Gregory v. Shurtleff

opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

{1 Appellants brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of a law, claiming that the law violated the state constitution in four respects. The district court dismissed the first two claims and rejected the second two claims on summary judgment. On appeal, we consider whether Appellants had standing to bring these claims in the first place. We hold that, although they lacked the personal injury required for traditional standing, Appellants had public-interest standing to bring the first two claims. We also hold that they did not have standing to bring the second two claims under either the traditional or the public-interest doctrine of standing, and we accordingly vacate the grant of summary judgment on those claims and remand to the district court for dismissal. Finally, we hold that although Appellants had standing to bring the first two claims, the district court properly dismissed the claims under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6).

BACKGROUND

2 In March 2008, the legislature enacted Senate Bill 2 (the Bill). The Bill contained some fourteen items relating to education, establishing new programs and amending existing programs; it also contained funding provisions for some programs.

T3 Appellants are a group of current and former legislators, other elected and unelected government officials, and self-described "good citizens." They include current and former members of the Utah State Board of Education (the Board). However, they appear in their individual capacities, and the Board itself is not a party to this litigation. In May 2008, Appellants filed suit in district court against the State's Attorney General, its Treasurer, and the Executive Director of the Department of Human Resources (collectively, Appellees), seeking a declaration that the Bill was unconstitutional and an injunetion against its implementation, as well as an award of costs and fees.

1 4 Appellants claimed the Bill was unconstitutional in four respects. The first two claims fall under Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue that the Bill as a whole violates this provision in two respects: first, they argue that it contained "more than one subject"; second, that its subject was not "clearly expressed in its title" (collectively, the Article VI Claims). The second two claims fall under Article X, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "[the general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education." Appellants argue that two items of the Bill violate this provision: first, the item that delegates the administration of the Teacher Salary Supplement Program to the Department of Human Resources; see-ond, the item that delegates textbook approval to private entities (collectively, the Article X Claims).

1 5 Appellees moved to dismiss the Article VI Claims pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They subsequently moved to dismiss the Article X Claims for lack of standing and moved in the alternative for partial summary judgment on those claims. The district court granted Ap-pellees' motion to dismiss the Article VI Claims for failure to state a claim, and later granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the Article X Claims. It did not rule on the alternative motion to dismiss those claims for lack of standing.

*1102T6 Appellants timely appealed.1 We permitted the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of the Utah Legislature to appear as amicus curiae.2 At oral argument, we asked the parties to discuss whether Appellants had standing to bring any of their claims. We then ordered supplemental briefing on the standing question in regard to the Article X Claims.

7 We have jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-1028)().

STANDARD OF REVIEW

18 "We review the grant of a motion to dismiss for correctness, granting no deference to the decision of the district court." State v. Apotex Corp., 2012 UT 36, ¶ 16, 282 P.3d 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, "[o}n appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint. We accept the factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id. 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

T9 Since standing is a jurisdictional requirement, we first must determine whether Appellants have standing to bring any of their claims. Unlike in the federal system, our law recognizes that appropriate plaintiffs without individualized injury may nevertheless possess standing to bring certain claims treating issues of great public importance. We determine that the issues underlying the Article VI Claims rise to this level and that Appellants are appropriate parties to bring these claims; Appellants therefore have standing to raise the Article VI Claims. The issues underlying the Article X claims, however, do not rise to this level, and furthermore Appellants are not appropriately situated to bring them. Accordingly, they do not have standing to raise the Article X claims.

On the merits of the district court's dismissal of the Article VI Claims, we hold that even on the facts alleged by Appellants, the Bill does not violate either the single-subject or clear-title rules of Article VI, Seetion 22. Accordingly, the dismissal is affirmed.

I. STANDING

111 "[In Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a jurisdictional requirement." Brown v. Div. of Water Rights of the Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14, ¶ 12, 228 P.3d 747.3 Furthermore, "[s]tanding is an issue that a court can raise sua sponte at any time." State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1207 (Utah 1989).

A. Utah Recognizes Public-Interest Staond-ing in Matters of Great Constitutional or Public Importance

112 "Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States Constitution requiring 'cases' and 'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).4 While it is "the usual rule that one must be personally adversely affect*1103ed before he has standing to prosecute an action .... it is also true this Court may grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned." Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978).5

118 "[Dlespite our recognition of this Court's power to grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned," however, "this Court will not readily relieve a plaintiff of the salu-tory requirement of showing a real and personal interest in the dispute." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

we engage in a three-step inquiry in reviewing the question of a plaintiff's standing to sue. The first step in the inquiry will be directed to the traditional criteria of the plaintiff's personal stake in the controversy.... If the plaintiff does not have standing under the first step, we will then address the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff. If there is no one, and if the issue is unlikely to be raised at all if the plaintiff is denied standing, this Court will grant standing.... The Court will deny standing when a plaintiff does not satisfy the first requirement of the analysis and there are potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the issues who can more adequately litigate the issues. The third step in the analysis is to decide if the issues raised by the plaintiff are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to grant him standing.

