United States v. Cameron

Following a bench trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, Defendant-Appellant James M. Cameron (“Cameron”) was convicted of thirteen counts for crimes involving child pornography. Cameron now appeals, challenging various rulings by the district court before and after the trial. The challenged rulings include: (1) the denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment for insufficiency and for improper venue, United States v. Cameron (Cameron I), 662 F.Supp.2d 177 (D.Me.2009); (2) the denial of a motion to suppress evidence allegedly seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, United States v. Cameron (Cameron II), 729 F.Supp.2d 418 (D.Me.2010); (3) the denial of a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence on Confrontation Clause grounds, United States v. Cameron (Cameron III), 733 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.Me.2010); and (4) the calculation of the number of child pornography images attributable to Cameron for sentencing purposes.

This case presents complex questions of first impression in this Circuit regarding the admissibility of evidence in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. After careful review, we conclude that the admission of certain evidence violated Cameron’s Confrontation Clause rights. We further conclude that the admission of this evidence was harmless as to some counts of conviction (Counts Six, Seven, Nine, Ten, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fifteen), but not as to others (Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Eleven, and Fourteen). We thus reverse Cameron’s convictions on certain counts and remand for re-sentencing, or a new trial if the government wishes to so proceed.

I. Background

A. Business and Regulatory Background

Before delving into the particular facts of Cameron’s case, we recite some background facts regarding the technologies, business practices, and regulations at issue here.

During 2006 and 2007, Yahoo!, Inc. (“Yahoo!”) offered a service (which has since been discontinued) called “Yahoo! Photo” that allowed users to upload photographs to the Internet. Users could then share photographs with other Yahoo! Photo users. Each Yahoo! Photo album was linked to a particular Yahoo! “user” or “account.” In turn, each “account” was designated by a “Login Name” (sometimes referred to as a “username” or “screen name”), such as “lilhotteeOOOOO,” one of the screen names at issue in this case. A Yahoo! user might use multiple other Yahoo! services in addition to Yahoo! Photo, such as email.

Whenever a person created a Yahoo! account, Yahoo! recorded certain information, some of which was captured automatically and some of which was entered by the person who created the account. One piece of information that was automatically collected was the “Registration IP Address,” which was the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address from which the account was created.1 Yahoo! also automatically re*628corded the date and time at which the account was created. Yahoo! recorded this information in an “Account Management Tool,” which it maintained for the life of a Yahoo! account. Further, whenever a user logged into a Yahoo! account, Yahoo! automatically recorded the date and time of the login as well as the IP address from which the login occurred. Yahoo! stored this information in a “Login Tracker.” The record indicates that, during the relevant time period, Yahoo! kept login records in its Login Tracker for sixty days.

During the same time period, Google, Inc. (“Google”) provided a service (also since discontinued) called “Google Hello.” Google Hello allowed users to sign in with a username and then chat and trade photos with other users over the Internet. Google automatically maintained records indicating the times at which a user logged into and out of Google Hello, as well as the IP address from which the user accessed the service (“Google Hello Connection Logs”).

At the relevant time, businesses such as Google and Yahoo! had (and still have to this day) a duty to report any apparent violation of federal child pornography laws to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”). See 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1) (1998) (creating a reporting duty for any entity “engaged in providing an electronic communication service or a remote computing service to the public, through a facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce”) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2258A(a)(l) (2012)). NCMEC is a non-profit organization that receives an annual grant from Congress to perform various functions related to preventing the exploitation of children. See 42 U.S.C. § 5773(b) (2012). Among these functions is the operation of a “cyber tip-line to provide ... electronic service providers an effective means of reporting” child pornography and other Internet-related crimes targeting children. Id. § 5773(b)(1)(F). NCMEC’s “cyber tipline” is called the “CyberTipline.” Once NCMEC receives a report of a possible child pornography crime via the CyberTipline, it determines “the appropriate international, Federal, State or local law enforcement agency for investigation” and forwards the report to that agency. Id.

