Gannon v. State

This is a “school finance” case that concerns Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution as well as various Kansas educational statutes. They include K.S.A. 72-6405 et seq. (School District Finance and Quality Performance Act or SDFQPA) and K.S.A. 72-8801 et seq. (capital outlay levy).

The defendant, the State of Kansas (appellant/cross-appellee), appeals from various holdings by a three-judge district court panel. The panel’s holdings included a determination that the State violated Article 6 when the legislature underfunded K-12 public education between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, as well as a related determination that the legislature failed to consider the actual costs of providing a constitutionally required education before making its funding decisions. Its holdings also concluded that additional constitutional violations occurred because the legislature either withheld or reduced certain funding to which school districts were statutorily entitled. The panel enjoined the State from taking certain actions regarding school finance legislation.

The plaintiffs, U.S.D. No. 259, Wichita; U.S.D. No. 308, Hutchinson; U.S.D. No. 443, Dodge City; and U.S.D. No. 500, Kansas City, along with 31 individuals named in the pleadings as students and their guardians, cross-appeal from a number of the panel’s holdings. Among other things, they contend the panel was wrong when it rejected education as a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution, denied their substantive due process and equal protection claims, and refused to order the State to make “capital outlay state aid” payments for fiscal year 2010 to which many districts were entitled by statute. They also complain tire panel set *1111“base state aid per pupil” at only $4,492 for fiscal year 2014 and denied their claims for attorney fees.

After the panel presided at a 16-day bench trial that produced a 21,000-page record, it issued a 250-page memorandum opinion and entry of judgment. Since then, approximately 800 pages of briefs have been filed by the parties and by five amici. The briefs contain numerous issues and arguments which we have consolidated.

At the outset, we hold the panel correctly ruled the individual plaintiffs do not have standing to bring any claims, and the plaintiff school districts do not have standing to bring their equal protection and due process claims. As for the districts’ claims arising under Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution, we hold those claims are jus-ticiable because they are not political questions. But we also hold the panel did not apply the correct constitutional standard in determining the State violated the Article 6 requirement of adequacy in public education. So we remand that issue to the panel to apply the standard articulated in this opinion and to make additional findings.

As for the capital outlay funding claims, we hold the panel correctly ruled that the State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities by withholding all capital outlay state aid payments to which certain school districts were otherwise entitled under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 72-8814(c). We additionally hold the panel correctly refused to order payment of capital outlay state aid to which districts were otherwise entitled for fiscal year 2010. We further hold that the panel correctly ruled that the State created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities by prorating the supplemental general state aid payments to which certain districts were entitled under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 72-6434 for their local option budgets.

Finally, we hold the panel correctly ruled that the plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees.

Accordingly, we remand for the panel to enforce the affirmed rulings on equity and to fashion appropriate remedies. We also remand for the panel to apply the correct constitutional standard to plaintiffs’ claims arising under Article 6 of the Kansas Consti*1112tution. On remand, the panel shall proceed consistent with the further direction provided in this opinion.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because of the nature of this case, a short overview of funding for K-12 public education in Kansas is helpful in understanding the case’s history, the arguments made by the parties to the panel, and the panel’s holdings.

SDFQPA Summary

The SDFQPA establishes the formula and mechanism through which most funds for K-12 public education are obtained by Kansas school districts. The formula provides a fixed amount of funding for each student through “base state aid per pupil,” also known as BSAPP. A district’s full-time equivalent enrollment is adjusted by adding various weightings based on the recognition that the needs of some students require more resources for their education than others. Once a school district’s enrollment is adjusted per the weightings, that figure is multiplied by the BSAPP. The resulting product is the amount of state financial aid to which tire school district is entitled.

Funding for the BSAPP is derived from two sources: local effort and state financial aid. The majority of school districts’ local effort consists of property tax funds, as each district is statutorily required to impose a mill levy upon taxable tangible property in its territory. Because property values vary widely throughout the state, the amount of money each district can raise by the required mill levy also varies widely. So the State provides additional funds to less wealthy districts through “general state aid.”

If a district’s local effort funds equal its state financial aid entitlements, it receives no additional money from the State, i.e., general state aid. And if a district’s local effort funds exceed its state financial aid entitlement, tire excess is remitted to the State. For those districts qualifying for general state aid, their amount is what remains after subtracting their local effort funds from their state financial aid entitlement.

