AI Case Brief
Generate an AI-powered case brief with:
Estimated cost: $0.001 - $0.003 per brief
Full Opinion
Defendant-appellant tobacco companies appeal from the September 19, 2002, order and October 22, 2002, supplemental memorandum and order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Jack B. Weinstein, Judge, which certified a nationwide non-opt-out class of smokers seeking only punitive damages under state law for defendants’ alleged fraudulent denial and concealment of the health risks posed by cigarettes. Having granted permission to appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), we must decide whether the district court properly certified this class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
Defendant-appellants challenge the propriety of certifying this action as a limited fund class action pursuant to a “limited punishment” theory. The theory postulates that a constitutional limit on the total punitive damages that may be imposed for a course of fraudulent conduct effectively limits the total fund available for punitive awards.
We hold that the order certifying this punitive damages class must be vacated because there is no evidence by which the district court could ascertain the limits of either the fund or the aggregate value of punitive claims against it, such that the postulated fund could be deemed inadequate to pay all legitimate claims, and thus plaintiffs have failed to satisfy one of the presumptively necessary conditions for
While we expressly limit our holding to the conclusion that class certification is incompatible with Ortiz, the circumstances warrant some discussion of whether the order is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003). As we discuss in Part II, Section F, of this opinion, it appears that the order fails to ensure that a potential punitive award in this action would bear a sufficient nexus, and be both reasonable and proportionate, to the harm or potential harm to the plaintiff class and to the general damages to be recovered, as required by State Farm.
Based on our holding, we vacate the district court’s certification order and remand for further proceedings.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The district court certified the class proposed by the Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint and an accompanying motion for class certification, both filed on July 26, 2002. The district court’s September 19, 2002, order and the supplemental memorandum and order of October 22, 2002, are published together at In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86, 96, 101 (E.D.N.Y.2002), and will be referred to collectively as the “Certification Order.”
Plaintiffs sought certification to determine defendants’ fraudulent course of conduct and total punitive damages liability to a class consisting of those who suffered from, or had died from, diseases caused by smoking. Plaintiffs did not seek a class-wide determination or allocation of compensatory damages or seek certification of subclasses. The certification followed extensive briefing and argument, not to mention numerous iterations of both the complaint and the proposed class.
An abbreviated history of the course of the litigation is outlined below. Additional procedural history of the cases related to this litigation appears in the district court’s Certification Order. See 211 F.R.D. at 131-38.
A.
The industry conspiracy prompting this litigation is described briefly in the allegations of the Third Amended Complaint and in considerable detail in the Certification Order. See 211 F.R.D. at 114-26. We will simply excerpt a relevant portion of the district court’s description of the allegations:
Plaintiffs allege, and can provide supporting evidence, that, beginning with a clandestine meeting in December 1953 at the Plaza Hotel in New York City among the presidents of Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, American Tobacco, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard and U.S. Tobacco, tobacco companies embarked on a systematic, half-century long scheme to ... :(a) stop competing with each other in making or developing less harmful cigarettes; (b) continue knowingly and willfully to engage in misrepresentations and deceptive acts by, among other things, denying knowledge that cigarettes caused disease and death and agreeing not to disseminate harmful information showing the destructive effects of nicotine and tobacco consumption; (c) shut down research efforts and suppress medical information that appeared to be adverse to the Tobacco Companies’ position that tobacco was not harmful; (d) not compete with respect to making any claims relating to*129 the relative health-superiority of specific tobacco products; and (e) to confuse the public about, and otherwise distort, whatever accurate information about the harmful effects of their products became known despite their “[efforts to conceal such information.]”
211 F.R.D. at 114 (quoting ¶ 104 of the complaint in Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 198 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (alteration in original), and citing Falise v. Am. Tobacco Co., 94 F.Supp.2d 316, 329-33 (E.D.N.Y.2000), to which the Simon II Third Amended Complaint refers for description of the fraudulent conduct).
