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Full Opinion
dissenting.
The issue presented to us is much narrower than is suggested by the far-ranging arguments of the parties and their amici. Neither the tragic facts of the case, nor the importance of according proper deference to law enforcement professionals, should divert our attention from that issue. That issue is whether the restraining order entered by the Colorado trial court on June 4,1999, created a “property” interest that is protected from arbitrary deprivation by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is perfectly clear, on the one hand, that neither the Federal Constitution itself, nor any federal statute, granted respondent or her children any individual entitlement to police protection. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U. S. 189 (1989). Nor, I assume, does any Colorado statute create any such entitlement for the ordinary citizen. On the other hand, it is equally clear that federal law imposes no impediment to the creation of such an entitlement by Colorado law. Respondent certainly could have entered into a contract with a private security firm, obligating the firm to provide protection to respondent’s family; respondent’s interest in such a contract would unquestionably constitute “property” within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. If a Colorado statute enacted for her benefit, or a valid order entered by a Colorado judge, created the functional equivalent of such a private contract by granting respondent an entitlement to mandatory individual protection by the local police force, that state-created right would also qualify as “property” entitled to constitutional protection.
I do not understand the majority to rule out the foregoing propositions, although it does express doubts. See ante, at ‘ 766 (“[I]t is by no means clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement of a restraining order could constitute a
The central question in this case is therefore whether, as a matter of Colorado law, respondent had a right to police assistance comparable to the right she would have possessed to any other service the government or a private firm might have undertaken to provide. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent souree such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits”).
There was a time when our tradition of judicial restraint would have led this Court to defer to the judgment of more qualified tribunals in seeking the correct answer to that difficult question of Colorado law. Unfortunately, although the majority properly identifies the “central state-law question” in this case as “whether Colorado law gave respondent a right to police enforcement of the restraining order,” ante, at 758, it has chosen to ignore our settled practice by providing its own answer to that question. Before identifying the flaws in the Court’s ruling on the merits, I shall briefly comment on our past practice.
The majority’s decision to plunge ahead with its own analysis of Colorado law imprudently departs from this Court’s longstanding policy of paying “deference [to] the views of a federal court as to the law of a State within its jurisdiction.” Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U. S. 156, 167 (1998); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 346, and n. 10 (1976) (collecting cases). This policy is not only efficient, but it reflects “our belief that district courts and courts of appeals are better schooled in and more able to interpret the laws of their respective States.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 500-501 (1985); Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U. S. 620, 629-630 (1946) (endorsing “great deference to the views of the judges of those courts ‘who are familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law and practice’”). Accordingly, we have declined to show deference only in rare eases in which the court of appeals’ resolution of state law was “clearly wrong” or otherwise seriously deficient. See Brockett, 472 U. S., at 500, n. 9; accord, Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U. S. 137, 145 (1996) (per curiam).
Unfortunately, the Court does not even attempt to demonstrate that the six-judge en banc majority was “clearly wrong” in its interpretation of Colorado’s domestic restraining order statute; nor could such a showing be made. For it is certainly plausible to construe “shall use every reasonable means to enforce a restraining order” and “shall arrest,” Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-6-803.5(3)(a)-(b) (Lexis 1999) (emphasis added), as conveying mandatory directives to the police, particularly when the same statute, at other times, tellingly employs different language that suggests police discretion, see § 18-6-803.5(6)(a) (“A peace officer is authorized to use every reasonable means to protect... ”; “Such peace officer may transport ...” (emphasis added)).
