Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc.

In this case, plaintiffs-appellees Shirley Williams, Gale Pelfrey, Bonnie Jones, and Lora Sisson are current or former hourly employees of defendant-appellant Mohawk Industries, Inc. (“Mohawk”). The plaintiffs filed this class-action complaint alleging that Mohawk’s widespread and knowing employment and harboring of illegal workers allowed Mohawk to reduce labor costs by depressing wages for its legal hourly employees and discouraging worker’s-compensation claims, in violation of federal and state RICO statutes. The plaintiffs also alleged that Mohawk was unjustly enriched by the lower wages it paid, as well as the reduced number of worker’s-compensation claims it paid. The district court denied in part and granted in *1281part Mohawk’s 12(b)(6) motion, and this interlocutory appeal followed.

After review and oral argument, this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 411 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir.2005). Appellant Mohawk then filed an application for writ of certiorari on two questions:

1. Whether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an “enterprise” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (“RICO”), in light of the settled rule that a RICO defendant must “conduct” or “participate in” the affairs of some larger enterprise and not just its own affairs.

2. Whether plaintiffs state proximately caused injuries to business or property by alleging that the hourly wages they voluntarily accepted were too low.

The United States Supreme Court granted the appellant’s petition for writ of certiora-ri “limited to Question 1 presented by the petition.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 830, 163 L.Ed.2d 705 (2005).

After oral argument, however, the Supreme Court entered a summary, three-sentence order that (1) dismissed the writ as improvidently granted as to Question 1, and (2) vacated the judgment of our prior opinion and remanded the case to this Court “for further consideration in light of Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006).” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2016, 164 L.Ed.2d 776 (2006).

This case is now before the Court on remand from the Supreme Court. After the remand, this Court ordered supplemental briefing as to not only Anza, but also the intervening decision by the Georgia Supreme Court in Williams General Corp. v. Stone, 280 Ga. 631, 632 S.E.2d 376 (2006). After further consideration, this Court now reinstates its prior opinion in part and modifies it in part as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

Mohawk is the second largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the United States and has over 30,000 employees. According to the plaintiffs, Mohawk has conspired with recruiting agencies to hire and harbor illegal workers in an effort to keep labor costs as low as possible.1 For example, according to the plaintiffs’ complaint,

Mohawk employees have traveled to the United States Border, including areas near Brownsville, Texas, to recruit undocumented aliens that recently have entered the United States in violation of federal law. These employees and other persons have transported undocumented aliens from these border towns to North Georgia so that those aliens may procure employment at Mohawk. Mohawk has made various incentive payments to employees and other recruiters for locating workers that Mohawk eventually employs and harbors.

Furthermore, “[vjarious recruiters, including Mohawk employees, have provided *1282housing to these illegal workers upon their arrival in North Georgia and have helped them find illegal employment with Mohawk.” Additionally, Mohawk knowingly or recklessly accepts fraudulent documentation from the illegal aliens.

The plaintiffs further allege that Mohawk has concealed its efforts to hire and harbor illegal aliens by destroying documents and assisting illegal workers in evading detection by law enforcement. According to plaintiffs’ complaint, Mohawk takes steps to shield those illegal aliens from detection by, among other things, helping them evade detection during law enforcement searches and inspections at Mohawk’s facilities.

According to the complaint, Mohawk’s widespread and knowing employment and harboring of illegal workers has permitted Mohawk to reduce labor costs. Mohawk has done so by reducing the number of legal workers it must hire and, thereby, increasing the labor pool of legal workers from which Mohawk hires. This practice permits Mohawk to depress the wages it pays its legal hourly workers.

Finally, the plaintiffs allege that Mohawk is “able to save substantial sums of money” by paying its workers reduced wages. Furthermore, Mohawk knows that illegal workers are less likely to file worker’s-compensation claims, and, therefore, Mohawk is able to save additional monies. According to the plaintiffs, these benefits constitute unjust enrichment under state law.

