Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc.

This is an appeal from an amended judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (William M. Skretny, Chief Judge) filed February 5, 2013, on a multimillion-dollar jury award (reduced by the district court on remittitur) for compensatory and punitive damages for violations of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law. The case before us on appeal involves a pattern of extreme racial harassment in the workplace.

The plaintiff, a longtime steelworker at a plant in Lackawanna, New York, endured an extraordinary and steadily intensifying drumbeat of racial insults, intimidation, and degradation over a period of more than three years. The demeaning behavior of the plaintiffs tormentors included insults, slurs, evocations of the Ku Klux Klan, statements comparing black men to apes, death threats, and the placement of a noose dangling from the plaintiffs automobile.1 Supervisors’ meager investigations and nearly total lack of action failed to stop the escalating abuse; instead, managers often appeared to condone or even participate in part in the harassment. The experience left the plaintiff psychologically scarred and deflated — injury for which a jury awarded $1.32 million in compensatory damages for the violation of statutes prohibiting a hostile or abusive work environment because of his race and the state tort of intentional infliction of emotional *147distress. The jury also assessed $24 million in punitive damages, mostly against the employer and its parent company. The district court subsequently granted a motion for remittitur as to the punitive damages, which remittitur was accepted by the plaintiff, and reduced the punitive award by $19 million, to $5 million. The court also awarded the plaintiff substantial attorney’s fees and costs.

The defendants appeal from this judgment and award. They do not seriously dispute the gravity of the underlying conduct, but they raise several procedural and substantive objections to the district court’s findings on liability and to its damages award. We reject most of these challenges, finding no error in the district court’s judgment concerning liability on the common-law and statutory claims or compensatory damages. We do, however, conclude that the punitive damages award, even after the remittitur in the district court, is excessive in light of the principles set forth in the prior case law of the Supreme Court and of this Circuit.

We are required to police closely the size of awards rendered in the trial courts within our Circuit. In recent opinions, w.e have addressed at length the individual and social harms associated with excessive awards of compensatory and punitive damages, many of which are relevant to this case.2 A jury’s assessment of damages based on intangibles such as emotional harm or the need for punishment injects an additional element of the immeasurable and subjective into the proceedings, which trial and appellate courts are expected to oversee with care. Excessive punitive damages also implicate a defendant’s constitutional due process rights insofar as they impose a substantial punishment without the safeguards, constitutional or otherwise, that attend criminal proceedings. Pursuant to these concerns, we scrutinize awards for fairness, consistency, proportionality, and, in the case of punitive damages, constitutionality.

After completing that review on the facts in the record before us, we conclude, first, that the jury’s award for compensatory damages was permissible in light of the nature of the plaintiffs claims. Second, we conclude that the punitive damages were excessive. We will remand to the district court for imposition of a remittitur, requiring a new trial on the issue unless the plaintiff accepts an award to be calculated by the district court. The resulting damages, which will remain substantial, will be appropriate and sufficient to remedy the plaintiffs injury and to impose civil punishment on the defendants for their misbehavior.

BACKGROUND

Elijah Turley was hired at the Buffalo-area Lackawanna Steel Plant in 1995, and remained in this job despite intense racial harassment until his employment was terminated when the plant closed its doors in 2009. During the period relevant to this litigation, the Lackawanna plant changed hands several times in a series of mergers and acquisitions that followed the 2003 liquidation of Bethlehem Steel, its longtime owner. For purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that the plant was owned successively by three Delaware-based corporations (referred to here as “the employer” or “Lackawanna”) whose names reflected those of three successive corporate parents (hereinafter “the parent compa*148ny”; the last of which hereinafter “Arce-lorMittal USA”).3

The Pattern of Racial Harassment

From 1997 onward, Turley worked as a process operator in the Lackawanna plant’s “pickier”4 department. Throughout the relevant time-period, he was the only African-American working regularly on his shift. Initially, he regarded the environment as pleasant and congenial, where workers treated each other “like a family.” 2 Trial Tr. 199, 201. But things deteriorated rapidly in 2005, after Turley filed a grievance alleging that Thomas Ja-worski, the manager in the pickier department, was giving favorable treatment to white employees. From that point onward, Turley testified, life in the pickier “was like hell.” 2 Trial Tr. 205.

