People v. Randolph

I respectfully dissent. In affirming the Court of Appeals, the majority concludes that this Court has never adopted the “transactional approach” to robbery. Ante at 540. The majority then proceeds *554to overrule more than thirty years of precedent in the Court of Appeals applying this view. In doing so, the majority states that “the force used to accomplish the taking underlying a charge of unarmed robbery must be contemporaneous with the taking.” Ante at 536. The majority concludes that defendant in this case “did not accomplish his taking by use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” Ante at 547. Therefore, the majority concludes that defendant cannot be convicted of unarmed robbery. I strongly disagree with this analysis.

In my judgment, a person is guilty of the crime of robbery if, before reaching a place of temporary safety, the person uses force either to effect his initial taking of the property, or to retain possession of the property or to escape with the property, as long as the property remains “in [the] presence” of the victim. MCL 750.530. The language of the robbery statute, Michigan case law, and the common-law understanding of robbery each support the view that a person can be convicted of robbery even if the required element of force occurs after the perpetrator’s initial seizure of the property, but before he has reached a place of temporary safety. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In the criminal law, a crime is not complete until the act element and the mental element of the particular crismé have concurred. People v Patskan, 387 Mich 701, 714; 199 NW2d 458 (1972).1 In the case of *555unarmed robbery, the act element is the “felonious [] rob[bing], stealing] and tak[ing]” of property from the person of another or of property that is “in his presence.” MCL 750.530. Further, the act element must be accomplished “by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear.” Id., see also People v Johnson, 206 Mich App 122, 125-126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994). I will refer to this in the shorthand as the force element. The mental element or intent element of unarmed robbery is the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. People v King, 210 Mich App 425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995). Thus, the act element and the force element must concur with the perpetrator’s intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property.

Because the statute, and the case law inteipreting the statute, provide that the property may be “in the presence” of the victim, “actual possession” of the property by the victim at the time that the force is used is not required. MCL 750.530, see also People v Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 430-431; 476 NW2d 749 (1991). The property continues to be “in [the] presence” of the victim where the property remains under his personal protection and control. Id., see also People v Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 97; 185 NW 770 (1921). It follows that, as long as the victim exercises this protection and control over the property, the requisite force element of robbery may still be used against him, because the property is still “in his presence”. MCL 750.530. Thus, where an assault occurs at any *556time during which the property can be said to be in the victim’s presence, a robbery within the meaning of the statute occurs. In this case, although defendant had initially seized items from the shelf of the Meijer store, the security guards continued to exercise protective custody and control over that property, because they continued to monitor defendant and they still had the right to take the property back. Therefore, the property was “in [their] presence” within the meaning of MCL 750.530 when defendant, by assault, attempted to unlawfully deprive the security guards of the property. This “transactional view” of robbery,2 as it has been applied in Michigan, is consistent with both the common-law definition and the statute defining robbery, and supports defendant’s conviction.

II. STATUTE

The majority, in my judgment, errs in its analysis of the crime of robbery by inteipreting too narrowly the statute’s requirements of the force element, the act element, and the concept of possession. As a consequence, the majority’s conclusion that defendant “did not use force, violence, assault or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of property” is also in error. Ante at 551.

The statute requires only that the force and violence or the assault occur at some point during which the property is “in the presence” of the victim.3 The *557statute does not limit the force element to the initial seizure of the property. A robbery may occur “by force and violence” or “by assault” as long as the property remains “in [the] presence” of the victim. The property is in the presence of the victim, although it is in the actual physical possession of the perpetrator, where the victim exercises protective custody and control over the property.4 This is in accord with the statute.

MCL 750.530 provides:

*558Any person who shall, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob, steal and take from the person of another, or in his presence, any money or other property which may be the subject of larceny, such robber not being armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony ....

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined in a statute, this Court will ascribe every statutory word or phrase its plain and ordinary meaning. See MCL 8.3a. Further, this Court shall ensure that words in a statute are not ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered nugatory. Hoste v Shanty Creek Mngt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 574; 592 NW2d 360 (1999).

Here, to describe the element of force, the Legislature used the words “by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear.” MCL 750.530. To describe the act that must be accomplished, the Legislature used the words “rob,” “steal,” and “take,” and to describe the allowable possession of the property that is subject to the robbery, the Legislature used the words “in his presence.”