Mohawk filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court determined that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under both federal and state RICO statutes, as well as a claim for unjust enrichment under state law for paying legal workers lower wages because of the illegal workers Mohawk employed. However, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichment claim insofar as it was based on the reduced number of worker’s-compensation claims Mohawk was forced to pay.2

II. FEDERAL RICO CLAIMS

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), it is illegal “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity....” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Thus, in order to establish a federal civil RICO violation under § 1962(c), the plaintiffs “must satisfy four elements of proof: ‘(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’ ” Jones v. Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 910 (11th Cir.1994) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)). These requirements apply whether the RICO claim is civil or criminal in nature.

In civil cases, however, RICO plaintiffs must also satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Section 1964(c) states that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of’ RICO’s substantive provisions has the right to “recover threefold the damages he sustains....” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Thus, under *1283§ 1964(c), civil RICO claimants, such as the plaintiffs here, must show (1) the requisite injury to “business or property,” and (2) that such injury was “by reason of’ the substantive RICO violation. We discuss each of these requirements in turn.

A. Pattern of Racketeering Activity

As mentioned above, there are four requirements under § 1962(c). Because elements (3) and (4)—a pattern of racketeering activity—are easily met in this case (at least at the motion-to-dismiss stage), we address them first.

“A ‘pattern of racketeering activity,’ for purposes of the RICO Act, ‘requires at least two acts of racketeering activity.’ ” Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1886, 1397 (11th Cir.1994), modified on other grounds by 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.1994). “An act of racketeering is commonly referred to as a ‘predicate act.’ A ‘pattern’ of racketeering activity is shown when a racketeer commits at least two distinct but related predicate acts.” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 671 (11th Cir.2001) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “If distinct statutory violations are found, the predicate acts will be considered to be distinct irrespective of the circumstances under which they arose.” Cox, 17 F.3d at 1397 (quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted).

According to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(F), “ ‘racketeering activity’ means any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), ...' if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain.” In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant has engaged in an open and ongoing pattern of violations of section 274 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In particular, plaintiffs allege that Mohawk has violated and continues to violate: (1) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly hire[ ] for employment at least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals are aliens” during a twelve-month period; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to “conceal ], harbor[ ], or shield from detection, or attempt[] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection” aliens that have illegally entered the United States; and (3) 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(l)(A)(iv), which makes it a federal crime to “encourage!] or induce! ] an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law.” According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, Mohawk has committed hundreds, even thousands, of violations of federal immigration laws. Consequently, we conclude that the plaintiffs have properly alleged a “pattern of racketeering activity.”3

B. Conduct of an Enterprise

With regard to elements (1) and (2) of the four-part test under § 1962(c), the plaintiffs must establish “conduct of an enterprise” and that the enterprise had a common goal. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2528-29, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (“The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course *1284of conduct.”)- Furthermore, Mohawk “must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185, 113 S.Ct. 1163, 1173, 122 L.Ed.2d 525 (1993).

An enterprise “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). As stated in United States v. Goldin Industries, Inc., 219 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.2000), “the existence of an enterprise is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, “the definitive factor in determining the existence of a RICO enterprise is the existence of an association of individual entities, however loose or informal, that furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes, that is, the pattern of racketeering activity requisite to the RICO violation.” Id.

In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that Mohawk and third-party temp ageneies/recruiters have conspired to violate federal immigration laws, destroy documentation, and harbor illegal workers. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that

[e]ach recruiter is paid a fee for each worker it supplies to Mohawk, and some of those recruiters work closely with Mohawk to meet its employment need by offering a pool of illegal workers who can be dispatched to a particular Mohawk facility on short notice as the need arises. Some recruiters find workers in the Brownsville, Texas area and transport them to Georgia. Others, like TPS, have relatively formal relationships with the company in which they employ illegal workers and then loan or otherwise provide them to Mohawk for a fee. These recruiters are sometimes assisted by Mohawk employees who carry a supply of social security cards for use when a prospective or existing employee needs to assume a new identity.

Given the Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the litigation, the plaintiffs’ complaint must be taken as true, and it has sufficiently alleged an “enterprise” under RICO; that is an association-in-fact between Mohawk and third-party recruiters. This Court has never required anything other than a “loose or informal” association of distinct entities. Mohawk and the third-party recruiters are distinct entities that, at least according to the complaint, are engaged in a conspiracy to bring illegal workers into this country for Mohawk’s benefit. As such, the complaint sufficiently alleges an “enterprise” under RICO.

