United States v. Martinez-Maldonado

This case presents multiple issues of substantial importance, including a question of first impression in this circuit on the interpretation of the federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666. Defendants are a Puerto Rico legislator and a Commonwealth businessman who were charged, inter alia, with unlawfully exchanging a trip to Las Vegas to attend a prize fight for favorable action on legislation. A jury returned guilty verdicts against both men, Juan Bravo Fernandez (“Bravo”) and Hector Martinez Maldonado (“Martinez”), and they now challenge their convictions on numerous grounds. Foremost is their contention that the jury was allowed to convict on a gratuity theory which is beyond the scope of § 666.

Unlike most circuits to have addressed this issue, we conclude that § 666 does not criminalize gratuities. Because the district court’s instructions permitted the jury to find guilt on the § 666 counts based on a gratuity theory, Defendants’ convictions on that count must be vacated. In addition, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause, though for reasons that differ for each Defendant, entitles both men to acquittal on their respective conspiracy charges.

I.

A. Factual Background

We briefly summarize the relevant facts, reserving for our analysis a more detailed discussion of the facts relevant to each issue presented on appeal. We view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts. See United States v. Ciresi 697 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir.2012).

From January 2005 until early 2011, Martinez served in the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.1 When Martinez became a senator he was assigned to the Public Safety Committee, where he served as chairman. Bravo was the president of Ranger American, a private firm that provides security services, including armored car transportation and security guard staffing.

In early 2005, Bravo advocated for the passage of legislation related to the security industry in Puerto Rico. One of these bills, Senate Project 410, addressed issues pertaining to security at shopping malls, while the other, Senate Project 471, involved licensing requirements for armored car companies. The government produced testimony at trial that the passage of these bills would have provided substantial financial benefits to Ranger American. As chairman of the Public Safety Committee, Martinez was in a position to exercise a measure of control over the introduction and progression of the bills through the Committee and the Senate.

On May 14, 2005, prominent Puerto Rican boxer Félix “Tito” Trinidad was scheduled to fight Ronald Lamont “Winky” Wright at the MGM Grand Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. On March 2, Bravo purchased four tickets to the fight at a cost of $1,000 per ticket. The same day, Martinez submitted Senate Project 410 for consideration by the Puerto Rico Senate. On April 20, Martinez presided over a Public Safety Committee hearing on Senate Project 471 at which Bravo testified. The next day, Bravo booked one room at *7the Mandalay Bay Hotel in Las Vegas. On May 11, Martinez issued a Committee report in support of Senate Project 471.

Bravo arranged for first-class airline tickets to Las Vegas for himself, Martinez, and another senator, Jorge de Castro Font.2 In Las Vegas, the three men stayed in separate rooms at the Mandalay Bay for two nights. Bravo paid for Martinez’s room the first night, and de Castro Font paid for Martinez’s room the second night. The men, along with de Castro Font’s assistant, went out to dinner the day before the fight, with Bravo footing the $495 bill. The men attended the Tito Trinidad fight the next night, using the $1,000 tickets Bravo had purchased.

The day after the fight, Bravo, Martinez, and de Castro Font flew from Las Vegas to Miami, where they spent the night in individual hotel rooms at the Marriott South Beach. The rooms were reserved and paid for by Bravo at a total cost of $954.75. The next day, on May 16, the three returned to Puerto Rico.

On May 17, de Castro Font, acting as Chair of the Committee on Rules and Calendars, scheduled an immediate vote on the floor of the Puerto Rico Senate for Senate Project 471. Both de Castro Font and Martinez voted in support of the bill. The next day, Martinez issued a Committee report in favor of Senate Project 410. On May 23, de Castro Font scheduled an immediate vote on the floor of the Senate for Senate Project 410. Again, both de Castro Font and Martinez voted for the bill.

B. Procedural Background

On June 22, 2010, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Bravo and Martinez with (1) violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to (a) commit federal program bribery, and (b) travel in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering; (2) violating 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A) by traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to “[pjromote, establish, carry on, and facilitate the promotion, establishment, and carrying on,” of unlawful activity, specifically (a) federal program bribery in violation of § 666, and (b) bribery in violation of P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 33, §§ 4360 and 4363; and (3) federal program bribery in violation of § 666. Martinez was additionally indicted for obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).

