Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In the above-referenced action, referred to the undersigned for general pretrial supervision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), plaintiffs, United States citizens, and several estates, survivors and heirs of United States citizens, who are victims of terrorist attacks in Israel allegedly perpetrated by the Islamic Resistance Movement (“HAMAS”),1 allege that defendant Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (“Credit Lyonnais”) is civilly liable for damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) for: (1) aiding and abetting the murder, attempted murder, and serious bodily injury of American *203nationals located outside the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332; (2) knowingly-providing material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization2 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; and (3) financing acts of terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C. On October 5, 2006, Judge Sifton granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the first claim, but denied its motion as to the second and third claims.3

Presently before the court are cross-motions to compel. On October 18, 2006, plaintiffs filed a Motion to Compel Responses to Their First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests. (See doc. no. 49, Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for an Order Overruling Objections and Compelling Further Responses to Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests, dated 10/18/06 (“Pis’ Motion”).) In response, Credit Lyonnais submitted a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion, dated 11/16/06 (“Defs Opp.”), Declaration of Jonathan I. Blackman, Esq. and Exhibits, Unreported Cases Cited in Defendant’s Memorandum, and Expert Declaration of Chantal Cutajar and Exhibits. (See doc. no. 61.) In reply, plaintiffs submitted a Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Compel, Declaration of Aaron Schlanger, Esq. and Exhibits, and Expert Declaration of Robert M. Chesney, Esq. and Exhibits. (See doc. no. 62.)

On October 18, 2006, Credit Lyonnais also filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Answers to Its First Set of Interrogatories and Document Requests. (See doc. no. 63, Att. 1, Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Credit Lyonnais S.A.’s Motion to Compel Production of Documents and Answers to Interrogatories, dated 10/18/06 (“Defs Motion”).) In support of its motion, defendant also submitted Unreported Decisions Cited in Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion and a Declaration of Lawrence B. Friedman, Esq. (See doc. no. 63.) In response, plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Compel (doc. no. 64, Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Opposition, dated 11/16/06 (“Pis’ Opp.”), Atts. A and B). In reply, defendant filed a Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Compel, Unreported Decisions Cited in Reply Memorandum of Law and a Declaration of Jonathan I. Blackman, Esq. (See doc. no. 65.)

After considering the foregoing submissions and for the reasons set forth herein, both motions are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are individuals and estates, survivors and heirs of individuals who were injured or killed in thirteen separate terrorist attacks, allegedly perpetrated by HAMAS in Israel between March 28, 2002 and August 19, 2003.4 (Doc. no. 52, Amended Complaint, dated 11/6/06 (“Am.Compl.”), at HH 5-447.) Plaintiffs allege that Credit Lyonnais is a financial institution incorporated and headquartered in France. (Id. at U1.) Plaintiffs further allege that Credit Lyonnais “conducts business in the United States and maintains an office at 601 Brickell Key Drive, Miami, Florida, 33131. Credit Lyonnais is registered with state banking authorities in Florida, and its Miami office is listed as its registered address.”5 (Id. at 11450.) Plain*204tiffs further allege that Credit Lyonnais maintains bank accounts in France for Le Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestinians (“CBSP”), and that although CBSP describes itself as a charitable organization, it is part of HAMAS’s fundraising infrastructure and a member of the Union of Good. (See id. at 1490.) The Union of Good, plaintiffs maintain, is an organization established by the Muslim Brotherhood and comprised of more than fifty Islamic charitable organizations worldwide, and is a “principal fundraising mechanism for HAMAS.” (Id. at 1111473-475.)

Plaintiffs base their claims on section 2333(a) of the Antiterrorism Act of 1992 (the “ATA”), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq., which provides civil remedies for United States nationals injured in international terrorist attacks. Section 2333(a) states in relevant part:

Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the costs of the suit, including attorney’s fees.

18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).

“International terrorism,” in turn, is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331(a) as activities that:

(a) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(b) appear to be intended—

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;

(in) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnaping; and

(c) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 2339B criminalizes support of formally designated terrorist organizations. It provides, in relevant part, that:

Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources6 to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both____ To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist organization ... that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity ... or that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism____

18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(l).

