American Motorists Insurance v. ARTRA Group, Inc.

This case arises out of a declaratory judgment action commenced by American Motorists Insurance Company (“American Motorists”) against ARTRA Group, Inc. (“ARTRA”) in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on April 29, 1992. The facts underlying the commencement of that declaratory judgment action are as follows.

In 1980, Sherwin-Williams Company (“Sherwin-Williams”) purchased from ARTRA a paint manufacturing factory located in Baltimore City on Hollins Ferry Road (the “Hollins Ferry *564Site”).1 After the sale, the Maryland Department of the Environment required that Sherwin-Williams investigate and remedy hazardous waste contamination in the soil and groundwater at the Hollins Ferry Site. In December, 1991, Sherwin-Williams filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against ARTRA and other previous owners of the Hollins Ferry Site, seeking recovery for the costs of investigation and remediation of the Site. In its complaint, Sherwin-Williams alleged that “numerous spills of hazardous substances and hazardous wastes were released at the Site during and as a result of regular operations of the plant.” The complaint further alleged that hazardous substances and hazardous wastes were released through discharge into the storm drainage system, through improper filling of underground storage tanks, and through the abandonment of underground storage tanks at the Hollins Ferry Site.

After receiving the Sherwin-Williams complaint, ARTRA requested that American Motorists defend and indemnify AR-TRA in the Sherwin-Williams suit. American Motorists had issued a series of nine comprehensive general liability policies to ARTRA and its predecessor companies, covering a period from April 1, 1976 through April 1, 1985. ARTRA and its predecessor companies were headquartered in Northfield, Illinois. American Motorists was also headquartered in Illinois and the policies were all countersigned on behalf of American Motorists in Illinois. Each policy contained a pollution exclusion which limited the scope of coverage. This exclusion precluded coverage for:

“bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, *565fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.”

American Motorists had also issued a Comprehensive Catastrophe Umbrella Policy to ARTRA which was in effect from 1976 to 1978. This umbrella policy contained similar pollution exclusion language.

American Motorists refused ARTRA’s request to defend and indemnify ARTRA, based on the pollution exclusions contained in the applicable policies.2 American Motorists then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, seeking a determination by that court that, under the applicable insurance policies, American Motorists owed no duty to defend or indemnify ARTRA in the SherwinWilliams suit.

ARTRA filed an answer to the complaint for declaratory judgment, arguing that at a minimum, American Motorists owed a duty to defend ARTRA in the Sherwin-Williams suit because the allegations of the Sherwin-Williams complaint gave rise to a potentiality of coverage under the applicable policies. ARTRA subsequently filed a motion to dismiss arguing that key factual issues determinative of the duty to indemnify were intertwined with facts to be determined at trial. At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, ARTRA asserted that, under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, Illinois law controlled the substantive issues and that, under Outboard Marine v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 154 Ill.2d 90, 180 Ill.Dec. 691, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992), Illinois law holds the pollution exclusion at issue to be ambiguous. Such ambiguity, ARTRA argued, *566must under Illinois law be construed in favor of the insured. In response, American Motorists moved for summary judgment and argued that the court should apply the principle of renvoi and that a Maryland court should look to the entire body of Illinois law, including Illinois conflict of law principles and determine whether Illinois would apply Maryland law for a decision on the coverage issues presented. American Motorists argued that, in the instant case, Illinois would apply the law of Maryland to the underlying dispute since Illinois conflict of law rules apply the “most significant contacts” test of Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws §§ 188 and 193 (1971). Section 193 provides that the validity and rights created by a casualty insurance contract are determined by:

“the local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship ... to the transaction and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.”

Thus, American Motorists argued because, under § 193, the validity of and rights created by an insurance policy are determined by the law of the state where the risk is located and because the risk of pollution was located in Maryland, Illinois choice-of-law rules would dictate the application of Maryland law to the substantive issues in the case.