In 1999, a group of cigarette smokers filed a class action captioned Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 99 CV 1988(JBW) (“Simon I”), on behalf of 20-pack-year smokers. They sought a determination of both compensatory and punitive damages for personal injury or wrongful death caused by lung cancer. Plaintiffs limited the class to 20-pack-year smokers because their medical and scientific experts had determined that, for that class, general and specific causation merged, and both could be proved class-wide without individual trials.
The Simon I class moved for certification in April 2000. Without ruling on the certification motion, the district court issued an order on April 18, 2000, consolidating Simon I and seven other tobacco-related suits pending before it “for purposes of settlement and for no other purpose.” In re Tobacco Litig., 192 F.R.D. 90, 95 (E.D.N.Y.2000).
On September 6, 2000, individual and representative plaintiffs in ten existing actions filed a consolidated class action complaint, In re Simon (II) Litigation, No. 00-CV-5332 (JBW) (E.D.N.Y.) (hereinafter “Simon II ”), on behalf of a proposed comprehensive nationwide class
On December 22, 2000, plaintiffs filed the First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint in Simon II
Following an April 30, 2002, status conference, plaintiffs decided to narrow Simon II to include only the three cigarette smoker class actions, Simon I, Decie, and Ebert, see supra n.2, and accordingly filed the Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on May 28, 2002, and an amended motion for class certification. In the Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs asserted a total of seven “Class Claims”: four for product liability (design defect, failure to warn, negligent design, and negligent failure to warn), one for fraudulent concealment or conduct, one for conspiracy, and another for unjust enrichment. Balancing the approaches taken in Simon I and initially in Simon II, the amended and renewed motion for class certification of May 28, 2002, sought certification on behalf of two classes: a class of 20-pack-year smokers with lung cancer to be certified for all purposes, including compensatory and punitive damages, and a broader disease-based class solely for purposes of determining .class-wide punitive damages. The first was to be an opt-out class under Rule 23(b)(3) and the latter a non-opt-out punitive damages class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). Following briefing and oral argument, the district court reserved decision and suggested class counsel revise their class proposal.
During a July 2, 2002, hearing on the certification motion, the district court expressed reservations about plaintiffs’ proposal to limit a smokers’ class to persons with lung cancer only or to persons with a 20-pack-year history of cigarette smoking only. The district court indicated that it was not inclined to certify a portion of the class for compensatory damages purposes, but that the majority of the class could be certified for punitive damages only.
On July 26, 2002, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint and an accompanying amended and renewed motion for class certification, which precipitated the Certification Order at issue here. Plaintiffs sought certification of a single class of smokers suffering from various diseases which the medical community attributes to smoking, including 20-pack-year smokers
B.
Upon considering the class proposed by plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and the motion for certification, the district court certified a punitive damages non-opt-out class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B). See 211 F.R.D. at 99. The class definition included current and former smokers of defendants’ cigarettes who are U.S. residents, or who resided in the U.S. at time of death, and were first diagnosed between April 9, 1993, and the date of dissemination of class notice, with one or more of the following diseases: lung cancer, laryngeal cancer, lip cancer, tongue cancer, mouth cancer, esophageal cancer, kidney cancer, pancreatic cancer, bladder cancer, ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular heart disease, aortic aneurysm, peripheral vascular disease, emphysema, chronic bronchitis, or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The class excluded persons who had obtained judgment or settlement against any defendant, persons against whom defendants had obtained judgment, members of the certified class in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 94-08273 CA-22, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla.Cir.Ct. Nov.6, 2000),
The district court determined that the class action would proceed in three stages. In the first stage, a jury would make “a class-wide determination of liability and estimated total value of national undifferentiated compensatory harm to all members of the class.” Id. at 100. The sum of compensatory harm would “not be awarded but will serve as a predicate in determining non-opt-out class punitive damages.” Id. The same jury would determine compensatory awards, if any, for individual class representatives, although the class itself did not seek compensatory damages. In the second stage, the same jury would determine whether defendants engaged in conduct that warrants punitive damages. Id. In the third stage, the same jury would determine the amount of punitive damages for the class and decide how to allocate damages on a disease-by-disease basis. The court would then distribute sums to the class on a pro-rata basis by disease to class members who submit appropriate proof. Any portion not distributed to class members would be “allocated by the court on a cy pres basis to treatment and research organizations working in the field of each disease on advice of experts in the fields.” Id. The order specified that the
II.
