Glassroth v. Moore

The Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court installed a two-and-one-half ton monument to the Ten Commandments as the centerpiece of the rotunda in the Alabama State Judicial Building. He did so in order to remind all Alabama citizens of, among other things, his belief in the sovereignty of the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church. And he rejected a request to permit a monument displaying a historically significant speech in the same space on the grounds that “[t]he placement of a speech of any man alongside the revealed law of God would tend in consequence to diminish the very purpose of the Ten Commandments monument.” Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1297 (M.D.Ala.2002).

The monument and its placement in the rotunda create the impression of being in the presence of something holy and sacred, causing some building employees and visitors to consider the monument an appropriate and inviting place for prayer. Three attorneys who do not consider the monument appropriate at all and who do not share the Chief Justice’s religious beliefs brought two separate lawsuits to have the monument taken out. Agreeing with them that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the district court ordered the monument removed. Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1319; Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1067 (M.D.Ala.2002). The Chief Justice appealed. We affirm.

I.

Because “[i]n religious-symbols cases, context is the touchstone,” King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1282, slip op. at 2552 (11th Cir.2003), we set out the relevant facts in some detail, most of which are pulled from the district court’s opinion, but a few of which we have drawn from undisputed testimony or other evidence in the record.

Chief Justice Moore began his judicial career as a judge on the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama. After taking office he hung a hand-carved, wooden plaque depicting the Ten Commandments behind the bench in his courtroom and routinely invited clergy to lead prayer at jury organizing sessions. Those actions generated two high-profile lawsuits in 1995 based on the Establishment Clause, one filed by a nonprofit organization seeking an injunction and the other brought by the State of Alabama seeking a declaratory judgment that then-judge Moore’s actions were not unconstitutional. Both suits were dismissed on justiciability grounds. Ala. Freethought Ass’n v. Moore, 893 F.Supp. 1522 (N.D.Ala.1995); Alabama ex rel. James v. ACLU, 711 So.2d 952 (Ala. 1998); see Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1293-94.

During his campaign for the Chief Justice position in the November 2000 elee*1285tion, then-judge Moore’s campaign committee, capitalizing on name recognition from the lawsuits, decided to refer to him as the “Ten Commandments Judge.” Although the Chief Justice says he never described himself that way, he did not disagree with his campaign committee’s decision. As a result, most of his campaign materials, including billboards, television and radio commercials, telephone scripts, and mailings, described him as the “Ten Commandments Judge” or otherwise referred to the Ten Commandments. The central platform of his campaign was a promise “to restore the moral foundation of law.” Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1294.

After he was elected, Chief Justice Moore fulfilled his campaign promise by installing the Ten Commandments monument in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building. Id. at 1294, 1303. That building houses the Alabama Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of Civil Appeals, the state law library, and the state’s Administrative Office of the Courts. The Chief Justice, as administrative head of the Alabama judicial system and as lessee of the Judicial Building, has final authority over the decoration of the rotunda and whether to put any displays in the building. See Ala. Const. Amend. 328, § 6.10; Ala.Code § 41-10-275. Chief Justice Moore placed the monument in the rotunda of the Judicial Building without the advance approval or even knowledge of any one of the other eight justices of the Alabama Supreme Court. All decisions regarding it were made by him. Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1294. He did not use any government funds in creating or installing the monument. Id.

Thousands of people enter the Judicial Building each year. In addition to attorneys, parties, judges, and employees, every fourth grader in the state is brought on a tour of the building as part of a field trip to the state capital. No one who enters the building through the main entrance can miss the monument. It is in the rotunda, directly across from the main entrance, in front of a plate-glass window with a courtyard and waterfall behind it. After entering the building, members of the public must pass through the rotunda to access the public elevator or stairs, to enter the law library, or to use the public restrooms. A person walking to the elevator, stairs, or restroom will pass within ten to twenty feet of the monument. The Chief Justice chose the location of the monument so that everyone visiting the Judicial Building would see it. Id.