B. Yahoo! Reports to NCMEC

On March 15, 2007, Yahoo! received an anonymous report that child pornography images were contained in a Yahoo! Photo account belonging to a user with the user-name “lilhottyohh.” The record does not indicate that Yahoo! knew, or ever attempted to find out, who made the anonymous report. In response to the anonymous tip, Yahoo! personnel searched the “lilhottyohh” account and discovered images that they believed to be child pornography. It is not known which Yahoo! employee conducted the search.

Yahoo! had an established process for dealing with reports of child pornography. If Yahoo! learned of child pornography in an account, an employee in Yahool’s Customer Care Department temporarily removed the content from public view and reviewed it. If he or she determined that the account contained child pornography, Yahoo! deactivated the account and notified the Legal Department. Meanwhile, the Customer Care Department created an archive of all the images associated with the account, including the date and time each image was uploaded and the IP ad*629dress from which it was uploaded. If the Legal Department agreed that any images were child pornography, it then sent an electronic report to NCMEC via the CyberTipline. Each report (“Yahoo! CP Report” or “CP Report”) listed a “Suspect Screen Name,” a “Suspect Email Address,” a “Suspect URL,”2 and a “Suspect IP Address.” The “Suspect IP Address” was the IP address that Yahoo! “associated” with the user; it is not clear from the record whether this IP address was the “Registration IP Address” stored in the Account Management Tool, or if it was some other IP address. One could argue, as the government seemed to do at trial, that it is the IP address from which the last image was uploaded onto the account, as in some CP Reports the “Suspect IP Address” is different from the “Registration IP Address” contained in the Account Management Tool for the same account. The “Suspect Email Address” was the Yahoo! email address of the Yahoo! user the CP Report pertained to, and the “Suspect URL” was the Internet location where the user’s photos could be found.

Each CP Report also included a table listing the child pornography images being sent with the report. Yahoo! attached to each report the suspected child pornography images. For each child pornography image, Yahoo! listed the date and time at which the image was uploaded and the IP address from which it was uploaded (“Image Upload Data”). In addition, Yahoo attached data from the Account Management Tool and Login Tracker to each CP Report. Whenever Yahoo! sent a CP Report to NCMEC, Yahoo! automatically stored a receipt. The receipt included a unique number assigned to the report by NCMEC and a record of what Yahoo! reported to NCMEC, including the attachments to the CP Report.

In this case, Yahoo! sent a CP Report of the child pornography in the “lilhottyohh” account to NCMEC. Subsequently, Yahoo! sent additional CP Reports to NCMEC of child pornography found in the accounts of the users “lilhotteeOOOO” and “harddudeOOOO.” All three CP Reports listed the same “Suspect IP Address”: 76.179.26.185.

C. ICAC Seizes Cameron’s Computers

On August 3, 2007, NCMEC sent a report (“CyberTipline Report”) of child pornography found in the “lilhotteeOOOOO” Yahoo! account to the Maine State Police Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”) unit. NCMEC later sent another CyberTipline Report to ICAC, this time regarding child pornography found in the Yahoo! Photo account of user “harddudeOOOO.” Both CyberTipline Reports listed the same IP Address, 76.179.26.185, in the “Suspect Information” section. Each report also noted that “[t]he IP included in this report is the most recent file or image upload IP available,” and then listed the date and time of the most recent upload.3

*630ICAC detective Laurie Northrup (“Northrup”) determined that the IP address 76.179.26.185 was part of a pool of IP addresses that Time Warner, an Internet Service Provider (“ISP”), distributed to its Internet access customers. Through a subpoena to Time Warner, Northrup determined that the IP address 76.179.26.185 had been assigned to the Cameron residence in Hallowell, Maine during the relevant time periods. On December 21, 2007, Maine police executed a search warrant at the Cameron residence. Officers found four computers at the residence: a Compaq desktop, a Dell laptop, an HP desktop with an external hard drive, and an eMachines desktop with an external hard drive. ICAC also executed a search warrant at Cameron’s workplace and seized his office computer. ICAC’s preliminary examination of the computers in Cameron’s home (conducted on site) indicated possible child pornography on the HP desktop. This examination also indicated that certain Yahoo! accounts had been accessed from the eMachines computer. Northrup later requested information from NCMEC related to these accounts.