The case went to trial on February 14, 2011. On March 7, 2011, a jury convicted Bravo of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce in aid of racketeering (count one), interstate travel in aid of racketeering with the intent to promote bribery in violation of Puerto Rico law (count two), and federal program bribery (count four). The jury found Martinez guilty of conspiracy (count one), but checked “No” as to each potential object of the conspiracy. He was also convicted of federal program bribery (count five). The jury acquitted Martinez of interstate travel in aid of racketeering (count three) and obstruction of justice (count six).

The trial court granted Bravo’s motion for judgment of acquittal on count two, finding that the repeal of the Puerto Rico bribery laws before the trip took place made it impossible for Bravo to satisfy the “thereafter” element3 of a Travel Act vio*8lation. It initially “dismissed” Martinez’s conviction on count one because the jury rejected both potential objects of the conspiracy, but then “reinstated” the conviction the next day, and eventually dismissed it without prejudice. On March 1, 2012, the district court sentenced both defendants to 48 months of imprisonment. Bravo received a fine of $175,000 and Martinez a fine of $17,500.4

C. Issues on Appeal

Both Defendants challenge their substantive § 666 convictions on numerous grounds. Martinez challenges on double jeopardy grounds the district court’s decision to reinstate his conspiracy conviction and then dismiss it without prejudice. Bravo also challenges his conspiracy conviction, arguing, among other things, that the judgment of acquittal on the Travel Act count requires the entry of judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count, as § 666, given the findings by the jury, cannot serve as an object of the conspiracy to violate the Travel Act.

II.

Defendants raise several challenges to the scope of the federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666, and, identifying certain elements of the statute, they also claim that the circumstances of this case do not satisfy any of those elements. We review the questions of law raised in their arguments de novo, United States v. Place, 693 F.3d 219, 227 (1st Cir.2012); to the extent that their claims challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, we again employ de novo review, appraising the proof in the light most favorable to the verdict, United States v. Rodríguez-Vélez, 597 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2010).

A. Agents

, Section 666 requires the government to show that the individual receiving or soliciting the bribe was “an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1). The term “agent” is defined as “a person authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative.” Id. § 666(d)(1). Defendant Martinez maintains that he could not be convicted under § 666(a)(1)(B) because he was not an agent of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Defendant Bravo argues that because neither Martínez nor de Castro Font were agents of the Commonwealth, he cannot be guilty of bribing them pursuant to § 666(a)(2).

1. The Scope of the Agency

At the outset, we reject any notion that state legislators are categorically exempt from prosecution under § 666. Indeed, the plain language of the statute includes a “representative” of a “government” in the list of positions that fall under the statute’s definition of “agent,” 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1), and there is no more classic government “representative” than a legislative branch officer. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 333 (5th Cir.2002) (“Congress clearly sought to ap*9ply § 666 to legislative-branch officials.”); United States v. Sunia, 643 F.Supp.2d 51, 67 (D.D.C.2009) (acknowledging that “a legislator who misuses his legislative authority to facilitate corrupt practices affecting agency programs that receive federal funds may well fall within the ambit of § 666”).

Defendants’ more nuanced argument is that the government failed to sufficiently specify the entity for which Martinez and de Castro Font were agents. They maintain that Martinez may only be appropriately classified as a representative (and thus an agent) of the Puerto Rico Senate, and not — as the indictment alleged — of the Commonwealth as a whole. This distinction is significant, Defendants claim, because the Puerto Rico Senate itself had no connection with, or control over, the federal funds identified by the two government witnesses, and without such a connection the government cannot show that “the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). If the $10,000 threshold is not met, then the actions of the agents of the non-qualifying organization, government, or agency — or the actions of others with respect to those agents — cannot implicate § 666.

Once again we need go no further than the plain language of the statute to conclude that Martínez and de Castro Font may be properly considered “agents” of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Among the five types of entities for which one may be an agent within the meaning of § 666 is a state government.5 See 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1), (2) (referring to “an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof’). The Puerto Rico Senate is a constituent part of the Commonwealth government, created by the Puerto Rico Constitution. See P.R. Const, art. Ill, § 1. Its members are thus part of the limited category of government officials who represent the “State” as a whole, unlike employees of localities or of agencies at every level of government. As such, they easily fall within the concept of “an agent of ... a State ... government.” Martínez and de Castro Font were thus properly considered agents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico under § 666.