As for the common purpose, the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that “[t]he recruiters and Mohawk share the common purpose of obtaining illegal workers for employment by Mohawk.” The complaint further alleges that “[ejach recruiter is paid a fee for each worker it supplies to Mohawk” and that “Mohawk has made various incentive payments to employees and other recruiters for locating workers that Mohawk eventually employs and harbors.” Furthermore, “[t]he acts of racketeering activity committed by Mohawk have the same or similar objective: the reduction of wages paid to Mohawk’s hourly workforce.” What is clear from the complaint is that each member of the enterprise is allegedly reaping a large economic benefit from Mohawk’s employment of illegal workers.

In United States v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 698 (11th Cir.1992), this Court concluded that the common purpose of making money was sufficient under RICO. Because the complaint clearly alleges that the members of the enterprise stand to gain sufficient financial benefits from Mohawk’s *1285widespread employment and harboring of illegal workers, the plaintiffs have properly-alleged a “common purpose” for the purposes of RICO.

Furthermore, Mohawk “must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.” Reves, 507 U.S. at 185, 113 S.Ct. at 1173. That is, Mohawk “must have some part in directing” the affairs of the enterprise. Id. at 179, 113 S.Ct. at 1170. However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s affairs .... ” Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that “Mohawk participates in the operation and management of the affairs of the enterprise ...which includes some direction over the recruiters. Whatever difficulties the plaintiffs may have in proving such an allegation, they have sufficiently alleged that Mohawk is engaged in the operation or management of the enterprise. Again, at this stage in the litigation, we simply cannot say whether the plaintiffs will be able to establish that Mohawk had “some part in directing” the affairs of the enterprise. However, they have alleged sufficient acts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ complaint states a claim that is cognizable under § 1962(c). In so doing, we note that the allegations in this case are similar to those in cases recently decided by the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. See Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, 370 F.3d 602 (6th Cir.2004) (former employees alleging employer used illegal immigrants in order to depress wages); Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.2002) (legally documented workers alleging that employers leveraged hiring of undocumented workers in order to depress wages); Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir.2001) (company alleging competitor hired undocumented workers in order to underbid competing firms). In each of these decisions, the circuit court determined that, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient damages to be permitted to pursue their RICO claims. Although none of the opinions specifically addressed § 1962(c)’s requirements, each of these cases has essentially the same factual basis for RICO liability as the complaint before this Court.

We recognize that the above conclusion puts our circuit in conflict with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 956, 125 S.Ct. 412, 160 L.Ed.2d 318 (2004). In Baker, an employees’ class-action lawsuit alleged that a meat-processing facility conspired with recruiters (and a Chinese aid group), and violated RICO by employing undocumented, illegal workers in an effort to drive down employee wages. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the employees’ union was a necessary party to the lawsuit. Id. at 690-91.

However, the Seventh Circuit in Baker also concluded that there was “another fatal problem” with the complaint. Id. at 691. Although stating that an “enterprise” arguably existed, the Seventh Circuit determined that there was not a common purpose among the entities in the enterprise. Id. at 691. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit stated that the employer “wants to pay lower wages; the recruiters want to be paid more for services rendered (though [the employer] would like to pay them less); the Chinese Mutual Aid Association wants to assist members of its ethnic group. These are divergent goals.” Id. at 691.

In our circuit, however, there has never been any requirement that the “common purpose” of the enterprise be the sole purpose of each and every member of the *1286enterprise. In fact, it may often be the case that different members of a RICO enterprise will enjoy different benefits from the commission of predicate acts. This fact, however, is insufficient to defeat a civil RICO claim. Rather, all that is required is that the enterprise have a common purpose. In this case, the complaint alleges that Mohawk and the recruiters, under Mohawk’s direction, worked together to recruit illegal workers to come to Georgia and that they had the common purpose of providing illegal workers to Mohawk so that Mohawk could reduce its labor costs and the recruiters could get paid. This commonality is all that this circuit’s case law requires. See Church, 955 F.2d at 698. Again, while the plaintiffs may be unable to prove such allegations at trial, we cannot say at this 12(b)(6) stage of the litigation that they have failed to properly allege a common purpose.