*1113Although local effort and state financial aid comprise most of the funds available for K-12 education, school districts can access additional funds in several ways, two of which are at issue in this case.

First, a local school board can impose an additional mill levy on property in its district to fund a local option budget (LOB) to augment the funds that are distributed through the BSAPP. After application of a statutory formula, in order to account for differences in property wealth among the districts, the less wealthy ones may also qualify for, and receive from the state, “supplemental general state aid.”

Second, a local board can also impose an additional mill levy on property in its district to fund capital outlay expenses such as purchasing certain equipment. Although not part of the SDFQPA, the capital outlay mechanism, like the LOB’s, also accounts for differences in districts’ property wealth. After application of a statutory formula, the less wealthy districts may also qualify for, and receive from the state, “school district capital outlay state aid.”

Montoy

The basic funding formula under the SDFQPA now in effect was essentially enacted in response to our holdings in a series of cases arising from litigation in Montoy v. State. These are: Montoy v. State, 275 Kan. 145, 62 P.3d 228 (2003) (Montoy I); Montoy v. State, 278 Kan. 769, 120 P.3d 306 (2005) (Montoy II); Montoy v. State, 279 Kan. 817, 112 P.3d 923 (2005) (Montoy III); and Montoy v. State, 282 Kan. 9, 138 P.3d 755 (2006) (Montoy IV).

The Montoy plaintiffs challenged certain components of the school finance formula, which the district court ultimately held unconstitutional because the formula did not comply with what the court determined was a duty under Kansas Constitution Article 6, Section 6(b) to “malee suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of die state.” This court affirmed in a brief opinion on Januaiy 3, 2005, designed to give the legislature guidance for modifying the formula during its 2005 session. Montoy II, 278 Kan. at 770-71.

*1114The legislature timely revised the school finance formula during its 2005 session. But on June 3, 2005, we held its amendments fell short of compliance with our previous decision, so we retained jurisdiction to review further legislative action. Montoy III, 279 Kan. at 845-47.

During a special session called later that month, the legislature timely amended the formula and provided a funding increase totaling $289 million for the 2005-06 school year. After our review of the legislation, we issued an order on July 8 that held the State had complied with Montoy III “ 'for interim purposes.’ ” Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 15. We again retained jurisdiction to review additional action by the 2006 legislature.

During the legislature’s 2006 regular session, it provided for an estimated total funding increase of $466.2 million over 3 years for K-12 education, making a total increase since January 3, 2005, of an estimated $755.6 million. See Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 18. Included in its increases was a raise of the BSAPP from $4,257 to $4,316 for fiscal year 2007; to $4,374 for fiscal year 2008; and to $4,433 for fiscal year 2009. See Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 17. The legislature again modified the funding formula. After our review of tire legislation, we concluded the State had responded by substantially complying with our previous decisions—and we dismissed the Montoy litigation. See Montoy IV, 282 Kan. at 22-23, 26-27.

Post Montoy

In the wake of a national economic recession, the 2009 legislature began reducing education funding. The BSAPP appropriation was reduced from the 2006 legislature’s statutorily specified amount of $4,433 to $4,400 in fiscal year 2009.' And although the 2009 legislature had initially established BSAPP at $4,492 for fiscal year 2010 and beyond, the appropriation for fiscal year 2010 was reduced to $4,012. Additionally, the legislature began to withhold qualifying districts’ funding entitlements to capital outlay aid and began to prorate, i.e., reduce, the qualifying districts’ funding entitlements to supplemental general state aid.

*1115Midway through the 2010 fiscal year, in January 2010, the Mon-toy plaintiffs moved this court to reopen their appeal and remand the case to the district court with directions to hear evidence on two issues: (1) whether the current Kansas school finance funding scheme was constitutional and (2) whether funding cuts since the dismissal of the Montoy case were made in violation of Article 6, Section 6(b) of the Kansas Constitution, state law, or our mandates in Montoy. But this court denied the motion, which ultimately led to the filing of the current case by new plaintiffs.

Legislative reductions in K-12 education funding continued. By fiscal year 2012, the legislature essentially had reduced BSAPP to $3,780, while cuts to BSAPP in fiscal years 2009 to 2012 totaled more than $511 million. And the legislature continued to withhold capital outlay aid and to prorate supplemental general state aid to otherwise-entitled districts.

