In re Couture Hotel Corp.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court9/2/2015
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BARBARA J. HOUSER, United States Bankruptcy Judge

On July 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2015, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing (the “Confirmation Hearing”) to consider both confirmation of the Debtor’s Second Amended Plan of Reorganization [ECF No. 261] (the “Plan”)1 filed by Couture Hotel Corporation (the “Debtor”) and a motion to lift stay [ECF No. 156, as supplemented by ECF No. 285] (the “Motion to Lift Stay”) filed by Mansa Capital, LLC (“Mansa”). At the conclusion of the Confirmation Hearing, the Court requested briefing from the parties regarding the admissibility of certain expert testimony, which will be discussed below. The last of these briefs was filed on August 12, 2015, and these contested matters are now ripe for ruling. Having considered the Plan, the Debtor’s brief in support of the Plan [ECF No. 309] (the “Debtor’s Brief’), Mansa’s objection to confirmation of the Plan [ECF No. 305] (the “Objection”), the Motion to Lift Stay and the Debtor’s objection thereto, the evidence admitted into the record and the arguments of counsel, and the post-hearing briefs, the Court hereby enters this Memorandum Opinion and Order2 denying confirmation of the Plan and granting the Motion to Lift Stay should the Debtor fail to timely comply with the requirements set forth at the end of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

1. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas has subject matter jurisdiction over the Debtor’s bankruptcy case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Although bankruptcy courts do not have independent subject matter jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 151 grants bankruptcy courts the power .to exercise certain “authority conferred” upon the district courts by title 28. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157, the district courts may refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy courts for either entry of a final judgment (core proceed*719ings) or proposed findings and conclusions (noncore, related-to proceedings).

So, as relevant here, this Court exercises authority over the Debtor’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case pursuant to the Order of Reference of Bankruptcy Cases and Proceedings Nunc Pro Tunc adopted in this district on August 3, 1984. Venue is proper with this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1409. Confirmation of the Plan is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), (L), and (0), while the Motion to Lift Stay is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G).

II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

A. Mansa’s Objection to the Debtor’s Methodology for Calculating the Cramdown Interest Rate Under the Plan is Overruled.

Mansa is the sole creditor objecting to confirmation.3 Under the Plan, the Debt- or proposes to repay Mansa with 59 equal monthly payments, culminating in a balloon payment at month 60.4 The monthly payments are to be calculated based upon a 30-year amortization period with a 4.25% interest rate (the “Cramdown Interest Rate”).

To determine the Cramdown Interest Rate, the Debtor retained Christopher Lucas of ValueScope, Inc. (“Lucas”) as its testifying expert.5 Lucas testified that he utilized the prime-plus formula set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 124 S.Ct. 1951, 158 L.Ed.2d 787 (2004), as analyzed in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324 (5th Cir.2013). Hr’g Tr. 7/29/15 at 163:20-164:10. Soon after Lucas took the stand, Mansa’s counsel objected to Lucas’s testimony, alleging that Lucas had used an improper methodology to determine the Cramdown Interest Rate. The Court permitted the Debtor to continue Lucas’s direct examination, and Mansa to cross examine Lucas, subject to Man-sa’s: (1) pending objection, and (2) oral motion to strike to be made at the conclusion of Lucas’s testimony. Id. at 171:23-173:25. During both direct and cross examination, Lucas admitted that the national prime rate as of the commencement of the Confirmation Hearing (3.25%) was not his starting point in calculating the Cram-down Interest Rate. Id. at 190:22-191:10 (direct); 197:19-210:6 (cross). Instead, Lucas used what he deemed a market-based interest rate as his starting point, which he believes is the proper approach under both Till and Texas Grand Prairie. Id. Mansa’s counsel argued that Lucas’s use of a market-based interest rate is in direct contrast with Till and Texas Grand Prairie, and moved to have Lucas’s testimony excluded. Id. at 211:13-212:19.

*720Since both parties rely on Till and Texas Grand Prairie in support of their positions, those cases will be the starting point of the Court’s analysis. In Till, the Supreme Court addressed the proper methodology for calculating a cramdown rate of interest in the Chapter 13 context. With respect to the auto loan at issue in Till, the Supreme Court adopted a prime-plus formula approach, described as follows:

Taking its cue from ordinary lending practices, the [prime-plus] approach begins by looking to the national prime rate, reported daily in the press, which reflects the financial market’s estimate of the amount a commercial bank should charge a creditworthy commercial borrower to compensate for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation, and the relatively slight risk of default. Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate accordingly. The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends, of course, on such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan.