Section 2339C, entitled “Prohibitions against the financing of terrorism,” prohibits the financing of terrorists, provides in relevant part:

Whoever ... by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully provides or collects funds with the intention that such funds be used, or with the knowledge that such funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out ... [an] act intended to cause death or serious bodily *205injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, shall be punished----

18 U.S.C. § 23390(a)(1).

In addressing defendant’s motion to dismiss in Weiss v. National Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F.Supp.2d 609, 613 (E.D.N.Y.2006), and in the instant case, 2006 WL 2862704, at *1, Judge Sifton found that “[vjiolations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and § 2339C are recognized as international terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a).” See also Linde v. Arab Bank, 384 F.Supp.2d 571, 580-581 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (finding that “plaintiffs have alleged that they were ‘injured by reasons of an act of international terrorism,’ as required by Section 2333(a)”); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute and Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1014-1015 (7th Cir.2002).

Plaintiffs allege that for more than thirteen years, defendant Credit Lyonnais “maintained an account for CBSP in Paris and provided HAMAS with material support in the form of financial services.” (Am. Compl. at 11529.) Plaintiffs further allege that, through CBSP, Credit Lyonnais “has knowingly transferred significant sums of money to HAMAS-controlled entities” and “knowingly provided material support ... to a designated FTO [Foreign Terrorist Organization], and has provided substantial assistance to HAMAS in the commission of acts of international terrorism in Israel, including the terrorist attacks that injured the plaintiffs.” (Id. at Hit 532, 535.) Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that Credit Lyonnais is civilly liable to them for damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), for providing “material support and resources” to a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) (in violation of § 2339B) and providing or collecting funds “with the knowledge that such funds are to be used” to support terrorism (in violation of § 2339C) (Id. at UK 543-556.)

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL

A. Plaintiffs’ Discovery Requests.

On June 30, 2006, plaintiffs served Credit Lyonnais with their First Request for the Production of Documents. (See Plaintiffs’ Document Requests, annexed to Pis’ Motion as Exh. B.) At issue are Document Requests Nos. 1-3, 11-13 and 15, in which plaintiffs request:

• No. 1: All account records maintained by, or in the custody and control of Defendant that concern CBSP, including account opening records, bank statements, wire transactions, deposit slips and all correspondence between Defendant and CBSP.

• No. 2: All documents and communications by or to Defendant concerning CBSP, including all internal reports and the contents of any internal investigations undertaken by Defendant that reference CBSP.

• No. 3: All non-privileged documents and communications by or to the Defendant from or to banking regulatory authorities in the United States, the Republic of France, or the European Union ... concerning CBSP and or accounts maintained by the Defendant on CBSP’s behalf.

• No. 11: All documents concerning Defendant’s decision in January 2002 to close CBSP’s accounts maintained by Credit Lyonnais including any documents that were the catalyst or basis of any decision to close or freeze said accounts.

• No. 12: All documents concerning Defendant’s actual closure in January 2002 of CBSP’s accounts maintained by Credit Lyonnais including any documents that were the catalyst or basis of any decision to close or freeze said accounts.

• No. 13: All documents concerning Credit Lyonnais’s anti-money laundering efforts, “Know Your Customer” procedures, or other measures Credit Lyon-nais used to prevent the rendering of financial services to Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations.

*206• No. 15: Copies of all internal Credit Lyonnais documents related to the following subjects and/or departments: [enumerating departments and procedures for account opening, security, customer accounts, compliance, internal audits, bank secrecy and terror financing designations or warnings].

(Id.)

On July 5, 2006, plaintiffs served Credit Lyonnais with their First Set of Requests for Admissions and Related Interrogatories “regarding the authenticity of seven (7) documents that Plaintiffs ... produced to the Bank.” (Pis’ Motion at 6; see also Plaintiffs’ Requests for Admissions and Interrogatories, annexed to Pis’ Motion as Exh. A.) Those documents, plaintiffs allege, “reflect transactions initiated by ... CBSP” and “involve wire transfers to organizations identified by the United States Department of Justice as controlled by HAMAS, an.” (Pis’ Motion at 6; see also Pis’ Motion, Exhs. Cl-7.) Specifically, plaintiffs request that Credit Lyonnais either admit, deny, or set forth in detail the reasons why it is unable to either admit or deny, the truth of the following facts:

• No. 1: Each document is a record of regularly conducted business activity of the Bank within the meaning of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

• No. 2: Each document is an accurate reproduction of an original document that is maintained in your files.

• No. 3: The document accurately identifies an account or accounts of a customer or customers of defendant.

• No. 4: The document accurately sets forth the details of a transaction processed by defendant.

(Id. at Exh. A.)