The 5280-pound granite monument is “approximately three feet wide by three feet deep by four feet tall.” Id. Two tablets with rounded tops are carved into the sloping top of the monument. Excerpts from Exodus 20:2-17 of the King James Version of the Holy Bible, the Ten Commandments, are chiseled into the tablets. The left one reads:

I AM THE LORD THY GoD

Thou shalt have no other gods before me

Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain

Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy

The right one reads:

Honour thy father and thy mother

Thou shalt not kill

Thou shalt not commit adultery

Thou shalt not steal

Thou shalt not bear false witness

Thou shalt not Covet1

*1286Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1294-95; id. at 1320 (App. A — photograph of the monument).

Below the Ten Commandments, each side of the monument contains one large-sized and several smaller-sized quotations. The quotations are excerpted from various historical documents and authorities. They are described and set out in full in the district court’s opinion. Id. at 1295; id. at 1320-21 (App. B — providing full quotations of the monument’s text). The quotations from secular sources were placed below the Ten Commandments because of Chief Justice Moore’s belief that the words of mere men could not be placed on the same plane as the Word of God. Id. at 1295.

“Due to the slope of the monument’s top and the religious appearance of the tablets, the tablets call to mind an open Bible resting on a lectern.” Id. The appearance and location of the monument itself give one “the sense of being in the presence of something not just valued and revered (such as an historical document) but also holy and sacred.” Id. Employees and visitors to the building consider it an appropriate and inviting place for prayer. Id.

The monument was installed after the close of business during the evening of July 31, 2001. The Chief Justice has explained that it was done at night to avoid interrupting the normal business of the building. The installation of the monument that night was filmed by Coral Ridge Ministries, an evangelical Christian media outreach organization. Id. at 1294. The organization has used its exclusive footage of the installation to raise funds for its own purpose and for Chief Justice Moore’s legal defense, which it has underwritten. Id. at 1304 n. 2.

At the public unveiling of the monument the day after its installation, Chief Justice Moore delivered a speech commemorating the event, and in that speech he talked about why he had placed the monument, which he described as one “depicting the moral foundation of our law,” where he did. He explained that the location of the monument was “fitting and proper” because;

this monument will serve to remind the appellate courts and judges of the circuit and district courts of this state, the members of the bar who appear before them, as well as the people who visit the Alabama Judicial Building, of the truth stated in the preamble of the Alabama Constitution, that in order to establish justice, we must invoke “the favor and guidance of Almighty God.”2

Id. at 1321-24 (App. C — -reproducing the full text of Chief Justice Moore’s remarks at the unveiling ceremony). During that speech, the Chief Justice criticized govern*1287ment officials who “forbid teaching your children that they are created in the image of Almighty God” and who “purport all the while that it is a government and not God who gave us our rights,” because they have “turned away from those absolute standards which form the basis of our morality and the moral foundation of our law” and “divorced the Constitution and the Bill of Rights from these principles.” Id. at 1322. Recalling his campaign “pledge to restore the moral foundation of law,” he noted that “[i]t is axiomatic that to restore morality, we must first recognize the source of that morality,” and that “our forefathers recognized the sovereignty of God.” Id. He noted during the speech that no government funds had been expended on the monument.

The Chief Justice described various acknowledgments of God throughout this country’s history, some of which, he pointed out, are inscribed on the monument. He proclaimed that the unveiling of the monument that day “mark[ed] the restoration of the moral foundation of law to our people and the return to the knowledge of God in our land.” Id. at 1321. In closing, he told the audience that they would “find no documents surrounding the Ten Commandments because they stand alone as an acknowledgment of that God that’s contained in our pledge, contained in our motto, and contained in our oath.” Id. at 1324.