Till, 541 U.S. at 479, 124 S.Ct. 1951 (footnotes omitted). The Till opinion also contains what is referred to as the “efficient markets footnote,” which recognizes that the prime-plus formula may not be the optimal approach in the Chapter 11 context. Id. at 476 n. 14, 124 S.Ct. 1951 (“Thus, when picking a cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case, it might make sense to ask what rate an efficient market would produce”).

In Texas Grand Prairie, the Fifth Circuit applied the Till formula to determine the appropriate cramdown interest rate to be used in a Chapter 11 plan, but specifically acknowledged that it was applying Till because the parties stipulated that was the appropriate methodology. Texas Grand Prairie, 710 F.3d at 327. ThĂ© Fifth Circuit, however, explicitly stated' that it was not adopting Till in the Chapter 11 context. Id. at 337 (“However, we do not suggest that the prime-plus formula is the only — or even the optimal — method for calculating the Chapter 11 cramdown rate”). Instead, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Fin. Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship), 116 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.1997), stating that

In T-H New Orleans, we “[declined] to establish a particular formula for determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate” under Chapter 11, reviewing the bankruptcy court’s entire § 1129(b) analysis for clear error. We reasoned that it would be imprudent to “tie the hands of the lower courts as they make .the factual determination involved in establishing an appropriate interest rate.”

Id. at 330 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).

With this background in mind, the Court will turn to Lucas’s testimony and his methodology, which he testified complies with his analysis and understanding of both Till and Texas Grand Prairie, to wit:

So the key documents that I reviewed were the Debtor’s plan and disclosure statements, including the exhibits to the disclosure statement. To understand Mansa’s position, I reviewed their motion to lift the automatic stay. I went— I read both the Till and Texas Grand Prairie decisions and analyzed the Debt- or from the five different points that are enumerated in Texas Grand Prairie, including the quality of management; the owner’s commitment to the business; the Debtor’s health, and I can’t remember the rest of that description; the *721quality of the collateral; and then also the feasibility and duration of the plan. And then finally, I looked at current market interest rates and made adjustments to current — and the current market interest rates on hotel loans, and then made adjustments to those based on my assessments of the five character — or the five characteristics described in Texas Grand Prairie.

Hr’g Tr. 7/29/15 at 163:20-164:10. Although Lucas testified that he did not believe an efficient market existed for the loan at issue in the Plan, he nonetheless looked to what he. considered comparable loans to estimate the current market rate for hotel loans. Id. at 209:23-24. To do so, Lucas visited the websites for Commercial Loans Direct and United Financial Group to view the offered rates on hotel loans with a similar loan-to-value ratio. Id. at 190:22-191:10.

Thus, as opposed to beginning with the current prime rate of 3.25% and making adjustments based upon the Texas Grand Prairie factors, Lucas began with base rates that he testified account for the industry risk associated with hotel lending: 4.19% (based upon information obtained from Commercial Loans Direct) and 4.3% (based upon information obtained from United Financial Group). Id. at 190:18-191:10; 194:15-23; 198:3-16. Lucas then adjusted each of those rates based upon his analysis of the Texas Grand Prairie factors.

Although the Court agrees with Mansa that Lucas’s methodology is not in strict compliance with Till, Texas Grand Prairie clarified that Till is merely instructive in determining cramdown rates in the Chapter 11 context. Moreover, in contrast to Texas Grand Prairie, the parties here have not stipulated that a strict, prime-plus' formula should be used. Indeed, although both experts rely on Till and Texas Grand Prairie, they interpret and apply the cases differently. Thus, under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, this Court is not required to follow a formulaic prime-plus approach when evaluating the Cramdown Interest Rate. Texas Grand Prairie, 710 F.3d at 331, 337. Instead, the Court has the discretion to consider additional factors in determining a proper cramdown interest rate, including industry risk.

For these reasons, the Court overrules Mansa’s objection and will consider Lucas’s testimony about what rate should be set as the Cramdown Interest Rate.