In response, Credit Lyonnais objected to both plaintiffs’ Document Requests and Requests for Admissions and Interrogatories on the grounds that, inter alia, the requests,

seek the disclosure of commercial and financial information in violation of Article 1 bis of French law No. 68-678 (“Article 1 bis”), which prohibits such disclosure in connection with a foreign judicial proceeding, except pursuant to an enforceable international treaty or agreement. Under Article 1 bis, [Credit Lyonnais] would be exposed to liability under French law unless disclosure proceeds in accordance with the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Convention”), 23 U.S.T. 2555, TIAS 7444, 847 UNTS 231, to which France and the United States are parties. Such liability would be avoided by following Hague Convention procedures, which should therefore be followed here.

(Id. at Exh. D, 1T 9.) In addition, Credit Lyon-nais also objected to all discovery requests,

to the extent they seek the disclosure of information and/or production of documents in violation of applicable French laws prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to a criminal investigation. The knowing disclosure of the existence and/or substance of a criminal investigation with the objective of adversely affecting criminal proceedings constitutes a criminal offense under French law and is sanctionable by imprisonment and substantial monetary penalties under Article L 434-7-2 of the French Criminal Code.

(Id. at Exh. D, H12.) As discussed herein, Articles 11 and L 434-7-2 of the French Criminal Code prohibit disclosure of information relating to a criminal investigation to persons “likely to be involved as perpetrators, co-perpetrators, accomplices or receivers in the commission of these infractions ... for the purpose of interfering with the progress of the investigations or the search for the truth____” (Expert Declaration of Chan-tal Cutajar in Support of Credit Lyonnais’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel, dated 11/14/06 (“Cutajar Decl.”), at 1137; French Criminal Code Article 434-7-2, attached as Exh. 26 to the Cutajar Decl.)

Credit Lyonnais also objected to plaintiffs’ discovery requests on the grounds that they “seek the disclosure of information in violation of applicable French bank customer secrecy obligations” and “applicable French anti-money laundering laws.” (Def s Opp. at 4-5.) Credit Lyonnais further noted that failure to comply with the above regulations *207“constitutes a criminal offense under French law and is sanctionable by imprisonment and a substantial monetary penalty under Article 226-13 of the French Criminal Code.” (Id.)

In order to avoid civil and criminal liability under these statutes, Credit Lyonnais twice “requested [CBSP] to release [Credit Lyon-nais] from its secrecy obligations in order to permit disclosure of information in [Credit Lyonnais’s] possession related to CBSP.” (Id. at 4.) On July 20 and September 14, 2006, the bank’s French counsel sent letters to CBSP’s counsel, and has yet to receive any substantive response. (See id. at 5.) Instead, CBSP’s counsel simply objected to disclosing correspondence between counsel for CBSP and counsel for Credit Lyonnais. (See id. at 6.) Credit Lyonnais has also sought the French government’s guidance regarding plaintiffs’ discovery demands by sending two letters and leaving one follow-up phone message with the French Ministry of Justice, but similarly has received no response. (See id.)

Plaintiffs now seek to compel Credit Lyon-nais to respond to Document Requests 1-3, 11-13 and 15, and Requests for Admission and Related Interrogatories Nos. 1-4.

B. Applicability Of French Civil And Criminal Laws.

1. Defendant gave adequate notice of the existence and applicability of French civil and criminal laws.

As a preliminary matter, the Court first addresses plaintiffs’ contention that defendant failed to give adequate notice of its objection based on foreign law, and failed to demonstrate that the foreign law applies to the requested discovery. (See Pis’ Motion at 8-9.) Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice.” The party must “provide the opposing party with reasonable notice that an argument unll be raised.” Rationis Enters. Inc. of Panama v. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., 426 F.3d 580, 585-86 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasis added). Once a discovery motion is made, the objecting party faces a higher burden “of demonstrating that such law actually bars the production or testimony at issue.... ” Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 34 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (emphasis added). “In order to meet that burden, the party resisting discovery must provide the Court with information of sufficient particularity and specificity to allow the Court to determine whether the discovery sought is indeed prohibited by foreign law.” Id. The party must describe, “inter alia, the provisions of the foreign law, the basis for its relevance, and the application of the foreign law to the facts of the case.” Rationis, 426 F.3d at 586.