During the trial the Chief Justice testified candidly about why he had placed the monument in the rotunda. The following exchanges between him and one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys establish that purpose:

Q [W]as your purpose in putting the Ten Commandments monument in the Supreme Court rotunda to acknowledge GOD’s law and GOD’s sovereignty? ...

A Yes.

1st Supp. Rec. Vol. 2 at 100.

Q ... Do you agree that the monument, the Ten Commandments monument, reflects the sovereignty of GOD over the affairs of men?

A Yes.

Q And the monument is also intended to acknowledge GOD’s overruling power over the affairs of men, would that be correct? ...

A Yes.

Q ... [W]hen you say “GOD” you mean GOD of the Holy Scripture?

A Yes.

1st Supp. Rec. Yol. 3 at 34.

The rotunda is open to the public, but it is not a public forum where citizens can place their own displays. Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1303. Chief Justice Moore has denied the two requests that have been made to place other displays in the rotunda. He did so because he believed that those displays would have been inconsistent with the rotunda’s theme of the moral foundation of law. An Alabama State Representative asked the Chief Justice if a monument containing the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s famous “I Have a Dream” speech could be placed in the rotunda. The Chief Justice denied the request in a letter, stating that, “The placement of a speech of any man alongside the revealed law of God would tend in consequence to dimmish the very purpose of the Ten Commandments monument.” Id. at 1297. He also denied an atheist group’s request to display a symbol of atheism in the rotunda. Id.

The Chief Justice did add two smaller displays to the rotunda at some point after the Ten Commandments monument was installed. The first, a plaque entitled “Moral Foundation of Law,” contains a quotation from the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s letter from the Birmingham jail speaking of just laws and “the moral law or law of God,” and a quotation from Frederick Douglass speaking of slavery as hid*1288ing man “from the laws of God.” Id. at 1324-25 (App. D — providing a full quotation of the plaque). That plaque, which the Chief Justice paid for with his own money, measures forty-two inches by thirty-two inches. Id. at 1296. The second display is a brass plaque that contains the Bill of Rights. That plaque, measuring thirty inches by thirty-six inches, had been found in a box in the building. The Chief Justice added both plaques because he thought that they “comported with the ‘moral foundation of law theme.’ ” Id. The two plaques are inconspicuous compared to the Ten Commandments monument. Each is not only much smaller than the monument, but also is located seventy-five feet from it. A person standing in front of the monument cannot see either plaque. Nothing about their location or appearance indicates that they are connected to the monument. Id.

The three plaintiffs are practicing attorneys in the Alabama courts. As a result of their professional obligations, each of them has entered, and will in the future have to enter, the Judicial Building. Because of its location, they necessarily come in contact with the monument. The monument offends each of them and makes them feel like “outsiders.” Because of the monument, two of the plaintiffs have chosen to visit the Judicial Building less often and enjoy the rotunda less when they are there. One of those two has avoided the building to the extent of purchasing law books and online research services instead of using the library, and hiring a messenger to file documents in the courts located in the Judicial Building. Id. at 1297.

II.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the three plaintiffs sued Chief Justice Moore in his official capacity as administrative head of Alabama’s judicial system, claiming that his actions violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought a declaratory judgment that his actions were unconstitutional and an injunction to force him to remove the monument. Prior to trial, Chief Justice Moore’s counsel requested — it may have been done jointly, but it is unclear from the record whether the plaintiffs actually joined or simply did not object to the request — that the district court judge visit the monument. The judge did so, accompanied by the attorneys for both sides. Id. at 1295.

After a seven-day bench trial, the district court concluded that Chief Justice Moore’s actions violated the Establishment Clause because his purpose in displaying the monument was non-secular and because the monument’s primary effect is to advance religion. Id. at 1299, 1304. The court entered judgment to that effect and gave the Chief Justice thirty days to remove the monument voluntarily. After he declined to do so, the district court entered an order enjoining him from failing to remove the monument from the public areas of the Judicial Building. Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1067 (M.D.Ala.2002). The Chief Justice appealed, and the district court stayed its injunction pending appeal. Glassroth v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1068 (M.D.Ala.2002).