At argument on American Motorists’s motion for summary judgment, the trial judge (Ward, J.) noted that the place of contracting was Illinois. Nonetheless, the trial judge held that Maryland substantive law would apply both because Illinois would itself apply Maryland law and because of Maryland’s public policy with regard to environmental issues. The court found that under the Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Bentz v. Mutual Fire, 83 Md.App. 524, 575 A.2d 795 (1990), the terms “sudden” and “accidental” in the language of the pollution exclusions were unambiguous and there was no potentiality for coverage under the American Motorists policies. The court therefore granted American Motorists’s mo*567tion for summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action and denied ARTRA’s motion to dismiss.

ARTRA appealed to the Court of Special Appeals' which reversed and held that the trial court was incorrect both as to choice of law and the potentiality of coverage. See ARTRA Group v. American Motorists, 100 Md.App. 728, 741-42, 642 A.2d 896, 902-03 (1994). The Court of Special Appeals held that the doctrine of renvoi was not accepted in Maryland, nor had Maryland accepted Restatement § 193’s significant relationship analysis. ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 736-37, 642 A.2d at 900. The Court of Special Appeals held that Maryland followed the doctrine of lex loci contractus and that the Maryland court should therefore look to the substantive law of Illinois, but not to Illinois’s choice-of-law rules. ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 736-38, 642 A.2d at 900-02. The court further held that although the Maryland legislature had “expressed a strong public policy regarding the protection of the land and citizens of Maryland from pollution ... Maryland has no strong public policy regarding who pays for the clean-up. That issue is controlled by the contract between insured and insurer.” ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 739, 642 A.2d at 901 (emphasis in original). With regard to the duty to defend, the intermediate appellate court held that under either Maryland or Illinois law, “there are allegations [in the Sherwin-Williams complaint] that at least some of the pollution at the Site occurred under circumstances that might well be deemed to be ‘sudden and accidental.’ ” ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 740, 642 A.2d at 902. Thus, a potentiality for coverage existed. Id. As to the duty to indemnify, the court held that there were facts which remained to be determined at trial as to whether the contamination that occurred was sudden and accidental and that if in fact the contamination was found at trial to be sudden and accidental, American Motorists would have to indemnify ARTRA. ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 741, 642 A.2d at 903. American Motorists petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider the issues raised in the instant case.

*568I.

In determining the issues presented in the instant case, we initially point out that, for the purpose of this opinion, we must assume that Illinois choice-of-law rules would dictate the application of Maryland law to the substantive issues in the present case. In granting summary judgment, the trial judge apparently found Maryland law applicable both because Illinois would itself apply Maryland law and because of Maryland’s strong public policy on the issue. In its brief before the Court of Special Appeals, ARTRA acknowledged that the trial judge “ruled that Illinois would apply Maryland law for purposes of conflict of law analysis in interpreting issues of coverage” and American Motorists agreed with the trial judge’s finding, contending that “Illinois would apply the law of Maryland in resolving the declaratory judgment case.” The Court of Special Appeals assumed that Illinois would apply Maryland law “because of [Illinois’s] own law regarding choice of law.” ARTRA, 100 Md.App. at 738, 642 A.2d at 901. In its petition for certiorari, American Motorists began its renvoi argument with the recognition that the trial judge had found that Illinois choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of Maryland law:

“In its analysis, the circuit court concluded that Maryland law applied under the choice-of-law doctrine known as renvoi Under this doctrine, a court applies the law of the state where the insurance contract was entered into unless that state, under its own internal choice-of-law rules, would apply Maryland law. The insurance contracts at issue were entered into in Illinois. However, because Illinois would apply Maryland law — out of recognition that Maryland is the location of the risk and has the most significant public policy interest in insurance coverage issues involving clean up of polluted land within its borders — the circuit court applied Maryland law.”

ARTRA did not dispute this assertion in its answer to the petition for certiorari, nor did it file a cross petition raising the issue that the trial judge was wrong in concluding that Illinois choice-of-law rules would lead to the application of Maryland *569law. See Maryland Rule 8 — 131(b) (“[T]he Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.”). That issue is therefore not properly before us and we must assume for purposes of this opinion that the trial court was correct in finding that Illinois would apply Maryland law.