The majority argues that a robbery occurs only when a person, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, uses that force initially to seize the property from the person of another, or in his presence. But, the statute plainly allows for more. A robbery occurs under the statute where, by force and violence or by assault, the perpetrator takes property from the person or in his presence. That is, where the robber initially seizes the property by force and violence or by assault. However, the statute also allows for a conviction of robbery where, “by assault” the perpetrator “robs” property that is “in [the] presence” *559of the victim. The phrase “by assault” cannot mean the same thing as “by force and violence.” Rather, “assault” is defined simply as “a sudden violent attack.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1991). The term is also defined more broadly as “illegal force.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).

Further, the word “rob” cannot encompass merely the taking of the property, because the term “take” is already used in the statute. The Legislature is not presumed to have used different terms to mean the same thing. Here, the Legislature used the words “rob,” “steal,” and “take.” “Rob” means to “[u]nlawfully deprive (a person) of or of something, esp. by force or the threat of force.” The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).

Thus, the statute, summarized, provides: “Any person who shall ... by assault . . . rob . . . [property] from the person of another or in his presence . . . shall be guilty ...” That is, a person may be guilty of robbery if “by assault” he “robs” property that is “in [the] presence” of the victim. As the majority recognizes, the defendant in this case committed an assault upon the security guards. Because the security guards exercised protective custody and control over that property, it remained in their “presence.” Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the assault was committed so that the defendant could remove the property “from [the] presence” of the security guards. Defendant’s violent act of assault evidenced his intent to unlawfully and permanently deprive the guards of the property.

The majority asserts that the dissent misapprehends the context of the statutory phrase “in his presence.” The majority emphasizes the words “by force *560and violence, or by assault or putting in fear,” ante at 548, and assumes that these words apply only to the initial taking itself, and therefore, concludes: “the statute identifies unarmed robbery as taking another’s property in the other’s presence ‘by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear,’ ” and “[i]f the physical taking was accomplished without force, assault, or fear, the statute does not permit treating the larcenous crime as a robbery because of a subsequent forceful act.” Id.

However, as I have indicated, I believe that, although property may be in the actual and wrongful possession of the perpetrator, it may still be “in [the] presence” of the victim such that the perpetrator may still, “by assault,” “rob” the victim. MCL 750.530. While the statute provides that the act must be accomplished “by force and violence, or by assault,” the requisite act is more than a mere taking or initial larceny of the property as evidenced by the statute’s employment of the word “rob.” As we have already indicated, “rob” means more broadly an unlawful deprivation of property by force.5

Therefore, although a larceny may be complete when the peipetrator initially wrongfully takes and conceals the property, the statute encompasses not merely a larceny, but a “rob[bing], stealing], and *561tak[ing]” by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear, of property, that is “in [the] presence” of the victim. MCL 750.530. Thus, while through an initial larceny the perpetrator may steal property, he may not yet have “rob[bed]” that same property. Thus, an assault to “rob” may occur after the initial seizure of the property.

Further, the phrase “from the person of another, or in his presence” has been defined by this Court, in a manner consistent with this interpretation, to mean that the victim must merely maintain personal protection over the property for it to be considered “in his presence.” In Covelesky, supra at 97, this Court stated:

“[T]he words ‘taking from the person of another,’ as used in connection with the common-law definition of robbery, are not restricted in application to those cases in which the property taken is in actual contact with the person of the one from whom it is taken, but include within their meaning the taking by violence or intimidation from the person wronged, in his presence, of property which either belongs to him or which is under his personal protection and control. And where such words have been incorporated into statutes defining robbery, they have received the same construction.”'[6]

In Covelesky, this Court further adopted the interpretation by the Iowa Supreme Court of the prepositional phrase “from the person of another” in the *562Iowa robbeiy statute, which “closely resembles” that of Michigan:

“The preposition ‘from’ does not convey the idea of contact or propinquity of the person and property. It does not imply that the property is in the presence of the person. The thought of the statute, as expressed in the language, is that the property must be so in the possession or under the control of the individual robbed that violence or putting in fear was the means used by the robber to take it.” [Id. at 99, quoting State v Calhoun, 72 Iowa 432; 34 NW 194, 196 (1887).]

