United States v. Richard I. Berger, United States of America v. Richard I. Berger

Defendant Richard I. Berger appeals his conviction of twelve counts of conspiracy, loan fraud, falsifying corporate books, and various securities fraud violations. Berger argues that: (1) the district court improperly coerced the jury into reaching a verdict, (2) the district court violated his constitutional right to be present during trial when the district court — with counsel’s consent — made certain comments at an informal meeting with the jury outside of Berger’s presence, (3) the district court used the wrong materiality standard for securities fraud violations, (4) the indictment did not charge with sufficient particularity the materiality element for securities fraud violations, and (5) the district court erred when it ordered Berger to pay restitution. The government crossappeals the sentence imposed by the district court, arguing that the district court erred when it refused to increase Berger’s sentence based on judicially-found facts. We have jurisdiction over Berger’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the government’s cross-appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). For the reasons given below, we affirm the conviction, affirm the restitution order, vacate the sentence and fine, and remand for resentencing under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005).

Factual Background

I. Offense Conduct

A. Craig Consumer Electronics, Inc. and the Revolving Credit Agreement

Craig Consumer Electronics, Inc. (“Craig Electronics”) operated a consumer electronics business that sold products such as car stereos, compact music cen *1084 ters, and small personal stereos to retail stores. Berger was Craig Electronics’ President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board. Donna Richardson, a co-conspirator, pled guilty to three counts of the indictment prior to trial. Richardson was the Chief Financial Officer of Craig Electronics until May 31, 1997, when she left the company. Defendant Bonnie Metz was at various times a Vice President in Craig Electronics’ Hong Kong and Cerritos, California locations. Metz is not a party to this appeal.

On August 5, 1994, Craig Electronics entered into a $50 million revolving credit agreement (“Credit Agreement”) with a consortium of banks including BT Commercial Corporation (“Bankers Trust”), La Salle National Bank, Nationsbank of Texas, and Sanwa Business Credit Corporation. Bankers Trust acted as the agent for the consortium (collectively “lending banks”). Under the Credit Agreement, Craig Electronics could, subject to certain exclusions, borrow up to:

(1) Eighty-five percent of the value of Craig Electronics’ accounts receivable. Accounts receivable consisted of the money owed Craig Electronics by retail stores that had purchased Craig Electronics products;

(2) Sixty-five percent of the value of Craig Electronics’ inventory of new goods, sometimes referred to as “A” goods, not to exceed $20 million; and

(3) Sixty-five percent of the value of Craig Electronics’ inventory of refurbished goods, sometimes referred to as “B” goods, not to exceed $1 million.

Craig Electronics was prohibited from borrowing against goods that had been returned to Craig Electronics but not yet inspected, or goods that were defective, sometimes referred to as “C” goods.

Craig Electronics was required to provide Bankers Trust with a Borrowing Base Certificate (“Borrowing Certificate”) every business day. Each Borrowing Certificate was supposed to report accurately the amount of Craig Electronics’ accounts receivable eligible for borrowing, updated on a daily basis, and the value of its inventory eligible for borrowing, updated on a weekly basis. The Credit Agreement required that either Berger or Richardson supervise the preparation of each Borrowing Certificate and certify in writing that the information it contained was true, correct, and complete in all material respects.

Based on the information in the Borrowing Certificates, Bankers Trust determined the amount of money Craig Electronics could borrow on each business day. Specifically, the lending banks conditioned their lending decisions on whether Craig Electronics had excess borrowing availability based on the information — particularly the accounts receivable and inventory eligible for borrowing purposes — set forth in the daily Borrowing Certificates.

Any materially false or misleading representation made in the Borrowing Certificates was identified as an event of default under the Credit Agreement. Craig Electronics was required to notify the lending banks of the nature of any default no later than two business days after it occurred.

