State v. Yusuf

Opinion

The defendant, Asheek Yusuf, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-94 (a), assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), threatening in violation *596of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1) and (2), and cruelty to persons in violation of General Statutes § 53-20. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search, (2) abused its discretion by admitting evidence of prior uncharged misconduct, (3) admitted expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome and (4) permitted the prosecutor to engage in misconduct during closing argument, which denied the defendant a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In July, 1998, the defendant and the victim, Carissa LeJeune, lived together in an apartment at 58 Yorkshire Street in Torrington. The defendant and LeJeune had been romantically involved with each other for about one year and, during that relationship, the defendant greatly restricted LeJeune’s movement. If LeJeune had to leave the apartment to go somewhere, the defendant demanded that she page him to tell him of her whereabouts. He allowed her to go across the street to the Pateo store to buy snacks, cleaning supplies and the like, and to use a pay telephone. He did not, however, allow her to speak to any men and only to certain friends. Although LeJeune worked, the defendant would pick her up from work and bring her home.

On July 29, 1998, at approximately 11 p.m., LeJeune went across the street to call her friend, Serita Oligny, from the pay telephone. The defendant had forbidden LeJeune from contacting Oligny. While she was speaking with Oligny, the defendant approached in his car. When LeJeune saw the defendant approaching, she immediately hung up the phone. The defendant asked LeJeune who she had been speaking with, and she told him Cristin Fitzgerald, a friend to whom the defendant allowed her to speak. He did not believe her and ordered her to get into the car. Upon returning to their apart*597ment, the defendant dragged her up the stairs to the kitchen where he threw her to the floor and kicked her in the back and crotch as he yelled that she had lied to him. He then drove LeJeune back to the pay telephone across the street and called Fitzgerald himself to determine whether she was the person to whom LeJeune had been speaking when he approached in his car. Fitzgerald said that she had spoken to LeJeune earlier that day. The defendant confronted LeJeune about her lie and called Oligny to determine whether she was the person LeJeune had telephoned. Oligny initially denied that LeJeune had telephoned her, but after LeJeune screamed at her to tell the truth, she told the defendant that she had been speaking to LeJeune when he approached in the car.

After the defendant finished speaking to Oligny, he and LeJeune got back in the defendant’s car and he punched her in face. When she began to bleed, he warned her not to bleed all over his car. They drove around until the defendant decided to stop at a nearby house. He went into the house and a short time later came out with a mini blind rod. Once he resumed driving, he hit LeJeune across her face with the rod and, when she put her head between her knees to avoid additional blows, he began hitting her on her head, back and legs. As he hit LeJeune, he asked her why she had betrayed him by speaking to Oligny and others and by going out. The defendant then ordered LeJeune to hold out her hands, which he hit with the rod because she had used them to dial the telephone. In addition, he repeatedly hit her in the face and forcefully pushed her head into the seat belt buckle. LeJeune did not attempt to open the car door and escape because the defendant did not permit her to touch the door and had threatened to kill her if she did so.

When they returned to their apartment, the defendant brought LeJeune into the living room, and ordered her *598to take off her clothes and kneel in front of a wall with her hands behind her back and her forehead to the wall. Again, he asked her why she had betrayed him and lied to him. He also asked her if she was sleeping with her uncle and, when LeJeune replied that she was not, forcefully pushed her head against the wall. LeJeune remained kneeling for several hours, during which time the defendant ate dinner and watched television. LeJeune asked the defendant if she could he down because she felt lightheaded, but he did not allow her to he down until he went to bed.

On July 30, 1998, at approximately 7 a.m., the defendant awakened LeJeune and asked her to iron his shirt because he had to appear in court. Because of her weakened condition, she had to prop herself up while lying on her stomach to iron his shirt. When she finished ironing his shirt, LeJeune went back to sleep. Before leaving for court, the defendant again ordered LeJeune to remain in the apartment. When he returned, the defendant, holding a razor blade in his hand, awakened LeJeune. He then cut the tip of her nose with the razor blade and told her that she was poison and that she should kill herself. Thereafter, he told her to take a shower because she had dried blood on her and she was “disgusting.” Before she could do so, the defendant told her to leave the bathroom so that he could use it. When he came out of the bathroom, the defendant picked up a steak knife and started to cut LeJeune on her foot, leg and arm while telling her that she was not going to make a fool out of him. He then threw the knife into the sink and left the apartment, again warning LeJeune not to leave and stating that if she did leave, he would kill her. LeJeune was aware that the defendant kept an operable gun in the trunk of his car. She recently had seen the gun in the defendant’s possession and was present when it was discharged.