r — i
Even if the Court had good reason to doubt the Court of Appeals’ determination of state law, it would, in my judgment, be a far wiser course to certify the question to the
Three flaws in the Court’s rather superficial analysis of the merits highlight the unwisdom of its decision to answer the state-law question de novo. First, the Court places undue weight on the various statutes throughout the country that seemingly mandate police enforcement but are generally understood to preserve police discretion. As a result, the Court gives short shrift to the unique case of “mandatory arrest” statutes in the domestic violence context; States passed a wave of these statutes in the 1980’s and 1990’s with the unmistakable goal of eliminating police discretion in this area. Second, the Court’s formalistic analysis fails to take seriously the fact that the Colorado statute at issue in this case was enacted for the benefit of the narrow class of persons who are beneficiaries of domestic restraining orders, and that the order at issue in this case was specifically intended to provide protection to respondent and her children. Finally, the Court is simply wrong to assert that a citizen’s interest in the government’s commitment to provide police enforcement in certain defined circumstances does not resemble any “traditional conception of property,” ante, at 766; in fact, a citizen’s property interest in such a commitment is just as concrete and worthy of protection as her interest in any other important service the government or a private firm has undertaken to provide.
In 1994, the Colorado General Assembly passed omnibus legislation targeting domestic violence. The part of the legislation at issue in this case mandates enforcement of a domestic restraining order upon probable cause of a violation, § 18-6-803.5(3), while another part directs that police officers “shall, without undue delay, arrest” a suspect upon “probable cause to believe that a crime or offense of domestic violence
Thus, when Colorado passed its statute in 1994, it joined the ranks of 15 States that mandated arrest for domestic violence offenses and 19 States that mandated arrest for domestic restraining order violations. See Developments in the Law, 106 Harv. L. Rev., at 1537, n. 68 (noting statutes in 1993); N. Miller, Institute for Law and Justice, A Law Enforcement and Prosecution Perspective 7, and n. 74,8, and n. 90 (2003), http://www.ilj.org/dv/dvvawa2000.htm (as visited June 24,2005, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (listing Colorado among the many States that currently have mandatory arrest statutes).
Given the specific purpose of these statutes, there can be no doubt that the Colorado Legislature used the term “shall” advisedly in its domestic restraining order statute. While
While Colorado case law does not speak to the question, it is instructive that other state courts interpreting their analogous statutes have not only held that they eliminate the police’s traditional discretion to refuse enforcement, but have
Indeed, the Court fails to come to terms with the wave of domestic violence statutes that provides the crucial context for understanding Colorado’s law. The Court concedes that, “in the specific context of domestic violence, mandatory-arrest Statutes have been found in some States to be more mandatory than traditional mandatory-arrest statutes,” ante, at 762, but that is a serious understatement. The difference is not a matter of degree, but of kind. Before this wave of statutes, the legal rule was one of discretion; as the Court shows, the “traditional,” general mandatory arrest statutes have always been understood to be “mandatory” in name only, see ante, at 760. The innovation of the domestic violence statutes was to make police enforcement, not “more mandatory,” but simply mandatory. If, as the Court says, the existence of a protected “entitlement” turns on whether “government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion,” ante, at 756, the new mandatory statutes undeniably create an entitlement to police enforcement of restraining orders.
Perhaps recognizing this point, the Court glosses over the dispositive question — whether the police enjoyed discretion to deny enforcement — and focuses on a different question— which “precise means of enforcement,” ante, at 763, were called for in this case. But that question is a red herring. The statute directs that, upon probable cause of a violation, “a peace officer shall arrest, or, if an arrest would be impractical under the circumstances, seek a warrant for the arrest of a restrained person.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (Lexis 1999). Regardless of whether the enforcement called for in this case was arrest or the seeking of an arrest warrant (the answer to that question probably changed over the course of the night as the respondent gave the police more information about the husband’s whereabouts), the crucial point is that, under the statute, the police were required to provide enforcement; they lacked the discretion to do noth
Because the statute's guarantee of police enforcement is triggered by, and operates only in reference to, a judge’s granting of a restraining order in favor of an identified “ ‘protected person,’ ” there is simply no room to suggest that such a person has received merely an “ ‘incidental’ ” or “ ‘indirect’ ” benefit, see ante, at 766-767. As one state court put it, domestic restraining order statutes “identify with precision when, to whom, and under what circumstances police protection must be afforded. The legislative purpose in requiring the police to enforce individual restraining orders clearly is to protect the named persons for whose protection the order is issued, not to protect the community at large by general law enforcement activity.” Nearing, 295 Ore., at 712, 670 P. 2d, at 143.