B. Falsification of Information

Starting as early as 1995 and continuing through September 1997, Craig Electronics did not have sufficient accounts receivable and inventory to continue to borrow the money needed to fund its operations. Presumably to hide Craig Electronics’ true financial condition from the lending banks, Berger, Richardson, and Metz regularly falsified the information contained in the Borrowing Certificates. They used the following methods: First, Berger, Rich *1085 ardson, and Metz inflated the accounts receivable reported to the lending banks by: (1) pre-billing retail stores for goods that had not yet been shipped and, in some instances, had never been purchased; (2) deliberately delaying the processing of credits for returned goods that had been received and identified in an off-the-books accounting ledger called the “queue,” and not reporting this substantial volume of credits; and (3) falsely reporting that $1 million in accounts receivable from a company in Brazil remained valid through May 1997 when, in fact, the underlying sales were reversed and the goods re-routed back to Craig Electronics approximately two months earlier.

Second, Berger, Richardson, and Metz distorted the inventory figures submitted to the lending banks by: (1) improperly classifying “C” goods as “A” or “B” goods, and (2) misreporting that Craig Electronics had requisite title to certain shipments of goods originating with its overseas suppliers when, in fact, Craig Electronics either did not have proper title to the shipments for borrowing purposes, or the shipments did not exist. The financial misreporting that falsely inflated Craig Electronics’ accounts receivable and inventory caused the lending banks to lend more money to Craig Electronics than it was allowed to borrow under the Credit Agreement.

Third, to conceal the fraudulent nature of Craig Electronics’ reported accounts receivable and inventory, Berger, Richardson, and Metz deceived and attempted to deceive Craig Electronics’ outside accountants as well as auditors from the lending banks. For example, they instructed Craig Electronics employees not to reveal to the accountants and auditors the true status of Craig Electronics’ accounts receivable and inventory.

The false statements resulted in the lending banks loaning millions of dollars to Craig Electronics based on either nonexistent or substantially overstated collateral. The lending banks did not discover the full extent of the fraud until after Craig Electronics filed for bankruptcy on August 1, 1997. According to one witness, the lending banks suffered approximately $8.4 million in losses.

Finally, Berger and Richardson failed to disclose Craig Electronics’ true financial condition in several mandatory reports they filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Those SEC filings were Craig Electronics’ Amended S-1 Registration Statement, Amended 1996 10-K Report, and First Quarter 1997 10-Q Report. As a result of the activities described above, Craig Electronics was operating while in default of the Credit Agreement and was substantially overdrawn on its line of credit. None of this information, however, was disclosed in Craig Electronics’ mandatory SEC filings.

II. Trial, Jury Deliberations, and Verdict

The grand jury returned an indictment against Berger and Metz. The indictment alleged conspiracy, loan fraud, falsification of corporate books and records, making false statements to accountants of a publicly-traded company, and making false statements in reports filed with the SEC. Berger’s and Metz’s trial began on May 20, 2003 and lasted forty-one days.

A. Status Conference with the Parties

On the morning of August 29, 2003, after the jury had deliberated for three-and-a-half days, the district court held a status conference with all parties and their respective attorneys. The court hoped to discuss some of the jurors’ conflicting schedules, that appeared to limit the number of days available for deliberation. The *1086 court believed that some of these requests for days off might be related to “the issue of stress and responsibility on the part of the jury.”

The court suggested that it might be helpful to engage in an informal discussion with jurors on the record but outside the presence of the parties and their attorneys. The court explained its proposal:

I think this is the time when the jurors need understanding and patience. This is the time when we do what we can to lead them not to make a rush to judgment and emotional unfair verdicts, chaos within the jury room and eventually a verdict of hung jury.

If there had been any suggestions about an Allen instruction I want the record to indicate that I do not believe in the Allen instruction, I will not give it, never have given it.

My suggestion was to communicate with the jurors quietly and personally, to convey to the jury, of course, an understanding of their problems. It’s not an easy task for the jurors to listen to two months of legal arguments, for them to have a clear head to the point where they could return what we would call a reasonable judgment.

My effort to communicate, wish to communicate was to add a positive energy to the deliberations, and not to impose ridiculous time tables. And this communication technique has been used, with the consent of the parties of course, on dozens of occasions and used when I have been on the bench. It has saved many jury verdicts and of course, the goodwill of the judicial system.