*599Despite the defendant’s threat, LeJeune got dressed and left the apartment. She walked to a friend’s house nearby and used the telephone to call for a ride. She did not wait for her ride at her friend’s house, fearing that if the defendant found her there her friend also would be at risk. Instead, she waited across the street in the doorway of a bowling alley. A short time later, a family friend picked her up and brought her to the hospital where she was treated for her injuries.1 While she was at the hospital, the police were called. The police questioned LeJeune and took photographs of her injuries. Thereafter, LeJeune’s mother arrived, and she and LeJeune drove to the Yorkshire Street apartment to retrieve LeJeune’s belongings.

As LeJeune was standing outside the apartment, the Torrington police arrived at the scene. LeJeune spoke with the police, telling them, among other things, that she lived there. One of the officers proceeded to knock on the apartment door to check if the defendant was in the apartment. No one answered. Detective John Murphy then asked LeJeune if she was willing to sign a consent to search form. The form stated that she had a right to refuse to consent to a warrantless search of her apartment and that she was signing the form voluntarily. LeJeune signed the form, and the police searched the apartment. After they determined that the defendant was not present, the police seized a steak knife and a razor blade from the apartment. The police also took photographs of the apartment. The defendant subsequently was arrested and charged.

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, assault in the second *600degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree, threatening and cruelty to persons. The court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-nine years imprisonment, execution suspended after fifteen years, and five years probation with special conditions. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained by the police from a warrantless search in violation of his rights under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut.2 Specifically, the defendant argues that the state failed to prove that LeJeune had the authority to consent to the search of the apartment and that the police reasonably believed that she had the authority to consent to the search. He also argues that the court’s reasoning with respect to its denial of his motion to suppress was “flawed.” We disagree.

The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the defendant’s claim. Prior to trial, the state proposed to offer as full exhibits the steak knife and the razor blade that the police had seized from the apartment. The defendant filed a motion to suppress that evidence, claiming that “the search was conducted absent a search warrant and no exception to [the] search warrant requirement appliefd].” The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress. At the hearing, the defendant testified that he lived alone at the 58 Yorkshire Street apart*601ment and that he lived there pursuant to a lease that he signed as “Lorenzo Montgomery.”3 He also testified that he had obtained the money for the security deposit from his family. The defendant further testified that LeJeune did not live with him, that she was never present in the apartment and that she did not have her clothes, toiletries or any of her personal property there.

On the other hand, LeJeune testified that she moved in with the defendant at the 58 Yorkshire Street apartment on July 17,1998, and that she still was living there on July 30, 1998, the date of the search.4 She further testified that she provided the money for the security deposit that enabled her and the defendant to rent the apartment. LeJeune also testified that when she moved in, she brought one week’s supply of clothing and other personal items, and that her friend was to bring the rest of her belongings at a later date. She also described the apartment as having four rooms — a bathroom, living room, kitchen and bedroom, which she shared with the defendant.

In its memorandum of decision denying the defendant’s motion to suppress, the court stated: “The evidence . . . established that both Carissa LeJeune and the defendant lived at the apartment in question. The court finds Ms. LeJeune’s testimony that she moved into the premises on July 17, 1998, and still lived there on the date of the search to be credible and persuasive.” The court reasoned that “[although [the] defendant asserts that there were no other indicia of Ms. LeJeune living in the apartment . . . the court finds Ms. LeJeune’s own testimony that she lived there, provided the *602funds for the security deposit, and intended to bring all her clothing to the apartment to be believable and convincing. The couple had just moved into the apartment a couple of weeks earlier. It is not unusual that such incidents of occupancy as a telephone, name on the door or mailbox, receiving mail at a new home and change of address not occur immediately after moving into a new home, but instead take some time.”5 In addition, the court noted that “[t]he defendant’s testimony that he alone lived in the apartment lacked credibility, not just because Ms. LeJeune’s actual testimony was more believable than his or his interest in the outcome, but also because of his demeanor and testimony on the witness stand during the [hearing].” Specifically, the court cited to the defendant’s testimony about signing the lease as Lorenzo Montgomery and about being present in the apartment all day on July 30, 1998, as “cast[ing] doubt on the overall veracity of his testimony.”6