Throughout the remainder of his employment, Turley’s co-workers frequently subjected him to racist epithets, degrading treatment, and, from time to time, outright threats. Co-workers declined to speak to him or interact with him socially on the job, by, for example, joining him for lunch. Jaworski, Turley testified, continually referred to him as “boy.” 3 Trial Tr. 4-5. Another witness estimated that thirty percent of the workers in the department referred to Turley as “that [fucking nigger].”5 2 Trial Tr. 90-91. Unidentified coworkers broadcast monkey sounds over the plant’s intercom system, also using the system to threaten Turley anonymously: “We[‘re] going to fucking kill you, fucking nigger, we’re going to kill your fucking Jewish lawyer too.” 3 Trial Tr.81.

.Turley’s workstation became a stage for repeated intimidation and harassment. Sometime in December 2005, he arrived at work to find a sign hanging from his workstation, printed with the words “dancing gorilla.” Joint Stmt, of the Case ¶ 20(a). Days later, the initials “KK” were spray-painted on the wall near his workstation, and the phrases “King Kong” and *149“King Kong lives” appeared on the floor plate that Turley crossed to enter his booth. Id. ¶ 20(b). In July 2006, someone spray-painted the initials “KKK” on the wall near Turley’s workstation; the initials appeared again in 2007. Id. ¶ 20(f). In late 2006, after Turley had filed two harassment complaints with the New York State Division of Human Rights, a face with tears was drawn on the wall in the pickier department. Id. ¶ 20(g). In 2008, a graffiti drawing of an ape-like man was found in a railroad car that had been parked inside the department.

Although many employees harassed and threatened Turley, a coworker, Frank Pele, was responsible for some of the more extreme conduct. He addressed Turley as “you fucking black bitch,” and “you fucking black piece of shit.” 3 Trial Tr.26. Pele would make monkey sounds when Turley tried to speak to him. Id. A worker who replaced Turley at his workstation at shift changes testified that, on a daily basis, the door handles and controls that Turley used would be covered with thick, black motor grease. When the worker complained about this to co-workers, Pele said, “It must be that [’]boon that’s doing it,” referring to Turley. 2 Trial Tr. 166. In May 2006, the same sort of grease was smeared all over Turley’s chair in the processor booth. Once, Pele told Turley: “[W]hen I see your black nigger ass on the outside, I’m going to fucking shoot you.” 3 Trial Tr.28. When Turley reported the threat to management, “[t]hey laughed it off.” Id.

The campaign of racial harassment intensified from 2005 into 2008. In one incident, on December 3, 2007, Turley was told to go check on his car, which had been vandalized several times in the past. Upon arriving, Turley found, dangling from his side-view mirror, a stuffed toy monkey with a noose around its neck.

Supervisors ’ Actions

Because Turley brings this claim against his immediate employer, its corporate parent, and three individually named plant managers, rather than against the persons most directly involved in the daily abuse, his claim depends on the adequacy of the supervisors’ response, or on their direct involvement in the harassment. Among the named defendants, Thomas Jaworski managed the pickier department from May 2003 to January 2007. Gerald Marchand was the plant’s manager of human resources from May 2003 until March 2007. And Larry Sampsell was the plant manager of labor relations and security during the entire relevant time period.

Management was not wholly unresponsive to Turley’s complaints. A foreman removed the “dancing gorilla” sign, and managers painted over some graffiti. After the “dancing gorilla” and “King Kong” incidents, Jaworski stated at a crew meeting that such conduct would not be tolerated. The situation nonetheless continued to worsen. Plant managers interviewed employees after many of Turley’s complaints. After the 2007 incident with the stuffed monkey, the company hired a lawyer to conduct an investigation. And defendant Larry Sampsell, the manager of labor relations and security, installed lights in the parking lot. Sampsell also once arranged for a private investigator to pose as a contractor working in the pickier department in order to gather information, but the plan failed when employees discovered that the investigator was taking photographs.

On other occasions, however, supervisors were apparently unresponsive; to the contrary, they appeared to encourage some of the behavior. For example, a coworker accosted Turley while he was meeting with Sampsell and Marchand, shouting, “Shut up you fucking black cry*150baby bitch. Fuck you. You ain’t shit. You’re always crying like a bitch.” 3 Trial Tr. 32. Turley testified that Sampsell and Marchand “just stood there,” id., and the employee was not disciplined for the verbal assault. In another incident, another coworker, David Pyanowski, apparently attempted to bait Turley into striking him, calling Turley a “black bitch,” a “cry baby,” and a “black piece of shit,” and saying, “Why don’t you get your b[l]aek ass out of here. Get the fuck out of here. We don’t want you here anyway.” 3 Trial Tr.82. When Turley and a union representative went to report the incident, they found Pyanowski and Sampsell laughing about the confrontation in Sampsell’s office. Pyanowski was not disciplined for his behavior.