Gannon

The Gannon plaintiffs are four school districts and 31 individuals identified in the pleadings as students who attend school in those districts and their guardians. Each district lost funding beginning in fiscal year 2009 due to the reductions in the BSAPP, the withholding of capital outlay state aid, and the proration of supplemental general state aid.

On June 17, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted a notice of claims to the State as required by K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 72-64b02 and filed suit in Shawnee County District Court the following November. Two days later a three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 72-64b03, and the panel eventually established venue in Shawnee County.

The plaintiffs raised eight counts, alleging a variety of constitutional and statutory violations related to school finance. Specifically, they alleged that the State violated the requirements of Article 6, Section 6(b) by failing to provide a suitable education to all Kansas students, consider the actual costs of education, and distribute education funds equitably. In support, the plaintiffs alleged that the State had (1) decreased overall education funding; (2) decreased the BSAPP; (3) required the use of LOB funds to pay for *1116basic educational expenses; (4) prorated supplemental general state aid; (5) withheld capital outlay state aid; and (6) underfunded special education.

The plaintiffs also alleged in a separate count that the State’s failure to distribute capital outlay aid payments beginning in fiscal year 2010 created an inequitable, unconstitutional distribution of funds. For this count only, the panel later certified a class of “[a]ll Kansas school districts that were or will be certified by the Kansas Board of Education to receive capital outlay state aid funding pursuant to K.S.A. 72-8814, as amended, for fiscal years 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012.” While 157 districts qualified as class members, 14 timely opted out before trial. The plaintiffs requested funds representing capital outlay aid payments not made for fiscal year 2010 and beyond.

The plaintiffs further claimed that the right to an education is a fundamental one under the Kansas Constitution and failure to provide suitable provision for finance under Article 6 was therefore a substantive due process violation under Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. They also alleged that the State denied them equal protection of the law under Sections 1 and 2 of the Kansas Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also raised a number of miscellaneous claims they later abandoned on appeal.

The State denied all of plaintiffs’ counts, generally asserting their claims were nonjusticiable. More specifically, the State challenged the plaintiffs’ standing to bring their claims and the particular remedies sought. R also argued that the panel lacked jurisdiction to decide whether more or less school funding should be provided and what constitutes suitable provision for finance and equitable financing of public education. It contended such determinations would violate the doctrine of separation of powers and the legislature’s decisions defining “suitable education” or “suitable provision for finance” were political questions beyond a court’s reach.

As for the merits, the State argued that it had complied with its constitutional duty to make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state. It contended that Kansas schools are receiving funds at record levels when all sources of state, local, *1117and federal funds are taken into account. It also highlighted the districts’ holding of millions of dollars in unspent, available cash reserves. The State further argued no scientific evidence proved that additional funding for education would appreciably improve student performance or the quality of education provided. It also contended that students are generally performing well on assessments and that most schools have been able to meet accreditation requirements. Finally, it denied that education is a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution.

At trial, the plaintiffs elicited testimony from various employees of the plaintiff districts; representatives from the Kansas Association of School Boards, Kansas Board of Regents, and Kansas State Department of Education; members of the legislature; and experts in the field of school finance. In response, the State called a series of school finance experts. In addition to this extensive testimony, 650 exhibits were received into evidence. Following trial, the panel issued its opinion, most of it devoted to the analysis of the plaintiffs’ Article 6 claim.

The panel generally held that the State had violated Article 6, Section 6(b) by failing to provide suitable funding for education. More specifically, for plaintiffs’ capital outlay claims the panel held that via K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 72-8814(c) the legislature’s elimination of capital outlay state aid payments beginning in fiscal year 2010 created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities among districts. And because the State failed to provide any such aid to districts with lower property wealth, the panel further held that K.S.A. 72-8801 et seq.—the act authorizing all districts to assess capital outlay mill levies—was unconstitutional and therefore inoperable.

As with the elimination of capital outlay state aid, the panel held that the legislature’s proration of supplemental general state aid created unconstitutional, wealth-based disparities among districts. But it ruled the statutory scheme establishing such aid, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 72-6434, was constitutional.

In rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that education is a fundamental right under the Kansas Constitution, the panel further held that even if it accepted this view, insufficient evidence existed about the individual plaintiffs to sustain a substantive due process violation. Sim*1118ilarly, the panel determined insufficient evidence existed about the individual plaintiffs regarding the equal protection claims. Given these rejections, it essentially ruled that the only plaintiffs with standing to bring their claims were the school districts, and only on the Article 6 claims.

In crafting remedies, the panel concluded that the “problems raised by the plaintiffs in our view have not been shown to flow from die [SDFQPA], but from a failure by the State to follow the Act’s tenets and fully fund it as it directs.” Thus, the panel entered a number of injunctions designed to enforce the SDFQPA and the capital outlay statute as enacted. It also directed and empowered tire plaintiffs, their attorneys, or any other counsel designated by die panel to enforce its entry of judgment and order if violated by the State.

All parties appealed, and the State requested this court order mediation. After granting the motion, we ordered the parties to continue on the established briefing schedule. The mediation was conducted with mediators of the parties’ choice on April 29 and 30, 2013, but was unsuccessful. Thus the briefs were filed in anticipation of oral argument and a decision by this court. We have jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-2101(b).

We will provide more facts when required for our analysis.

ANALYSIS

Justiciability

The plaintiffs do not have standing to bring all the claims they assert.

For the first time in Kansas school finance litigation since at least the district court level in U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 885 P.2d 1170 (1994), the State raises the issue of nonjusticiability. If the State prevails on this threshold matter, we do not reach the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and the case is dismissed. Plaintiffs respond that the issues are justiciable.

Standard of review

Whether a claim is nonjusticiable is a question of law. See Cochran v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 291 Kan. 898, 903, 249 P.3d *1119434 (2011); cf. Van Sickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 439, 511 P.2d 223 (1973); see also Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 254-55, 990 A.2d 206 (2010) (“Because an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review is plenary.”); Nebraska Coalition for Ed. Equity v. Heineman, 273 Neb. 531, 540, 731 N.W.2d 164 (2007).

Discussion

Like the federal courts, Kansas courts do not render advisory opinions. See State ex rel. Morrison v. Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 888, 179 P.3d 366 (2008). The federal courts’ prohibition against advisory opinions is imposed by Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which expressly limits the judicial power to “Cases” or “Controversies.” 285 Kan. at 889.

But because Article 3 of the Kansas Constitution does not include any “case” or “controversy” language, our case-or-controversy requirement stems from the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the Kansas constitutional framework. 285 Kan. at 896. That doctrine recognizes that of the three departments or branches of government, “[generally speaking, the legislative power is the power to malee, amend, or repeal laws; the executive power is the power to enforce the laws, and the judicial power is the power to interpret and apply the laws in actual controversies.” (Emphasis added.) Van Sickle, 212 Kan. at 440. And Kansas,.not federal, law determines the existence of a case or controversy, i.e., justiciability. Sebelius, 285 Kan. at 893 (citing ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617, 109 S. Ct. 2037, 104 L. Ed. 2d 696 [1989]). But this court is not prohibited from considering federal law when analyzing jus-ticiability.

Under the Kansas case-or-controversy requirement, courts require that (a) parties have standing; (b) issues not be moot; (c) issues be ripe, having taken fixed and final shape rather than remaining nebulous and contingent; and (d) issues not present a political question. See 285 Kan. at 891-92. The State relies upon two of these requirements to argue there is no justiciable case or con*1120troversy: (1) plaintiffs lack standing and (2) plaintiffs’ claims raise political questions.

Before we address these arguments, it is helpful to first set forth some of the relevant Kansas constitutional provisions dealing with education at grades K-12.

Article 6, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution deals with the legislature and public schools. It provides:

“The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related activities which may be organized and changed in such manner as may be provided by law.”

Article 6, Section 2 deals with the legislature and the State Board of Education. It provides in relevant part:

“(a) The legislature shall provide for a state board of education which shall have general supervision of public schools, educational institutions and all the educational interests of the state, except educational functions delegated by law to the state board of regents. The state board of education shall perform such other duties as may be provided by law.”

Article 6, Section 5 deals with the State Board of Education and local public schools. It provides:

“Local public schools under the general supervision of the state board of education shall be maintained, developed and operated by locally elected boards. When authorized by law, such boards may malee and carry out agreements for cooperative operation and administration of educational programs under the general supervision of the state board of education, but such agreements shall be subject to limitation, change or termination by the legislature.”