In March of 2008, forensic examiner Scott Bradeen (“Bradeen”) examined Cameron’s five computers and external hard drives. For each computer, Bradeen determined the IP addresses from which the computer had accessed the Internet. Bradeen found evidence that someone had accessed seventeen different Yahoo! accounts, including those that were the subject of the reports that NCMEC originally sent to ICAC, from various computers in Cameron’s home. In addition, Bradeen found child pornography images and transcripts indicating that someone using Cameron’s computers had signed into Google Hello using one or more usernames to send and receive child pornography images. Bradeen found child pornography images on Cameron’s Dell laptop and on his HP desktop. Bradeen found no child pornography on the Compaq desktop or on the eMachines desktop. However, the Internet history stored on the eMachines desktop showed that someone had executed Internet searches for terms related to child pornography.

D. ICAC Search Warrants to Yahoo! and Google

ICAC subsequently served search warrants on Yahoo! for information about the Yahoo! accounts that had been accessed from Cameron’s computers. The data produced by Yahoo! in response to the search warrants included emails that had been sent to and from those accounts. The emails indicated that on at least one occasion, someone using the “harddudeOOOO” Yahoo! account sent child pornography to another individual via email and received child pornography via email in response. Yahoo! also produced the receipts of its Yahoo! Reports to NCMEC, the “Account Management Tool,” and the “Login Tracker” for each account; however, it is not clear if Yahoo! produced the Image Upload Data. In addition, Yahoo! produced disks containing images of child pornography found in the accounts in question.

ICAC also served search warrants on Google for information regarding the Google Hello accounts accessed from Cameron’s computers. In response, Google provided the Google Hello Connection Logs for the specified user accounts.

E. Indictment and Pre-Trial Proceedings

On February 11, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Cameron on sixteen counts of *631child pornography-related crimes. The counts included ten counts of knowingly transporting child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(l) and 2256(8)(A); four counts of knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2) and 2256(8)(A); and two counts of knowingly possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2256(8)(A). Each of the counts recited a specific date on which Cameron allegedly transported, received, or possessed child pornography. Of the ten counts of transporting child pornography, seven alleged the uploading of child pornography images to Yahoo! Photo accounts; two alleged the sending of child pornography via Google Hello; and one alleged both the uploading of child pornography to Yahoo! Photos and the sending of child pornography via Google Hello. Of the four counts of receiving child pornography, three alleged that Cameron had received child pornography via Google Hello, and one alleged that Cameron had received child pornography via a Yahoo! email account. All of the transportation counts alleging uploads to Yahoo! Photo specified the Yahoo! usernames Cameron allegedly used. The indictment further alleged that all of the crimes charged occurred in the District of Maine.

Cameron filed three motions prior to trial that are relevant to this appeal. First, on May 18, 2009, Cameron moved to dismiss all counts of the indictment. See Cameron I, 662 F.Supp.2d at 179. Cameron made a host of arguments, two of which demand our attention here. The first was that all counts of the indictment should be dismissed for insufficient pleading. Specifically, Cameron argued that dismissal was warranted because the indictment did not specify the images that were alleged to be child pornography. Id. at 180. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the indictment satisfied the First

Circuit’s specificity requirement because each count of the indictment tracked the statutory language and set forth the elements of the offense. Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Serino, 835 F.2d 924, 929 (1st Cir.1987)). Cameron also argued that venue in Maine was improper for three counts because he was not in Maine on the dates of the alleged offenses. Id. at 182-183. The court found that venue was proper because the indictment alleged that the child pornography images on which those counts were based had moved into Maine at some point. Id. at 183. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (venue is proper in any district where the offense was started, continued, or completed).

Second, on July 2, 2010, Cameron moved to suppress all evidence resulting from Yahool’s searches for child pornography in Yahoo! Photo accounts that occurred before Yahoo! received search warrants from ICAC. See Cameron II, 729 F.Supp.2d at 419. Cameron contended that Yahoo! acted as an agent of the government when it searched password-protected accounts for child pornography before reporting to NCMEC. Therefore, Cameron argued, the searches violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Furthermore, Cameron contended that because these allegedly illegal searches were the basis of YahooPs CP Reports to NCMEC, and because NCMEC’s resulting CyberTipline Reports to ICAC started the government’s investigation, all evidence seized by ICAC should be suppressed as well.