Id. (emphases added).6

*1104T 14 In a more recent case, we summarized this alternative basis for standing as follows: "[The statutory and the traditional common law tests are not the only avenues to gain standing; Utah law also allows parties to gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance ...." Cedar Mountain Envtl., Inc. v. Tooele Cnty. ex rel. Tooele Cnty. Comm'n, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95 (emphasis added).

15 In Jenkins v. Swan we framed the middle step of the "three-step inquiry" as "the question of whether there is anyone who has a greater interest in the outcome of the case than the plaintiff," 675 P.2d at 1150. In Cedar Mountain, however, we modified the inquiry, requiring a determination of whether the plaintiff is "an appropriate party." 2009 UT 48, 18, 214 P.3d 95 (emphasis added). This shift in analysis is explained in intervening precedent. In 2006 we explained:

Under the alternative test, a petitioning party must first establish that it is an appropriate party to raise the issue in the dispute before the court. A party meets this burden by demonstrating that it has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions and that the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing. We recognize that there is language in both Jenkins [v. Swan] and subsequent cases suggesting that in making this determination the court may grant standing only to the party with the greatest interest in the case, or in other words, the most appropriate party. We now conclude, however, that the notion that a court must find the most appropriate party, thereby limiting standing under the alternative criteria to only one party in any given case, is unnecessary and counter-productive.... [A] court addressing standing under the alternative test does not need to determine which party seeking to intervene is the most appropriate party in comparison to any other potential party, but rather needs to determine only which parties are, in fact, appropriate parties to a full and fair litigation of the dispute in question.

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In addition, an appropriate party must still satisfy the second part of the alternative test before we will grant standing. Once a party has established that it is an appropriate party to the litigation, it must also demonstrate that the issues it seeks to raise are of sufficient public importance in and of themselves to warrant granting the party standing.

Utah Chapter of the Sterra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 36, 39, 148 P.3d 960 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).7 Cedar Mountain's more concise statement of the test is the applicable standard: "[Plarties [may] gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate *1105party raising issues of significant public importance ...." 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95. This is a two-part inquiry. Id. 115 ("[T)his test breaks down to two elements: (1) is the plaintiff an appropriate party; and (2) does the dispute raise an issue of significant public importance." (citing Sterra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 36-39, 148 P.3d 960)).8

€ 16 Our public-interest standing doctrine is not unusual in state jurisprudence. Numerous other states, mindful that their constitutions do not impose the same restrictions on their judicial power that the federal constitution imposes on federal courts,9 have similarly established (under various names) a doctrine of public-interest standing.10 Seq, e.g., Trustees for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1987) ("[Tlaxpayer-citizen status is a sufficient basis on which to challenge allegedly illegal government conduct on matters of significant public concern."); Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal.4th 155, 127 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 254 P.3d 1005, 1011-12 (2011) ("[Where the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the petitioner need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced We refer to this variety of standing as public interest standing." (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex *1106rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) ("Indiana cases recognize certain situations in which public rather than private rights are at issue and hold that the usual standards for establishing standing need not be met.... [Wlhen a case involves enforcement of a public rather than a private right the plaintiff need not have a special interest in the matter nor be a public official." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Godfrey v. State, 752 N.W.2d 413, 425 (Iowa 2008) ("We believe our doctrine of standing in Towa is not so rigid that an exception to the injury requirement could not be recognized for citizens who seek to resolve certain questions of great public importance and interest in our system of government."); New Energy Econ., Inc. v. Martines, 149 N.M. 207, 247 P.3d 286, 290 (2011) ("We do not need to decide whether Petitioners have an actual beneficial interest because we conclude that they have standing under the great public importance doctrine. This court, in its discretion, may grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in cases presenting issues of great public importance." (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (1999) ("This court has long taken the position that when the issues sought to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the public, they may be resolved in a form of action that involves no rights or obligations peculiar to named parties.").