During the multiyear period in which this harassment took place, only two employees were disciplined for their roles in the abuse. Frank Pele was suspended for three days for painting the “King Kong” graffiti in January 2006, and for another two days the following month for threatening to “deal with [Turley] on the outside.” 4 Trial Tr. 19. In 2007, another employee received a five-day suspension for asking, in reference to Turley, “Do I have to work with that black man?” 2 Trial Tr. 110-11. The defendants have contended that their efforts to root out further culprits were frustrated by a “code of silence” among the workers, 1 Trial Tr.231, but they have not explained why employees such as Pya-nowski went unpunished for hostile acts of which the supervisors were aware.

Several witnesses testified that management seemed uninterested in addressing the ongoing harassment. Turley testified that multiple calls to the company’s complaint telephone line, “Alertline,” met with no response or investigation. Company managers, including Sampsell, also were unresponsive to the efforts of local police to investigate the continuing course of threats and harassment. Detective Daniel Cardi testified that he repeatedly asked Sampsell and other plant managers for access to surveillance video and other records of the company’s investigations. Each time, managers told Cardi that they would have to check with the company’s legal department, and failed to follow up.

Sampsell did, however, begin to monitor Turley closely after the complaints started. After Turley had filed suit in federal court, Sampsell surreptitiously installed two cameras trained on Turley’s workstation. Although Sampsell testified that the cameras were meant to detect the persons responsible for harassing Turley, it is undisputed that he did not inform Turley as to their presence; indeed, he initially denied it. After cameras were removed, a spray-painted eyeball appeared on the wall where one of the cameras had been.

Sampsell also retained a private investigator to run a background check on Tur-ley. At trial, Turley’s counsel reminded Sampsell that, in an earlier, deposition, he had testified that he ran the background check because he was looking for a felony or other offense in Turley’s history. Sampsell did not deny saying this, and admitted that his recollection would have been better at the time of the deposition than it was at the time of trial. The defendants did not object to this exchange, and it therefore became part of the record that the jury could consider.

Effects on Turley

At trial, the union representative testified that between 2006 and 2008, inclusive, Turley, “was losing it.” 1 Trial Tr. 191. Turley’s psychologist noted that Turley suffered serious panic attacks and engaged in other abnormal behavior. The psychologist diagnosed Turley with a short-term adjustment disorder, depression, and a panic disorder. A psychiatrist further di*151agnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder brought on by the workplace harassment. Several times, Turley had to be taken to the hospital as a result of the threats and harassment he experienced. He lost thirty pounds. Turley testified that, at the time of the trial, he did not sleep, struggled to relate to his children, did not socialize, and was frequently overcome by memories of his experience.

According to the district court:

When Turley began work at the steel plant, he enjoyed his job and was a man full of confidence; he possessed a colorful and animated personality. He came in, as one witness put it, displaying his feathers like a “rooster.” But the unyielding harassment took its toll. And by the time he left, he was broken and dispirited. The company had, again in the words of this witness, “cut the head off the rooster.”

Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 960 F.Supp.2d 425, 434-35 (W.D.N.Y.2013) (internal citations omitted).

Procedural History

Turley filed charges of discrimination with federal and state authorities in 2005 and 2006. On December 6, 2006, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Turley, through counsel, instituted this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York. The complaint alleges disparate treatment, retaliation, and the creation of a hostile work environment, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law § 291 et seq.,6 as well as a common-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 2011, the district court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants as to retaliation and as to most disparate treatment claims, but allowed the plaintiff to proceed on his hostile work environment and emotional distress claims.7 Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 803 F.Supp.2d 217 (W.D.N.Y.2011).

The trial lasted for three weeks, after which the jury deliberated for less than a *152full day before reaching a verdict. They found all defendants liable to Turley for creating a hostile work environment, and Sampsell and Lackawanna liable on the emotional distress claim. Following a two-day trial on damages, the jury awarded a total of $1,320,000 in compensatory and $24,005,000 in punitive damages against the defendants, broken down by defendant.