American Motorists’s first suggestion is that we recognize that the rule of lex loci contractus is antiquated arid should be abandoned in favor of some form of the more modern approaches to choice of law such as the one advocated by Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws. These “modern” choice-of-law approaches differ slightly in their methodology, but generally examine the contacts with the jurisdictions involved and attempt to apply the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant interest in, and relationship to, the contractual issue before the court. We shall collectively refer to these approaches with the Restatement term “most significant relationship” test. No attempt will be made to discuss and differentiate the various, rather similar approaches, but we shall briefly discuss the Restatement test. Based on our holding on the renvoi issue, we need not give any consideration to the intriguing question of whether Maryland’s traditional lex loci contractus test should be abandoned in favor of one of the “modern” most significant relationship tests. American Motorists’s second suggestion is that we engraft the doctrine of renvoi to our body of conflict of law rules. We need not determine today how far we should go in incorporating the doctrine of renvoi but we do adopt a limited form of renvoi which will direct the application of Maryland law to resolve the substantive issues in the instant case.

THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS

The Restatement’s most significant relationship test was adopted by the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws in 1971, although preliminary drafts containing the approach were circulated as early as 1953. See 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 83, at 140 n. 89 (1979). It is generally referred to as *570one of the “modern approaches,” and it applies the law of the place having the most significant relationship to the contract issue in dispute. This “most significant relationship” test is set forth in Restatement § 188. Section 188 states:

“The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties----”

Section 188 also sets forth the factors that should be considered in determining what state has the most significant relationship. These include the place of contracting, the place of negotiation of the contract, the place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and the domicil and place of business of the parties. Section 193 further narrows the most significant relationship test in the context of fire, surety or casualty insurance contracts and finds that the state where the parties understood to be the principal location of the insured risk typically will be the state with the most significant relationship.

This modern test embodied by the Restatement contrasts with the rule of lex loci contractus, which requires that the construction and validity of a contract be determined by the law of the place of making of the contract. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 529, 611 A.2d 100, 101 (1992); Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, 311 Md. 387, 390, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988). The Restatement test sacrifices some of the certainty, simplicity, and predictability of the lex loci contractus rule in favor of a rule which gives the jurisdiction with the strongest interest in the litigation the most control over the outcome of the litigation. It also may be based, at least in part, on an assumption that the parties to a contract might expect that the law applied to contract issues should be the law of the jurisdiction with the predominant contacts and concern in the outcome. See 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflict of Laws § 83, at 141 (1979) (“It is said that the modern approach ... enables] the court, not only to reflect the relative interests of the several jurisdictions involved, but also to give effect to the *571probable intention of the parties and consideration to the best practical result.”).

In the instant case, both parties cited Restatement §§ 188 and 198 in their briefs, agreeing that “Illinois adheres to the most significant interest approach” and that “[p]ursuant to Restatement § 193, the rights created under an insurance contract are determined by the local law of the state which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk.” See Diamond State Ins. v. Chester-Jensen Co., 243 Ill.App.3d 471, 183 Ill.Dec. 435, 611 N.E.2d 1083 (1993); KNS Companies, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 866 F.Supp. 1121 (N.D.Ill.1994).

In Diamond State, supra, the Illinois Appellate Court held that even though the insured was a Pennsylvania corporation, both the insured and the insurer were principally located in Pennsylvania, and the insurance policies were delivered to the insured in Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania law did not govern the coverage issues. 183 Ill.Dec. at 444-45, 611 N.E.2d at 1094-95. Rather, the court applied Illinois law because the coverage issues concerned a suit against the insured over a defective thermal bank system which the insured had installed in a building in Illinois and, thus, the risk was located in Illinois. Diamond State, 183 Ill.Dec. at 445, 611 N.E.2d at 1095. The court noted that:

“While ... section [193] does not preclude considerations of other factors in a choice of law analysis, the ‘location of the insured risk will be given greater weight than any other single contact in determining the state of applicable law provided that the risk can be located, at least principally in a single state.’ ”

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 193, cmt. b, at 611 (1971)).