III.

As this Court recently explained, Establishment Clause challenges are not decided by bright-line rules, but on a case-by-case basis with the result turning on the specific facts. King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir.2003). As we have already noted, the facts set out in this opinion are taken largely from the district court’s findings. The Chief Justice attacks those findings on several bases.

*1289A.

First, he contends that the district court judge should not have made any factfind-ings based upon his viewing of the monument and its surrounds. The judge unquestionably made important factfindings as a result of what he saw when he viewed the monument and the rotunda in which it is located. That was error, the Chief Justice argues, because he had thought that the only purpose of the district court’s view of the monument and the area around it was to provide the court with a physical context within which to assess the evidence admitted in the courtroom.

The sole decision cited by the Chief Justice in connection with the viewing issue is Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir.1992), which involved a judge’s uninvited viewing of the scene of the accident, outside the presence of counsel and without their knowledge. The Tenth Circuit concluded that was error because, “[wjithout presence of counsel there is no way to be certain that the premises viewed are in the same condition as when the event occurred, or that the court does not view the wrong premises or objects.” Id. at 1191. That is not a problem in this case, because the district court judge undertook the view only after fully discussing the matter with counsel for both sides and scheduling the time of the viewing with counsel in advance. And he undertook the view in their presence. There was no procedural irregularity or lack of notice.

The district court told the attorneys early in the status conference that if the case was decided on summary judgment motions, the court would not be making any findings of fact from its view. That is, of course, correct. Courts do not find facts when deciding summary judgment motions, but this case was not decided on summary judgment. As we will point out shortly, counsel for both sides fully expected that the district court judge would be considering the facts and circumstances he observed during the view if the case was decided by trial, as it was, instead of on summary judgment.

To the extent the Chief Justice is arguing that factfinders should never find facts from what they observe at a view but should only use what they see to put into context the facts they hear in the courtroom, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that “such a distinction is only semantic, because any kind of presentation to the jury or the judge to help the fact finder determine what the truth is and assimilate and understand the evidence is itself evidence.” Id. at 1190; accord Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 121, 54 S.Ct. 380, 338, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (the “inevitable effect [of a view] is that of evidence, no matter what label the judge may choose to give it”), overruled on other grounds by Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964); In re Application to Take Testimony, 102 F.R.D. 521, 524 (E.D.N.Y.1984) (“Authorities now generally agree that the view provides independent evidence.”); Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 755, 12 So. 822, 823 (1893) (“To say the jury cannot receive evidence by simply viewing the scene is to insult common sense. The most convincing evidence is made by the sense of sight. The juror, on the view, sees, and thinks he knows what he sees, with all the conclusions flowing therefrom.”); 6 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 1803 (James H. Chadbourn rev.1976) (the jury on a view is receiving evidence because “to view the thing itself in issue — i.e., the premises — is undoubtedly to consult a source of proof’); 2 Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence (2d ed.) § 403.07[4] (2d ed. 2003) (“[T]he modern position is that the view does provide independent evidence.”). Just as pictures of *1290the monument and the rotunda that were submitted as exhibits are evidence, so too is what the judge saw when he viewed the actual monument and its setting.

In any event, “[i]t is ‘a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.’ ” United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Crockett v. Uniroyal, Inc., 772 F.2d 1524, 1530 n. 4 (11th Cir.1985)). Counsel for Chief Justice Moore urged the district court judge to undertake a view. When the judge said at a status conference that if summary judgment was granted the issue of looking at the monument would be moot, counsel for the Chief Justice disagreed, protesting that: “I believe it’s almost incumbent upon the Court to walk into the Judicial Building,” and “I still think it’s almost necessary to take a look at this yourself because of the proximity and also because of just the manner in which the facts play out here.” Rec. Vol. 12 at 15.