The court concluded that “[a]s an occupant of the premises, LeJeune was lawfully entitled to give the police permission to search her home and seize items from it to be used in a prosecution of the defendant” and that because of his “coresiding” with LeJeune in the apartment, the defendant “had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to items in the apartment.” The court further concluded that the evidence established that “LeJeune voluntarily consented to the search” when she signed the consent to search form and that there was no indication that “her will was overborne or that her consent was the result of promises, force, threats or other coercion.” Finally, the court determined that “there is no evidence that the defendant had exclu*603sive control over any part of the apartment; nor is there evidence . . . that the police had reason, at the time consent was given, to doubt the accuracy of the claims of the person giving consent [i.e., LeJeune].”

As a prehminary matter, we set forth the standard of review. “Our standard of review of a trial court’s findings and conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record .... [Wjhere the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Clark, 255 Conn. 268, 279, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001). On a motion to suppress, “[i]t is the function of the trier to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 240, 456 A.2d 288 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S. Ct. 1014, 79 L. Ed. 2d 244 (1984).

“It is axiomatic that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980); State v. Guertin, 190 Conn. 440, 446, 461 A.2d 963 (1983).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, 49 Conn. App. 699, 700, 716 A.2d 137, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 943, 723 A.2d 323 (1998). “A warrantless search or entiy into a house is not unreasonable, however, under the fourth amendment to the United States constitution or article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution when a person with authority to do so has freely consented. State v. Reagan, 209 Conn. 1, 7, 546 A.2d 839 (1988). It is the state’s burden to prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given, and that the person who purported to consent had the authority to do so. Bumper v. North Carolina, *604391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968); State v. Reagan, supra [603]. Such consent may not be established by mere acquiescence to police authority.” State v. MacNeil, 28 Conn. App. 508, 513, 613 A.2d 296, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 901, 615 A.2d 1044 (1992). “Whether there was valid consent to search is a factual question that will not be lightly overturned on appeal. United States v. Sanchez-Jaramillo, 637 F.2d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862, 101 S. Ct. 166, 66 L. Ed. 2d 79 (1980).” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rodriguez, supra, 700.

“[W]hen the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). “Common authority is . . . not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent does not rest upon the law of property . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 171 n.7.

In addition, a warrantless search is valid when it is based on the consent of a third party who the police, at the time of the search, reasonably believe possesses common authority over the premises but who in fact does not have such authority. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). *605“As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In the present case, the court, in its thoughtful and thorough memorandum of decision, determined that the evidence established that LeJeune and the defendant lived together at the apartment and that, as an occupant, LeJeune lawfully was entitled to give the police permission to search her home and seize items therefrom. The court further concluded that LeJeune voluntarily had consented to the search and that there was no indication that her will was overborne or that her consent was the result of promises, force, threats or other coercion. It is apparent that witness credibility was crucial in the court’s ruling. Although the parties presented two different scenarios with respect to their living arrangement, the court stated that it did not find the defendant’s testimony credible and that it found LeJeune’s testimony “credible and persuasive.” “It is the function of the trier to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Zindros, supra, 189 Conn. 240.

On the basis of our review of the whole record, we conclude that the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, and that its denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress legally and logically was correct and properly supported by the facts. We further conclude that the court’s reasoning with respect to its denial of the motion to suppress was not “flawed,” as the defendant claims. Accordingly, the court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.7

*606II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior uncharged misconduct. Specifically, the defendant argues that the purpose for which the evidence was admitted does not fall into any exception that permits the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. He further argues that the evidence of prior misconduct was not relevant to the charges against him, that it was more prejudicial than probative and that its admission deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.