My philosophy there is not to encourage them to do anything more than to diligently study the evidence, to relieve the tension and to redefine their responsibility.

Defense counsel expressed concern that the need for the judge to address the jurors was not yet necessary. After further discussion, however, counsel for Berger and Metz indicated that “doing it informally” might be acceptable. Berger’s counsel agreed with the prosecutor that it would be more productive for the court to indicate what it intended to say, and then the parties “could come to an agreement pretty quickly.” The court explained:

This is what I was planning to do. I was planning to address the issue, first of all, regarding the jury request for days off. And in the process of doing so I was going to suggest to them that your fellow jurors are going to be, I suppose there will be, contrary to their particular private plans, but then we also recognize the fact that if you have to take off we could certainly understand that.

And I want to make certain that I can convey to them the thought that a rush to judgment is probably the worst form of verdict you could receive. I feel very strong about that.

Other than that, nothing magical about what I want to say except that in the past anyway, it’s been very effective when I could get down to the jury room, chat with them, let them know that they’re not doing wrong. And a lot of times there’s little clashes within the jury room and I try to resolve those. It’s not a question of emotions, it’s a question of determining what the truth is. Write your script and I will certainly diligently—

Counsel for defendants declined the court’s invitation to write a “script.” Metz’s counsel stated that Metz would be willing to have the court informally address the jury “without counsel being present,” because the court’s “vague outline” of what it intended to say “does not sound to us like it will in any way pressure the jury *1087 to rush to judgment,” but “will do just the opposite.” Berger’s counsel agreed, stating that he had conferred with Metz’s counsel and agreed “with everything he said.” Berger’s counsel’s agreement was qualified only by his request that, “in discussing search for justice,” the jurors “be reminded that the government bears the burden of proof and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Based on this representation from counsel, the court accepted Berger’s personal waiver of his right to be present for the court’s meeting with the jury. Berger waived his “right to be present for the particular communication that[the court] anticipate^] having with the jury.” The court found Berger’s and Metz’s waivers to be free and voluntary.

B. Informal Meeting with the Jury

In its discussion with the jury, the court first observed that several jurors had conflicting medical appointments. The judge stated:

As far as medical appointments are concerned, I don’t know whether you know it or not, but during the middle of the trial I was hospitalized. After I gave you instructions, that very evening I had to go to the hospital again, water in the lungs. They tell me that’s not a good thing. But the heart and lungs are very strong, so I guess I’m going to stick around for a while.

The problem we have here is we have to emphasize one thing. That is this. Jurors should not be forced to reach a verdict. Please understand that. Because any time you’re forced to reach a verdict you’re going to reach an improper verdict or for improper reasons.

And so far as that’s concerned, there’s no time limit, except it interferes with your life because if one person takes off, the entire jury will be unable to continue. Amd we’d like to finish this before Christmas.

After some laughter, two jurors indicated that they were willing to modify their plans so that deliberations could go forward on September 2nd and 5th. Juror Roux, who lived 170 miles from the courthouse, changed her child care plans; Juror Morgan delayed her medical appointment. When Morgan commented that she was not happy about the delay, the court responded, “I understand. The day that I gave instructions, I think Friday, I hadn’t slept for four nights. That’s rough, not sleeping. Then not breathing.” -

When the court turned to dates for the week starting September 9th, Juror Roux interjected that she was “ninety-nine percent sure we’ll be done by then,” to which .the court responded, ‘Wonderful., I’m glad to hear that.” Juror Roux asked whether the others agreed they would be finished by the 9th. Juror Morgan stated, “There’s no way to say.” In response, Juror Roux said, “I pretty much — I do— we all have our set minds pretty piueh.” The court then engaged in the following discussion with the jury:

Court: If there’s set minds and everybody is not agreeing, then well, calm down and try to resolve it using your rational mind.

Juror Roux: There won!t be a resolution to a lot. There’s some of us that are dead set on our verdicts and others that are dead set. You could probably leave us in here a hundred years and we’ve deliberated, we’re gone over it and my vote will not change. •

Court: The way I look at it, as long as your position is sincere, the position taken—

Juror Roux: It is.