As evidenced by this analysis, the majority takes too narrow a view of the concept of “possession” when it states that “this defendant did not use force, violence, assault or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of property.” Ante at 551. Neither the statute nor the common law requires that the victim be in actual possession of the property when the force is exercised. Although in the actual possession of the thief, the property may still be in the “presence” of the victim, because it is “under his personal protection and control,” Covelesky, supra at 97-99, and the use of force at the time the perpetrator attempts to ultimately remove the property from the presence of the victim, sufficiently establishes the force necessary to commit robbery.7 For a “thief does not obtain the complete, independent and absolute possession and control of money or property adverse to the rights of the owner where the taking is immediately resisted *563by the owner before the thief can remove it from the premises or from the owner’s presence.” State v Long, 234 Kan 580, 586; 675 P2d 832 (1984), see also People v Clark, 113 Mich App 477, 480; 317 NW2d 664 (1982); Newcomb, supra at 430-431.

The dissent does not disagree that the crimes of larceny and robbery are distinct.8 However, for the purpose of the crime of robbery, the relevant act encompasses a broader spectrum of time, and includes not simply an initial larcenous taking, “by force and violence” or “by assault,” but a robbing of the victim “by assault” when the property remains in the victim’s presence.

Thus, as long as the property is in the presence of the victim, that is, before the perpetrator reaches a place of “temporary safety,” a robbery can occur when the perpetrator with actual possession attempts to sever the property from the victim’s presence “by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear.” MCL 750.530.9

*564III. INTENT TO “PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE”

That the “transactional view” constitutes the proper view of robbery under the statute is reinforced, in my judgment, by the fact that the “intent to permanently deprive” element may occur after the initial taking. Unarmed robbery is a specific intent crime. People v Dupie, 395 Mich 483, 487; 236 NW2d 494 (1975), citing People v McKeighan, 205 Mich 367; 171 NW 500 (1919). The focus of the intent element of robbery is on the perpetrator’s intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. King, supra at 428.

While, ordinarily, the taking and the use of force in a robbery are relatively contemporaneous so that the requisite intent may be readily inferred from these events, the act of force nonetheless may precede or follow the taking. People v LeFlore, 96 Mich App 557, 561-562; 293 NW2d 628 (1980). For example, a typical robbery occurs when, by the threat or use of force, the robber forces the victim to turn over property directly to him. However, that the force occurs after the initial taking does nothing to negate the “intent to permanently deprive” element. In other words, when the perpetrator, by assault, intends still to permanently deprive the victim of property that remains in the victim’s presence, a robbery can be said to have occurred. It is the perpetrator’s intent at the time of the use of force—either to preserve his unlawful possession of the goods or to effect his escape (at least where these occur while the property remains “in the presence” of the victim)—that completes the crime of robbery.10

*565As long as there is a “purposeful relationship” between the elements of the crime of robbery: the act, whether that be robbing, stealing or taking, which establishes the intent to permanently deprive the victim of his property, and the force, which aggravates that crime into robbery, the robbery is complete. LeFlore, supra at 562, citing LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972), § 94, p 701-702. “The entire larcenous transaction should be reviewed to determine if there is a continuity of intent between the forceful act and the taking (or vice versa).” Id,.11

To clarify, consider the perpetrator who is observed shoplifting and manages to escape from the store before being apprehended. In such a case, the only crime that occurs is a larceny. The larceny is complete upon the perpetrator’s concealment of the item, for it is at that time that the intent to deprive the owner of the property merged with the actual taking.

Next consider the perpetrator who is observed shoplifting and who is followed out into the parking lot. Before being confronted by the security guards, he drops the property onto the ground or he is appre*566hended. Again, the crime is larceny, for no further criminal intent may be inferred from his acts.

Finally, consider the perpetrator who uses force in the parking lot, as in this case, while he is still in actual possession of the property. The perpetrator is still viewed under the robbery statute as having robbed the victim because the property was still in the victim’s presence when the assault occurred. The property was at the time of the thief’s initial taking of it, and is still at the time of the assault, “in [the] presence” of the victim. MCL 750.530. The security guards continued to exercise “protective custody and control” over the property. Covelesky, supra at 97-98.