The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the defendant’s claim. At trial, the state sought to elicit testimony from LeJeune regarding a number of prior incidents in which the defendant had inflicted physical harm on her. LeJeune testified that during the course of the year she dated the defendant, he had (1) burned her with a lighter, (2) kicked her on her leg, causing an imprint of his boot, (3) hit her continuously on her legs with a one liter Nestea bottle, (4) kicked her in the face, causing her nose to bleed and (5) punched her in the face, splitting her lip. The state sought to admit those acts of prior misconduct as a predicate to the testimony of Evan Stark, the state’s expert on battered woman syndrome. The state *607explained that it intended “to offer a continuum of acts of battery against [LeJeune] over a period of time to show how she became a battered woman and why she didn’t do some things that other people might have done, like leave when she had the opportunity.” Defense counsel objected to the admission of the prior misconduct evidence.

The court allowed the introduction of the prior misconduct evidence “to show or establish why LeJeune acted in this case as she did. In other words, to explain her conduct.” It ruled that the defendant’s prior misconduct was admissible “subject to linking [it] up and subject to the predicate conduct necessary being shown for Dr. Stark to testify.” The court further ruled that at least one of the acts was “admissible to show the assault in the second degree.” The court also gave a thorough limiting instruction to the jury as to that evidence during LeJeune’s testimony.8

*608“As a general rule, evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or misconduct is not admissible. . . . We have, however, recognized exceptions to the general rule if the purpose for which the evidence is offered is to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity or the elements of a crime. . . . [Prior misconduct] evidence may also be used to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony. . . . Moreover, we have held that such evidence may be used to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings. . . .

“To determine whether evidence of prior misconduct falls within an exception to the general rule prohibiting its admission, we have adopted a two-pronged analysis. . . . First, the evidence must be relevant and material to at least one of the circumstances encompassed by the exceptions. Second, the probative value of such evidence must outweigh the prejudicial effect of the other crime evidence. . . .

“Our standard of review on such matters is well established. The admission of evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is a decision properly within the discretion of the trial court. . . . [E]very reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling. . . . [T]he trial court’s decision will be reversed only where abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done. . . . The problem is . . . one of balancing the actual relevancy of the other crimes evidence in light of the issues and the other evidence available to the prosecution against the degree to which the jury will probably be roused by the evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Vega, 259 Conn. 374, 396-97, 788 A.2d 1221 (2002).

In the present case, the state presented evidence that the victim was a battered woman, suffering from what *609has been classified as battered woman syndrome. The state’s expert, Stark, testified as to the cyclical nature of the violence perpetrated on battered women by their batterers and the effects of such violence on those women. The evidence of the defendant’s prior misconduct toward LeJeune corroborated Stark’s testimony. We conclude therefore that evidence of the defendant’s prior incidences of violence toward LeJeune was relevant and material to corroborating crucial prosecution testimony in that it demonstrated the manifestation of the battered woman syndrome as it affected LeJeune. See id., 398.

With respect to whether the court properly determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, we conclude that the court’s determination was proper. Given LeJeune’s testimony concerning the brutality of the incidents that took place on July 29 and 30, 1998, the prejudicial impact of the relatively less brutal prior misconduct evidence was minimal, and it is unlikely that it unduly aroused the juiy’s emotions, hostility or sympathy, especially in light of the court’s limiting instruction.9 See State v. Battista, 31 Conn. App. 497, 514-16, *610626 A.2d 769, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 907, 632 A.2d 696 (1993); see also State v. Sauris, 227 Conn. 389, 403, 631 A.2d 238 (1993) (absent clear indication to contrary, jury presumed to have followed court’s instructions).

We perceive no impropriety in the court’s admission of the prior misconduct evidence to demonstrate the manifestation of battered woman syndrome as it affected LeJeune. See State v. Vega, supra, 259 Conn. 398-99. The court properly determined that the probative value of the prior misconduct evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the defendant’s prior uncharged misconduct.

Ill

The defendant next claims that the court improperly allowed Stark, a sociologist, to testify as an expert witness on battered woman syndrome. Specifically, he claims that (1) Stark’s testimony was “minimally’’ relevant because the state presented no evidence that LeJeune was a battered woman, (2) the prejudicial effect of Stark’s testimony outweighed its probative value, and (3) Stark’s testimony bolstered LeJeune’s credibil*611ity and, thus, invaded the province of the jury. We are not persuaded by any of those claims.