Recently, in KNS Companies, supra, a federal court in Illinois applied Indiana law in an environmental coverage case involving a polluted waste site in Indiana, even though the insured in that case was an Illinois corporation. 866 F.Supp. at 1125. The court, applying Illinois’s choice-of-law rules, *572relied on Diamond State in concluding that where a policy potentially covers risks in multiple states, the law of the state where the pollution took place should govern. The court held:

“Although KNS is an Illinois-based corporation, all of the insurers’ policies provided it with coverage extending to all of its operations, and the claim at issue stems from the United States Environmental Protection Agency’s having asserted KNS’ responsibility for the payment of costs of cleaning up an Indiana site where KNS’ solvent was treated by another company (a licensed hazardous waste treatment facility). Thus the assertedly insured risk has its situs in Indiana, and Diamond State calls for the application of Indiana law.”

KNS Companies, 866 F.Supp. at 1125.

Despite growing acceptance elsewhere, Maryland courts have never applied the “most significant relationship” test embodied by the Restatement. We have, however, cited with approval other provisions of the Restatement. In Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980), we cited with approval Restatement § 187 in determining whether we would enforce the contracting parties’ choice-of-law clause contained in a contract. See also National Glass v. J.C. Penney, 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (1994) (applying § 187 to analyze the validity of a choice-of-law clause). Section 187, however, concerns whether a choice-of-law clause contained in a contract is to be enforced and provides that such a clause will be honored unless either: 1) the state whose law is chosen has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction; or 2) the strong fundamental public policy of the forum state precludes the application of the choice-of-law provision. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 187. The present case involves no such choice-of-law provision.

We have also cited the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws on other occasions. See, e.g., Eckard v. Eckard, 333 Md. 531, 545, 636 A.2d 455, 462 (citing § 102 regarding the enforcement of a foreign deed), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 77, 130 L.Ed.2d 31 (1994); Mack v. Mack, 329 Md. 188, *573198-99, 618 A.2d 744, 749 (1993) (citing § 79 regarding jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over the person); Rein v. Koons Ford, 318 Md. 130, 135, 567 A.2d 101, 103 (1989) (citing § 89 regarding a foreign penal cause of action); Johnson v. Searle, 314 Md. 521, 525, 552 A.2d 29, 30 (1989) (citing § 84 for the principle of forum non conveniens); In re Lynn M., 312 Md. 461, 471, 540 A.2d 799, 804 (1988) (citing § 14 regarding domicile). We have never, however, looked to the Restatement’s "most significant relationship” test to determine what law would govern absent a choice-of-law provision contained in the contract.

Absent a choice-of-law provision in the contract, our courts have applied the rule of lex loci contractus to matters regarding the validity and interpretation of contract provisions. See Allstate, 327 Md. at 529, 611 A.2d at 101; Kramer, 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467. We have recognized an exception to the application of lex loci contractus when application of a foreign jurisdiction’s law would be contrary to a strong public policy of this State, see Bethlehem Steel v. G.C. Zamas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 498 A.2d 605 (1985); National Glass, supra, but we do not find this exception applicable to the facts of the instant case.3 Although American Motorists asks us to abandon our adherence to lex loci contractus, we need not consider such a sweeping change, for we adopt a limited application of renvoi which permits us to apply Maryland law where the application of lex loci contractus indicates that the foreign jurisdiction would apply Maryland law to the substantive issues of the controversy.

*574 RENVOI

Renvoi is a French word meaning “send back” or “remit.” It has been suggested that the doctrine of renvoi was formulated to avoid the harshness of the traditional common law choice-of-law principles. Rhoda S. Barish, Comment, Renvoi and the Modem Approaches to Choice-of-Law, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. 1049, 1061-62 (1981) (hereinafter “Barish”). The doctrine of renvoi is basically that, when the forum court’s choice-of-law rules would apply the substantive law of a foreign jurisdiction to the case before the forum court, the forum court may apply the whole body of the foreign jurisdiction’s substantive law including the foreign jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rules. Barish, 30 Am.U.L.Rev. at 1062. If, in applying renvoi principles, the foreign jurisdiction’s conflict of law rules would apply the forum’s law, this reference back of the forum to its own laws is called a remission. Id. That is what is involved in the instant case. If the choice-of-law rules of the foreign jurisdiction whose laws the forum would apply refers the forum court to the law of a third jurisdiction that is called a transmission. Id. How we would in the future treat a transmission is not before this court. It has been suggested that renvoi could have the danger of creating an endless cycle. In the instant case, Maryland choice-of-law rules apply the doctrine of lex loci contractus and, pursuant thereto, apply Illinois law. In applying Illinois law, we also adopt Illinois choice of law, which would apply Maryland law, which applies Illinois law, and back and forth. What breaks the endless cycle? As shall be seen, we adopt a limited form of renvoi in the instant case that does not have the endless cycle.