The district court rejected Cameron’s argument because it found that Yahoo! had not acted as a government agent. See id. at 422-23. Relying on this court’s three-part test from United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir.2009), to be discussed further infra, the district court held that *632because Yahoo! voluntarily searched the accounts for its own interests and without direction by the government, it did not act as a government agent. Cameron II, 729 F.Supp.2d at 423-24. The court noted that in a similar case, the Fourth Circuit held that an online email provider did not act as a government agent when it searched the defendant’s emails for child pornography and reported it to NCMEC. Id. (citing United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 363-67 (4th Cir.2010)).

Finally, also on July 2, 2010, Cameron filed a motion in limine to exclude all images and other material provided by Yahoo!, Google, and NCMEC. Cameron III, 733 F.Supp.2d at 183. The government had indicated that it did not intend to call as witnesses the original authors of the Yahoo! Reports to NCMEC, NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports to ICAC, or the Yahoo! records that were attached to the Yahoo! Reports (and then forwarded to ICAC with the CyberTipline Reports) or produced in response to search warrants. Based on this absence of witnesses, Cameron argued that the introduction of this evidence would violate his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 185.4

The district court denied Cameron’s motion without prejudice. The court noted that the Confrontation Clause was implicated only if the prosecution sought to introduce “testimonial” statements without making the declarant available for cross-examination. Id. at 186 (citing United States v. Figueroa-Cartagena, 612 F.3d 69, 84 (1st Cir.2010)). However, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court suggested that “business records” were not considered “testimonial.” 541 U.S. 36, 56, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Thus, the court considered whether the records in question could be admitted as “business records” under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The court held that as long as the government could successfully authenticate the Yahoo! records and establish that they were kept in the ordinary course of business, they would be admissible as business records, and, therefore, the Confrontation Clause would not be implicated. Cameron III, 733 F.Supp.2d at 188-89. The court also ruled that the NCMEC reports and attached images were admissible as business records because NCMEC simply forwarded information it received from Yahoo!, information which itself consisted of business records. Id. at 189.

F. Trial

Cameron requested a bench trial, which began on August 16, 2010. The government voluntarily dismissed one of the two possession counts before trial. At trial, the government introduced evidence from Yahoo! via the testimony of Christian Lee (“Lee”), a Yahoo! employee. Lee was a Legal Assistant in Yahoo!’s Legal Compliance Department who had no technical training, but who testified that he was knowledgeable about Yahoo!’s data retention and legal procedures. Lee testified about the information that Yahoo! kept about its users. See Part I.A. In particular, Lee stated that Yahoo! automatically recorded the data in the Account Management Tool and the Login Tracker in the regular course of its business in order to “provide reliable and accurate data about its customer accounts.” Lee also testified that, as part of its ordinary business practice, Yahoo! automatically stored a receipt *633of each CP Report it sent to NCMEC, as well as the attachments, including the Image Upload Data.

Moreover, despite Cameron’s objection, the government introduced the Account Management Tool data, the Login Tracker data, and the receipts of Yahoo’s CP Reports to NCMEC. The government also introduced compact discs containing the child pornography found in various accounts and other data, including emails, produced in response to the search warrants. However, it does not appear from the record that the government introduced the Image Upload Data (or that the government even had this data).5

The government introduced the Google Hello Connection Logs through the testimony of Google employee Colin Bogart (“Bogart”). Bogart was an employee in Google’s Legal Compliance Department and, like Lee, had no technical training. Bogart testified that he retrieved the Google Hello Connection Logs by using an internal Google program that allowed him to enter a username and retrieve the Logs for that username. Bogart testified that Google recorded this login information automatically and that it relied on this information for its regular business activities.