We recognize that the Baker Court also concluded that there was no way to establish that the employer “operate[d] or managed] th[e] enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Baker, 357 F.3d at 691 (emphasis omitted). However, as this Court has noted, “the Supreme Court has yet to delineate the exact boundaries of the operation or management test.” United States v. Starrett, 55 F.3d 1525, 1546 (11th Cir.1995). Although the exact boundaries have not been established, it is possible that the plaintiffs will be able to establish that Mohawk played some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise. Whether the plaintiffs ultimately establish sufficient evidence to meet the boundaries of the operation-or-management test is a question best answered at the summary-judgment stage or at trial. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged conduct that may potentially satisfy the operation-or-management test. As such, the plaintiffs are entitled to continue with their claims at this juncture.

Having reviewed the four elements of § 1962(c), we turn to § 1964(c).

C. Injury to “Business or Property” Interest Under RICO

As indicated above, RICO’s civil-suit provision states that “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of’ RICO’s substantive provisions has the right to “recover threefold the damages he sustains_” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). “The terms ‘business or property’ are, of course, words of limitation which preclude [certain forms of] recovery.” Doe v. Roe, 958 F.2d 763, 767 (7th Cir.1992). However, RICO is to be “liberally construed,” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497-98, 105 S.Ct. at 3285-86. Accordingly, we must determine whether the plaintiffs have a “business or property” interest that could be injured under RICO. We need not reach whether plaintiffs have a property interest because plaintiffs clearly have alleged a business interest affected by Mohawk’s alleged RICO violations.

Indeed, this ease is similar to the Ninth Circuit’s Mendoza decision, where legally documented agricultural workers sued fruit growers under RICO alleging that the growers depressed wages by hiring illegal workers. In Mendoza, the defendant claimed that the employees would have to show a “ ‘property right’ in the lost wages[ ] by showing that they were promised or contracted for higher wages.” Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168 n. 4. The Ninth Circuit concluded that this argument was misplaced, pointing out that the plaintiffs’ claim did not implicate procedural due process. Id. Rather, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “what is required is precisely what the employees allege here: a legal entitlement to business relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate statutes.” Id. (citations omitted). Given that a relationship clearly *1287exists between plaintiff workers and their employer, Mohawk, we conclude that a similar business interest exists in this case, and that the employees’ alleged injury to their business interests satisfies the business-interest requirement. Consequently, the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury to a business interest to pursue their RICO claims.

D. By Reason Of’ the Substantive RICO Violations

We now turn to the “by reason of’ requirement contained in § 1964(c). The “by reason of’ requirement implicates two concepts: (1) a sufficiently direct injury so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause. See Trollinger, 370 F.3d at 612 (“RICO’s civil-suit provision imposes two distinct but overlapping limitations on claimants—standing and proximate cause.”); Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1037, 124 S.Ct. 2094, 158 L.Ed.2d 723 (2004) (“[0]ne or more of the predicate acts [in a RICO claim] must not only be the ‘but for’ cause of the injury, but the proximate cause as well.” (citations omitted)); Mendoza, 301 F.3d at 1168-72 (concluding that the plaintiffs had satisfied both “statutory” and “constitutional” standing requirements of RICO). Despite some significant overlap, we address the proximate cause and standing concepts separately.4

(i) Proximate Cause

It is well-established that RICO plaintiffs must prove proximate causation in order to recover. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1991, 164 L.Ed.2d 720 (2006); Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992); Cox, 17 F.3d at 1399 (citations omitted). Anza makes clear that courts should scrutinize proximate causation at the pleading stage and carefully evaluate whether the injury pled was proximately caused by the claimed RICO violations. See Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1997.

More importantly, in Anza, the United States Supreme Court instructed that “[wjhen a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiffs injuries.” Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1998. This central question stems from the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Holmes, which examined “the common-law foundations of the proximate-cause requirement” and specifically the “demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1996 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 112 S.Ct. at 1318). Although Anza *1288does not require plaintiffs to show that the injurious conduct is the sole cause of the injury asserted, Anza does emphasize that in RICO cases there must be “some direct relation” between the injury alleged and the injurious conduct in order to show proximate cause. Id.5

In evaluating whether the requisite causal connection exists, Anza also instructs that courts should consider the “motivating principiéis]” behind the directness component of the proximate-cause standard in RICO cases. “One motivating principle is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages caused by some remote action.” Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1997. Stated another way, “the less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the amount of plaintiffs damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent factors.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269, 112 S.Ct. at 1318. This remoteness concern is heightened when RICO suits are brought by economic competitors seeking damages for lost sales because those types of claims, “if left unchecked, could blur the line between RICO and the antitrust laws.” Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1998.