A persuasive case for adopting renvoi is made by two law school professors in their text on conflict of laws.

“Early commentators: and most of the cases rejected the more general use of renvoi. The reasons offered in the case law include that renvoi is (1) a manipulative device to explain the application of a different law, that (2) the forum’s conflicts rules should not be displaced by those of another jurisdiction, and that (3) the ‘circular process’ of renvoi would add to the confusion in choice of law.

*575None of these objections is persuasive. The first two objections overlook one of the important objectives of conflicts law: to minimize the effect that litigation was commenced in this rather than in another forum and to achieve, to the greatest extent possible, uniformity of decisions. The third objection — the circularity of renvoi — assumes that both jurisdictions’ choice-of-law rules refer to each other and that a reference back to the forum would trigger the process anew. The answer is two-fold. Often, there will not be any circularity. Thus, in cases of transmission, it may well happen that A, the forum refers to B, the latter to C, and C to itself. In this situation the use of renvoi by A would assure that all three courts would reach the same result. Blind adherence by A to its own conflicts rules would produce a different result in A than in B and C. Circularity also does not happen if only A, but not B, employs renvoi. In this case, A refers to B, B refers to A and would not accept a reference back: A law applies.

Nevertheless, a mechanical use of renvoi by all concerned jurisdictions could theoretically produce the problem of circularity. In this case, however, it is suggested that the forum accept the reference to its own law, refer no further, and apply its own law. This is the practice of most jurisdictions that do employ renvoi. This is good policy: the foreign conflicts rule itself discloses a disinterest to have its own substantive law applied, indeed it recognizes the significance of the forum’s law for the particular case; the case therefore probably presents a ‘false conflict.’ Furthermore, since uniformity in result would not otherwise be achieved in these circumstances, ease in the administration of justice is furthered by the application of forum law rather than by the use of foreign law.” (Footnotes omitted).

Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.13, at 67-70 (2d ed. 1992).

Where the forum would apply the law of the foreign jurisdiction and the foreign jurisdiction would apply the law of the forum, it would seem that the balance should tip in favor of the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts or, if not to *576the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts, then for ease of application and to prevent forum shopping, the law of the forum should be applied. In the instant case, Maryland is apparently the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts as well as the forum. Maryland courts should, in applying Illinois law, apply Illinois’s most significant relationship choice-of-law rule and follow the law an Illinois court would follow if the case was instituted in Illinois — Maryland law. Thus, whether suit was filed in Maryland or Illinois, Maryland law would govern the contract.

In our situation, there may not even be a real “conflict.” In the absence of some reason to apply foreign law, Maryland courts would ordinarily apply Maryland substantive law, and there is no reason to apply the substantive law of á foreign state if that foreign state recognizes that Maryland has the most significant interest in the issues and that Maryland substantive law ought to be applied to the contract issues. In Bethlehem Steel, we recognized that it makes no sense for Maryland courts to apply the law of another state when that state would apply Maryland law. In Bethlehem Steel, we were asked to construe a contract, executed in Pennsylvania, which provided for indemnification of the indemnitee’s sole negligence. Maryland law considered such a provision to be void and unenforceable as against public policy, but the provision was permitted under Pennsylvania law. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 187-88, 498 A.2d at 608. In finding that Maryland’s strong public policy would override the application of Pennsylvania law under lex loci contractus, we noted that Pennsylvania did not have a strong interest in applying its law to the transaction at issue. Bethlehem Steel, 304 Md. at 191 n. 5, 498 A.2d at 609 n. 5. We recognized that Pennsylvania’s conflict of law principles applied the law of the state with the most significant contacts to the transaction and that under this principle, “had suit on the indemnity agreement been brought in Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania court would likely have decided the issue according to Maryland law.” Id. We further found that “it would be ironic if, ... we were to hold that principles of comity require us to apply Pennsylvania law *577and ignore that state’s conflict of law principles.” Id. In effect, because Pennsylvania’s conflict of law rules led to the application of Maryland law, there was no real “conflict” because both Maryland and Pennsylvania preferred that the substantive law of Maryland be applied to the controversy.