After trial, the defendants moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59 for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur of damages, on several grounds. Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 960 F.Supp.2d 425, 433 (W.D.N.Y.2013). The district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, but partially granted the motion for a new trial based on its conclusion that the punitive damages award was excessive. Id. at 450, 456. The court ordered the new trial unless the plaintiff agreed for the punitive damages award to be reduced to a total of $5 million on remittitur, a figure the district court thought represented “the upper most limit permissible under the law.” Id. at 453-54. The plaintiff accepted the reduction. A final breakdown of the awards is as follows:

Compensatory Punitive

Hostile Work Environment

Corporate defendants $1,000,000 $4,000,000

Sampsell $25,000 $0

Marchand $25,000 $0

Jaworski $10,000 $0

Subtotal $1,060,000 $4,000,000

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

ArcelorMittal USA Lackawanna Inc. $250,000 $998,750

Sampsell $10,000 $1,250

Subtotal $260,000 $1,000,000

Total $1,320,000 $5,000,000

See id. at 456. .The district court also awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees of $437,323.30 and costs of $32,711.42. Id.

The defendants appealed.

DISCUSSION

The degree of racial intimidation and ridicule that pervaded Turley’s workplace during the relevant period far surpassed any threshold necessary to demonstrate a hostile and abusive work environment. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). The defendants do not argue otherwise.

Instead, they allege five errors in the verdict and judgment, for which the remedy demanded ranges from a reduction in damages to a new trial. First, the defendants contend that alleged errors in the jury instructions and verdict form prejudiced their case and warrant a new trial on the statutory harassment claims. Second, the parent corporation in this case, now named ArcelorMittal USA, Inc., argues that it was not the plaintiffs employer, and should not have been held liable as to those claims. Third, the defendants argue that, irrespective of whether the alleged conduct constituted racial harassment, it does not meet the strict standard set under New York law for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, they dispute the size of both the compensatory and punitive damages awards.

I. Jury Instructions and Verdict Form

We review a claim of error in the district court’s jury instructions de novo, *153disturbing the district court’s judgment “only if the appellant shows that the error was prejudicial in light of the charge as a whole.”8 Japan Airlines Co. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 178 F.3d 103, 110 (2d Cir.1999). “A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law.” Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir.1997). We will not require a new trial “[i]f the instructions, read as a whole, presented the issues to the jury in a fair and evenhanded manner.” Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 156 (2d Cir.2012).

The asserted error in this case concerns the court’s instructions on the standard for employer liability in a hostile work environment claim. It is the plaintiffs burden to establish that the discriminatory conduct may be imputed to the employer. See, e.g., Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir.2013). To succeed in that endeavor, the plaintiff can demonstrate that a supervisor used his or her authority “to further the creation of a discriminatorily abusive working environment,” Perry, 115 F.3d at 153, or that the employer knew or reasonably should have known about harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, “yet failed to take appropriate remedial action,”9 Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The appropriateness of an employer’s remedial action must “be assessed from the totality of the circumstances.” Distasio v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 157 F.3d 55, 65 (2d Cir.1998).

The defendants contend that the district court’s instructions would have led the jury to conduct a different, and legally unsound, inquiry. The court instructed the jury that when a non-supervisory coworker creates a hostile work environment, the employer will be liable only if the plaintiff proves that his “supervisor or successively higher authority knew ... or should have known ... of the hostile or abusive work environment and permitted it to continue by failing to take remedial action.” 13 Trial Tr. 121-22. The defendants argue that this instruction would have allowed the jury to hold the company liable if any single supervisor or higher authority failed to adequately respond, on his own, to the harassment. If the defendants’ interpretation is correct, then this instruction would constitute legal error because the employer’s response to harassment must be assessed as a whole and in light of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Distasio, 157 F.3d at 65.

We conclude, however, that when read in context, it is clear that the instruction does not contain the error that the defendants assert. In the paragraph immediately following the language in question, the district court explained:

[A]n employer’s response need only be reasonable under the circumstances.... Whether an employer’s response was reasonable has to be assessed from the totality of the circumstances.... Factors to be considered in determining whether the response was reasonable include — okay, we’re talking about reasonable employer response — the gravity of the harm being inflicted upon the plaintiff, the nature of the employer’s *154response in light of the employer’s resources, and the nature of the work environment. An employer’s response to co-worker harassment is not unreasonable simply because it has not been successful in preventing further harassment.