At trial, the Associate Director for the Office of Budget and Management testified that during 2005 — -the year of the charged conduct — the Commonwealth received over $4.7 billion in federal funds. Because Martínez and de Castro Font are agents of the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to show that they are agents of a “government ... [that] receives, in any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).

2. Agent Control of Expenditures

Defendants argue that being an “agent” under § 666 must include an element beyond merely representing the entity. Framing their argument partially in constitutional terms, they assert that, to establish the requisite link to Congress’s authority to legislate under the Necessary and Proper Clause, an “agent” under § 666 “must be ‘authorized to act on behalf of [the entity] with respect to its funds.’ ” United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 344 (5th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 411 (5th Cir. *102000)); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (describing Congress’s authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause). Defendants maintain that the government failed to adduce any evidence at trial establishing that either Martinez or de Castro Font, acting as senators, had the authority to control the expenditure of funds by any entity receiving federal funds, and that the senators therefore do not qualify as “agents” for purposes of § 666.

We disagree. Neither the statutory language nor constitutional principles lead to such a restricted understanding of the provision. As the Eleventh Circuit recently noted when presented with this argument, “[n]owhere does the statutory text either mention or imply an additional qualifying requirement that the person be authorized to act specifically with respect to the entity’s funds.” United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 989-90 (11th Cir.2012). The statute merely requires that the individual be “authorized to act on behalf of another person or government.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). In interpreting the text of a statute, “we will not depart from, or otherwise embellish, the language of a statute absent either undeniable textual ambiguity, or some other extraordinary consideration, such as the prospect of yielding a patently absurd result.” Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 67-68 (1st Cir.1994) (citations omitted); cf. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57-58, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997). Defendants fail to show that any absurd result would follow from a reading loyal to the plain meaning of the statute.

The Supreme Court’s and this circuit’s § 666 jurisprudence support the conclusion that the statute incorporates no embellishment on the concept of “agent.” Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected constructions of § 666 that would impose limits beyond those set out in the plain meaning of the statute. In Salinas, for example, the Court rejected a defendant’s attempt to read into the statute an extra-textual requirement of proof that “the bribe in some way affected federal funds, for instance by diverting or misappropriating them, before the bribe violates § 666(a)(1)(B).” 522 U.S. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 469. In reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed to the “enactment’s expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered.” Id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 469. Seven years later, in Sabri v. United States, the Court rejected a similar argument that the statute requires proof of a “nexus” between a bribe or kickback and some federal money. It noted that while “not every bribe or kickback offered or paid to agents of governments covered by § 666(b) will be traceably skimmed from specific federal payments, or show up in the guise of a quid pro quo for some dereliction in spending a federal grant,” the absence of such links does not “portend[ ] ... enforcement beyond the scope of federal interest, for the reason that corruption does not have to be that limited to affect the federal interest.” 541 U.S. at 605-06, 124 S.Ct. 1941; see also Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667, 677-79, 120 S.Ct. 1780, 146 L.Ed.2d 707 (2000) (adopting broad reading of “benefits” under § 666(b) in light of statutory language “reveal[ing] Congress’ expansive, unambiguous intent to ensure the integrity of organizations participating in federal assistance programs”).

We previously addressed the scope of § 666(d)(l)’s definition of “agent” in United States v. Sotomayor-Vázquez, 249 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2001). Drawing largely from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in Salinas, we held that “an expansive definition of ‘agent’ is necessary to fulfill *11the purpose of § 666, i.e., to protect the integrity of federal funds.” Id. at 8. In support of this reading, we quoted at length from the dissent in United States v. Phillips:

[T]he expansive statutory definition [in § 666(d)(1) ] recognizes that an individual can affect agency funds despite a lack of power to authorize their direct disbursement. Therefore, to broadly protect the integrity of federal funds given to an agency, § 666 applies to any individual who represents the agency in any way, as representing or acting on behalf of an agency can affect its funds even if the action does not directly involve financial disbursement.