B. The Debtor’s Motion to Strike the “Sub-Opinions” Given by Man-sa’s Expert Witness is Denied.

At the Confirmation Hearing, Mansa called John Keeling of The Keeling Consultancy, LLC (“Keeling”) to the stand. As reflected in Keeling’s appraisal report [Ex. M-29] (the “Keeling Report”),6 he was retained by Mansa’s counsel to “form an opinion as to the market value of the fee simple ownership of the Subject Property [the Dallas Hotel, defined in § III.C, infra].” Keeling Report at 1. Keeling’s ultimate opinion is as follows:

Based on the facts, assumptions and procedures outlined in this report, it is my opinion that the market value of the fee simple estate as a going concern for the Wyndham Garden Hotel North in Dallas, Texas as of July 1, 2015 is: Eight Million Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($8,600,000)[J

Id. at 35. Keeling was not the subject of a Daubert challenge, and no party has ques*722tioned his qualifications or methodology to testify here.

Prior to the Confirmation Hearing, the parties exchanged expert reports. After receiving the Keeling Report, the Debtor informed Mansa that it would agree to stipulate that the current fair market value of the Dallas Hotel is $8.6 million. Mansa, however, chose not to accept that stipulation in lieu of calling Keeling as a witness at the Confirmation Hearing, and instead sought to put on evidence as to the value of the Dallas Hotel, including Keeling’s analysis and conclusions.

After Mansa called Keeling to the stand at the Confirmation Hearing, the Debtor objected to Keeling being permitted to testify regarding the predicate opinions and process he utilized to reach his ultimate conclusion of value, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant because it will not have any tendency to make the Dallas Hotel’s value more or less probable (as the Debtor had agreed to the $8.6 million value determined by Keeling). See Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Debtor further objected alleging that it was not given notice that Mansa intended to call Keeling to testify regarding the predicate conclusions (or sub-opinions) allegedly contained within the Keeling Report, and that the sub-opinions are not expressed as independent opinions within the Keeling Report.

Mansa countered by arguing that: (1) it never agreed to rely on the Debtor’s proposed stipulation to the value of the Dallas Hotel as determined by Keeling, (2) it is entitled to present its case as it sees fit, and (3) Keeling’s ultimate conclusion regarding the value of the Dallas Hotel is built upon various sub-opinions, which are relevant both to his ultimate conclusion of value and other confirmation requirements like feasibility of the Plan. In short, Mansa argued that the Court needed to hear Keeling’s testimony at the Confirmation Hearing to understand things like the market conditions in which the Dallas Hotel operates and what hotels Keeling believes are a part of its competitive set. And, while those items were considered by Keeling in coming to his ultimate conclusion regarding the current value of the Dallas Hotel, they are also relevant to whether the Plan is feasible. According to Mansa, the Debtor should not be permitted to circumvent Keeling’s testimony on these underlying issues by stipulating to Keeling’s ultimate conclusion of value.

To clarify this issue, the Court asked Mansa’s counsel to identify the sub-opinions that he wanted Keeling to testify to at the Confirmation Hearing, which were delineated as follows (collectively, the “Sub-Opinions”):

(1) on a going forward basis, the Dallas Hotel is not going to perform against its competitive set;
(2) the Farmers Branch market, where the Dallas Hotel is located, is declining and that, as a result of the limits on penetration, the Dallas Hotel’s value and performance are going to continue to decline;
(3) the rates charged by the Debtor at the Dallas Hotel will lag behind those of its competitive set and be lower than its competition in the marketplace;
(4) the Dallas Hotel’s anticipated year of stabilization will be 2018;
(5) there are less than 10 years of economic life remaining for the Dallas Hotel, as configured; and
(6) the value of the Dallas Hotel is declining.

Hr’g Tr. 7/30/15 at 35-38.

With the Sub-Opinions identified, the Court permitted Mansa to elicit Keeling’s testimony, and the Debtor to cross examine Keeling, all subject to the Debtor’s objection and subsequent oral motion to *723strike Keeling’s testimony. At the conclusion of the Confirmation Hearing, the Court directed the parties to submit post-hearing briefs regarding the admissibility of Keeling’s testimony regarding the Sub-Opinions. Each party submitted a brief and a reply brief.

In its post-hearing brief [ECF No. 355] (the “Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief’), the Debtor argues that Keeling’s testimony regarding the Sub-Opinions should be stricken from the record because it: (1) was not properly disclosed as expert opinion as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), (2) is irrelevant due to the Debtor’s stipulation regarding the value of the Dallas Hotel and unfairly prejudicial, and (3) is inadmissible hearsay summaries of reports and studies performed by third parties. The Court will address each of the Debtor’s arguments, and Mansa’s responses thereto, in turn.

1. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c), Mansa was Not Required to Disclose the Sub-Opinions in the Keeling Report.

The Debtor complains that the Sub-Opinions were not sufficiently disclosed in the Keeling Report, in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Mansa, however, correctly points out that a hearing to consider confirmation of a plan of reorganization is a contested matter, not an adversary proceeding. And, pursuant to Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9014, Rule 26(a)(2) is among the provisions that “shall not apply in a contested matter unless the court directs otherwise.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 9014(c); see In re Minh Vu, 2013 WL 4804822, *12 (D.Md. Sept. 6, 2013), aff'd, 556 Fed.Appx. 262 (4th Cir.2014) (unless the court orders, disclosures under Rule 26(a)(2) are not applicable to contested matters); In re Atlas Computers, Inc., 2012 WL 3018256, *5 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. July 24, 2012), affd, 2014 WL 1267007 (N.D.Okla. Mar. 26, 2014) (same).

Here, the parties apparently agreed to voluntarily exchange expert reports. Debtor’s PostHearing Reply Brief [ECF No. 358] ¶ 5. The Debtor argues that this voluntary exchange reflects Mansa’s implied agreement to comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2). Id. However, Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c) expressly states that Rule 26(a)(2) shall not apply to contested matters “unless the Court directs otherwise,” which it has not, as the parties did not ask the Court to (1) apply Rule 26(a)(2) to this contested Confirmation Hearing, or (2) approve any agreement to do so. Thus, the Court finds and concludes that the parties’ voluntary exchange of expert reports is insufficient, standing alone, to overcome application of Bankruptcy Rule 9014(c), and that Mansa was not required to disclose the Sub-Opinions under Rule 26(a)(2).

Undeterred, the Debtor further argues that under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c), which does apply to contested matters, “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) ..., the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence ... at a hearing, or at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7037. Basically, the Debtor argues that, even if a party is excused from the application of Rule 26(a)(2), it should nonetheless be sanctioned for failing to comply with Rule 26(a)(2).

Mansa disagrees, as does this Court. Rule 37 generally addresses a party’s failure to make required disclosures or participate in discovery. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 37; Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7037. Bankruptcy Rule 9014, however, expressly states that Rule 26(a)(2) does not apply to a contested proceeding, unless otherwise *724directed by the Court. Since the Court has not so directed, it finds that Mansa’s failure to comply with Rule 26(a)(2) was substantially justified and it will not sanction Mansa by excluding Keeling’s testimony.

Finally, it appears that the Debtor had the opportunity to discover the Sub-Opinions when it took Keeling’s deposition, which was scheduled. But, the Court understands that the Debtor elected to cancel Keeling’s deposition. Thus, it appears that if the Debtor was surprised by the Sub-Opinions, it only has itself to blame.

For all of these reasons, the Debtor’s objection is overruled.

2. The Relevance of the Sub-Opinions is Not Outweighed by the Risk of Unfair Prejudice.

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) if has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Debtor argues that the Sub-Opinions are irrelevant because it has stipulated to the value of the Dallas Hotel. And, to the extent the Sub-Opinions are relevant, they should nonetheless be excluded because their value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Mansa counters with the arguments that Keeling’s testimony is relevant to matters other than valuation, such as feasibility; and, in any event, this Court should not permit the Debtor to ‱ unilaterally “stipulate” how Mansa should be permitted to present its case. Both parties rely on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) in support of their respective positions.

In Old Chief the defendant was convicted of, among other things, being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 644. In relation to trial, the defendant offered to stipulate to the fact that he was a convicted felon within the meaning of the relevant statute, but the Assistant U.S. Attorney refused to join in the stipulation, insisting on the government’s right to prove the case as it saw fit. Id. at 177, 117 S.Ct. 644. The district court agreed with the government, and the court records regarding the prior felony conviction were admitted at trial. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion. Id. The defendant appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. Id.