117 The case of Michigan is particularly illuminating. Recently, the Supreme Court of that state overruled a line of cases which "departed dramatically from Michigan's historical approach to standing." Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass'n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 487 Mich. 349, 792 N.W.2d 686, 689 (2010); see generally Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, the Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 PEnn St. L. Rav. 199 (2011). In restoring Michigan's traditional approach to standing, the Lonsing court explained that "[tJhere is no support in either the text of the Michigan Constitution or in Michigan jurisprudence ... for recognizing standing as a constitutional requirement or for adopting the federal standing doctrine." 792 N.W.2d at 698. The same is true of Utah's constitution and jurisprudence.11

18 We reaffirm today the teaching of our precedent that "Utah law ... allows parties to gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant importance." Cedar Mountain, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95.

B. Appellants Do Not Meet the Traditional Standing Criteria of Having a "Personal Stake in the Controversy" for Any of Their Four Claims

119 As explained above, Appellees below moved to dismiss the Article X Claims for lack of standing. The district court, however, granted Appellees' alternative motion for summary judgment on those claims without ever ruling on the question of standing. Appellees had earlier moved to dismiss the Article VI Claims for failure to state a claim pursuant to rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although that rule may be used to dismiss a claim for lack of standing, see Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah Ct.App. 1996), Ap-pellees invoked it only to assert that Appellants had failed to state a cause of action. The district court therefore never considered *1107whether Appellants had standing with respect to any of their claims.

120 As mentioned above, however, this court may raise standing "sua sponte at any time." Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1207. We did so at oral argument, and then requested supplemental briefing on standing with respect to the Article X Claims. The arguments submitted by the parties in their supplemental briefs, however, are applicable to all four claims. For the following reasons, we determine that Appellants do not have traditional standing to raise any of their claims.

4] 21 Appellants argue that they have traditional standing to bring the Article X Claims for two reasons. First, they argue that the challenged provisions of the Bill deny "plaintiffs as voters ... their political prerogative, implicit in Article 10, Section 3, to hold Board members politically accountable by a meaningful exercise of the right to vote." This argument is not persuasive. To the extent that one's status as a voter in itself ever gives one a right to challenge legislation, it can only be through some form of an alternative form of standing, such as our public-interest doctrine. It does not constitute a "personal stake in [a] controversy." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150.

{22 Appellants' second argument is that they have traditional standing to bring the Article X Claims because six of them are members of the Board.12 They argue that the Salary Supplement Program and the Textbook Approval Program "positively forbid the members of [the Board] from exercising their Article 10, Section 3 powers respecting those programs .... mak[ing] it impossible for them to fulfill their oaths of office ... and impair[ing] their ability, as candidates, in seeking re-election to office." This argument is similarly unconvincing. Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that elected officials have a vested interest in reelection sufficient to satisfy the traditional test for standing. And while it is true that elected officials who take oaths of office should take those oaths seriously, they likewise cite no authority establishing that taking such an oath gives them standing to challenge a law which they assert will infringe on their ability to faithfully execute it. Appellants are, in essence, asking that we view those who were members of the Board at the time they brought suit as being localized attorneys general, charged with constitutional authority to prosecute alleged violations of their portion of the constitution. This we decline to do.

123 For similar reasons, we determine that Appellants lack standing to bring those claims under the traditional doctrine of standing. As explained below, we conclude that they do have public-interest standing to bring the Article VI Claims. But that is only because we determine that violations of the provisions at issue in those claims are of sufficient public importance that they give Appellants standing to raise such violations in their role as citizens.

1 24 In previous cases where this court has reviewed the merits of a claim that either or both the single-subject and clear-title rules of Article VI, Section 22 have been violated, the plaintiffs alleged a direct and personal injury sufficient to satisfy the traditional standing test. See, eg., State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647, 655 (1944) (persons con-vieted under a law criminalizing polygamous lifestyle alleging "that the statute actually contains four subjects"); Pass v. Kanell, 98 Utah 511, 100 P.2d 972, 973, 975 (1940) (renter and owner of car found liable for tort challenging statutory basis for lability as violating both the single-subject and the clear-title rules); State v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 P. 367, 368 (1908) (court reporter alleging that a law which "affect[ed] his salary" violated the single-subject rule). While we determine below that the Article VI Claims treat issues of public significance and that Appellants are appropriately situated to *1108bring them, comparison with the cases cited above clarifies that Appellants have standing to bring those claims only under the alternative public-interest doctrine. They do not have a "personal stake in the controversy." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150.13

C. The Article VI Claims Rise to the Level of Great Constitutional Importance, and Appellants are Appropriately Situated to Raise Them

$25 As explained above, Appellants do not meet the traditional requirements for standing on any of their four claims. We therefore consider whether they meet the requirements for public-interest standing. First, we examine their Article VI Claims, and determine that they do meet those requirements.