In this case, Credit Lyonnais gave sufficient notice of its argument that French civil and criminal laws apply to plaintiffs’ requested discovery. In its responses to both plaintiffs’ Document Requests and Requests for Admissions and Related Interrogatories, Credit Lyonnais noted that “disclosure of commercial and financial information” would violate Article 1 bis of French law No. 68-678 (Pis’ Motion, Exh. D at 119), French bank customer secrecy regulations pursuant to Article L 511-33 of the French Monetary and Financial Code (see id. at If 10), applicable French anti-money laundering laws (see id. at If 11), and French laws prohibiting the disclosure of information relating to a criminal investigation (see id. at K12). Credit Lyonnais’s objections to discovery constituted adequate written notice that it was invoking foreign law. See Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34; compare In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that defendant had failed to comply with Rule 44.1 because defendant never raised the applicability of foreign laws during district court proceedings).

Furthermore, in its objection to plaintiffs’ motion to compel, Credit Lyonnais adequately supported its position that “the discovery sought is indeed prohibited by foreign law.” Alfadda, 149 F.R.D. at 34. In her expert declaration for Credit Lyonnais, Chantal Cu-tajar attaches translated portions of French law upon which Credit Lyonnais relies and explains:

First, CREDIT LYONNAIS is subject to the obligations of bank secrecy under French law____[A]bsent such a waiver [by *208its customer], CREDIT LYONNAIS is legally bound to maintain the confidentiality of customer information, and would be subject to criminal liability if it failed to do so. Second, CREDIT LYONNAIS is subject to obligations of professional confidentiality intended to protect the vital interests of France and to ensure the efficacy of the French legislative and regulatory procedures aimed at combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism____ Third, persons in France who provide to French legal authorities information regarding preliminary criminal investigations are also subject to obligations of professional confidentiality, and are subject to criminal penalties if they violate those obligations.

(Cutajar Deel. at 117.) Cutajar continues, “If CREDIT LYONNAIS fails to observe bank secrecy, it is liable to three types of sanctions, all of which may be inflicted concurrently: sanctions of a criminal nature (1), of a disciplinary nature (2) and of a civil nature (3).” (Id. at 1114.)

Here, plaintiffs, in part, seek precisely the sort of information protected by French bank secrecy obligations, anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism laws, and information related to criminal investigations: e.g., admissions regarding the authenticity of wire transfer and other account records and, inter alia, “[a]ll non-privileged documents and communications by or to the Defendant from or to banking regulatory authorities in the United States, the Republic of France, or the European Union ... concerning CBSP and/or accounts maintained by the Defendant on CBSP’s behalf.” (Pis’ Motion, Exh. B, Request No. 3.) Credit Lyonnais has met both its burden of placing plaintiffs on notice of its objection based on French law, and demonstrating that the foreign law applies to at least some of the requested discovery.

2. French civil and criminal laws are not rendered inapplicable by plaintiffs’ possession of documents and information in the United States.

Plaintiffs argue unavailingly that French bank secrecy obligations do not apply to Credit Lyonnais documents already in plaintiffs’ possession and located in the United States. (See Pis’ Motion at 10-11.) Plaintiffs rely on In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 348 (D.Mass.2003), adopted and amended to correct clerical error, 2004 WL 3217802 (D.Mass. July 2, 2004), for the proposition that once a party has seen the documents at issue, the producing party can no longer withhold those documents on grounds of foreign confidentiality law. In Lemout, plaintiffs brought suit against KPMG-B, a Belgian entity, in the United States. See id. at 349. During the United States litigation, plaintiffs also became civil claimants in separate criminal proceedings against KPMG-B pending in Belgium. See id. at 350. As part of the criminal case, Belgian prosecutors gave plaintiffs access to workpapers for the years 1998-2001, a subset of the documents plaintiffs were seeking in their U.S. litigation. See id. Plaintiffs were allowed to review the workpapers, but were not allowed to copy them, and filed a motion to compel production of those same papers in their federal civil action. See id. KPMG-B objected to producing the documents in the civil action on the grounds that the documents were protected by the Belgian Criminal Code, which prevents auditors and “all other persons whose state or profession renders them depositories of the secrets entrusted to them” from disclosing those secrets. Id. The court found that although certain exceptions to the Belgian Code applied, “the most compelling argument ... is that in light of their recent review of the audit workpapers in Belgium, such documents have already been disclosed, [and] are therefore no longer confidential....” Id. at 350-51. The court further noted that plaintiffs may “eventually ... receive copies of these documents from the Belgian prosecutors.” Id. at 351. The court therefore granted plaintiffs motion to compel, stating, “It seems absurd that plaintiffs should have to resort to the time-consuming and uncertain process of letters rogatory to obtain documents they have already seen....” Id.