The use of renvoi where no “real” conflict exists was predicted by Judge Motz in Travelers Indent. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F.Supp. 1252 (D.Md.1989). In Travelers, Judge Motz applied Maryland choice-of-law principles in a case concerning insurance coverage for pollution-related cleanup costs. The contracts in question were formed in New York and New Jersey. Travelers, 718 F.Supp. at 1253. Despite the rule of lex loci contractus, the court used the doctrine of renvoi and predicted that Maryland courts would apply Maryland law to the contracts because New York and New Jersey would apply Maryland law to the contract issues. Travelers, 718 F.Supp. at 1254-55. The court noted:

“This use of what is known as the doctrine of renvoi to pierce through ‘false conflicts’ is widely endorsed. Commentators have recognized it as a sensible approach which enhances uniformity and accommodates situations where ‘the foreign conflicts rule itself discloses a disinterest to have its own substantive law applied and a recognition of the significance of the forum’s law.’ ”

Travelers, 718 F.Supp. at 1254 (quoting Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.13, at 69-70 (1984)).

ARTRA contends that failure to apply a strict lex loci contractus test in the instant case would be unfair because ARTRA allegedly had some expectation that Illinois law would govern these insurance contracts. This contention is unpersuasive, at best, because if American Motorists had filed its declaratory judgment action in Illinois then, as was held below, Maryland law would have been applied to the coverage issues, since Illinois applies the law of the state with the most significant contacts and the location of the risk, i.e., Maryland. For consistency and to prevent forum shopping when the action is filed in Maryland, our courts also ought to apply *578Maryland substantive law when the place of contracting would apply Maryland law to resolve the dispute had suit been filed in that jurisdiction.

It is axiomatic that Maryland law is Maryland law because our courts and legislature believe the rules of substantive law we apply are the best of the available alternatives. From this fundamental principle, it is safe to assume our courts would prefer to follow Maryland law unless there is some good reason why Maryland law should yield to the law of a foreign jurisdiction. Our own substantive law is not only more familiar to and easier for Maryland judges to apply, but there has been a legislative or judicial determination that it is preferable to the available alternatives. Sometimes, however, there are good reasons why our courts should, and do, apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction.4 First, if Maryland does not defer to other states when they have a significant interest, they might not defer to Maryland when we have a significant interest. Second, we should discourage forum shopping and strive for some uniformity and predictability in resolving conflict of law issues regardless of where suit is filed. For simplicity, predictability, and uniformity in contract law, Maryland courts have, as have a majority of other state courts, followed the rule of lex loci contractus and have applied the substantive law of the place of contracting. In declining to apply Maryland law to a contract made in another state, we do so not because we deem the law of the other state preferable to Maryland law, but because our preference for Maryland law is outweighed by considerations of simplicity, predictability and *579uniformity. Where, however, the place of contracting applies Maryland law, then simplicity, predictability, and uniformity would be better achieved if Maryland courts followed the conflict of law rule of the place of contracting and apply Maryland law. In that case, there would be uniformity in choice of law regardless of in which jurisdiction suit was filed, and where, as in the instant case, suit was filed in Maryland, then Maryland courts would be applying Maryland law.

The limited renvoi exception which we adopt today will allow Maryland courts to avoid the irony of applying the law of a foreign jurisdiction when that jurisdiction’s conflict of law rules would apply Maryland law. Under this exception, Maryland courts should apply Maryland substantive law to contracts entered into in foreign states’ jurisdictions in spite of the doctrine of lex loci contractus when:

1) Maryland has the most significant relationship, or, at least, a substantial relationship with respect to the contract issue presented; and

2) The state where the contract was entered into would not apply its own substantive law, but instead would apply Maryland substantive law to the issue before the court.

Our hold