The government introduced the NCMEC CyberTipline Reports through the testimony of John Shehan (“Shehan”), the executive director of NCMEC. Shehan testified that once a report is received through the CyberTipline, NCMEC’s staff reviews the suspected images and conducts an online search regarding the provided suspect information. According to him, this query is aimed at identifying the appropriate law enforcement agency with jurisdiction to investigate the suspected child pornography activity. Although NCMEC does not alter the information it receives via the CyberTipline in any way — other than to record a unique “report ID” and an “entry date,” — Shehan noted that sometimes NCMEC employees would annotate the CyberTipline Reports with their own analysis regarding the information contained therein.6

In the instant case, each time a NCMEC employee finished processing the information contained in a Yahoo! CP Report, he or she would create a CyberTipline Report and forward it to the appropriate law enforcement agency, here the ICAC Unit belonging to the Maine State Police. As we briefly described earlier, the CyberTipline Reports received by ICAC contained several sections, among them a “Reporting Person Information” section which reflected YahooFs contact information, as well as a “Suspect Information” section, which provided the user name, e-mail and IP Address of the account associated with the images. According to the reports themselves, the IP Address was that of the computer that originated the most recent image file upload. It is unclear exactly how NCMEC extracted this IP Address or how it determined the date and time of the last image upload, information which also appeared on the reports. The only logical conclusion we can draw from the record is that someone at NCMEC analyzed the Image Upload Data attached to the Yahoo! *634CP Reports and selected the IP address from which the most recent image had been uploaded, along with the date and time of the upload, and included this information in the CyberTipline Report. As we will see later on, this is of particular import to Cameron’s argument that the admission of these reports violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause.

Armed with these CyberTipline Reports, ICAC detectives were eventually able to obtain several search warrants against Cameron’s home and office. The government introduced evidence regarding what ICAC found through these searches via the testimony of Bradeen and Northrup. Bradeen testified about the child pornography he found on Cameron’s computers and about the evidence he found showing that various Yahoo! and Google Hello accounts had been accessed from those computers. Bradeen also testified about the IP addresses from which Cameron’s computers had accessed the Internet. Some of these IP addresses matched the IP addresses included in the CyberTipline Reports that NCMEC had created for the different Yahoo! accounts. For example, there was evidence that all four computers seized at Cameron’s home had accessed the Internet at some point through IP address 76.179.26.185, which was the IP address listed on CyberTipline Reports for “lilhotteeOOOOO” and “harddudeOOOO.” Bradeen also testified that Cameron’s HP desktop had accessed the Internet through IP address 24.198.90.108, which the Google Hello evidence showed was an IP address from which a Google Hello user had logged in to trade child pornography.

Additionally, the government introduced evidence showing that, on the specific dates of the transportation and receipt crimes charged in the indictment, Cameron’s computers had been assigned the IP addresses from which those crimes had been committed. For example, through a witness from Time Warner, Cameron’s ISP, the government introduced records showing that the Time Warner account for Cameron’s residence had been assigned certain IP addresses on certain dates. To show that child pornography had actually been uploaded on the dates alleged in the indictment, and to show that it had been uploaded from the IP address that Cameron had on those dates, the government relied on the CyberTipline Reports; it does not appear from the record that the government introduced the Image Upload Data into evidence (or even that it had this information in the first place). The government also introduced extensive evidence to show that no one else living in Cameron’s household at the time (Cameron lived with his wife and two minor children) could have committed the offenses in the indictment.

To show that the images alleged to be child pornography did in fact depict minors, the government relied on the testimony of Dr. Lawrence Ricci (“Ricci”), a physician and child abuse expert. Ricci analyzed the images by determining into which “Tanner Stage” the persons depicted in the images fell. There are five “Tanner Stages” of “secondary sexual development,” the first being Stage I, at which there is no evidence of such development. Ricci analyzed the images recovered from Cameron’s computers “very conservatively” and identified as minors only those persons whom he considered to be at Stage I, even though children generally reach Stage II between the ages of ten and fourteen.

G. Conviction and Sentencing

Following the bench trial, the district court found Cameron guilty of eight counts of transporting child pornography, four counts of receiving child pornography, and *635one count of possessing child pornography. The court found Cameron not guilty on two of the transportation counts — one related to the uploading of photos to Yahoo! Photo and one relating to the sending of photos over Google Hello — because the court could not conclusively find that the persons in the images connected to those counts were minors. Cameron filed a motion for new trial, in which he renewed his Confrontation Clause arguments, but the district court rejected that motion. See United States v. Cameron (Cameron IV), 762 F.Supp.2d 152, 159-60, 165 (D.Me.2011).

