Wannall v. Honeywell International, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is a products liability case involving allegations that the defendant’s automobile brakes, containing ehrysotile asbestos fibers, caused the decedent’s lung cancer.1 This ease is set for trial on May 20, 2013, and among the thirty pre-trial motions filed is a motion to reconsider the denial of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.2 See Def.’s Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 49. The primary basis for that motion is the intervening decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer, 285 Va. 141, 736 S.E.2d 724 (2013), in which the Supreme Court of Virginia abrogated the “substantial contributing factor” test as an appropriate articulation of proximate cause under Virginia tort law. See Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. for Recons. (“Def.’s Recons. Mem.”) at 1, 14, ECF No. 49-1. In opposition to the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff submitted a revised expert report, which the plaintiff argued creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial on causation. The defendant subsequently moved to strike that declaration on a number of grounds. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants both motions of the defendant to strike the revised expert report and for summary judgment in its favor.

I. BACKGROUND

An exhaustive recitation of the factual background of this case is not necessary to understand the Court’s reasoning on the two motions considered in this opinion. Therefore, the Court will limit its summary of the background to the facts bearing on those two motions.

*28As referenced above, the decedent died on July 28, 2010 from malignant pleural meso-thelioma—a form of lung cancer. See Am. Joint Pretrial Statement (“Pretrial Statement”) at 2, ECF No. 133. The plaintiff claims that the decedent’s lung cancer was caused by exposure to ehrysotile asbestos fibers contained in automobile brakes manufactured by Bendix Corporation.3 Id. As the defendant concedes “it is undisputed that ... [the decedent] performed shade tree automobile repairs, which to some extent included brake repairs.” Def.’s Recons. Mem. at 2. The term “shade tree automobile repairs” refers to the fact that, although he was not licensed as a mechanic, the decedent “did work on automobiles for [himself], [his] family and the neighborhood whenever they asked [him] to do it,” which included “changing batteries, changing starter motors, generators, alternators, tires and brakes.” Def.’s Reeons. Mem. Ex. B (“Tyler Dep.”) at 399:1-8, 400:3-5, ECF No. 49-3. The parties dispute the precise extent to which the decedent was exposed to asbestos fibers from Bendix brakes, though the decedent testified in his de benne esse deposition that he filed and beveled “hundreds and hundreds” of Bendix brake shoes in his lifetime. See id. at 416:13. The decedent further testified that he customarily used Bendix brakes, and he would ask for Bendix brakes by name “because [he] liked their product.” See id. at 413:10-19.

Both before and during his “shade tree mechanic” work, the decedent was also exposed to asbestos when he served in the Navy and when he worked as a trades helper at Fort Belvoir in Fairfax County, Virginia. See Def.’s Recons. Mem. at 3-9. In fact, the plaintiff not only concedes that the decedent was exposed to asbestos in the Navy, but he also concedes that “[the decedent]’s exposure to asbestos during his Naval service caused his mesothelioma.” See PL’s Mot. to File Second Am. Joint Pretrial Statement at 1, ECF No. 135. In light of the decedent’s Naval and Fort Belvoir asbestos exposure, there are at least three potential causes of the decedent’s cancer: the Naval exposure, the Fort Belvoir exposure, and the Bendix brake exposure.