*1088 Court: — is based upon your recollection of the evidence and law, there’s not much more we can ask for.

Juror Roux: It is. I’m letting you know where I stand.

The court then called on the foreperson, Juror Lynch, who had a personal conflict the week of September 9th. Lynch prefaced her answer by emphasizing that the jury still had not reviewed all the evidence and therefore could not “say [they were] stuck on things,” rather, “everythingfwas] still undecided completely.” After scheduling a portion of the week of September 9th for deliberation, the court indicated that it probably did not need to worry about dates during the week of September 15th through 18th because “[y]ou feel by that time a verdict will be reached.” At that point, an unidentified juror stated, “I sure hope so. If not, I’ll jump out this window.” Juror Roux stated, “I’m with you, buddy. Can I go first? I will even let you push me.”

In response to these concerns, the judge closed the meeting with the following comment:

Okay. One thing I would like to comment on. I don’t know if I should or not, but with respect to those of you who reached a particular conclusion, and that you will not change your minds. It wouldn’t be wrong for you to reconsider your position if you can be convinced that perhaps your position was not accurate, that it could be wrong.

And you have to have that state of mind throughout the deliberations. Otherwise it’s going to be like the Hatfields fighting the McCoys. It’s not going to be promotive of a final conclusion. As long as you understand that.

C. Post-Meeting Ameliorative Instruction

Upon returning from its discussion with the jury, the judge stated that he “may”

have gone “beyond the script” by responding to jurors who had “blurted out ... that they made up their minds and [were] not going to change[them]” to “reexamine your views to see if you’re correct in your view.” At the request of Berger’s counsel, the judge agreed to have a transcript of his colloquy with the jury made available immediately, so that a corrective instruction could be given if necessary.

At a mid-afternoon hearing that same day, Berger moved for a mistrial, arguing that the court’s final comments to the jury misstated the burden of proof and took “the worst part of an Allen charge” without the balancing language. The government argued that the challenged passage essentially reiterated the instruction in the court’s initial charge concerning the duty to deliberate. The court denied Berger’s motion for a mistrial. The court, however, brought the jury back into the courtroom and read the following clarifying instruction:

You should not take from my remarks this morning any suggestion that you should change your views simply in order to reach an agreement or because other jurors think it is right. If at any time you believe that you are deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict, you should inform the Court. The government has the burden of proving every element of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

And those are the supplemental instructions. You are now excused to enjoy the weekend.

The jurors resumed deliberations at 9:30 a.m. on September 2, 2003, after the Labor Day weekend. At 1:20 p.m. that day, they sent a note indicating that they: (1) had reached unanimous verdicts against Berger on twelve counts but were deadlocked *1089 as to the remaining twenty-four counts against Berger and as to all twenty-one counts against Metz, and (2) needed further instructions as to how to proceed. Upon the jury’s return for further proceedings on September 4, 2003, the court took the jury’s guilty verdicts as to twelve counts against Berger and declared a mistrial as to the rest of the counts against Berger and on all of the counts against Metz.

III. Sentencing

The court sentenced Berger to six months in prison and imposed a $1.25 million fine. The court also ordered Berger to pay the lending banks $3.14 million in restitution.

Discussion

I. Alleged Allen Instruction

A. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision to issue an Allen instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1027 (9th Cir.1998), amended by 161 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir.1998). An Allen instruction “must be upheld unless it is clear from the record that the charge had an impermissibly coercive effect on the jury.” Id. Whether a judge has improperly coerced a jury’s verdict is a mixed question of law and fact we review de novo. See Jiminez v. Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir.1994).

B. The Court Did Not Coerce the Jury into Reaching Unanimous Verdicts

Berger contends that the district judge gave an improper Allen charge when he met informally with the jury and that the charge effectively coerced the jury to reach unanimous verdicts against him on twelve counts in violation of Berger’s right to an impartial jury. We disagree.