Here, Credit Lyonnais correctly asserts that Lernout is inapposite for two reasons. First, the issue for the Lernout defendants was maintaining the confidentiality of documents already authenticated, not admitting *209to the authenticity of confidential information; and second, prosecutors provided the KPMG-B documents to the plaintiffs in the Belgian proceeding, unlike Credit Lyonnais, which has never allowed plaintiffs to review the requested documents, much less ever voluntarily produced them.

Plaintiffs also contend that French laws do not apply to documents located in the United States. Plaintiffs cite Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442, which provides:

(1) (a) A court or agency in the United States ... may order a person subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the information is outside the United States.

(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject the person to whom the order is directed to sanctions ....

(c) In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and the extent to which noncomplianee with the request would undermine the important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine the important interests of the state where the information is located.

(2) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state in which the information or prospective witness is located,

(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to comply with the order for production____

(Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs point to the phrases “outside the United States” (§ 442(1)(a)); “order directing production of information located abroad” (§ 442(1)(c)); and the court’s power to impose sanctions for failure to comply with an order for “disclosure of information located outside the United States” even if prohibited by foreign law (§ 442(2)), as evidence that Section 442 applies only to those documents physically located abroad.

Plaintiffs further note that in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed.2d 461 (1987), the defendants, two French manufacturers, did not object to producing “material or information that was located in the United States,” but only to producing material or information located in France and subject to French blocking statutes. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 526 n. 4, 107 S.Ct. 2542. Plaintiffs here assert that because the Court in Aerospatiale considered “the scope of the district court’s power to order foreign discovery in the face of objections by foreign states,” documents located within the United States (even if they originate from foreign sources) are accorded less protection. Id. at 544 n. 28, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs’ reasoning regarding the bank documents located in the United States is flawed. First, Restatement § 442(1)(c) identifies as a factor whether the “information originated in the United States,” not whether the information currently is located in the United States. (Emphasis added.) Simply because Section 442 and the Court in Aerospatiale address documents located outside the United States does not mean that documents, obtained involuntarily from, or without the consent of, a foreign bank or its customer, and now located in the United States, should be accorded any less protection based solely on the location of the documents. The court is unaware of any precedent which ignores the bank-customer relationship simply because the documents at issue are currently located in the United States. See Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir.1996) (deferring to British *210bankruptcy laws because the American interests were “not very compelling,” and, although one wire transfer was routed through the British bank’s New York office, the wire transfers “at the heart of such a suit ... related primarily to England”)

The mere possession by plaintiffs in the United States of some of the disputed documents does not dispose of the parties’ discovery dispute. There is no dispute that the documents at issue originated outside the United States. Accordingly, the court next considers the factors set forth in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and in Minpeco v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y.1987).

C. The Factors In Rst § 442(1) (c) and Minpeco Compel Credit Lyonnais to Produce the Requested Information.

In determining whether to compel production of documents located abroad from foreign parties, courts in the Second Circuit consider the following five factors elucidated by the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale and set forth in Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 442(l)(c):

(1) the importance to the ... litigation of the documents or other information requested;

(2) the degree of specificity of the request;

(3) whether the information originated in the United States;

(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and

(5) the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine the important interests of the state where the information is located.

British Int’l Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90 Civ. 2370, 2000 WL 713057, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000) (citing Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (quoting tentative draft of Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 437(l)(c), subsequently adopted as Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 442(l)(c))). Courts in the Second Circuit also consider “the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought [and] the good faith of the party resisting discovery.” Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523; Reino De Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping, No. 03 Civ. 3573, 2005 WL 1813017, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.1, 2005).

In support of defendant’s position, defendant relies on what the court in Minpeco identified as the four principal factors for courts to consider when conducting a foreign discovery analysis. (See Defs Opp. at 14.) The Minpeco court, however, identified seven factors relevant to a foreign discovery analysis, and then highlighted four of those as the “principal factors:”7

(1) the competing interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict,

(2) the hardship of compliance on the party or witness from whom discovery is sought,

(3) the importance to the litigation of the information and documents requested, and

(4) the good faith of the party resisting discovery.

Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523 (emphasis added). Two of those factors — the competing national interests of each nation, and the *211importance to the litigation of the requested discovery — are also identified in the Restatement. In reconciling these factors, the Southern District of New York explained:

This Circuit thus considers two factors— hardship of compliance and good faith— not listed by the Supreme Court---[T]his Court will consider each of these seven factors, giving the most weight to the fifth [Aerospatiale] factor — the balance of national interests — “as it directly addresses the relations between sovereign nations.”

Reino De Espana, 2005 WL 1813017, at *3 (quoting Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y.1999)).

This court similarly will follow Second Circuit cases which apply all five factors enumerated by the Supreme Court and the Restatement, and the two additional “principal” factors identified in Minpeco: the hardship of compliance on the party from whom discovery is sought, and the resisting party’s good faith. Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523; see In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated August 9, 2000, 218 F.Supp.2d 544, 554 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (“[T]he Second Circuit applies a balancing test distilled from the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, and has endorsed consideration of the [Minpeco] factors.... The [Minpeco] analysis is broad, and may encompass additional considerations — whether they are enumerated separately or considered as part of the four Minpeco factors.”); Reino De Espana, 2005 WL 1813017, at *3 (considering all seven factors); Madanes, 186 F.R.D. at 285-286; British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd., 2000 WL 713057, at *8-9.

Having already considered the third factor — noting that the information sought by plaintiffs’ discovery requests did not originate in the United States — the court will consider the remaining six factors, beginning with the first.

1. The requested information is crucial to the litigation.

Consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Restatement § 442(l)(c) requires that the court examine the relevance of the requested discovery to the litigation:

In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested____

Rst. § 442(c).

In this case, plaintiffs seek documents and information revealing Credit Lyonnais’s knowledge of CBSP’s alleged terrorist connections and the extent of the bank’s financial services in support of CBSP’s alleged terrorist acts. Indeed, Credit Lyonnais concedes that “the documents and information sought by plaintiffs are undeniably of potential importance to the outcome of this litigation.” (Defs Opp. at 21.) The information plaintiffs seek regarding the CBSP accounts) is crucial and thus relevant to plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333(a), 2339B and 2339C, which require plaintiffs to demonstrate that (1) they were injured by an act of international terrorism (pursuant to Section 2331(a)); (2) defendant “knowingly provided material support and/or resources” to a designated terrorist (in violation of Section 2339B); and (3) defendant “willingly provid[ed] or collect[ed] funds” used to carry out terrorist acts (in violation of Section 2339C). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B, 2339C; see also Linde, 384 F.Supp.2d at 588.

Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the claim or defense of any party____Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Because the scope of civil discovery in the United States is broader than that of many foreign jurisdictions, some courts have applied a more stringent test of relevancy when applying the Federal Rules to foreign discovery. See Ae-rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542, 546, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (noting that the requested documents were “vital” to the litigation, and advising U.S. courts that “[wjhen it is necessary to seek evidence abroad, the district court must supervise pretrial proceedings particularly *212closely to prevent discovery abuses”); see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir.1992) (“[W]here the outcome of the litigation ‘does not stand or fall on the present discovery order,’ ... courts have generally been unwilling to override foreign secrecy laws.”) (quoting In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th Cir.1977)); Rst. § 442, comment (a) (the discovery must be “directly relevant and material”); but see Compagnie Francaise d'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 32 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (“In ordering production of these documents, this Court does not need to find, nor can it find at this point, that the requested documents are ‘vital’____”); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 515 (N.D.Ill.1984) (noting that Aerospatiale indicated that the requested discovery should be “vital,” but declining to articulate a standard).

Given plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Credit Lyonnais’s provision of financial services to CBSP for more than thirteen years, including accepting deposits from and/or distributing funds to alleged terrorist organizations on behalf of CBSP (Am.Comp.UH 529-536), the court finds that the discovery sought is both relevant and crucial to the litigation of plaintiffs’ claims. Because the documents and information sought by plaintiffs are highly relevant and important to the claims and defenses in this action, the court finds that this second factor weighs heavily in plaintiffs’ favor.

2. The discovery requests are narrowly tailored.

Rst. § 442(l)(c) also provides, “[A] court or agency in the United States should take into account ... the degree of specificity of the request____” Although the parties have agreed to brief only the issue of French laws at this time (see Defs Opp. at 2, n. 1), and not issues such as relevance or overbreadth, the court, having determined that the requests seek relevant information, must also examine the specificity of the discovery requests in performing an analysis under Rst. § 442.

Here, the court finds that the requested discovery is relevant, vital and narrowly tailored to the litigation. See Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 n. 8; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 515. As noted above, at iss