The decedent and his wife originally filed this lawsuit on December 31, 2009 in D.C. Superior Court against thirty-six separate defendants. See Notice of Removal at 1-7, ECF No. 1. The case was removed to this Court on March 3, 2010, see id., and on June 23, 2011, the case was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the “MDL Court”) by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation for coordinated pretrial proceedings, see Conditional Transfer Order at 1, ECF No. 43. On November 5, 2012, after the conclusion of all pretrial proceedings, the case was remanded to this Court for trial. See Conditional Remand Order at 1, ECF No. 44. By that time, the only remaining viable defendants for trial were John Crane, Inc. and Honeywell International, Inc. (“Honeywell”). See Suggestion of Remand at 2, ECF No. 44-3.4 While this case was pending in the MDL Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims. See Def.’s Recons. Mem. Ex. M at 1, ECF No. 49-14. In denying that motion, the MDL Court cited the decedent’s deposition testimony as well as the testimony of the plaintiffs experts “that [the decedent’s exposure to Bendix brakes [was] a substantial cause of his mesothelioma.” Id. at 4. Specifically, the MDL Court cited the testimony of Dr. Steven Markowitz, who opined that the decedent’s exposure to Bendix brakes “ ‘was significant and contributed to his over-all exposure, [and] that his meso-thelioma was caused by his cumulative exposure to asbestos.’ ” Id. (quoting PL’s Resp. to Honeywell’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 12). In the end, the MDL Court denied summary judgment to the defendant because “Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Honeywell’s products, specifically, *29were a substantial contributing factor in causing Decedent’s injuries.” Id.

On January 10, 2013, however, after this ease was remanded to this Court, the Virginia Supreme Court decided Boomer. That ease was an appeal “of a jury verdict against Honeywell International Incorporated and Ford Motor Company for the wrongful death of James D. Lokey, caused by mesothelioma resulting from exposure to asbestos in dust from Bendix brakes installed in Ford and other vehicles.” Boomer, 736 S.E.2d at 726. The similarity between Boomer and the instant case is therefore self-evident. In Boomer, the trial court “on five occasions instructed the jury to determine whether [the defendants’] negligence was a ‘substantial contributing factor’ to Lokey’s mesotheli-oma,” and the defendants challenged that instruction as contrary to Virginia law. Id. at 727-28. The Virginia Supreme Court, “[considering it ... for the first time,” rejected the “substantial contributing factor” instruction primarily because “a reasonable juror could be confused as to the quantum of evidence required to prove causation in the face of both a substantial contributing factor and a proximate cause instruction.” Id. at 730. Nevertheless, the court also held, in agreement with a prior line of Virginia precedent, that a plaintiff could still recover from a defendant in a multiple-exposure asbestos case if the plaintiff could prove “that a negligent [asbestos] exposure was more likely than not sufficient to have triggered the harm.” Id. at 731 (emphasis in original).

On January 28, 2013—less than three weeks after Boomer was decided—the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of its motion for summary judgment in light of Boomer. See Def.’s Mot. for Reeons. In that motion, the defendant argued that summary judgment is appropriate in light of Boomer because the plaintiff “has failed to provide any specific evidence that [the deeedent]’s alleged exposure to Bendix brakes ... was a sufficient cause of his injury.” Def.’s Reeons. Mem. at 17. On this same point, the defendant argued that “Plaintiff’s own experts contend that [the deeedent]’s exposure to Bendix brakes was merely part of his cumulative exposure to asbestos and cause of [the decedentj’s disease.” Id. After reviewing the testimony and opinions of the plaintiffs experts—in particular Dr. Markowitz, the plaintiffs primary causation expert—the defendant argued that “Plaintiff has not offered expert evidence to opine that [the decedentj’s alleged lifetime dosage is more likely than not a sufficient cause of his mesothelioma” and “Plaintiff has offered no evidence to quantify [the decedent]’s exposure to Bendix brakes.” Id. at 19 (emphasis in original). In light of Boomer and these perceived deficiencies in the plaintiffs evidence, the defendant contended that the plaintiff “cannot create a genuine issue of material fact regarding any alleged liability of Honeywell.” Id. at 20.