IV. TRANSACTIONAL VIEW

Having established that the statute encompasses not merely an initial taking of property “by force and violence” or “by assault,” but rather, a robbing of the victim by assault, where property continues to be in the presence of the victim, the question next to be addressed is whether this Court should recognize the transactional view of robbery as it has hitherto been applied in Michigan.

A. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS

While this Court has never expressly adopted the “transactional view” of robbery, Michigan jurisprudence on this issue is no tabula rasa. The Court of Appeals, including the panel in this case, has expressly applied this view to robbery for at least *567thirty years.12 See, e.g., People v Sanders, 28 Mich App 274, 277; 184 NW2d 269 (1970) (stating that, in the context of armed robbery, “the incident of the taking must be viewed in its totality in order to ascertain the intent of the defendant when the assault occurs”); People v Beebe, 70 Mich App 154, 158; 245 NW2d 547 (1976) (stating that the view of the majority of other jurisdictions considers robbery as an “ongoing transaction” rather than one “broken up into its component acts”); LeFlore, supra at 562, stating that the “assault may follow the taking if that force is used to completely sever the victim’s possession”); Clark, supra at 480 (stating that Michigan employs the “ ‘transaction’ test for armed robbery, which provides that a taking is not considered complete until the assailant has effected his escape because the victim is still considered in possession of his property”); People v Denny, 114 Mich App 320, 324; 319 NW2d 574 (1982); People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 28; 328 *568NW2d 5 (1982); People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119, 121; 439 NW2d 313 (1989); Newcomb, supra at 430-431; People v Velasquez, 189 Mich App 14, 17; 472 NW2d 289 (1991).

Thus, the Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted the statutes defining robbery and armed robbery as “continuous offense [s], which [are] not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety.” Tinsley, supra at 121. This line of precedent, with its attendant reasoning, provides considerable support for the proposition that the “transactional view” of robbery is consistent with Michigan jurisprudence.13

B. ANALOGOUS PRINCIPLES IN SUPREME COURT

In addition to being consistent with the robbery statute, Michigan case law, and the common law, the “transactional view” of robbery has been implicitly accepted by this Court in other contexts. While the majority asserts, correctly, that this Court has never recognized the “transactional approach” in the specific context of robbery, ante at 540, this Court has adopted a “transactional view” of robbery in the context of felony murder, where the murder occurs after commission of the robbery. People v Podolski, 332 Mich 508, 515-518; 52 NW2d 201 (1952). There, the Court stated that “the robber may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime while he is endeavoring to escape and make away with the goods *569taken.” Id. at 518. In Podolski at 515-518, this Court expressly adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v Moyer, 357 Pa 181, 190-191; 53 A2d 736 (1947), which stated:

“It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon’s attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act ... . Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he inaugurates will be the use of deadly force against him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible.”

Further, the Podolski Court at 517-518 agreed with the reasoning asserted by the prosecutor, quoting from Wharton, Homicide (3d ed), ch 9, § 126, p 186:

“Where a homicide is committed within the res gestae of a felony, however, it is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony within the meaning of such statutes. That the attempt to commit the felony was not far advanced does not lessen the offense. And a burglar who breaks into a building, or who shoots a person who discovers him in an effort to escape, cannot avoid punishment for murder in the first degree, upon the theory that the burglary consisted in breaking in, and was consummated before the killing. A burglar may be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime of burglary while making away with the plunder, and while engaged in securing it. So, a robbery within the meaning of a rule that a homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery is murder in the first degree is not necessarily concluded by the removal of the goods from the presence of the owner; and it is not necessary that the *570homicide should be committed at the precise time and place of the robbery.”[14]

In my judgment, it is altogether reasonable to extend, by analogy, this reasoning with respect to felony murder for a killing committed after a burglary or after a robbery, to the case of an assault committed after an initial taking, but before the perpetrator’s escape.