The court sentenced Cameron to 192 months in prison, followed by ten years of supervised release. The sentence was based in part on the court’s calculation that Cameron’s offenses involved “at least 300, but fewer than 600” images of child pornography, which triggered a sentence enhancement under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(C) (2012).

Cameron now appeals his conviction and sentence.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Cameron again raises many of the challenges he made in his pre-trial motions. First, he argues that the district court erred in not dismissing all counts of the indictment for lack of specificity. Second, he argues that the District of Maine was not the proper venue for two of the counts of conviction. Third, he argues that the district court erred in failing to suppress all evidence derived from Yahoo!’s allegedly illegal search of password-protected Yahoo! accounts. Fourth, he argues that the admission of evidence from Yahoo!, Google, and NCMEC violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Finally, he argues that his sentence was erroneous because the district court erred in finding that at least 300 images were involved. We address Cameron’s arguments in turn.

A. Sufficiency of the Indictment

Cameron argues that the indictment is insufficient because it fails to identify the specific images that each offense was based on. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c)(1) states that an indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). “When grading an indictment’s sufficiency, we look to see whether the document sketches out the elements of the crime and the nature of the charge so that the defendant can prepare a defense and plead double jeopardy in any future prosecution for the same offense.” United States v. Guerrier, 669 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2011). The sufficiency of an indictment is a question of law which we review de novo. Id. (describing question of sufficiency as a “legal issue” to which de novo review applies).

We conclude that the indictment was sufficient. As the district court correctly noted, each count of the indictment included the following information: a description of the offense that tracks the language of the relevant statute, the date of the offense, the type of child pornography involved (digital images), and the means by which Cameron either transported (for example, by uploading to a specified Yahoo! Photos album), received, or possessed the child pornography in question. See Cameron I, 662 F.Supp.2d at 180-81. Cameron’s argument that the indictment is insufficient because it failed to identify the specific images that each offense was based on is unavailing. As the district court correctly noted, neither the statutes under which Cameron was charged nor Rule 7(c)(1) itself requires such specificity. See id. at 180. Thus, we *636agree with the district court that the indictment in this case satisfies Fed. R.Crim.P. 7(c)(l)’s requirements.

B. Venue

Cameron argues that venue in Maine was improper for Counts Twelve and Thirteen of the indictment because he was in New York on the dates alleged. Counts Twelve and Thirteen alleged that on August 11, 2007, Cameron transported and received child pornography, respectively, using Google Hello. Cameron argues that since he and his computer were physically located in New York, venue was only proper in New York.

“The right to be tried in the appropriate venue is one of the constitutional protections provided to defendants by the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir.2001). As such, “[t]he burden of showing proper venue is on the government, which must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. However, “[w]e review the evidence on venue in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. at 35. We review legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 34.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (2012), a crime involving interstate commerce can be “prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such commerce, mail matter, or imported object or person moves.” Transporting and receiving child pornography via Internet services such as Google Hello are both crimes involving interstate commerce. See id. § 2252A(a)(l) (making it illegal to “transporte ]” child pornography “using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer”); id. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (making it illegal to receive “any child pornography that has been mailed, or using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer”). In addition, the district court found from the evidence at trial that the child pornography images Cameron sent and received while in New York were stored on Cameron’s Dell Laptop, which he later brought back to Maine. Thus, because the objects of Cameron’s commerce moved into the District of Maine, venue there was proper.

We further note that finding venue in Maine is consistent with the purpose of the Constitution’s venue protection, which is to “ensure[ ] that a criminal defendant cannot be tried in a distant, remote, or unfriendly forum solely at the prosecutor’s whim.” United States v. Salinas, 373 F.3d 161, 164 (1st Cir.2004). Since Cameron lives in Maine, the District of Maine cannot be “distant” or “remote” for him, and there is no evidence that the District Court was an “unfriendly” forum.