In opposing the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff made several arguments, some of which will be discussed in more detail below. Importantly, one of the plaintiffs arguments was that “[e]xpert testimony demonstrates that the exposure to Bendix brake dust described by [the decedent] is sufficient to cause [the deeedent]’s mesothelioma.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Reeons. (“Pl.’s Reeons. Opp’n”) at 7, ECF No. 53. This statement was based on a declaration by Dr. Markowitz, completed on February 8, 2013, after the defendant had filed its motion for reconsideration. See id. In that new declaration, Dr. Markowitz offered four “additional opinions,” one of which was that “[the deeedent]’s exposure to asbestos from Bendix asbestos-containing brake lining—as well as the non-friction exposures identified in my report of November 22, 2011 [sic] (Naval and Fort Belvoir exposures)— are each independently sufficient to cause mesothelioma in and of themselves.” Pl.’s Reeons. Opp’n Ex. 3 (“Markowitz Deck”), at 5-6, ECF No. 53-3 (emphasis added). Dr. Markowitz had never before opined that the decedent’s exposure to Bendix brakes was independently sufficient to have caused his cancer. The plaintiff, in his opposition, also pointed to the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs pathology expert, Dr. Jerrold Abraham, who opined that “if [the decedent] had only that [Navy exposure], that would have been the only cause. If he had other exposures \i.e., brake exposures] and not that [Navy exposure], those [brake exposures] would have been the only cause.” See Pl.’s *30Recons. Opp’n at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ex. 5 (“Abraham Dep.”), at 135-37, ECF No. 53-5).

In response to the submission of the February 8, 2013 Markowitz Declaration, the defendant filed a motion to strike the declaration as both untimely and inconsistent with Dr. Markowitz’s prior opinions. See Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Recons. & Mot. to Strike Deck of Dr. Steven Markowitz (“Def.’s Strike Mem.”) at 2-5, ECF No. 57. Specifically, the defendant argued that (1) the Markowitz Declaration is untimely under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37; and (2) the Markowitz Declaration constitutes a “sham affidavit” because it contradicts his prior sworn statements. See id. at 4. In the alternative, the defendant also contended that the new Mar-kowitz Declaration “does not satisfy the standard under Boomer” because it “lacks any support as to the level of exposure [the decedent] allegedly experienced or that this particular level of exposure was sufficient to cause mesothelioma.” Id. at 9.

Upon consideration of this briefing, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on May 1, 2013 to clarify a variety of questions relating to the motion for reconsideration and the motion to strike. See Order dated Apr. 25, 2013, ECF No. 144; see also Def.’s Supplemental Briefing, ECF No. 149; Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing, ECF No. 150. Additionally, on May 3, 2013, the Court heard oral argument on both motions during the pretrial conference in this matter. After this extensive briefing and oral argument, the Court must now consider the proper disposition of the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and motion to strike. As discussed below, the Court grants both motions.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Amending Interlocutory Decisions

“Denial of a summary judgment motion is an interlocutory order” and “[district courts have discretion to entertain successive summary judgment motions on the same (or different) grounds.” 3 William W. Schwar-zer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 14:367 (2013) (emphasis in original). Indeed, a district court may revise any of its interlocutory decisions “at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); accord Langevine v. District of Columbia, 106 F.3d 1018, 1023 (D.C.Cir.1997) (“Interlocutory orders are not subject to the law of the case doctrine and may always be reconsidered prior to final judgment.”). Rule 54(b) “recognizes [the district court’s] inherent power to reconsider an interlocutory order ‘as justice requires.’” Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, Inc. v. Guest Servs., Inc., 630 F.3d 217, 227 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Greene v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 764 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.1985)). To determine whether “justice requires” reconsideration, a court may consider, among other possible grounds, whether “a controlling or significant change in the law or facts has occurred since the submission of the issue to the court.” Act Now to Stop War & End Racism Coal. v. District of Columbia (“Act Now”), 286 F.R.D. 117, 125 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Estate of Botvin ex rel. Ellis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 772 F.Supp.2d 218, 223 (D.D.C.2011)).