The district court judge asked if the lawyers were going to make arrangements for him to see the monument and point out what he was to see. Counsel for the plaintiffs answered, without objection, that both sides had agreed: “you just walk in the front door and everything in the rotunda is fair game. And we believe that the lawyers shouldn’t speak unless you’ve got a question for us. And the lawyers would be there, none of their clients would be there, and that would be it.” Rec. Vol. 12 at 17.

Counsel for the Chief Justice agreed with that statement about how the view should be conducted, and he made clear that the whole point was for the district court judge to be able to gather facts about the monument and its setting, saying:

But I think with either the summary judgment motion or response, and/or the pretrial briefs, that there’s going to be a lot of facts in there that will probably give each side’s impression of how they interpret the inside of the rotunda. But I agree with [plaintiffs’ counsel] that you’re a jury. You have to walk in and see what you see and then [sic] just like a juror would.

Rec. Vol. 12 at 16-17.

During argument about the cross-motions for summary judgment, and before the view took place, counsel for the Chief Justice contended that summary judgment was improper because the district court needed to view the monument as part of the necessary “inquiry into the facts and circumstances”:

[T]he issue with regard to how a reasonable person would view the monument would require an examination of what you might call social facts, which would require at least an examination of the monument itself. This is why we believe it’s important for you to go into the rotunda and view that monument and view the setting itself. Unless you see it yourself, and since the reasonable person test is a test that’s supposed to be applied by the judge, it would be difficult for the judge to apply that particular test unless there was an inquiry into the facts and circumstances with regard to this matter.

Rec. Vol. 13 at 43-44. So eager was he to have the district court judge conduct the view “just like a juror would,” that counsel for the Chief Justice volunteered his help in arranging parking for the district court judge at the Judicial Building. Any conceivable error was not just invited error, but invited error with a parking space.

B.

The Chief Justice also complains that the district court did not state its findings from the view into the record so that the parties would have had an opportunity to *1291challenge them before the court issued its opinion. He never asked the court to do that, and factfinders traditionally do not state facts into the record before deciding the case; juries never do. The parties were on notice that the court might make factfindings from what it saw during the view, and if either side had wanted those findings stated into the record before a decision was made, it should have requested that extraordinary procedure. Since neither side asked for that procedure, we need not decide whether it would have been necessary or appropriate if requested.

C.

In a related challenge to the district court’s findings, the Chief Justice argues that the district court judge should not have relied upon his subjective impressions from viewing the monument and its surrounding space. Recall that this same party’s counsel had urged the district court judge to undertake a view in order to find the “social facts” about how a reasonable person would see the monument and its surroundings. When the district court described how the monument and its presentation in the rotunda gave one a “sense of being in the presence of something not just valued and revered (such as an historical document) but also holy and sacred,” Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1295, the court was articulating findings about the impression the monument made on the viewer, and would make on a reasonable person viewing it. It was required to do that in order to apply the reasonable person test.

D.

Apart from the factfinding issues arising from the view, Chief Justice Moore also argues that the district court made fact-findings not supported by the record. We review district court factfindings only for clear error, and as we have explained, “[w]e cannot hold a district court’s finding of fact clearly erroneous unless, in view of the entire record, we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Eng’g Contractors Ass’n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 904 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). We cannot reach the requisite definite and firm conviction that a mistake in factfinding has been made, the Supreme Court has told us, where the district court has chosen one of two plausible views of the evidence. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574, 105 S.Ct. at 1511 (“If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”) (citations omitted).

The specific factfinding relating to the merits of the constitutional issue that the Chief Justice challenges is the district court’s finding that “visitors and building employees consider the monument an appropriate, and even compelling, place for prayer.” Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1295. That is at least a plausible view of the evidence in light of the testimony of one of the plaintiffs that she had witnessed a group in prayer around the monument, and the testimony of a building employee that on several occasions he had prayed in front of the monument by himself and with other employees, silently and out loud.