C. Motion to Suppress

Cameron argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He posits that Yahool’s search for child pornography in password-protected accounts violated the Fourth Amendment because Yahoo! acted as an agent of the government. Cameron further contends that, because the Yahoo! CP Reports to NCMEC were the result of Yahooi’s search, and because NCMEC sent Cyber-Tipline Reports to ICAC after receiving Yahoo!’s reports, all subsequent searches executed by ICAC at Cameron’s home or executed via search warrants served on Yahoo! and Google derived from Yahool’s original illegal searches. Thus, Cameron argues, all evidence obtained as a result of searches conducted during ICAC’s investigation should have been suppressed.

*637In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court reviews the facts “in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling,” and will review any “findings of fact and credibility determinations for clear error.” United States v. Camacho, 661 F.3d 718, 723 (1st Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “ ‘A clear error exists only if, after considering all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 529 (1st Cir.1996)). “[W]e will uphold a denial of a motion to suppress if any reasonable view of the evidence supports it.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s conclusions of law, including its application of the law to the facts.” Id. at 724. “The appellant bears the burden of showing a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment states that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The Supreme Court has consistently construed the Fourth Amendment protection as limiting only governmental action.” United States v. Momoh, 427 F.3d 137, 140 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Fourth Amendment does not apply “to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A private search only implicates the Fourth Amendment if the private party acts as a “government agent.” Silva, 554 F.3d at 18. In Silva, we established that in determining whether a private party has acted as a government agent, courts must consider three factors: (1) “the extent of the government’s role in instigating or participating in the search”; (2) “[the government’s] intent and the degree of control it exercises over the search and the private party”; and (3) “the extent to which the private party aims primarily to help the government or to serve its own interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We will not find that a private party has acted as an agent of the government “simply because the government has a stake in the outcome of a search.” Id.

Here, as to the first Silva factor, there is no evidence that the government had any role in instigating or participating in the search. Yahoo! began searching Cameron’s accounts after it received an anonymous tip regarding child pornography in the Yahoo! Photo album of user “lilhottyohh.” There is no evidence that the person who sent this tip to Yahoo! was a government employee. Cameron contends that the Yahoo! employees who searched his accounts likely had “strong connections to law enforcement.” However, this contention is rank speculation on Cameron’s part, with no support in the record.

As to the second Silva factor, there is no evidence that the Government exercised any control over Yahoo! or over the search. As discussed above, Yahoo! employees conducted the search pursuant to Yahool’s own internal policy. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the Government compelled Yahoo! in any way to maintain such a policy. Cameron points to the fact that Yahoo had a duty under federal law to *638report child pornography to NCMEC in August of 2007. See 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1) (repealed 2008). However, the statute did not impose any obligation to search for child pornography, merely an obligation to report child pornography of which Yahoo! became aware.

Finally, as to the third Silva factor, it is certainly the case that combating child pornography is a government interest. However, this does not mean that Yahoo! cannot voluntarily choose to have the same interest. As discussed above, there is no evidence that the government instigated the search, participated in the search, or coerced Yahoo! to conduct the search. Thus, if Yahoo! chose to implement a policy of searching for child pornography, it presumably did so for its own interests. The record does not reflect what YahooPs interests might have been, but it is Cameron’s burden to show that Yahoo! did what it did to further the government’s interest, and he can point to no evidence to carry this burden.

Having applied the Silva factors, we conclude that Yahoo! was not acting as an agent of the government; therefore, its searches of Cameron’s accounts did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Because there was no Fourth Amendment violation, there was no reason to suppress any evidence that may have derived from YahooPs initial searches. For this reason, we hold that the district court properly denied Cameron’s motion to suppress evidence.

D. Confrontation Clause

Cameron next argues that the district court’s admission of evidence obtained from Yahoo!, Google, and NCMEC violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Although Cameron’s brief does not make clear which specific records he believes should not have been admitted, he does specify that he is not challenging the admission of those child pornography images that Yahoo provided in response to search warrants. We thus presume that Cameron’s challenge is to the following categories of evidence: (1) the Yahoo! Account Management Tool and Login Tracker data— this data was attached to the CP Reports and was also produced in response to search warrants; (2) electronic receipts of Yahoo’s CP Reports to NCMEC — these receipts were produced by Yahoo! in response to search warrants; (3) NCMEC’s CyberTipline Reports to ICAC; and (4) the Google Hello Connection Logs.7

We review de novo a district court’s decision that the admission of various exhibits did not violate the