IV
Given that Colorado law has quite clearly eliminated the police’s discretion to deny enforcement, respondent is correct that she had much more than a “unilateral expectation” that the restraining order would be enforced; rather, she had a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to enforcement. Roth, 408 U. S., at 577. Recognizing respondent’s property interest in the enforcement of her restraining order is fully consistent with our precedent. This Court has “made clear that the property interests protected by procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.” Id., at 571-572. The “types of interests protected as ‘property’ are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating ‘to the whole domain of social and economic fact.’” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 430 (1982); see also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 601 (1972) (“ ‘[Property’ interests subject to procedural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather, ‘property’ denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by ‘existing rules or understandings’ ”). Thus, our cases have found “property” interests in a number of state-conferred benefits and services, including welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S. 254 (1970); disability benefits, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319 (1976); public education, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975); utility services, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1 (1978); government employment, Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v.
Police enforcement of a restraining order is a government service that is no less concrete and no less valuable than other government services, such as education.
Because respondent had a property interest in the enforcement of the restraining order, state officials could not deprive her of that interest without observing fair procedures.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The Court of Appeals also looked to other provisions of the statute to inform its analysis. In particular, it reasoned that a provision that gave police officers qualified immunity in connection with their enforcement of
The Court declines to show deference for the odd reason that, in its view, the Court of Appeals did not “draw upon a deep well of state-specific expertise,” ante, at 757, but rather examined the statute’s text and legislative history and distinguished arguably relevant Colorado case law. See ante, at 757, and n. 4. This rationale makes a mockery of our traditional practice, for it is precisely when there is no state law on point that the presumption that circuits have local expertise plays any useful role. When a circuit’s resolution of a novel question of state law is grounded on a concededly complete review of all the pertinent state-law materials, that decision is entitled to deference. Additionally, it should be noted that this is not a case in which the Court of Appeals and the District Court disagreed on the relevant issue of state law; rather, those courts disagreed only over the extent to which a probable-cause determination requires the exercise of discretion. Compare 366 F. 3d, at 1105-1110, with App. to Pet. for Cert. 122a (District Court opinion).
See Colo. Rule App. Proc. 21.1(a) (Colorado Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States or another federal court if those questions “may be determinative of the cause” and “as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the [Colorado] Supreme Court”).
See Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P. 2d 585, 590 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (in interpreting an ambiguous statute, the Colorado Supreme Court will consider legislative history and the “consequences of a particular construction”); ibid. (“ ‘Because we also presume that legislation is intended to have just and reasonable effects, we must construe statutes accordingly and apply them so as to ensure such results’ ”). Additionally, it is possible that the Colorado Supreme Court would have better access to (and greater facility with) relevant pieces of legislative history beyond those that we have before us. That court may also choose to give certain evidence of legislative intent greater weight than would be customary for this Court. See, e. g., Brief for Peggy Kerns et al. as Amici Curiae (bill sponsor explaining the Colorado General Assembly’s intent in passing the domestic restraining order statute).
