Hardy v. LaBelle's Distributing Co.

Montana Supreme Court3/30/1983
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Full Opinion

=== Opinion ===

                              No. 82-110
               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T I STATE OF MONTANA
                                        IE

                                   1983



DEBRA JO HARDY,

               Plaintiff and Appellant,



LaBELLEIS DISTRIEUTING CO., STEVEN
E. NEWSOM, Loss Prevention Manager;
DAVID KOTKE, Showroom Manager,
               Defendants and Respondents.




Appeal from:   District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
               In and for the County of Yellowstone, The Honorable
               Charles Luedke, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

     For Appellant:

               Joseph P. Hennessey, Billings, Montana

      For Respondents:
               James L. Jones, Billings, Montana



                              Submitted on Briefs:    January 27, 1953
                                             Decided: March 31, 1983




                               8
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                              Clerk
Mr.    J u s t i c e L . C.       G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of          the Court.


       Plaintiff          , Debra J o Hardy                brought t h i s a c t i o n a g a i n s t defen-

dants       for       false         imprisonment.                    The        District           Court          of     the

T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Yellowstone County,                        i s s u e d judgment

aEter       a     jury       verdict             in    favor         of     defendants             and      plaintiff

appeals.

       Defendant,           LaBelle      I   s    D i s t r i b u t i n g Company ( L a B e l l e I s )           , hired
Hardy      as     a    temporary             employee          on     December             1, 1 9 7 8 .           She    was

assigned          duty       as      a    sales         clerk          in       the     jewelry          department.

       On December 9 ,              1 9 7 8 , a n o t h e r employee f o r L a B e l l e                  I s ,    Jackie

Renner,         thought          she     saw       Hardy       steal        one       of     the    watches             that

J A a B e l l e l s had     in    stock.              Jackie    Renner            reported         her     belief         to

L a B e l l e s showroom manager t h a t e v e n i n g .

       On t h e morning o f                  December 1 0 ,            Hardy was a p p r o a c h e d by t h e

a s s i s t a n t manager o f L a B e l l e l s j e w e l r y d e p a r t m e n t and                      told         that

a l l new e m p l o y e e s were g i v e n a t o u r of t h e s t o r e .                           He showed h e r

into     the      showroom m a n a g e r ' s             o f f i c e and          then      left,     closing            the

d o o r b e h i n d him.

       T h e r e is c o n f l i c t i n g t e s t i m o n y c o n c e r n i n g who was p r e s e n t i n

the      showroom           manager      I   s     off ice      when            Hardy        arrived.                  Hardy

t e s t i £ i e d t h a t David Kotke , t h e showroom m a n a g e r ,                              Steve Newsom,

the    store's         loss prevention                  manager,            and       a uniformed           policeman

were     present.                Newsom          and    one     of        the     policemen          in      the        room
testified         t h a t another policeman,                        i n s t e a d of K o t k e , was p r e s e n t .

       Hardy was t o l d t h a t s h e had been a c c u s e d o f s t e a l i n g a w a t c h .

Hardy d e n i e d         t a k i n g t h e w a t c h and a g r e e d t o t a k e a l i e d e t e c t o r

test.           According         to     conflicting            testimony,                 the   meeting           lasted

a p p r o x i m a t e l y from t w e n t y to f o r t y - f i v e m i n u t e s .

       Hardy t o o k t h e l i e d e t e c t o r t e s t which s u p p o r t e d h e r s t a t e -

m e n t t h a t s h e had n o t t a k e n t h e w a t c h .                 The showroom manager apo-

l o g i z e d t o Hardy t h e n e x t morning and t o l d h e r t h a t s h e was s t i l l

welcome t o work a t L a B e l l e l s .                      The employee who r e p o r t e d                     seeing

Hardy t a k e         t h e watch        a l s o apologized.                      The      two e m p l o y e e s        then

a r g u e d b r i e f l y , and Hardy l e f t t h e s t o r e .
       H a r d y b r o u g h t t h i s a c t i o n c l a i m i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s had wrong-

f u l l y d e t a i n e d h e r a g a i n s t h e r w i l l when s h e was q u e s t i o n e d a b o u t

t h e watch.

       On a p p e a l H a r d y r a i s e s b a s i c a l l y t w o i s s u e s

       1.      W h e t h e r t h e e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t

and judgment; and

       2.      Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d               i n the       i s s u a n c e of    its

instructions.