Trial Tr. 13:122. This passage uses the phrase “employer’s response” five times, and explicitly states that the jury must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. It employs phrases, such as “the employer’s resources,” id., that would make little sense unless the jury was being asked to consider the employer’s response as a whole.

We are not permitted to dissect a jury verdict by combing through a trial court’s instructions seeking language that, when isolated from its context, might be or appear to be misleading. See, e.g., Lore, 670 F.3d at 156 (noting that a charge must be read “as a whole”); Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600-01 (2d Cir.1978) (similar). “[A] jury charge should be examined in its entirety, not scrutinized strand-by-strand.” SR Int’l Bus. Ins. Co. v. World Trade Ctr. Properties, LLC, 467 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g Co., 173 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir.1999)). In the case at bar, the jury instruction, when examined as a whole, properly focused the jury’s attention on the totality of the employer’s response. The district court therefore did not “provide a misleading impression or inadequate understanding of the law.” Schwartz v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 539 F.3d 135, 147 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The defendants also contend, with respect to the same issue, that a question on the verdict form was misleading and prejudicial. A verdict form “must be read in conjunction with the judge’s charge to the jury.” Vichare v. AMBAC, Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 466 (2d Cir.1996); Shah v. Pan Am. World Svcs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84, 96 (2d Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1142, 119 S.Ct. 1033, 143 L.Ed.2d 42 (1999); accord Lore, 670 F.3d at 159-60. Here, the form was ambiguous with respect to whether any one manager’s failure to respond adequately could create liability for a hostile work environment.10 But, as we have explained, the district court’s instructions made clear that the jury was to consider the totality of the employer’s response to the harassment. These instructions thus clarified any ambiguity in the verdict form.

Even assuming arguendo that the jury instructions and the form had been erroneous, however, we do not think that the errors would have prejudiced the defendants. Defendants Sampsell, Marchand, and Jaworski undertook most of the several remedial actions in response to Turley’s complaints, conducting some investigations, holding a few employee meetings, and taking security precautions, such as installing lights in the parking lot. The jury nonetheless decided that each of these defendants had either actively participated in the harassment or had failed to take adequate measures to stop or remedy it. *155We doubt that the presumably reasonable jury could have determined that the relatively meager and ultimately ineffective response efforts from a few other employees would have tipped the balance and led the jury to determine that the response, as a whole, was adequate.11

II. Parent-Subsidiary Liability

The parent company — now, as noted, named ArcelorMittal USA, Inc.— further argues that it cannot be held liable on the plaintiffs harassment claims because it was not the plaintiffs “employer,” as that term is understood under the relevant statutes. We review de novo the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on this issue, although our review is “bound by the same stern standards” as the district court’s. Cross v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 417 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir.2005). We therefore view all evidence and draw all inferences in favor of the party opposing judgment as a matter of law, Fabri v. United Techs. Int'l Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir.2004) — in this case, the plaintiff. We will overturn a verdict only if we conclude that there is “such a complete absence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or such an overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the appellant that reasonable and fair minded [jurors] could not arrive at a verdict against the appellant.” Gronowski v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 292 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The record supporting the jury’s finding on this issue is not so sparse as to require a reversal.

The jury determined that both Lackawanna and its corporate parent were liable on the federal and state harassment claims.12 Of course, as a general matter, the law “allows a corporation to organize so as to isolate liabilities among separate entities.” Murray v. Miner, 74 F.3d 402, 404 (2d Cir.1996). Nonetheless:

there is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law, applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced and the shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to accomplish certain wrongful purposes.

United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 62, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). In the employment-discrimination context, we may look past the formal separation among corporate affiliates when “extraordinary circumstances” permit treating a parent and a subsidiary as a “single employer” for the purposes of applicable statutes. Murray, 74 F.3d at 404; see generally 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations § 43.90 (2014).

To determine whether, under Title YII,13 a parent and subsidiary consti*156tute a single employer, we apply a four-factor test. See, e.g., Brown v. Daikin Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir.2014). “Under this test, ‘a parent and subsidiary cannot be found to represent a single, integrated enterprise in the absence of evidence of (1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control of labor relations, (3) common management, and (4) common ownership or financial control.’ ” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir.1995)). Although no one factor controls the analysis,14 the second, “centralized control of labor relations,” is the most significant. See Cook, 69 F.3d at 1240-41.