Id. at 8 (quoting Phillips, 219 F.3d at 422 n. 3 (Garza, J., dissenting)). We thus held that “an outside consultant with significant managerial responsibility” could be an “agent” of a government entity. Id.

In keeping with our own precedent and that of the Supreme Court, we conclude that embracing an approach faithful to the plain language of § 666 is appropriate here. Even if the officials accepting bribes do not have the ability to control the expenditure of an entity’s funds, “it cannot be denied that their fraudulent conduct poses a threat to the integrity of the entity, which in turn poses a threat to the federal funds entrusted to that entity.” Keen, 676 F.3d at 990; see also United States v. Hines, 541 F.3d 833, 835-36 (8th Cir.2008). Such conduct “raise[s] the risk [that] participating organizations will lack the resources requisite to provide the level and quality of care envisioned by the program.” Fischer, 529 U.S. at 681-82, 120 S.Ct. 1780; cf. Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606, 124 5.Ct. 1941 (“Money is fungible, bribed officials are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds, and corrupt contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value.”). Narrowing the scope of § 666(d)(l)’s definition of “agent” would be “inconsistent not only with the expansive, unqualified language that Congress has elected to use, but also with Congress’ clear objective of ensuring the integrity of entities receiving substantial sums of federal funds.” Keen, 676 F.3d at 991 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore decline to do so.

These concerns about financial integrity also doom Defendants’ constitutional argument. “[I]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1956, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010). In rejecting a different Necessary and Proper Clause challenge to § 666 in Sabri,6 the Supreme Court wrote:

Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and it has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause ... to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under that power are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered away in graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value for dollars.

541 U.S. at 605, 124 S.Ct. 1941.

We have no hesitation in concluding that “measures to police the integrity *12of entities receiving federal funds fall under the scope of this power,” Keen, 676 F.3d at 991, even absent evidence of an agent’s authority to act specifically with respect to the covered entity’s funds. “Congress does not have to sit by and accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity.” Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605, 124 S.Ct. 1941. To accept that there can only be harmful effects of such dishonest conduct when the actor has authority to control the expenditure of the entity’s funds would be naive; to accept that the prohibition of such conduct by such individuals is not “rationally related” to Congress’ implementation of its constitutionally enumerated powers would be an unduly restrictive application of that standard. The Supreme Court has stated that to fall within the scope of the federal interest, “[i]t is certainly enough that the statutes condition the offense on a threshold amount of federal dollars defining the federal interest, such as that provided [in § 666].” Id. at 606, 124 S.Ct. 1941. We see no basis for departing from that view here.

B. The Transactional Element

For a bribe to fall within the purview of § 666, it must be made “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of [the covered] organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B), (a)(2). This requirement has been referred to as the “transactional element” of § 666. United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir.2011). Defendants point out that a circuit split exists as to how the $5,000 threshold in the transactional element is met, but argue that under either approach the government’s evidence was insufficient. Taking this opportunity to clarify the correct standard, we conclude that under the proper approach the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the $5,000 threshold and the transactional element generally.

1. Value of Bribe or Transaction?

In determining how to calculate the $5,000 requirement, some courts have suggested that a court should look to the value of the bribe actually offered or paid. See United States v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 521 (6th Cir.2009) (stating that “§ 666 contains ... a requirement that the illegal gift or bribe be worth over $5,000”); United States v. Spano, 401 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir.2005) (“[T]o establish a case under § 666, the government need only prove that an agent ... was offered or accepted a bribe worth $5000 or more....”); United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026, 1028 (10th Cir.1999) (stating that § 666 “prohibits the unlawful acceptance of anything of value of $5,000 or more”). Other courts, however, have held that the $5,000 requirement “refers to the value of the ‘business, transaction, or series of transactions,’ not the value of the bribe.” United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152, 1185 n. 38 (11th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 976 (5th Cir.1988) (“[I]t is clear that the $5000 figure qualifies the transactions or series of transactions that the recipient of the bribe carries out in exchange for receiving ‘anything of value.’ ”).