       The t w o k e y e l e m e n t s o f         f a l s e i m p r i s o n m e n t are t h e r e s t r a i n t

of   an       individual against h i s w i l l                  and    t h e u n l a w f u l n e s s of       such

restraint.            3 2 Am. J u r . 2 d , F a l s e I m p r i s o n m e n t , § 5 .     The i n d i v i d u a l

may b e r e s t r a i n e d b y a c t s or m e r e l y b y w o r d s w h i c h h e                   fears      to

disregard.             Panisko v.          Dreibelbis           (1942),          1 1 3 Elont.        310,      124

P.2d      997;     Kroeger v.          Passmore          ( 1 9 0 8 ) , 36 M o n t .      504,    9 3 P.       805.

       Here,. t h e r e      is a m p l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s          finding

t h a t H a r d y was n o t u n l a w f u l l y r e s t r a i n e d a g a i n s t h e r w i l l .          While

Hardy s t a t e d       that      she f e l t compelled               t o r e m a i n i n t h e showroom

manager's         o f f ice, she also admitted                    t h a t s h e wanted          t o s t a y and

c l a r i f y the situation.                She d i d n o t a s k to l e a v e .                S h e was n o t

told      she could not leave.                    No     t h r e a t of    f o r c e or o t h e r w i s e was

made t o c o m p e l h e r t o s t a y .            Although she followed the a s s i s t a n t

manager        i n t o t h e o f f i c e u n d e r p r e t e n s e of        a t o u r , she t e s t i f i e d

a t t r i a l t h a t s h e would h a v e f o l l o w e d him v o l u n t a r i l y i f s h e had

known t h e t r u e p u r p o s e o f t h e m e e t i n g and t h a t two p o l i c e m e n were

in   the       room.       Under      these       circumstances,             the jury could e a s i l y

find      t h a t H a r d y was       not detained            against her w i l l .               See also,

Meinecke         v.     Skaggs       (1949),        1 2 3 Mont.           308,     213    P.2d       237,      and

R o b e r t s v . Coleman ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 228 O r . 2 8 6 , 3 6 5 P.2d 7 9 .

       Hardy        also      claims        the      District          Court        erred       by     issuing

c o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n s 1 0 , 12, 1 3 , and 1 4 , and b y r e f u s i n g h e r p r o -

p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s 7 , 11, 1 7 , 1 9 , and 3 0 .              Hardy a r g u e s t h a t t h e

court's         instructions           failed       to    comply w i t h          the     facts      and      law,

w h i c h were more a c c u r a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d          i n h e r proposed            instruc-

tions     .
       Where        jury       instructions,               taken        as    a whole,       state the            law
a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c a s e , a p a r t y c a n n o t claim r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r as

to     the     giving          of    certain            instructions.                Goodnough        v.        State

(1982) ,              Mont      .           , 647 P.2d 3 6 4 , 39 S t . R e p . 1 1 7 0 .
       Here,       the court's             instructions adequately stated                          the      l a w on

f a l s e imprisonment.               A p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s 7 , 11, 1 7 ,

19,     and     30    either reiterated                      the    court's         instructions         o r were

inappropriate ,                and       t h e r e f ore      were       properly        r e f used        by     the

District Court.

       Instruction             10 g i v e n        by      the     District         Court    provided            that

there        was     no     false        imprisonment              if    the    plaintiff         voluntarily

complied         with       the      request         to remain           in    the    showroom m a n a g e r ' s

office.            This     is o n e o f          t h e k e y e l e m e n t s of       false     imprisonment

and     was        properly          given.             32       Arn.Jur.2df         False     Imprisonment,

§lo;    G r i f f i n v . C l a r k ( 1 9 3 5 ) , 5 5 I d a h o 3 6 4 , 42 P.2d 297.

       Court's        instruction              12 provided              t h a t a n e m p l o y e r upon         rea-
s o n a b l e c a u s e may r e q u e s t a p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n .          Instruction 13

provided           that    a    store        e m p l o y e e may        temporarily          detain        another

person        t o i n v e s t i g a t e a t h e f t o n l y upon p r o b a b l e c a u s e .                    These

instructions              paraphrase              the      standard          rule     requiring        probable

cause before              a p e r s o n may be d e t a i n e d .               Duran v.        B u t t r e y Food,

Inc.     (1980),                     Mont     .              ,   616 P.2d       327,     38 S t . R e p .       1545.

       A p p e l l a n t f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o i n s t r u c t i o n 1 4 , and f i n d i n g no

p l a i n e r r o r , w e need n o t r e v i e w t h e                  instruction.           S t a t e Highway

Commission v . B e l d o n ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 2 4 6 , 5 3 1 P.2d                         1324.

       Finding s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t o support the                               judgment        and no

error i n t h e           i s s u a n c e of      the      instructions,            the D i s t r i c t Court's

j u d g m e n t is a£f i r m e d     .
W e Concur:



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