely clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 223 Conn. 731, 744-45, 613 A.2d 804 (1992); Mercado v. Commissioner *561of Income Maintenance, 222 Conn. 69, 74, 607 A.2d 1142 (1992); Rose v. Freedom of Information Commission, 221 Conn. 217, 225, 602 A.2d 1019 (1992); Anderson v. Ludgin, 175 Conn. 545, 552-53, 400 A.2d 712 (1978). That maxim requires some slight but plausible degree of linguistic ambiguity as a kind of analytical threshold that must be surmounted before a court may resort to aids to the determination of the meaning of the language as applied to the facts of the case. See, e.g., Sanzone v. Board of Police Commissioners, 219 Conn. 179, 187, 592 A.2d 912 (1991). It is also true, however, that we have often eschewed such an analytical threshold, and have stated that, in interpreting statutes, we look at all the available evidence, such as the statutory language, the legislative history, the circumstances surrounding its enactment, the purpose and policy of the statute, and its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles. See, e.g., Fleming v. Garnett, 231 Conn. 77, 91-92, 646 A.2d 1308 (1994); State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994); Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Assn., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 852-57, 633 A.2d 305 (1993); Ambroise v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764, 628 A.2d 1303 (1993); Texaco Refining & Marketing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987). This analytical model posits that the legislative process is purposive, and that the meaning of legislative language (indeed, of any particular use of our language) is best understood by viewing not only the language at issue, but by its context and by the purpose or purposes behind its use.”

Since then, we have not been consistent in our formulation of the appropriate method of interpreting statutory language. At times, we have adhered to the formulation that requires identification of some degree of ambiguity in that language before consulting any *562sources of its meaning beyond the statutory text. See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 257 Conn. 128, 154, 778 A.2d 7 (2001) (“if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature’s intent” [internal quotation marks omitted]). We refer herein to that formulation as the “plain meaning rule,” which we discuss in further detail later in this opinion. At other times, we have, as in the present case; see part I of this opinion; adhered to a more encompassing formulation that does not require passing any threshold of ambiguity as a precondition of consulting extratextual sources of the meaning of legislative language. See, e.g., Bender v.