“Importantly, the standard for reconsideration of interlocutory orders under Rule 54(b) is distinct from the standard applicable to motions for reconsideration of final judgments.” Cobell v. Norton, 224 F.R.D. 266, 272 (D.D.C.2004). Despite the imprecision of the “as justice requires” standard, “it is clear that ‘courts have more flexibility in applying Rule 54(b)’ than in determining whether reconsideration is appropriate under Rules 59(e) and 60(b).” Id. (quoting Moore v. Hartman, 332 F.Supp.2d 252, 256 (D.D.C. 2004)). The considerations embedded in the “as justice requires” standard “leave a great deal of room for the court’s discretion and, accordingly, the ‘as justice requires’ standard amounts to determining ‘whether [relief upon] reconsideration is necessary under the relevant circumstances.’ ” Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 811 F.Supp.2d 216, 224 (D.D.C.2011) (quoting Co-bell, 224 F.R.D. at 272). Despite the potential breadth of the “as justice requires” standard, “the court’s discretion under Rule 54(b) is ... ‘subject to the caveat that, where *31litigants have once battled for the court’s decision, they should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again.’” Id. (quoting Singh v. George Wash. Univ., 383 F.Supp.2d 99, 101 (D.D.C. 2005)); see also 3 Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 14:368 (successive summary judgment motion that “presents no new material facts or legal arguments ... may even be treated as a ‘bad faith’ motion, exposing the moving party to sanctions under FRCP 56(h)” (emphasis omitted)).

B. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is properly granted against a party who, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s ease, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute. Id. at 323,106 S.Ct. 2548.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and shall accept the nonmoving party’s evidence as true. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). For a factual dispute to be “genuine,” the nonmoving party must establish more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [its] position,” id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 and cannot rely on “mere allegations” or conelusory statements, see Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124, 134 (D.C.Cir.2006); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993); accord Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, All U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, All U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In that situation, “[t]he moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law1 because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of either motion, the Court will first discuss two procedural issues raised by the plaintiff with respect to the motion for reconsideration. Next, the Court will discuss the merits of the defendant’s motion to strike, since the resolution of that motion bears upon the merits of the motion for reconsideration. Finally, the Court will address the merits of the motion for reconsideration.

A. The Motion for Reconsideration Is Procedurally Sound.

In his opposition to the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff contends that the “motion is procedurally defective for two reasons.” Pl.’s Reeons. Opp’n at 2. First, the plaintiff argues that “Honeywell’s twenty-two (22) page Memorandum of Law exceeds this Court’s explicit direction that motions for reconsideration ‘may not exceed 10 pages in length.’ ” Id. at 2-3 (quoting Supplemental Standing Order ¶ 7, ECF No. 45). This argument, however, mispereeives the Court’s directive. The Court’s Standing Order states that “[m]otions to alter or amend a judgment____shall be filed only when the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(c) and/or 60(b) are met” and “[s]uch motions and oppositions thereto may not exceed 10 pages in length.” Supplemental Standing Order ¶ 7. Although this portion of the Court’s Standing Order correctly states that motions to alter or amend a judgment are “commonly known as *32‘motions for reconsideration,’ ” see id., a motion to reconsider under Rule 54(b) is not a motion to alter or amend a judgment. A “judgment,” as that term is used throughout the Federal Rules (including in Rules 59(e) and 60(b)), “includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies,” see Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a), which would necessarily not include an interlocutory order (such as an order denying a motion for summary judgment). Indeed, Rule 54(b) makes clear the distinction between an interlocutory order and a judgment, providing that “any order or other decision ... that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, the page limitations that the Court applies to motions to alter or amend a judgment do not apply to the defendant’s instant motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b).