126 Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides: "Except general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." These provisions, we have observed, "reflect[ ] an intent to limit legislative power and prevent special interest abuse" and are "clearly motivated by a wariness of unlimited legislative power." Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, ¶ 34, 57 P.3d 1007.

127 The restrictions placed on legislative activity by Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution are part of the fundamental structure of legislative power articulated in our constitution. They are accordingly of sufficient importance and general interest that claims of their violation may be brought even by plaintiffs who lack standing under the traditional criteria.14 Not every constitutional provision, to be sure, is of such importance that a claim of its violation will necessarily rise to the level of "significant public importance" required for public-interest standing under the formulation of Cedar Mountain, 2009 UT 48, ¶ 8, 214 P.3d 95. Our discussion below reveals, for instance, that delegations of particular functions to specific *1109executive agencies may not rise to that level. But today we hold that the single-subject and clear-title rules of Article VI, Section 22 do.

$28 Under Cedar Mountain, the importance of the issue by itself is not enough to give parties public-interest standing. One must also be "an appropriate party." Id.; see also id. T 15 (emphasizing that "this test breaks down to two elements"). "[AJn appropriate party .... has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions ...." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, 136, 148 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate that it is an "appropriate party," a plaintiff must further show that "the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

129 First, Appellants are "appropriate parties" with "the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions" with respect to the Article VI Claims. The "appropriateness" of a party under the public-interest standing doctrine is a question of competency. In the Sierra Club case, we determined that the Club "would have standing under the alternative [public-interest] test" due to its policy concerns and status as an "entity focused on protecting the environment." 15 Id. $42. The coalition of Appellants in the instant case is not as well-established or long-standing as the Sierra Club, but it similarly has policy concerns and has come together to "focus[ ] on" the instant constitutional challenge. Further, Appellants have shown themselves able to "effectively assist the court" in its consideration of the Article VI Claims. While the district court dismissed those claims, and we affirm that dismissal, Appellants have nevertheless done an admirable job of briefing the facts and controlling law. That their complaint ultimately failed to state a claim does not mean that they were not appropriate parties to bring it. While we hold today that the Bill does not violate the clear-title and single-subject rules of Article VI, Section 22, Appellants have caused this court to consider those rules and clarify the standards they impose for the first time in decades, and that in itself is a considerable achievement.16

1 30 Second, Sterra Club requires that "the issues [be] unlikely to be raised if the party is denied standing." Id. 186 (internal quotation marks omitted). We can certainly construct hypothetical plaintiffs who might be seen to have traditional standing to bring at least some of Appellant's claims. For instance, a teacher whose colleagues' salaries were raised under the Teacher Salary Supplement Program, but whose own salary was left unchanged, might invoke direct economic interests. Similarly, we can imagine a suit brought by a textbook publisher whose materials were rejected pursuant to the Textbook Approval Program. But our inquiry is not whether some hypothetical plaintiff can be imagined; it is whether "the issues are unlikely to be raised if the party is denied [public-interest] standing." Id. (emphasis *1110added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, where the Board itself is silent and no other plaintiff has emerged in the years since the Bill's passage, we think that is indeed unlikely.

$31 One more feature of our prior statements on public-interest standing deserves mention. In Sterre Club, we observed that a court's recognition that a party has public-interest standing analysis

requires the court to determine not only that the issues are of a sufficient weight but also that they are not more appropriately addressed by another branch of government pursuant to the political process. The more generalized the issues, the more likely they ought to be resolved in the legislative or executive branches.

Id. 189 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But Article VI, Section 22 places restrictions on the legislative process itself. Where the legislature has passed a bill and the governor has signed it, we cannot assume that either of those branches are appropriate parties to whom to entrust the prosecution of a claim that the bill violates the strictures of Article VI, Section 22. And "more generalized" in this context speaks not to the general nature of the interest-for that is inherent in every issue of "sufficient weight" to justify the recognition of public-interest standing-but rather to the generalized nature of the issue itself. 17 In other words, public-interest standing should not be used by courts to engage in review of nonjusticiable political questions. Here, Appellants' claims do not raise that type of question. Rather, they seek to enforce an explicit and mandatory constitutional provision dealing primarily with questions of form and process. See Uvax Const. art. I, § 26 ("The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.").