Article 6, Section 6 deals with the legislature and, to a lesser extent, the State Board of Regents, which deals with higher education. It provides:

“(b) The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state. No tuition shall be charged for attendance at any public school to pupils required by law to attend such school, except such fees or supplemental charges as may be authorized by law. The legislature may authorize die state board of regents to establish tuition, fees and charges at institutions under its supervision.”

*1121 Plaintiffs’ standing

“Standing is 'a party’s right to malee a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1536 (9th ed. 2009).” Board of Miami County Comm’rs v. Kanza Rail-Trails Conservancy, Inc., 292 Kan. 285, 324, 255 P.3d 1186 (2011).

The State generally argues that none of the plaintiffs has standing to bring claims under Article 6, equal protection, or due process. It specifically alleges that all plaintiffs lack standing because they failed to establish a cognizable injury. The State further argues the plaintiff school districts lack standing because they cannot assert third-party standing on behalf of their students. So the State urges dismissal, consistent with our past holding that “if a person does not have standing to challenge an action or to request a particular type of relief, then ‘there is no justiciable case or controversy and the suit must be dismissed. [Citation omitted.]” Board of Sumner County Comm’rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 750, 189 P.3d 494 (2008).

The plaintiffs counter that the individual students and their guardians have standing to bring all claims because they suffered a cognizable injury. The plaintiffs further argue that the school districts have standing to bring the Article 6 and equal protection claims on behalf of the individual student plaintiffs under the doctrine of associational standing and to bring all the claims in their own right.

The panel’s holdings

The panel only briefly addressed standing in the context of the due process and equal protection claims. The panel held that the students, and by implication their guardians, lacked standing to assert these particular claims because the record failed to adequately identify those individuals and their link to those issues. It denied the individual plaintiffs’ due process claim after holding that

“there is inadequate evidence before Ais Court about Ae individually named Plaintiffs oAer Aan their names and schools of attendance (Plaintiffs’ Amended Petition and ¶¶ 1-31) upon which Ais Court could assign one of those named Plaintiffs to a recognized statute or class Aat might. .. invoke such a due process violation.”

*1122And the panel similarly denied the individual plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, holding it “falters from lack of any identifying characteristics of, or circumstances attributable to, the named student Plaintiffs.”

As for the four plaintiff school districts, the panel also held that they lacked standing to assert an equal protection claim, ruling that the school districts “failed to identify a deliberate, intended disparate consequence from the school finance act or by those acting in furtherance of it.” In the alternative, citing Cross v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 279 Kan. 501, 507-08, 110 P.3d 438 (2005), it held the districts had no standing because “they have not demonstrated that they can raise an equal protection claim on behalf of their students.” Cross reaffirmed the general rule that a litigant may not challenge the constitutionality of a statute as it hypothetically applies to another unless it first establishes that the statute negatively affects its own rights. 279 Kan. at 507-08. So the panel appears to have held that the districts lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge on behalf of their students because they failed to establish that their own rights had been violated.

As for the plaintiff school districts’ due process claim, die panel’s analysis is less clear. It denied the districts’ substantive due process claim after holding, in part, that “substantive due process is an individual and personal right” and school districts “do not hold a status as individuals.”

Standard of review and principles of law for standing challenges

While standing is a requirement for a case-or-controversy, i.e., justiciability, it is also a component of subject matter jurisdiction that may be raised at any time. Stechschulte v. Jennings, 297 Kan. 2, 29, 298 P.3d 1083 (2013). The question of standing is one of law over which this court’s scope of review is unlimited. Cochran, 291 Kan. at 903.

Generally, to have standing, i.e., to have a right to make a legal claim or seek enforcement of a duty or right, a litigant must have a “sufficient stake in the outcome of an otherwise justiciable controversy in order to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy.” Moorhouse v. City of Wichita, 259 Kan. 570, 574, 913 P.2d 172 *1123(1996). Under the traditional test for standing in Kansas, “ ‘a person must demonstrate that he or she suffered a cognizable injury and that there is a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct.' ” Cochran, 291 Kan. at 908-09 (quoting Bremby, 286 Kan. at 761). We have also referred to the cognizable injury as an “ ‘injury in fact/ ” Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood v. Kline, 287 Kan. 372, 406, 197 P.3d 370 (2008). And this court occasionally cites the federal rule’s standing elements that “a party must present an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; the injury must be fairly traceable to the opposing party’s challenged action; and the injury must be re-dressable by a favorable ruling.” Ternes v. Galichia, 297 Kan. 918, 921, 305 P.3d 617 (2013).