In People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257-259; 549 NW2d 39 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had not reached a place of temporary safety in his escape from the scene of retail fraud, defined in the chapter on larceny, MCL 750.356, and, thus, that the death of a child in a vehicle struck by the defendant’s vehicle during a high-speed police chase from the store was sufficiently connected to the underlying offense to support felony murder. See also People v Oliver, 63 Mich App 509, 523; 234 NW2d 679 (1975); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189; 222 NW2d 172 (1974). Again, by analogy, these cases support the view that an assault following an ordinary larceny elevates the crime to robbery and that a perpetrator who uses that force at any time before reaching a place of temporary safety in an effort to retain *571the property or escape with the property can be charged with robbery.15

Finally, we would observe that the “transactional view” of robbery is also consistent with the premises that underlie the greater culpability of the perpetrator who resorts to violence in an attempt to steal property.16 It is not the victim, but the perpetrator who should bear the full responsibility for his actions. “ ‘Every robber or burglar knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he inaugurates will be the [attempted] use of deadly force against him on the part of the selected victim. For whatever results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating force, the felon must be held responsible.’ ” Podolski, supra at 516 (citations omitted). The use of force by the perpetrator against the owner of property who discovers his deed is an act, the need for which should not take the perpetrator by surprise. The use of force in such a circumstance should not be viewed as unusual or uncommon, but rather as a typical incident of the crime of larceny.17

*572V. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE

When analyzing whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a criminal conviction, this Court reviews the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). In that case, the Court articulated that this “standard of review is deferential: a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jmy verdict.” Id. at 400.

The “transactional view” of robbery, as explained in this opinion, and in light of the facts and charges presented to the jury, supports defendant’s conviction in the instant case. The record establishes that the Meijer security guards observed defendant commit a larceny when he concealed items that he had taken from a Meijer department store and proceeded to leave the store without paying for them. The security guards continued to surveil defendant during this entire transaction, from the moment he took the property and concealed it until the altercation in the parking lot. During their observation of defendant, the security guards continued to exercise protective custody and control over the property. That is, the security guards had the authority and the right to take it back. Thus, the property was for all purposes “in [the] *573presence” of the guards. MCL 750.530. As security guards for the property’s owner, Meijer, Inc., these guards had a right and the authority to regain possession of the property. In the moments prior to the confrontation, defendant had a choice either to surrender peacefully or to attempt to remove the property from their presence by force, in this particular case, by assault. He chose the latter, and his conduct thereby evidenced an intent to forcefully and permanently deprive Meijer of its property. By assault, defendant robbed the security guards of property that was in their presence. It is at the moment when the defendant turned to force (which caused one of the guards to suffer a fractured bone in her face and two broken teeth) that his intent to deprive the owner of its property and the use of force merged to satisfy the elements of the crime of robbery.

VI. COMMON LAW

A. FORCE AFTER INITIAL TAKING

Finally, an analysis of the common law supports the view that force used after an initial wrongful seizure of property, to prevent the victim’s resistance or to escape with the property, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime of robbery. The common-law crime of robbery was defined as “the unlawful taking possession of the goods of another by means of violence or threats of violence, used with the object of obtaining those goods from the owner, without his consent and with the intention of depriving him permanently of all the benefits of his ownership.” 1 Odgers, The Common Law of England (2d ed), ch 8, p 331. In this work, which is a compilation of *574“all important statutes and decisions,” the authors declare that where a person “used any personal violence at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery, he may be sentenced” as a robber was at that time, “to penal servitude for life.” Id. The difference between larceny and robbery is further explained: “If the only violence used occurs accidentally and unintentionally in the prisoner’s efforts to obtain possession of the property, the offence is larceny from the person and not robbery. But if violence is necessary to enable the prisoner to obtain possession of the property, and the prisoner on discovering this intentionally resorts to violence with that object, this is robbery.” Id. at 332. In an example that follows, the author sets out the distinction between the successful escape and the violent altercation before the robber completes the escape:

Thus, the snatching of a purse from a prosecutor, who is unaware of what is happening until after the purse is gone from his possession, cannot amount to robbery; but it will be otherwise if the prisoner does something to put the prosecutor in bodily fear before snatching the purse, for here the fear precedes the taking.

So, if the prisoner obtains possession of the property without actual violence or threats of violence, the crime is only larceny from the person, unless the prisoner immediately after taking possession of the property uses personal violence.” [Id.]

Finally, the common-law indictment for robbery was pled as follows:

A.B., on the_day of_, in the county of, robbed C.D. of a watch, and at the time of or immediately before or immediately after such robbery did use personal violence to the said C.D. [2 Odgers, at 1478.]