{32 We conclude that Appellants satisfy the requirements of the public-interest standing doctrine with respect to the Article VI Claims.18

D. The Article X Claims do not Rise to the Same Level of Great Constitutional Importance, and Appellants Are Not Appropriately Situated to Raise Them

133 Article X, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution provides: "The general control and supervision of the public education system shall be vested in a State Board of Education." Appellants claim that the Bill violates this provision in two respects. First, they object to the Teacher Salary Supplement Program, which delegates to the Utah Department of Human Resources Management the duty of administering a pilot program to provide salary enhancements to certain science teachers in Utah public schools in order to dissuade them from seeking private employment. Appellants claim this is an unconstitutional delegation of an element of the "general control and supervision of the public education system" to an executive agency other than the one with that constitutionally specified role Second, they argue *1111that another provision of the Bill, which requires a private contractor to "evaluate and map the alignment of public school instrue-tional materials" to the "core curriculum," unconstitutionally delegates another element of that "general control and supervision."

1 34 As explained above, Appellants do not have standing to bring the Article X Claims under "the traditional criteria of [having al personal stake in the controversy." Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d at 1150. For the following reasons, we determine that they also lack standing under the alternative public-interest standing doctrine. As articulated in Cedar Mountain, that doctrine provides that "parties [may] gain standing if they can show that they are an appropriate party raising issues of significant public importance." 2009 UT 48, 1 8, 214 P.3d 95. "[An appropriate party .... has the interest necessary to effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions ...." Sterrae Club, 2006 UT 74, 136, 148 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks omitted).

T35 Appellants fail to satisfy either element of the public-interest standing test with respect to their Article X Claims. First, while we have explained above that Appellants are "appropriate part[ies]" to raise the Article VI Claims, they are not as well situated to raise the Article X Claims. While the restrictions on the legislative process imposed by Article I, Section 22 give every citizen of Utah an interest in seeing them obeyed, the delegation in Article X, Section 83 of "general control and supervision of the public education system" to the Board does not create such a general interest. Further, Appellants below and in their briefs and argument on appeal have not proved themselves able to "assist the court in developing and reviewing all relevant legal and factual questions." Id. €36. The crucial question of how we are to understand the scope of "general control and supervision of the public education system," and the related question of what the historical practice and traditional core functions of the Board have been, were never sufficiently framed and answered. This played a role in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the Article X Claims.

986 In addition to demonstrating that they are "appropriate part[ies]," plaintiffs must also raise issues of "sufficient pub-lie importance" to have standing under the public-interest doctrine. Id. 140. Every constitutional provision is surely important, but not every alleged violation of a constitutional provision will provide a basis for public-interest standing. As discussed above, the single-subject and clear-title rules imposed on the legislature by Article VI, Section 22 meet that standard. They are restrictions which must be observed every time the legislature exercises its core function of passing laws. The provision at issue in the Article X Claims, in contrast, is a delegation of a defined subject to a particular agency. While we do not conclude that such questions can never be appropriate ones in which to employ the public-interest standing doctrine, in combination with the Appellants' lack of "appropriateness" to treat them, their more localized significance renders the public-interest standing doctrine inapplicable to these plaintiffs on these claims.

$37 Appellants further argue that their claims are unlikely to be brought by anyone else. As explained above, that is a necessary part of the showing parties must make under the public-interest standing doctrine. Id. 136. However, by itself it is not sufficient- and we have already determined that Appellants do not meet the other criteria for public-interest standing. Accordingly, we vacate the entry of summary judgment against Appellants on the Article X Claims and remand to the district court. The district court is directed on remand to dismiss these claims for lack of standing.

II. TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF ARTICLE VI CLAIMS

138 Having determined that Appellants, although they lack standing under "the traditional criteria of [having al personal stake in the controversy," Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983), do have standing to bring the Article VI Claims under the alternative standard, we review the district court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. Again, Appellants claim that the Bill contains "more than one subject," and that *1112its contents are not "clearly expressed in its title"; therefore, they argue, it violates Article VI, Section 22 in two respects. We determine that Appellants have failed to state a claim on either count.

A. -The Complaint did not State a Violation of the Single-Subject Rule

Y39 Again, Article VI, Section 22 provides that "no bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." Appellants argue that the Bill treats too many separate aspects of the public education system to pass muster under the single-subject rule. In their complaint, Appellants supported this claim by extensive reference to the legislative history of the items contained in the Bill. They point out that, when introduced as separate items, some had failed on a floor vote, some passed in one chamber but were held in committee in the other, and some were never submitted for even committee consideration as individual items. They further assert that popular bills were "used as hostages to extort or compel enactment of the less popular bills."

140 Almost a century ago, this court opined that while the single-subject rule '

is mandatory and binding alike upon the courts and the Legislature, yet it should be liberally construed in favor of upholding a law, and should be so applied as to effectuate its purpose in preventing the combination of