The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of the defendant’s claim. After LeJeune testified at trial, the state called Stark to testify as an expert witness on battered woman syndrome. The defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude Stark’s testimony, arguing that the state had not established a proper foundation for the testimony. The defendant, citing State v. Ali, 233 Conn. 403, 431, 660 A.2d 337 (1995), also argued that although similar testimony in other cases has been allowed to explain a victim’s recantation relative to battered woman syndrome, Stark’s testimony was not admissible because there was no evidence that LeJeune had recanted.

The court conducted a lengthy hearing on the defendant’s motion. At the hearing, the state argued that Stark’s expert testimony was necessary to assist the jury in understanding why LeJeune did not end her relationship with the defendant after the prior assaults, why she did not report the prior assaults to the police, why she did not leave the scene after the subject assaults despite the opportunity to do so and why she complied with the defendant’s demands. The state further argued that Stark’s input on battered woman syndrome would enable the jury to better determine whether LeJeune fit the profile of a battered woman. In response, the defendant argued that the jury did not need Stark’s testimony to explain LeJeune’s conduct. He further argued that the testimony was immaterial, irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative.

After reviewing the cases that counsel cited and considering their arguments of counsel, the court denied the defendant’s motion in limine and allowed the state to present Stark’s testimony. In so doing, the court determined that recantation was not “a necessary pre*612requisite” for the admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome, but rather it was “just one kind of . . . paradoxical behavior that someone might not understand . . . .”10 The court stated that it is “particularly appropriate to use expert testimony to explain this kind of behavior of not reporting the crime or not attempting to leave when the opportunity presented itself because that conduct seems unusual and, without explanation, would raise questions about whether the conduct actually happened.” The court also determined that the state could pose appropriate hypothetical questions to Stark as he testified.

A

The defendant first claims that Stark’s testimony was “minimally” relevant because the state presented no evidence that LeJeune was a battered woman. We disagree.

“[T]he trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Correa, 241 Conn. 322, 353, 696 A.2d 944 (1997). “Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. . . .

“ [E]vidence is relevant only when it tends to establish the existence of a material fact or to corroborate other direct evidence in the case. . . . [T]he test of relevancy is not whether the answer sought will elucidate any of *613the main issues, but whether it will to a useful extent aid the court or jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and in assessing the probative value of the direct testimony.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Battista, supra, 31 Conn. App. 513.

Our Supreme Court has held that expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome is relevant “to describe the behavior patterns typically ascribed to battered [woman] syndrome.” State v. Borrelli, 227 Conn. 153, 174, 629 A.2d 1105 (1993). “Of course, expert testimony, like all other evidence, must be relevant to be admitted. . . . Expert testimony on the subject of battered [woman] syndrome is not relevant unless there is some evidentiary foundation that a party or witness to the case is a battered woman, and that party or witness has behaved in such a manner that the jury would be aided by expert testimony providing an explanation for the behavior.” (Citation omitted.) Id., 172 n.15.

In the present case, Stark testified at length with respect to battered woman syndrome on the basis of his experience with battered women and research into domestic violence.11 Stark defined “woman battering” as “involving] a course of conduct that includes, but is not limited to, multiple instances of physical abuse or assault and the pattern of isolation, intimidation, mental abuse and control.” He indicated that there is a subgroup of battered women, which, as a result of repeated abuse, suffers what he termed a “learned help*614lessness,” which is exhibited “after they [experience] frustration in trying to extricate themselves from the situation or, for whatever reason, they simply [give] up for a period of time, at least, and [believe] that they [cannot] escape from the situation even when there [are] opportunities for them to do so.”