*575Compare the view expressed by Rapalje in 1892, which also supports the view that the force element of robbery can occur after the initial seizure of the property: “To constitute robbery, the force used must be either before or at the time of the taking and of such a nature as to show that it was intended to overpower the party robbed, or to prevent resistance on his part, and not merely to get possession of the property.” Rapalje, Larceny & Kindred Offenses (1892), § 446, p '637 (emphasis added). These views are more precise with regard to the actual nature of the crime of robbery as one of force against the victim to remove property from his presence. It is the use of force “not merely to get possession,” but also, “to prevent resistance” that satisfies the elements of the crime. Id.18 In my judgment, the majority errs in concluding that the common law of robbery would not support defendant’s conviction in the instant cáse. The common law, which, as the majority acknowledges, has been incorporated into MCL 750.530, supported a conviction for robbery when a perpetrator used force against the victim even after the property *576had already been taken by the perpetrator, if the perpetrator used that force to prevent the victim’s resistance or to escape with the property. This is what occurred in this case.19

B. BLACKSTONE

In contending that the common law supports its view, the majority makes much of the quotation from Blackstone that “if one privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is subsequent . . . .”4 Blackstone, Commentaries, Public Wrongs, ch 17, p 242. However, as pointed out by Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed), ch 4, § 2, p 348, this quotation has been misapplied:

If the two transactions are essentially distinct,—if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery .... [Id. at 349.]

The majority attempts to distinguish this quotation from Perkins in three ways, all of which are unavailing. First, the majority states that the dissent “misunderstands the point that Perkins was making.” Ante at 542, n 9. To demonstrate that the “transactional view” *577is not only consistent with the statute and Michigan case law, but also consistent with the common law as reflected by Blackstone, we set forth the language from Perkins in full. Following the disputed quotation from Blackstone, Perkins writes:

Occasionally this has been misapplied. For example, during a chance meeting d suggested he might be interested in buying the gun x was carrying and asked permission to examine it, which was granted. Finding the gun loaded D then pointed it at x and told him to run for his life. As x backed away, d ran off with the weapon. A conviction of robbery was reversed on the theory that the resort to intimidation was after the acquisition of the gun.[20] This completely overlooks the distinction between possession and custody. When d received the gun to examine momentarily in the presence of X, D had custody only. Had he run off with the gun without violence or intimidation he would have been guilty of larceny because this would have been a trespassory taking and carrying away with all the elements of that offense. And since he actually did this under a threat to kill he clearly committed robbery, as the same court had held earlier under an equivalent set of facts. And a motorist whose tank had been filled with gas at his request, after which he held off the attendant at gunpoint, under threat to shoot while he drove away without making payment, was properly convicted of robbery. Furthermore, if one snatches property from the hand of another and uses force or intimidation to prevent an immediate retaking by the other, this is all one transaction and constitutes robbery. If the two transactions are essentially distinct,—if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not rob*578bery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery, although there is still some authority for the earlier view that force or intimidation used to retain possession of property taken without it, is not sufficient. [Perkins, swpra at 348-349.]

The majority concedes that, in the first example given by Perkins, “the thief initially had mere custody of the weapon, but his possession of it was secured by threat of force.” Ante at 542, n 9. In this case, defendant, likewise, had mere custody of the items, and the attempt to gain complete possession of the items, that is, to remove the items from the presence of the security guards, was secured by the use of force. As explained elsewhere, the successful escape with the property, or the complete removal of the property from the presence of the victim, is not a necessary element of robbery. Rather, escape and such removal merely indicate the end point of the “transaction.”21

Second, the majority states that Perkins’ use of the words “ ‘res gestae’. . . does not suggest an expansive ‘transactional’ view of robbery. Rather it narrowly refers to the events occurring contemporaneously with the taking, precisely the time frame in which the application of force must occur.” Ante at 542, n 9. *579However, “res gestae” in terms of the law, and in the context in which Perkins used it, simply means “[t]he whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it.” It means “things or things happened.” Indeed, a res gestae witness is defined as “[a]n eyewitness to some event in the continuum of the criminal transaction and one whose testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the alleged commission of the charged offense.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed). Thu