On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged the general rule that a party has the right to prosecute its case as it sees fit. Id. at 189, 117 S.Ct. 644. The Court, however, also acknowledged that this rule has “virtually no application when the point at issue is a defendant’s legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly and independently of the concrete event of later criminal behavior charged against him.” Id. In Old Chief the defendant fell under the statute by virtue of a past conviction for a qualifying offense, and that was the most the jury needed to know. Id. In summary, the Court held:

Given these peculiarities of the element of felony-convict status and of admissions and the like when used to prove it, there is no cognizable difference between the evidentiary significance of an admission and of the legitimately probative component of the official record the prosecution would prefer to place in evidence. For purposes of the Rule 403 weighing of the probative against the prejudicial, the functions of the competing evidence are distinguishable only by the risk inherent in the one and wholly absent from the other. In this case, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support *725conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.

Id. at 191, 117 S.Ct. 644 (footnote omitted).

Here, the Debtor argues that both its offered stipulation of value and the Sub-Opinions lead to the same conclusion — that the Dallas Hotel has a fair market value .of $8.6 million as of July 1, 2015;7 however, only admission of the Sub-Opinions bears the risk of unfair prejudice. Mansa, on the other hand, argues that the Sub-Opinions are clearly distinguishable from the court records in Old Chief in their proposed use and relevance, and that the general rule regarding a party’s right to prosecute its case should apply. As explained below, the Court agrees with Mansa on this point.

The Keeling Report contains facially relevant statements that are potentially harmful to the Debtor’s case, not only as to valuation but also as to Plan feasibility.8 Presumably to alleviate the risk of those statements coming into evidence; the Debtor offered to stipulate to the value of the Dallas Hotel. However, as the Supreme Court recognized, a party has the right within legal bounds to prosecute a case as it sees fit, and Mansa is not required to accept the Debtor’s proposed stipulation. See id. at 191, 117 S.Ct. 644. Further, the Court agrees that the Debt- or’s proposed stipulation is not a comparable substitute for the Sub-Opinions, which Mansa seeks to use for purposes beyond valuation. Finally, that the Sub-Opinions may contain statements against the Debt- or’s interests does not make them unfairly prejudicial. The standard under Fed. R. Evid. 403 is whether the “probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.” Here, it is not. As the Debtor has acknowledged, unlike Old Chief this is a bench trial, and this Court is more than capable of weighing the evidence submitted. See Debtor’s PostHear-ing Brief [ECF No. 355] ¶ 28 n.23. Thus, the Court finds and concludes that the Sub-Opinions should not be excluded on the grounds of relevance or unfair prejudice. This objection is overruled.

3. The Sub-Opinions are Keeling’s Expert Opinion.

Finally, the Debtor argues that the Sub-Opinions are not Keeling’s expert opinion; instead, they are charts and data derived from third-party sources or, alternatively, mere “stepping stones” used by Keeling to arrive at his ultimate opinion regarding the value of the Dallas Hotel. Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 355] ¶¶ 10-15, 22. According to the Debt- or, for such information to come into the record, it must be independently admissible.

Mansa counters that, although the Sub-Opinions were “certainly derived from hearsay data in the Hotel Horizons and STR reports, the sub-opinions themselves are the product of Mr. Keeling’s expert analysis synthesizing data from the Dallas Hotel, comparing it with similar data relating to the Dallas Hotel’s competitive set, and projecting future performance based upon, and informed by, Mr. Keeling’s years of experience in the hotel industry.” Mansa’s Post-Hearing Reply Brief [ECF No. 357] ¶ 13. According to Mansa:

*726Mr. Keeling’s expert report was no cut and paste job from readily available summaries of the Farmer’s Branch hotel market. Instead, Mr. Keeling identified a competitive set of four hotels that would most closely approximate the Dallas Hotel and provide a useful point of comparison for his analysis. Keeling Report at 9. He then calculated the changes in the historical performance of the competitive set to provide a baseline for his analysis. 7/30/15 Hearing Tr. at 61:5-13. Mr. Keeling further testified that he employed an econometric model of the sort regularly relied upon by experts in the hotel industry. 7/30/15 Hearing Tr. at 65:6-18.

Id.% 14.

The Court finds Mansa’s argument on this point persuasive, as it will now explain.9 The starting point to analyze the parties’ respective arguments is Fed. R. Evid. 703, which states that:

[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the experts has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.