IV.

We turn now to the legal issues. The threshold one is whether these plaintiffs have standing to bring the lawsuits that *1292led to these appeals. The Chief Justice disputes the district court’s conclusion that they do, a conclusion we review de novo. Ga. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.1999).

The applicable principles are well-settled:

To satisfy the “case” or “controversy” requirement of Article III, which is the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing, a plaintiff must, generally speaking, demonstrate that he has suffered “injury in fact,” that the injury is “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant, and that the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.

Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1161, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997) (citations omitted). For Establishment Clause claims based on non-economic harm, the plaintiffs must identify a “personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Sep. of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485, 102 S.Ct. 752, 765, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). In this type of case, plaintiffs have standing if they are “ ‘directly affected by the laws and practices against [which] their complaints are directed,’ ” Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 692 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1572 n. 9, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963)), such as where the plaintiffs are “ ‘forced to assume special burdens’ to avoid ‘unwelcome religious exercises,’ ” ACLU v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1107 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 487 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. at 766 n. 22).

The location of the monument in the rotunda of the Judicial Building makes it impossible for anyone using the stairs, elevators, or restrooms to avoid it. Everyone going to the state law library in the building has to walk past the monument. Glassroth, 229 F.Supp.2d at 1294. The three plaintiffs are attorneys whose professional duties require them to enter the Judicial Building regularly, and when they do so they must pass by the monument. None of them shares the Chief Justice’s religious views, and all of them consider the monument offensive. It makes them feel like outsiders, and two of the plaintiffs have altered their behavior as a consequence. Id. at 1297. As we noted earlier, one of those two has incurred expenses in order to minimize contact with the monument, purchasing law books and online research to minimize use of the state law library and hiring messengers to file documents in the courts located in the building.

Under these facts, the two plaintiffs who have altered their behavior as a result of the monument have suffered and will continue to suffer injuries in fact sufficient for standing purposes. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. at 1572 n. 9 (holding that school children and parents had standing to challenge a state law requiring the Bible to be read every morning in public schools); Saladin, 812 F.2d at 692-93 (holding that city residents had standing to challenge the city’s placement of the word “Christianity” on its official seal because they regularly received correspondence bearing the seal and the seal made them feel like “second class citizens”); Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1107-08 (holding that state residents who used public parks had standing to challenge the placement of a lighted Latin cross in a public park where they were unwilling to camp in that park because of the “physical and metaphysical impact of the cross”). Further, a favorable decision will likely redress their injuries. If Chief Justice Moore is required to remove the monu*1293ment from the public area of the Judicial Building, the plaintiffs will no longer have to observe it or take actions to avoid going into the building.

Having concluded that those two plaintiffs have standing, we are not required to decide whether the other plaintiff, the one who has not altered his behavior as a result of the monument, has standing. Rabun County, 698 F.2d at 1108-09 (“Because we have determined that at least these two individuals have met the requirements of Article III, it is unnecessary for us to consider the standing of the other plaintiffs in this action.”); accord Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160, 102 S.Ct. 205, 212, 70 L.Ed.2d 309 (1981).

Contrary to Chief Justice Moore’s contention, the injuries the plaintiffs assert are not based solely on their disagreement with his views about religion and government, which would be a non-redressable injury. "While the Chief Justice’s views may aggravate the emotional injury the plaintiffs suffer from viewing the monument, the worst of the wound is inflicted by the monument itself. The plaintiff who has incurred expense and inconvenience to avoid entering the building has done so not because it houses the Chief Justice’s chambers, but because the monument is there. The district court did not err by declining to dismiss the cases on standing grounds. Now to the merits of the constitutional issue.

V.

Because of this country’s “history and tradition of religious diversity that dates from the settlement of the North American Continent,” the Founders included in the Bill of Rights an Establishment Clause which prohibits any law “respecting an establishment of religion.” County of Allegheny v. ACLU,