DISCUSSION
A.Standard of Review
We review the district court’s order granting class certification for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard. See Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 331 F.3d 13, 18 (2d Cir.2003). “A district court ‘abuses’ or ‘exceeds’ the discretion accorded to it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as the application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision— though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding — cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001) (footnotes omitted).
We note that this case raises issues of first impression insofar as this Circuit has never squarely passed on the validity of certifying a mandatory, stand-alone punitive damages class on the proposed “limited punishment” theory.
B. Prerequisites for a Class Action under Rule 23(a)
The district court found that the proposed class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. See 211 F.R.D. at 189-90. Appellants do not contest these particular findings. Rather, they direct their arguments to the district court’s conclusion that this class action could be maintained under Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
C. Standards for Maintaining a Class Action under Rule 23(b)(1)
In addition to showing that the class action prerequisites set out in Rule 23(a) have been met, a plaintiff must show that a class action is maintainable under either Rule 23(b)(1), (2) or (3). Fed.R.Civ.P. 23.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be disposi-tive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests[.]
Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1).
Plaintiffs in this case sought certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B),
Suits under Rule 23(b)(1) are often referred to as “mandatory” class actions because they are not subject to the Rule 23(c) provision for notice to absent class members or the opportunity for potential class members to opt out of membership as a matter of right. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 833 n. 13, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999). The Advisory Committee’s Note for the 1966 Amendment of Rule 23 explains that “[t]he vice of an individual action would lie in the fact that the other members of the class, thus practically concluded, would have had no representation in the lawsuit.” 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966). The Committee Note cites by way of illustration several suits pre-dating the amendment that had warranted class treatment, including a suit by policyholders against a fraternal benefit association to attack the financial reorganization of the society, a suit by shareholders to compel declaration of a dividend or to compel proper recognition and handling of redemption and preemption rights, and an action charging a breach of trust by an indenture trustee or fiduciary, affecting a class of security holders or beneficiaries and requiring an accounting or other measure to restore the subject of the trust. Id.
Regarding the subset of these cases involving a limited fund, the Committee’s Note remarks:
In various situations an adjudication as to one or more members of the class will necessarily or probably have an adverse practical effect on the interests of other members who should therefore be represented in the lawsuit. This is plainly the case when claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims. A class action by or*134 against representative members to settle the validity of the claims as a whole, or in groups, followed by separate proof of the amount of each valid claim and proportionate distribution of the fund, meets the problem.
Id.
D. Limited Fund Class Action Based on the “Limited Punishment” Theory
The district court, in certifying the punitive damages class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), cited recent scholarship and court decisions that “have concluded that the theory of limited punishment supports a punitive damages class action.” 211 F.R.D. at 184. “Under this theory,” the district court stated, “the limited fund involved would be the constitutional cap on punitive damages, set forth in BMW v. Gore [517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996)] and related cases.” Id.
The premise for this theory is that there is a constitutional due process limitation on the total amount of punitive damages that may be assessed against a defendant for the same offending conduct. Whether the limitation operates to prejudice the respective parties, it seems, turns on two contrary assumptions. For the potential
The notion of a constitutional cap on total allowable aggregate punitive damages awards, or on the number of times punitive awards can be made, has never been squarely articulated by the Supreme Court, but is said to derive from its precedents regarding punitive damages. In the Supreme Court’s most recent punitive damages decision, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct. 1513, 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003), Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, reiterated what the Court’s precedents had made clear: “While States possess discretion over the imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and substantive constitutional limitations on these awards. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.” Id. at 416, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (internal citations to Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993), Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) omitted.) The Court pointed to concerns voiced in earlier cases: “To the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Haslip, 499 U.S. at 42, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991) (“Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category.”)).
“Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law,” and Congress has provided for punitive damages in a number of statutes. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15, 17 n. 6, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (internal quotation omitted). While compensatory damages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful conduct,” punitive damages, “which have been de
Despite the long-recognized possibility that defendants may be subjected to large aggregate sums of punitive damages if large numbers of victims succeed in their individual punitive damages claims, see, e.g., Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir.1967) (Friendly, J.) (“We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.”), the United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether successive individual or class action punitive awards, each passing constitutional muster under the relevant precedents, could reach a level beyond which punitive damages may no longer be awarded.
E. The Traditional “Limited Fund” Class Action Under Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.
This brings us to appellants’ chief argument — that class certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) is precluded by the Supreme Court’s decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d 715 (1999), because the proposed class plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate what the Supreme Court identified as the “presumptively necessary” conditions for certification in limited fund cases. See id. at 842, 119 S.Ct. 2295. Although Ortiz considered a set of circumstances quite unlike those in the instant case when it reviewed the certification of a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory,
The first characteristic, a fund “with a definitely ascertained limit,” usually entailed a situation where “the totals of the aggregated liquidated claims and the fund available for satisfying them, set definitely at their máximums, demonstrate the inadequacy of the fund to pay all the claims.” Id. at 838, 119 S.Ct. 2295. “The concept driving this type of suit was insufficiency, which alone justified the limit on an early feast to avoid a later famine.” Id. The second characteristic required that “the whole of the inadequate fund was to be devoted to the overwhelming claims.” Id. at 839, 119 S.Ct. 2295. In other words, the defendant with the inadequate fund “had no opportunity to benefit himself or claimants of lower priority by holding back on the amount distributed to the class,” thus ensuring that the limited fund case “did not give a defendant a better deal than seriatim litigation would have produced.” Id. The third characteristic required that “the claimants identified by a common theory of recovery were treated equitably among themselves. The cases assume that the class will comprise everyone who might state a claim on a single or repeated set of facts, invoking a common theory of recovery, to be satisfied from the limited fund as the source of payment.” Id.
While neither the Rule itself, nor the Advisory Notes accompanying it, purports to delineate the outer limits of the Rule’s application in the particular subset of “limited fund” cases, the Supreme Court in Ortiz has read the “limited fund” case as being moored to the Rule’s historical antecedents, describing the classic actions as involving, for instance, “claimants to trust assets, a bank account, insurance proceeds, company assets in a liquidation sale, proceeds of a ship sale in a maritime accident suit, and others.” Id. at 834, 119 S.Ct. 2295 (quoting Herbert B. Newberg & Alba Conte, 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 4.09, at 4-33 (3d ed.1992)). In these cases, “equity required absent parties to be represented, joinder being impractical, where individual claims to be satisfied from the one asset would, as a practical matter, prejudice the rights of absent claimants against a fund inadequate to pay them all.” Id. at 836, 119 S.Ct. 2295.
The Ortiz Court sounded a number of cautionary notes, expressing its extreme hesitation to apply Rule 23 in ways that would have been beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the Advisory Committee Notes. See id. at 842, 119 S.Ct. 2295 (“the Advisory Committee looked cautiously at the potential for creativity under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), at least in comparison with Rule 23(b)(3),” and was “consciously retrospective with intent to codify pre-Rule categories under Rule 23(b)(1), not forward looking as it was in anticipating innovations under Rule 23(b)(3)”).
Keeping in mind that the Court has thus counseled “against leniency in recognizing mandatory limited fund actions in circumstances markedly different from the traditional paradigm,” id. at 864, 119 S.Ct. 2295, we hold that the first fundamental requisite for limited fund treatment is