Fed. R. Evid. 703. The purpose of Rule 703 is largely practical — experts generally base their opinions on information which, to be admissible in court, would entail “the expenditure of substantial time in producing and examining various authenticating witnesses.” Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon USA L.P., 705 F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir.2013) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703, advisory committee’s note). “Because experts may use their past experience and professional judgment to make critical decisions on the basis of such information outside of court, Rule 703 was intended ‘to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.’ ” Id. at 524 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703, advisory committee’s note). Courts nevertheless must serve a gate-keeping function with respect to Rule 703 opinions to ensure “the expert isn’t being used as a vehicle for circumventing the rules of evidence.” Id. (quoting In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 173 (7th Cir.1992)). Further, the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “[a]n expert is permitted to disclose hearsay for the limited purpose of explaining the basis of his expert opinion, Fed. R. Evid. 703, but not as general proof of the truth of the underlying matter, Fed. R. Evid. 802.” Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349, 1356 (5th Cir.1983).

It appears to the Court that the Debtor is confusing the information underlying the Sub-Opinions and the Sub-Opinions themselves. For example, in support of Keeling’s testimony regarding Sub-Opinions (1) through (3),10 Mansa directs the Court *727to the Keeling Report at page 15, the chart titled “Historic & Projected Penetration,” and to the chart on page 16, titled “Historic and Projected Average Rate Penetration.” Mansa’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 354] ¶ 2. Each chart summarizes information obtained from third party sources regarding the Dallas Hotel and the competitive set of hotels. Hr’g Tr. 7/30/15 at 64:22-75:18. Because of this, the Debt- or complains that the charts and data are not Keeling’s expert opinion, but inadmissible hearsay. Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 355] ¶¶ 10-12. Mansa, though, has not sought to admit the charts and data into the record for the truth of the matter asserted. Instead, it seeks to admit Keeling’s testimony regarding Sub-Opinions (1) through (3), which is based upon the charts and data at issue. Keeling’s reliance on information obtained from third parties when forming his expert opinion is clearly contemplated by Fed. R. Evid. 703, and there was no objection that the information Keeling relied upon was not the type reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. See Fed. R. Evid. 703. Accordingly, the Court overrules the Debt- or’s objection, finding that Sub-Opinions (1) through (3) are admissible expert testimony.

As to Sub-Opinion (4),11 the Debtor argues that setting the Dallas Hotel’s stabilization date is merely a stepping stone to Keeling’s ultimate opinion regarding the value of the Dallas Hotel. Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 355]. at ¶ 13. Based upon the record before it, however, the Court finds that Keeling’s testimony regarding the Dallas Hotel’s stabilization date was derived from his independent analysis. Accordingly, the Court overrules the Debtor’s objection to Keeling’s testimony regarding Sub-Opinion (4), finding the testimony is proper expert opinion.

As to Sub-Opinion (5),12 the Debtor argues that Keeling’s testimony is “merely an assumption used to make a calculation” rather than expert opinion. Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 355] ¶ 14. The Court, however, disagrees. The Keeling Report discusses the Dallas Hotel’s remaining useful life on pages 30-32, where it discloses the basis for Keeling’s opinion that the Dallas Hotel had less than 10 years of remaining economic life. The Court finds that this is admissible expert testimony, and overrules the Debtor’s objection.

As to the final Sub-Opinion,13 the Debt- or argues that “nowhere in the Keeling Report does Mr. Keeling say either (a) the value of the Dallas Hotel is declining, or (b) that the value of the Dallas Hotel will be a certain amount in the future that is less than the $8.6 Million on July 1, 2015.” Debtor’s Post-Hearing Brief [ECF No. 355] ¶ 15. The Court agrees that the Keeling Report fails to quantify the alleged decline in the value of the Dallas Hotel; however the report does contain information and assumptions regarding the future value of the Dallas Hotel upon which Keeling bases his opinion that the value of the Dallas Hotel will decline. Although Keeling’s failure to quantify this decline makes his opinion of limited value, the Court nonetheless finds that his testimony is proper expert testimony, and overrules the Debtor’s objection.

*728III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Debtor is a closely-held Montana corporation headquartered in Dallas, Texas that currently owns and operates two hotels: (1) a limited-service hotel located in Corpus Christi, Texas that is currently operated as a Howard Johnson (the “Corpus Hotel”), and (2) a full-service hotel located in Dallas, Texas that is currently operated as a Wyndham Garden Inn (the “Dallas Hotel” and, together, the “Hotels”). The Debtor’s stock is held by two individuals: John Blomfield (“Blomfield”) and Shelby Weaver (“Weaver”). Blom-field, a 70% shareholder, serves as the Debtor’s Secretary and Treasurer. He resides at the Dallas Hotel and is involved in the day-to-day management of the Hotels. Weaver, a 30% shareholder, serves as the Debtor’s President. She assists with the Debtor’s accounting and bookkeeping functions, which she mainly performs from Anchorage, Alaska, with periodic visits to Dallas. Brittany Blomfield (“Brittany”), Blomfield’s daughter, is the Debtor’s Vice President.