This court has explained:

The term “Allen charge” is the generic name for a class of supplemental jury instructions given when jurors are apparently deadlocked; the name derives from the first Supreme Court approval of such an instruction in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). In their mildest form, these instructions carry reminders of the importance of securing a verdict and ask jurors to reconsider potentially unreasonable positions. In their stronger forms, these charges have been referred to as “dynamite charges,” because of their ability to “blast” a verdict out of a deadlocked jury. The charge has also been called the “third degree instruction,” “the shotgun instruction,” and “the nitroglycerin charge.”

United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1265 n. 1 (9th Cir.1981) (citation omitted). The Allen instruction is most often used in cases of “apparent juror deadlock” to “admonish jurors to keep trying.” Id. at 1265; see also Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 365 (9th Cir.1999) (“In the archetypal Allen charge context, the judge instructs a deadlocked jury to strive for a unanimous verdict.”).

In Weaver, this court stated that “[s]o long as the defendant has offered facts that fairly support an inference that jurors who did not agree with the majority felt pressure from the court to give up their conscientiously held beliefs in order to secure a verdict, we must proceed to the Allen charge analysis.” Weaver, 197 F.3d at 365. In the instant case, the district judge made comments that echoed a mild Allen instruction when he mentioned: “[W]ith respect to those of you who reached a particular conclusion, and that *1090 you will not change your minds[, i]t wouldn’t be wrong for you to reconsider your position if you can be convinced that perhaps your position was not accurate, that it could be wrong.” The court’s remarks came soon after Juror Roux commented: “There’s some of us that are dead set on our verdicts and others that are dead set. You could probably leave us in here a hundred years and we’ve deliberated, we’re gone over it and my vote will not change.” These comments fairly support the inference that the jury might have been deadlocked — at least as to some counts — and that the court’s comments could have been construed as instructing the jurors to reconsider their respective positions if convinced their position was not correct. Accordingly, a full Allen analysis is appropriate.

We have stated that there is “nothing talismanic about any single element either making the charge valid or invalid; the fundamental question is whether the jury was improperly coerced, thus infringing the defendant’s due process rights.” Id. We apply a “totality of the circumstances” analysis when examining whether a judge’s statements to a jury were impermissibly coercive. Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 980. In performing the Allen analysis, it is helpful to consider three relevant factors: “(1) the form of the instruction, (2) the time the jury deliberated after receiving the charge in relation to the total time of deliberation and (3) any other indicia of coerciveness.” United States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir.2002). 1

1. The form of the instruction was not coercive

Berger takes issue with three aspects of the “form” of the so-called Allen instruetion the court delivered during its informal meeting with the jury. First, Berger complains that the judge’s comments omitted an instruction that jurors should not abandon their conscientiously held beliefs. Second, Berger alleges that the judge’s statements about his poor health coerced the jury into reaching a verdict. Finally, Berger claims that the judge strongly suggested to the jurors that they should work to a unanimous verdict when he said that if they did not follow his instruction it would be like “the Hatfields fighting the McCoys.” We conclude that Judge Taka-sugi’s remarks were not coercive. In addition, the ameliorative instruction cured any coerciveness that may have resulted from the judge’s informal comments to the jurors.

a. The district court instructed the jurors to hold on to their beliefs

At the end of the judge’s informal meeting with the jurors, he told them that “[i]t wouldn’t be wrong for you to reconsider your position if you can be convinced that perhaps your position was not accurate, that it could be wrong.” If the jury was truly deadlocked, these words could be interpreted as directing the jury to “reconsider potentially unreasonable positions.” Mason, 658 F.2d at 1265 n. 1. Berger contends that because the judge overlooked telling the jury to hold on to their “conscientiously held beliefs,” there was no adequate counterbalance to the coercive aspects of the so-called Allen instruction.

Generally, when a judge tells jurors to reconsider their positions, the judge must also warn the jurors to hold on to their *1091 conscientiously-held beliefs. See Mason, 658 F.2d at 1268 (reversing where instruction was more coercive than the instruction approved in Allen and failed to tell jurors in the minority not to abandon their conscientiously-held views); see also Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 981 & n. 5 (noting that failure to instruct jurors to hold on to conscientiously held beliefs “weighs heavily in favor of the conclusion that the defendant’s right to a fair trial and impartial jury has been violated”); but see United States v. Cuozzo, 962 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir.1992) (“While it is helpful for an Allen charge to include such ameliorative language, its lack does not itself necessarily require reversal.”). Berger, however, misconstrues the record when he contends that Judge Takasugi’s informal comments to the jury — which Berger characterizes as an Allen instruc tion — were not offset by other comments by the judge telling the jury to hold on to their beliefs.