Second, the plaintiff contends that “Honeywell’s motion is almost two years too late.” Pl.’s Recons. Opp’n at 3. The premise for this assertion is that “Honeywell’s only excuse for filing this motion so late is that there was an ‘intervening change in law.’” Id. (quoting Def.’s Reeons. Mem. at 14). This argument by the plaintiff, however, suffers from the same misperception that doomed his other procedural argument: The plaintiff confuses the defendant’s Rule 54(b) motion—which may be filed “at any time before the entry of a judgment,” see Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b)—for a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment, which “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). The plaintiff is correct that if the defendant had filed a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Court would not need to grant it “unless [it] finds that there is an intervening change of controlling of law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As discussed above, however, “the standard for reconsideration of interlocutory orders under Rule 54(b) is distinct from the standard applicable to motions for reconsideration of final judgments” in that “it is clear that courts have more flexibility in applying Rule 54(b) than in determining whether reconsideration is appropriate under Rules 59(e) and 60(b).” Cobell, 224 F.R.D. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, not only does the twenty-eight day period for filing Rule 59(e) motions not apply to the defendant’s instant Rule 54(b) motion—and hence, it is not “two years too late,” as the plaintiff argues, see Pl.’s Recons. Opp’n at 3—but the Court also has discretion to grant such a Rule 54(b) motion “as justice requires,” even in the absence of a change in the controlling law, see, e.g., Capitol Sprinkler Inspection, 630 F.3d at 227.

It is worth noting in any event that the Court does consider Boomer to be an intervening change in Virginia law, or at the very least “a controlling or significant change in the law ... since the submission of the issue to the court,” see Act Now, 286 F.R.D. at 125, which warrants reconsideration of the MDL Court’s denial of the defendant’s previous motion for summary judgment. It defies a plain reading of the MDL Court’s Order denying summary judgment to claim, as the plaintiff does, that “[the MDL Court]’s ... legal analysis and conclusion [in that Order] are in lock-step with Boomer.” See Pl.’s Recons. Opp’n at 3. There can be no question that the MDL Court relied upon a substantial contributing factor standard in concluding that summary judgment should be denied. The Order states: “On the record presented, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Honeywell’s products, specifically, were a substantial contributing factor in causing Decedent’s injuries.” See Def.’s Recons. Mem. Ex. M at 4 (emphasis added). That this conclusion was not preceded by citation to Virginia ease law applying the “substantial contributing factor” test is unsurprising because no such case law exists. As the Virginia Supreme Court observed in Boomer: “The phrase ‘substantial contributing factor’ is not grounded ... in the jurisprudence of this Court: we have not, in the history of our ease law, ever invoked *33this language.’ Boomer, 736 S.E.2d at 730.5

In addition to the MDL Court’s reliance upon the substantial contributing factor test, Boomer represents a significant change in the law that applies to this case because, as the Virginia Supreme Court noted in Boomer, it was breaking new ground: “Here, for the first time, we are called upon to rule explicitly as to the causation standard appropriate for mesothelioma.” Boomer, 736 S.E.2d at 732 (emphasis added); see also id. at 730 (“Considering it now for the first time, we find several problems with the substantial contributing factor instruction.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, counsel for the plaintiff appeared to concede this at the pretrial conference, stating: “[E]veryone in this courtroom knows Boomer was a sea[ ] change for how litigants, litigants in the trial courts in Virginia [have] to litigate these cases now____ So I stand here to say at a minimum, Boomer, sufficiently shook things up.” See Tr. of Pretrial Conference at 71:25-72:9 (May 3, 2013). Thus, whether one calls it a “change,” a “sea[] change” or a substantial clarification in Virginia law, it is plain that Boomer constitutes a sufficiently significant shift in Virginia law to warrant reconsideration of the MDL Court’s decision to deny summary judgment to the defendant in this ease.

B. Defendant’s Motion to Strike

In support of its motion to strike the Mar-kowitz Declaration, the defendant makes two arguments. First, the defendant contends that the Markowitz Declaration should be stricken because it is “untimely under Rules 26 and 37.” See Def.’s Strike Mem. at 4. Second, the defendant argues that the Mar-kowitz Declaration should be stricken because it “constitute^] a sham affidavit.” Id. The Court will begin by discussing the defendant’s timeliness arguments.