The Debtor began its operations approximately 60 years ago with the ownership of a few cabins located at the entrance to Glacier National Park. Hugh Black, the forest ranger who started the Debtor, grew the company such that, by 2007, the Debtor owned a number of other real estate projects, including a 125 room resort. Blomfield, along with a partner, purchased the Debtor’s stock in 2008, and ultimately sold the Montana assets in 2011. Thereafter, the Debtor purchased and remodeled various hotel properties that, as of the Petition Date, consisted of: (1) a 110 room hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada operating as a Howard Johnson (the “Las Vegas HoJo Hotel”), (2) a 121 room hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada that was previously operating as a ValuePlace Hotel, but subsequently operated as an independent hotel (the “Las Vegas VP Hotel” and, together with the Las Vegas HoJo Hotel, the “Las Vegas Hotels”), (3) the Corpus Hotel, and (4) the Dallas Hotel.

A. The Las Vegas Hotels

In September 2011, the Debtor entered into a number of loan documents with Armed Forces Bank, N.A. (“AFB”) in conjunction with the purchase of the Las Vegas Hotels. The Debtor defaulted on the AFB loan, and AFB sought appointment of a state court receiver. AFB’s request was granted, and by order of the District Court of Clark County, Nevada, dated September 10, 2014, Smiling Hospitality Inc. was appointed as receiver (the “Receiver”). After its appointment, the Receiver prepared its Initial Report regarding the Las Vegas Hotels, which was admitted into evidence at the Confirmation Hearing [Ex. D-22] (the “Receiver’s Report”). Ultimately, the Debtor and AFB reached an agreement regarding the Las Vegas Hotels, which resulted in AFB submitting a credit bid for the Las Vegas Hotels in the full amount of its claim against the Debtor. See Order Approving Settlement Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019 and Agreement Related to Stay with Respect to Las Vegas Hotels Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4001(d) [ECF No. 163], As reflected in stipulations filed with the Court [ECF Nos. 298 and 317], the Debtor reached agreement with each of Howard Johnson International, Inc. (“HoJo”) and Value Place Franchise Services LLC (“Value Place”) regarding the treatment of their respective claims under the Plan, and the resolution of Value Place’s objection to confirmation.

B. The Corpus Hotel

In June 2013, the Debtor entered into a Promissory Note and Loan Agreement *729(the “Ability Note”) executed in favor of Southwest Guaranty Mortgage Corp., which was immediately transferred to Ability Insurance Company (“Ability”) in the original amount of $3,200,000.00. In order to secure the obligations under the Ability Note, the Debtor executed, among other things, a Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents, and Security Agreement, which granted Ability security interests in the real property and personal property of the Corpus Hotel. The Debtor and Ability reached agreement regarding Ability’s treatment under the Plan, which is set forth in Class 4. See Plan § 5.8. Further, as reflected in the stipulation on file with the Court [ECF No. 298], the Debtor and the Corpus Hotel’s franchisor, HoJo, reached agreement with respect to the treatment of Ho Jo’s claims under the Plan.

C. The Dallas Hotel

After purchasing the Dallas Hotel, the Debtor took steps to brand it ás a Wynd-ham Night Hotel. In order to facilitate the associated renovation and construction, the Debtor entered into a loan agreement with Mansa. The documents associated with this loan include: (1) a Loan Agreement dated July 3, 2013 between the Debt- or, as borrower, Blomfield and Weaver, as guarantors, and Mansa, as lender, in the original principal amount of $8,870,000 [Ex. M-3] (the “Mansa Note”), (2) a Deed of Trust, Assignment of Rents, and Security Agreement dated July 3, 2013 securing the Debtor’s obligations under the Mansa Note [Ex. M-4], (3) an All-Assets Security Agreement dated July 3, 2013 between the Debtor, as borrower, Blomfield and Weaver, as guarantors, and Mansa, as lender [Ex. M-5] (the “All-Asset Security Agreement”), (4) a Continuing Guaranty executed by each of Blomfield

Additional Information

In re Couture Hotel Corp. | Law Study Group