Our case law instructs us to apply the same four-factor inquiry to determine whether two or more entities constitute a “single employer” under the New York Human Rights Law. Brown, 756 F.3d at 226-28. Applying the test under both federal and state statutes serves the stated goal of the New York Court of Appeals “to resolve federal and state employment discrimination claims consistently.”15 Aurecchione v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 98 N.Y.2d 21, 25, 744 N.Y.S.2d 349, 771 N.E.2d 231, 233 (2002); see also Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.2010) (explaining that New York courts rely on federal case law in this area); Argyle Realty Assocs. v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 65 A.D.3d 273, 277, 882 N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (2d Dep’t 2009) (adopting the Cook test in a related context).

The single-employer inquiry is conceptually distinct from other theories of corporate veil-piercing. Cf. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Reg’l Imp. & Exp. Trucking Co., 944 F.2d 1037, 1046 (2d Cir.1991) (making a similar point in the context of labor relations). For example, under the single-employer test, a plaintiff need not demonstrate unlawful motive or any intent to use the corporate form to avoid contractual obligations. See, e.g., Lihli Fashions Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 80 F.3d 743, 748 (2d Cir.1996); Trustees of Pension, Welfare & Vacation Fringe Benefit Funds of IBEW Local 701 v. Favia Elec. Co., 995 F.2d 785, 788-89 (7th Cir.1993). And the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the parent company exercises “day-to-day control” over labor relations. See Solis v. Loretto-Oswego Residential Health Care Facility, 692 F.3d 65, 76-77 (2d Cir.2012). The plaintiff must *157show only that the corporate parent’s involvement “is sufficient and necessary to the total employment process, even absent total control or ultimate authority over hiring decisions.” Cook, 69 F.3d at 1241 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, there was some evidence that the parent company was directly and necessarily involved in decisions relating to the plaintiffs employment and to the course of harassment. It negotiated and entered into the collective bargaining agreement with the union, and it was this agreement that governed the plant’s response to Turley’s complaints. A 2007. harassment training seminar explained that all complaints must be reported to the corporate human resources department, and that any settlement that changes anyone’s terms of employment must be approved by the corporate office. Employees were directed to report harassment to the “Alertline,” a nationwide “hotline.” Plant managers repeatedly stated that they were required to check with the corporate legal department in Chicago before providing information to assist police investigations concerning threats against Turley.16 And Turley’s employment ended' when the parent company shut down the Lackawanna plant and sold its assets.

This evidence, along with additional facts recounted in the district court’s opinion, see Turley, 960 F.Supp.2d at 437-40, provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the two companies constituted a single employer for the purposes of the federal and state statutory claims. We do not mean to imply that Lackawanna and its parent company would have constituted a single entity for all purposes. And, because our review is constrained by the strict standards that govern a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we do not imply that we would have necessarily treated these two entities as a single employer were we sitting as the trier of fact in this case. But because we find neither a “complete absence of evidence” supporting the jury verdict nor an overwhelming amount of evidence favoring the defendant, see Gronowski, 424 F.3d at 292, we will not disturb the jury verdict' as to corporate liability.

III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Turley, 960 F.Supp.2d at 443-45. The defendants contend that the district court erred by permitting the jury’s verdict on that claim to stand. Our review is de novo, within the strict limitations explained above. See, e.g., Gronowski, 424 F.3d at 292.

The IIED tort is problematic. It provides a remedy for the damages that arise out of a defendant engaging in “extreme and outrageous conduct, which so transcends the bounds of decency as to be regarded as atrocious and intolerable in a civilized society.” Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 143, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 480 N.E.2d 349, 355 (1985); accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965).17 To prevail on such a claim, a *158plaintiff must establish that there was “extreme and outrageous conduct,” that the conduct was undertaken with “intent to cause, or disregard of a substantial probability of causing, severe emotional distress,” and that the conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress. Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121, 612 N.E.2d 699, 702, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993); accord Conboy v. AT & T Corp., 241 F.3d 242, 258 (2d Cir.2001).

Then-Chief Judge Kaye, writing for the New York Court of Appeals in Howell, explained the court’s reasons for reading the IIED tort narrowly:

Unlike other intentional torts, intentional infliction of emotional distress does not proscribe specific conduct (compare, e.g., Restatement [Second] of Torts § 18 [battery]; id., § 35 [false imprisonment] ), but imposes liability based on after-the-fact judgments about the actor’s behavior. Accordingly, the broadly defined standard of liability is both a virtue and a vice. The tort is as limitless as the