Another consideration is the risk of du-plicative recoveries. “The requirement of a direct causal connection is especially warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the laws by pursuing their own claims.” Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1998. As also aptly expressed in Holmes, “directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.” Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70, 112 S.Ct. at 1318.

Turning back to this case, we conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged sufficient proximate cause to withstand defendant Mohawk’s motion to dismiss. According to their complaint, Mohawk has hired illegal workers “[i]n an effort to keep labor costs as low as possible.” Furthermore, “Mohawk’s employment and harboring of large numbers of illegal workers has enabled Mohawk to depress wages and thereby pay all of its hourly employees, including legally employed workers who are members of the class, wages that are lower than they would be if Mohawk did not engage in this illegal conduct.” Again, the complaint alleges that “Mohawk’s widespread employment and harboring of illegal workers has substantially and unlawfully increased the supply of workers from which Mohawk makes up its hourly workforce. This unlawful expansion of the labor pool has permitted Mohawk to depress the wages that it pays all its hourly employees.... ” The plaintiffs also allege that “[o]ne purpose and intended effect of Mohawk’s widespread employment and harboring of illegal workers is to deprive Mohawk’s hourly workforce of any individual or collective bargaining power” and that they “were injured by direct and proximate reason of Mohawk’s illegal conduct.”

Given these allegations, which we must assume are true at this Rule 12(b)(6) stage of the litigation, it is clear that the plaintiffs have alleged a sufficiently direct rela*1289tion between their claimed injury and the alleged RICO violations. In short, according to the complaint, Mohawk’s widespread scheme of knowingly hiring and harboring illegal workers has the purpose and direct result of depressing the wages paid to the plaintiffs. Simply put, wholesale illegal hiring depresses wages for the legal workers in north Georgia where Mohawk is located. According to plaintiffs, Mohawk’s illegal conduct had a substantial and direct effect on wages that Mohawk pays to legal workers. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57, 96 S.Ct. 933, 937, 47 L.Ed.2d 43 (1976) (explaining that “acceptance by illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens”).6 While DeCanas is not a RICO case, plaintiffs point out that the Supreme Court has already recognized a direct correlation between illegal hiring and lower wages.

In response, Mohawk asserts that other economic factors contribute to the plaintiffs’ wages, that illegal hiring is just one of myriad factors affecting wages, and that therefore plaintiffs have not satisfied Anza’s proximate-cause requirements. However, plaintiffs persuasively reply that Mohawk’s argument ignores that Mohawk’s conduct has grossly distorted those normal market forces by employing literally thousands of illegal, undocumented aliens at its manufacturing facilities in north Georgia, thus depriving plaintiffs of “business relations unhampered by schemes prohibited by the RICO predicate statutes.” Plaintiffs submit that their complaint focuses on only what is happening in the particular narrow labor market that Mohawk dominates in north Georgia. We agree with plaintiffs that their complaint alleges a sufficiently direct injury to satisfy Anza and Holmes, especially given the recognition of a direct correlation between illegal hiring and lower wages.

More importantly, as plaintiffs point out, in both Holmes and Anza, the Supreme Court emphasized that dismissal was appropriate because a more direct victim could bring suit. For example, the Anza plaintiff alleged that National Steel Supply, a competitor, had stopped paying sales taxes to the New York tax authority, submitted fraudulent documents to the tax authority, and used its tax savings to lower prices. The plaintiff sued for treble damages for sales lost to National. The Supreme Court concluded that New York, which lost the tax revenue due to National’s fraudulent conduct, was the direct victim who could bring suit and not the plaintiff. Anza, 126 S.Ct. at 1997. Indeed, the state of New York could “be expected to pursue appropriate remedies.” Id. at 1998. National’s decision to lower prices to its customers and win sales from the plaintiff was “entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation” of mail and wire fraud a