1. The Markowitz Declaration Was Untimely.

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party who intends to offer expert testimony is required to disclose a written report for each expert witness. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). Rule 26 also provides that “[a] party must make these disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(D). There is a limited exception to this rule that requires a party to “supplement” any disclosure made under Rule 26(a) “if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, .and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in wilting.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1).

It is clear that, under the Federal Rules outlined above, the February 8, 2013 Markowitz Declaration is untimely. First, there is no dispute that the plaintiff did not submit the Markowitz Declaration “at the times and in the sequence that the court order[ed].” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(D). The MDL Court’s scheduling order required all of the plaintiffs expert reports to be completed and served by November 22, 2010. See Def.’s Strike Mem. Ex. A at 1, ECF No. 57-1. That same order required that all expert discovery be completed by January 24, 2011. Id. The plaintiff was not granted any extensions of time in this regard, nor did the plaintiff otherwise seek leave of the Court before filing the Markowitz Declaration.

In opposing the defendant’s motion to strike, the plaintiff argued that the Markow-itz Declaration was timely, under the logic that “[i]f Honeywell’s Motion for Reconsideration ... is timely, then Plaintiffs response to the Honeywell motion and Dr. Markow-itz’s Declaration are, necessarily, timely.” See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Strike Decl. *34of Dr. Steven Markowitz (“Pl.’s Strike Opp’n”) at 2, ECF No. 72. The plaintiff appears to believe that, because “Honeywell has refreshed its summary judgment motion” by asking for reconsideration of the MDL Court’s order, the defendant “has refreshed the Plaintiffs rights under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including FRCP 56(c)(4).” Id. In this regard, the plaintiff claims that Rule 56(c)(4) “provides a party with the right to produce an affidavit or declaration to support or oppose a summary judgment motion” and “Plaintiff has complied with this rule by submitting Dr. Markowitz’s February [8], 2013 Declaration.” Id. at 2-3. This argument misperceives the meaning of Rule 56(c)(4). That rule states simply that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion [for summary judgment] must be made on personal knowledge, set out the facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed.R.CivP. 56(c)(4). In other words, Rule 56(c)(4) sets forth the requirements for an affidavit or declaration submitted in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment; it does not impart any “right” to submit such affidavits or declarations. The plaintiffs capacious reading of Rule 56(c)(4) would essentially have that provision nullify Rule 26(a)(2)(D)’s requirement that expert testimony be submitted “at the times and in the sequence that the court orders.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(D).

The plaintiff also argues for the first time in his Court-directed supplemental briefing that the Markowitz Declaration “was designed to respond to an issue not specifically raised by Honeywell’s initial motion for summary judgment and is timely under Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2) and 26(a)(3)(B).” See Pl.’s Supplemental Briefing at 2.6 As a result of the plaintiffs failure to raise this argument— or even to reference Rules 26 or 37—in his opposition to the defendant’s motion to strike, the plaintiff has waived this argument. See, e.g., In re Asemani, 455 F.3d 296, 300 (D.C.Cir.2006) (a litigant’s argument “[was] waived because it was made for the first time in [appellant’s] reply brief’); Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries, 284 F.Supp.2d 15, 25 (D.D.C.2003) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.” (citing FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58, 67-68 (D.C.Cir.1997))).