Citing similar considerations, the Second Circuit certified questions of state law to the Connecticut Supreme Court when it was faced with a procedural due process claim involving a statute that arguably mandated the removal of children upon probable cause of child abuse. See Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F. 3d 51 (2003). The Connecticut Supreme Court accepted
The Court is correct that I would take an “anyone-but-us approach,” ante, at 758, n. 5, to the question of who decides the issue of Colorado. law in this case. Both options that I favor — deferring to the Circuit’s interpretation or, barring that, certifying to the Colorado Supreme Court — recognize the comparative expertise of another tribunal on questions of state law. And both options offer their own efficiencies. By contrast, the Court’s somewhat overconfident “only us” approach lacks any cogent justification. The fact that neither party requested certification certainly cannot be a sufficient reason for dismissing that option. As with abstention, the considerations that weigh in favor of certification— federal-state comity, constitutional avoidance, judicial efficiency, the desire to settle correctly a recurring issue of state law — transcend the interests of individual litigants, rendering it imprudent to cast them as gatekeepers to the procedure. See, e. g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U. S. 647, 662 (1978) (certifying state-law issue absent a request from the parties); Aldrich
See Fuller & Stansberry, 1994 Legislature Strengthens Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 23 Colo. Lawyer 2327 (1994) (“The 1994 Colorado legislative session produced several significant domestic abuse bills that strengthened both civil and criminal restraining order laws and procedures for victims of domestic violence”); id., at 2329 (“Although many law enforcement jurisdictions already take a proactive approach to domestic violence, arrest and procedural policies vary greatly from one jurisdiction to another. H. B. 94-1253 mandates the arrest of domestic violence perpetrators and restraining order violaters. H. B. 94-1090 repeals the requirement that protected parties show a copy of their restraining order to enforcing officers. In the past, failure to provide a copy of the restraining order has led to hesitation from police to enforce the order for fear of an illegal arrest. The new statute also shields arresting officers from liability; this is expected to reduce concerns about enforcing the mandatory arrest requirements” (footnotes omitted)).
See Sack 1669 (“The movement to strengthen arrest policies was bolstered in 1984 by the publication of the results of a study on mandatory arrest in domestic violence cases that had been conducted in Minneapolis. In this study, police handled randomly assigned domestic violence offenders by using one of three different responses: arresting the offender, mediating the dispute or requiring the offender to leave the house for eight hours. The study concluded that in comparison with the other two re
See also Brief for International Municipal Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae 6 (“Colorado is not alone in mandating the arrest of persons who violate protective orders. Some 19 states require an arrest when a police officer has probable cause to believe that such orders have been violated” (collecting statutes)).
See Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But is It Enough? 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 533, 541-542, 544-546 (describing the problems that attend a discretionary arrest regime: “Even when probable cause is present, police officers still frequently try to calm the parties and act as mediators.. .. Three studies found the arrest rate to range between 3% and 10% when the decision to arrest is left to police discretion. Another study found that the police made arrests in only 13% of the cases where the victim had visible injuries.... Police officers often employ irrelevant criteria such as the ‘reason’ for the abuse or the severity of the victim’s injuries in making their decision to arrest.. . . Some [officers] may feel strongly that police should not interfere in family arguments or lovers’ quarrels. Such attitudes make police much more likely to investigate intent and provocation, and consider them as mitigating factors, in responding to domestic violence calls than in other types of cases” (footnotes omitted)); see also Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 Pace L. Rev. 97, 98 (1995). C£ Sack 1671-1672 (“Mandatory arrest policies have significantly increased the number of arrests of batterers for domestic violence crimes. ... In New York City, from 1993, the time the mandatory arrest policy was-instituted, to 1999, felony domestic violence arrests increased 33%, misdemeanor domestic violence arrests rose 114%, and arrests for violation of orders of protection were up 76%”).
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the “widespread refusal or failure of police officers to remove persons involved in episodes of domestic violence was presented to the legislature as the main reason for tightening the law so as to require enforcement of restraining orders by mandatory arrest and custody.” Nearing, 295 Ore., at 709, 670 P. 2d, at 142.
Under the Court’s reading of the statute, a police officer with probable cause is mandated to seek an arrest warrant if arrest is “impractical under the circumstances,” but then enjoys unfettered discretion in deciding whether to execute that warrant. Ante, at 764. This is an unlikely reading given that the statute was motivated by a profound distrust of police discreti