First, the judge told the jurors: “The way I look at it, as long as your position is sincere, the position taken ... is based upon your recollection of the evidence and law, there’s not much more we can ask for.” The judge’s statement was substantially the same as an instruction telling jurors to hold on to their conscientiously held beliefs. Telling the jury to hold on to a “sincere” position based on a “recollection of the evidence and law” neutralized any potentially coercive effect and undercuts Berger’s contention.

Second, at the request of the defendants, the court gave an ameliorative instruction later that afternoon. The court instructed the jury: ‘You should not take from my remarks this morning any suggestion that you should change your views simply in order to reach an agreement or because other jurors think it is right.” That corrective instruction also neutralized any coercive effect of the court’s earlier informal comments. The instruction explained that each juror’s personal views were more important than the parties’ or the court’s interest in obtaining a unanimous verdict. Thus, we find that Berger’s first challenge to the court’s informal comments lacks merit. See United States v. Bonam, 772 F.2d 1449, 1451 (9th Cir.1985) (“When the portion of the instruction that asks the minority to re-examine its views is counterbalanced by the caution that a juror should not abandon his conscientiously held views, we have generally upheld the instruction as not coercive.”); see also United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir.1992).

b. It was not coercive for the judge to mention his recent illness

Berger next argues that the judge engaged in coercion when he told the jury he had been hospitalized during trial with a serious illness. Berger implies that because Judge Takasugi is a senior judge who made reference to his illness, the jury felt compelled to reach a verdict. Such an interpretation is a misreading of the transcript. The judge’s comments regarding his health cannot reasonably be read to have had any coercive effect on the jury. First, the judge tempered his comments about his health by saying, “But the heart and lungs are very strong, so I guess I’m going to stick around for a while.” Further, Berger’s contention that references to the judge’s illness pushed the jury to reach a verdict is undermined by reading the judge’s next words, which were: “Jurors should not be forced to reach a verdict. Please understand that. Because any time you’re forced to reach a verdict you’re going to reach an improper verdict or for improper reasons. And so far as that’s concerned, there’s no time lim-it____” The judge’s discussion of his illness did not create a coercive atmosphere.

*1092 c. The judge’s statement that failure to reconsider a position would “be like the Hatfields fighting the McCoys” was not coercive

Berger next focuses on the judge’s informal comment that it “wouldn’t be wrong for you to reconsider your position,” and that jurors “have to have that state of mind throughout the deliberations. Otherwise it’s going to be like the Hatfields fighting the McCoys. It’s not going to be promotive of a final conclusion.” Berger asserts that “[t]he court’s statements told the jurors that honest and conscientious beliefs were less important than getting along — indeed, these statements told the jurors that hanging on to such beliefs would make them responsible for inappropriate feuding.”

The comparison of a deadlocked jury to the Hatfields and the McCoys might have conveyed to the jury that the judge favored a unanimous agreement over a deadlock. But we must not consider that analogy in isolation. We must instead consider it in the context of the judge’s other informal remarks and his ameliorative instruction. See Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 980. When so viewed, the “Hatfields fighting the McCoys” comment was not coercive. As noted above, the judge told the jury that they would not be “forced to reach a verdict” and that jurors should not “changeftheir] views simply in order to reach an agreement or because other jurors think it is right.” Furthermore, the court later gave the ameliorative instruction that the jurors should not “change [their] views simply in order to reach an agreement or because other jurors think it is right.” Any coercive effect that emanated from the court’s “Hatfields fighting the McCoys” comment was neutralized by the court’s counterbalancing statements and corrective instruction.