Stark then described the second part of the syndrome, the “cycle of violence,” which “feeds into” the learned helplessness. He explained that in abusive situations, “there [is] a buildup of tension, which [creates] tremendous anxiety and fear on the part of the victim, and then there [is] an episode of physical abuse . . . .” Thereafter, he continued, there occurs what is called “the honeymoon phase” in which the abusive partner apologizes. Stark indicated that it is during that honeymoon phase that a battered woman often is drawn into the relationship because she “desperately [wants] to believe things [will] change, [and she hopes] they might change during this period where the apology or the promises dominate, [and] the battered woman in a sense [gets] sucked into the relationship more deeply than she would have otherwise been; common sense should have told her to leave, but now she’s confused . . . [a]nd the result is . . . that she is there when the second episode occurs and possibly the third.” Stark testified that at that point, the abuser “may no longer apologize, he may no longer be promising change, but because of the cycle of violence, she’s in some sense entrapped in the relationship and, because of the ongoing abuse, that entrapment leads to . . . leam[ed] helplessness and then, at least for a period of time, [she] is unable to seek help . . . even when it’s offered.” Such women, Stark explained, “shift their focus from escape, from getting out of the relationship, to merely surviving in the relationship, and they may identify exposing the facts in the relationship to friends or authorities as counter to their interest in surviving *615either because [the abuser] threatened them with punishment if they report or because they believe at that point, because of the isolation and intimidation, that he has powers which he does not have, in her mind.”

During his testimony, Stark also was asked a number of hypothetical questions that tracked the facts that gave rise to the charges against the defendant.12 Gener*616ally, with respect to each hypothetical question, Stark *617was asked to give his expert opinion whether the hypothetical victim’s conduct was consistent with that of a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome. In each case, Stark concluded that the victim’s conduct as set out in the hypothetical question was indeed consistent with a woman suffering from battered woman syndrome.

As previously stated, before expert testimony about battered woman syndrome becomes relevant, an evidentiary foundation must first be established that the victim is a battered woman and that her conduct is such that the jury would be aided by expert testimony providing an explanation therefor. See id. Here, contrary to the defendant’s assertions, we conclude that the state presented sufficient evidence of an abusive relationship warranting the testimony on battered woman syndrome.

The state presented evidence that the defendant battered LeJeune on a number of occasions during the course of their relationship. Stark’s testimony was offered to assist the jury in understanding whether LeJeune’s conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered woman. His expert testimony provided the jury with a relevant insight into LeJeune’s behavior that it might not otherwise bring to its evalua*618tion of her credibility. That insight was made more significant in light of the defendant’s extensive cross-examination of LeJeune, which focused on her failure to escape from the defendant when she had the opportunity to do so.

Moreover, Stark’s testimony was particularly crucial to the jury’s determination because although battered woman syndrome has become known to the public more widely than it was in the past, much of the subject still remains beyond the ken of the average juror. Indeed, “ [c] ommentators have noted that the research data indicates that potential jurors may hold beliefs and attitudes about abused women at variance with the views of experts who have studied or had experience with abused women. In particular, males are likely to be skeptical about the fear the woman feels in an abusive relationship and about her inability to leave a setting in which abuse is threatened.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 167. Reliance, therefore, on an expert such as Stark in a case such as this one was well warranted. See State v. Vega, supra, 259 Conn. 393.

We conclude therefore that the court properly determined that Stark’s testimony concerning battered woman syndrome was relevant to assist the jury in understanding whether LeJeune’s conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered woman and to the issue of her credibility.

B

The defendant also claims that the prejudicial effect of Stark’s testimony outweighed its probative value. We disagree.

“There are situations where the potential prejudicial effect of relevant evidence would suggest its exclusion. These are: (1) where the facts offered may unduly arouse the jury’s emotions, hostility or sympathy, (2) *619where the proof and answering evidence it provokes may create a side issue that will unduly distract the jury from the main issues, (3) where the evidence offered and the counterproof will consume an undue amount of time, and (4) where the defendant, having no reasonable ground to anticipate the evidence, is unfairly surprised and unprepared to meet it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Battista, supra, 31 Conn. App. 515-16. “The primary responsibility for conducting the prejudicial-probative balancing test rests with the trial court, and its conclusion will be disturbed only for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . We note that [bjecause of the difficulties inherent in this balancing process . . . every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 377, 757 A.2d 36, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 764 (2000).

As we already have concluded, Stark’s testimony could have assisted the jury substantially in understanding whether LeJeune’s conduct was consistent with the pattern and profile of a battered woman. The court reasonably could have concluded that the probative value of that evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. We therefore are not persuaded that the court abused its discretion in admitting Stark’s testimony, especially in light of the court’s