As to standing’s first element of establishing a cognizable injury, more particularly we have held that “a party must establish a personal interest in a court’s decision and that he or she personally suffers some actual or threatened injury as a result of the challenged conduct.” Sierra Club v. Moser, 298 Kan. 22, 33, 310 P.3d 360 (2013). The injury must be particularized, i.e., it must affect the plaintiff in a “ ‘personal and individual way.’ ” 298 Kan. at 35 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 [1992]). It cannot be a “ ‘generalized grievance’ ” and must be more than “merely a general interest common to all members of the public.’ [Citations omitted.]” 504 U.S. at 575.

The burden to establish these elements of standing rests with the party asserting it. See, e.g., State ex rel. Stovall v. Reliance Ins. Co., 278 Kan. 777, 793, 107 P.3d 1219 (2005) (for third-party standing); DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 164 L. Ed. 2d 589 (2006) (for federal jurisdiction).

And the nature of that burden depends on the stage of the proceedings because the elements of standing are not merely pleading requirements. Each element must be proved in the same way as any other matter and with the degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. So because the panel apparently waited until after the trial to dismiss some claims based on lack of standing, and the State has waited *1124until the appeal to raise some standing arguments, tire facts alleged to prove standing must be “ ‘supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial.’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. In these civil proceedings the preponderance of the evidence standard applies. In re B.D.-Y., 286 Kan. 686, 691, 187 P.3d 594 (2008). Under this standard the plaintiffs’ evidence must show that “a fact is more probably true than not true.” 286 Kan. at 691.

The individual plaintiffs do not have standing to bring any claims.

Despite the panel’s finding that the only evidence regarding the individually named plaintiffs was their names and schools of attendance, the State contends the plaintiffs have failed to meet even that burden to present evidence identifying at least one of the individual plaintiffs by name and establishing that he or she attended public school in Kansas. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (facts necessary to establish standing “depend[] considerably upon whether the plaintiff himself is an object of the action”). As explained below, we agree.

In their cross-appellant’s brief, the plaintiffs assert that they “consist of students, parents of students, and school districts that represent all Kansas school children.” In support, they cite an excerpt from Caldwell v. State, No. 50,616 (Johnson County D. Ct., August 30, 1972), their amended petition, and testimony by two trial witnesses.

The Caldwell decision is of no support. There, the district court described the plaintiffs as “Michele Caldwell and Michael Caldwell, minors by and through James Caldwell, their father and next friend as representatives of a class composed of all public school pupils in Kansas.” Caldwell, No. 50,616. We do not have the Caldwell record before us to confirm that tire district court there certified a plaintiff class. But it is clear from the record in this case that the panel certified a class action only for the school districts and on only the capital outlay issue. So we must reject plaintiffs’ claim that the individual students in this case represent a class composed of all public school children.

*1125Turning to plaintiffs’ amended petition, they alleged without any substantive argument that the individual plaintiffs and plaintiff school districts have standing to bring all claims. In identically formatted paragraphs numbered 1-31, the amended petition identifies the individual plaintiffs, their next friends and guardians, and the school districts they purport to attend. For example:

“1. Plaintiff Luke Gannon, by next friends and guardians, Jeff and Meredith Gan-non, is a student attending public school at U.S.D. 259 and is a citizen and resident of the State of Kansas.”

The State’s amended answer declared that it lacked sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the allegations. And in the pretrial order, the State continued to assert that the plaintiffs lacked standing as a general defense to all claims and that it did not stipulate to the factual basis that would support the individual students’ standing.

At trial, the plaintiffs entered their amended petition into evidence as an exhibit by stipulation. But as their counsel admitted at oral arguments before this court, and as the trial transcript bears out, the parties only stipulated that both sides’ exhibits were admissible^—and not that tire exhibits were “accurate and true.” Consistent with this limited stipulation, plaintiffs’ counsel had expressed on the record his intention to the panel “to challenge every one” of the exhibits entered by the State.

When parties stipulate only to the admissibility of evidence, the stipulation is enforceable only to the extent of that agreed-upon condition. See State v. Gordon, 219 Kan. 643, 651,