2. The time the jury deliberated after the informal meeting in relation to the total time it deliberated does not suggest that the court’s statements were coercive

“A jury verdict reached immediately after an Allen charge can be an indication of coercion.” Bonam, 772 F.2d at 1451. In contrast, this court has found no coercion existed in circumstances where the deliberations lasted some significant amount of time after an Allen instruction was given. See id. at 1450-51 (finding no coercion with just over one day of total deliberation, one- and-a-half hours of which came after Allen charge); see also Lorenzo, 43 F.3d at 1307 & n. 3 (finding no coercion with five-and-a-half hours of deliberation coming after Allen charge); Cuozzo, 962 F.2d at 952 & n. 6 (finding no coercion with two days and six hours of deliberation, six hours of which came after Allen charge); but see Weaver, 197 F.3d at 366 (finding coercion existed when jury returned with unanimous verdict five minutes after Allen charge).

The jury deliberated at least seven hours following the challenged comments by the judge. On the morning of August 29, 2003, the court, with counsel’s consent, had its informal meeting after the jury had deliberated about three-and-a-half days. Following the judge’s meeting with the jurors, the jury deliberated until 3:19 p.m. At that time, the court gave the ameliorative instruction that the jury members should not “change [their] views simply in order to reach an agreement or because other jurors think it is right.” The court recessed for the weekend. The jury resumed deliberations at 9:30 a.m. on September 2, 2003, and reached a verdict that afternoon at 1:20 p.m.

Seven hours was a substantial amount of time after the informal meeting. During that time, the jury could consider the *1093 charges against both defendants. In our opinion, seven hours was a “sufficient period of time to allow the jury to reach a reasoned decision in this case.” Cuozzo, 962 F.2d at 952 n. 6.

Finally, we note that the jury’s verdict on September 2nd came after the three-day Labor Day holiday. We have held:

The fact the jury reached its verdict half an hour after returning from a weekend recess could merely reflect that the jurors came to a resolution during a weekend when they individually pondered the evidence. The weekend interval itself probably would have diluted any coercive effect of an Allen charge given the prior Thursday.

Steele,.298 F.3d at 911. Here, as in Steele, any potentially coercive effect of the judge’s remarks was diluted by the long holiday weekend and the time the jury deliberated after the court’s informal remarks.

3. There Were No Other Indicia of Coercion

a. The Court’s informal statements to the jury were not directed toward a specific juror or set of jurors

Berger argues that the judge’s informal comments were particularly coercive because they were directed at a specific juror, Juror Roux. This argument misrepresents the record, because the judge addressed his remarks toward the jurors as a group. The judge only knew that “some” of the jurors were set on one position and that “others” were set on another. The judge did not know which jurors favored guilt and which favored acquittal. Moreover, because of the complicated nature of the case, Juror Roux’s comment that “some of us ... are dead set on our verdicts” might have related only to some of the dozens of charges the jurors had to consider. The record also does not reveal whether Juror Roux was in the majority or minority on any particular charge, nor how many jurors she was referring to when she said “some of us that are dead set on our verdicts.”

Here, “the judge did not ask what the division was. There is no evidence that he knew who the dissenting jurorfs were.] Further, the judge did not even know whether the majority position was to convict or acquit.” Lorenzo, 43 F.3d at 1307. Thus, Juror Roux could not have been singled out by the judge in his comments, which were made to the multiple jurors who were “dead set” on their verdicts.

b. It is not clear that the jurors were in fact deadlocked

Contrary to Berger’s contention, the jury was not deadlocked at the time the judge, with the consent of counsel, had an informal meeting with the jurors regarding scheduling issues. Berger’s case is distinguishable from other cases where an allegedly coercive Allen charge is made to an obviously deadlocked jury. In those cases, the jury typically sends out a note indicating that it is deadlocked and inquiring about the next appropriate step. See Jim-inez, 40 F.3d at 978-79 (explaining that jury sent notes to judge that stated “We are unable to reach a verdict and feel strongly that we would not be able to reach a verdict” and “We are at an impasse and request further direction.”).

There is simply no evidence in the record that any of the jurors considered further deliberations to be futile. The jury knew that deliberations w