Even if the plaintiff had not waived this argument, the argument would still fail on the merits. Rule 26(e) imposes a duty on a party to “supplement or correct its [26(a) ] disclosure or response ... if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(1). This duty only applies “if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” Id. Rule 26(e) “does not permit parties to file supplemental reports whenever they believe such reports would be ‘desirable’ or ‘necessary’ to their case.” Minebea Co. v. Papst, 231 F.R.D. 3, 6 (D.D.C.2005); accord Dag Enters., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 226 F.R.D. 95, 110 (D.D.C.2005) (observing that Rule 26(e) “ ‘does not ... bestow upon litigants unfettered freedom to rely on supplements produced after a court-imposed deadline, even if the rule’s pretrial limit is satisfied’ ” (quoting Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 662 (N.D.Ga.2001))). Rather, Rule 26(e) “permits supplemental reports only for the narrow purpose of correcting inaccuracies or *35adding information that was not available at the time of the initial report.” Minebea, 231 F.R.D. at 6 (citing Keener v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 639, 640 (D.Mont.1998)). “To construe supplementation to apply whenever a party wants to bolster or submit additional expert opinions would reek [sic] havoc in docket control and amount to unlimited expert opinion preparation.” Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 212 F.R.D. 306, 310 (M.D.N.C.2002); see also Keener, 181 F.R.D. at 641 (“To countenance a dramatic, pointed variation of an expert’s disclosure under the guise of Rule 26(e)(1) supplementation would be to invite the proverbial fox into the hen-house. The experienced expert could simply ‘lie in wait’ so as to express his genuine opinions only after the plaintiff discloses hers.”).

The plaintiff in the instant action does not argue that the Markowitz Declaration corrects any inaccuracies or that it is based on new information. Rather, by the plaintiffs own admission, the Markowitz Declaration “was designed to respond to an issue not specifically raised by Honeywell’s initial motion for summary judgment.” PL’s Supplemental Briefing at 2. Although the plaintiff may perceive the addition of Dr. Markowitz’s new opinions to be “‘necessary1 to [his] case,” that is not a proper reason to supplement an expert report under Rule 26(e). See Minebea, 231 F.R.D. at 6. As the Supreme Court has observed, “a litigant’s failure to buttress its position because of confidence in the strength of that position is always indulged in at the litigant’s own risk.” Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 897, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). For all of the above reasons, the Markowitz Declaration is untimely under Rule 26.

2. The Untimely Submission of the Mar-kowitz Declaration Was Neither “Substantially Justified” Nor “Harmless.”

Generally, “[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c). Exclusion is not appropriate, however, when “the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.” Id. A court is also vested with discretion to impose other sanctions, such as “ordering] payment of the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,” which may be ordered “[i]n addition to or instead of’ the sanction of exclusion. Id. The phrase “substantially justified” is generally interpreted to mean “ ‘justified in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988). The advisory committee’s commentary to Rule 37(c) indicates that exclusion is a “self-executing sanction,” and that “[l]imiting the automatic sanction to violations ‘without substantial justification,’ ... is needed to avoid unduly harsh penalties in a variety of situations.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c) advisory committee’s note (1993 Amendments). The advisory committee note goes on to list examples of situations in which violations would be “substantially justified” or “harmless,” which include: “the inadvertent omission from a Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosure of the name of a potential witness known to all parties; the failure to list as a trial witness a person so listed by another party; or the lack of knowledge of a pro se litigant of the requirement to make disclosures.” Id.

The plaintiffs failure to disclose Dr. Markowitz’s new opinion in a timely fashion was not “substantially justified” or “harmless” within the meaning of Rule 37(c). First, it is clear that the omission of Dr. Markowitz’s new opinion regarding the independent sufficiency of the decedent’s Bendix brake exposure was not an innocent oversight. Prior to his February 8, 2013 declaration, Dr. Markowitz had submitted an expert report on November 22, 2010 and a supplemental declaration on March 7, 2011, and he was also examined at a deposition on January 24, 2011. See Markowitz Deck at 1. This was more than ample opportunity to “clarify” the nature and scope of his expert opinions. That Dr. Markowitz chose to tailor his opinions to a particular- legal standard was a choice that he (and the plaintiff) made at their own peril. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 897, 110 S.Ct. 3177.

*36Furthermore, the manner in which the plaintiff submitted the February 8, 2013 Markowitz Declaration was, in particular, not “substantially justified” or “harmless.” The plaintiff did not seek leave of the Court to file a late declaration, nor did he confer with the defendant before doing so. The plaintiff did not ask the Court to reopen expert