In our view, the statutory language is unambiguous and plainly requires the latter reading. Applied to the present case, § 666(a)(1)(B) prohibits a government agent from accepting or agreeing to accept “anything of value ” from another individual “intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of that government “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Section *13666(a)(2) prohibits offering, giving, or agreeing to give “anything of value ” to an individual with the “intent to influence or reward” a government agent “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of that government “involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.” Id § 666(a)(2) (emphasis added). The thing accepted or agreed to be accepted in § 666(a)(1)(B) — and the thing given or offered in § 666(a)(2) — is the bribe. Thus, the bribe can be “anything of value” — it need not be worth $5,000. The $5,000 element instead refers to the value of the “business” or “transaction” sought to be influenced by the bribe. “In other words, the subject matter of the bribe must be valued at $5,000 or more; the bribe itself need only be ‘anything of value.’ ” Robinson, 663 F.3d at 271.

We note, however, that the value of the bribe may be relevant in determining the value of the bribe’s objective. In United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir.1996), for example, the court looked to the value of bribes where the subject matter of the bribes consisted of “intangible items.” The defendants in Marmolejo were two local law enforcement officers who had agreed to permit conjugal visits between an inmate and his wife (and his girlfriend) in exchange for a monthly payment of $6,000 and $1,000 per conjugal visit. Id at 1191. The court noted that “[t]he transactions involved something of value — conjugal visits that [the prisoner] was willing to pay for,” id. at 1193 — and it looked to “traditional valuation methods” to estimate that value, id. at 1194. The court concluded that the prisoner’s willingness to pay $6,000 per month plus $1,000 per visit set the market value for the conjugal visits, and it thus found that the transactions between the prisoner and the two defendants “involved something of value of $5,000 or more.” Id. at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Hence, where the subject matter of the bribe is a “thing of value” without a fixed price, courts may look to the value of the bribe as evidence of the value of the “business, transaction, or series of transactions.” That collateral use does not alter the proposition that the bribe itself need only consist of “anything of value.”

2. “Business or transaction” requirement

Defendants maintain that the enactment of Senate Projects 410 and 471 should not be considered to be “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions ... involving anything of value of $5,000 or more” under § 666. They offer several justifications for this position. We find none of them persuasive.

First, Defendants focus on the “in connection with” language. Their attack is anchored in a Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Whitfield, which involved two state judges who were convicted of accepting bribes from an attorney in exchange for favorable rulings in his cases. 590 F.3d at 335. The government argued, and the court assumed, that the judges were “agents” of the Administrative Office of the Courts (“AOC”), a Mississippi state agency that received over $10,000 in federal funds and was “charged with assisting] in the efficient administration of the nonjudicial business of the courts of the state.” Id at 344 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held, however, that the judges’ rulings were not made “in connection with” the business or transactions of the AOC, as they were made while the judges were performing purely judicial duties. Id. at 346-47. Here, Defendants maintain that the federal funds identified by the government went to the Puerto Rico Departments of Education and Trea*14sury, and because there is no nexus between the Departments of Education and Treasury and the act of legislating Senate Projects 410 and 471 in the Puerto Rico Senate, the legislation was not “in connection with” the business or transactions of the federally funded entity.

Whatever the merits of Whitfield’s “nexus” requirement, they are not implicated in this case, as we have determined that Martínez and de Castro Font were agents of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, which receives federal funds. When the judges in Whitfield were acting in their capacity as judicial decisionmakers, they were not acting within their scope as agents of the AOC, as the AOC was specifically limited to the nonjudicial business of the courts. By contrast, when Martinez and de Castro Font were acting in their capacity as legislators, they were performing the precise functions that members of a state legislative body perform as agents of a state government. The legislative acts that constituted the subject of the bribes had a direct “connection with the business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

Second, Defendants argue that the passing of Senate legislation cannot be considered “business” or a “transaction” under § 666. The thrust of their argument is that the terms “business” and “transaction” should be construed narrowly to encompass only commercial conduct, and “the Senate does not conduct business or financial transactions through legislating.”

In Salinas, the Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s similar attempt to impose a narrowing construction on § 666. 522 U.S. at 57, 118 S.Ct. 469. There, the defendant argued that federal funds must be affected to violate § 666(a)(1)(B). Id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 469. Looking to the language of the statute, the Court concluded that the word “any,” which precedes the business or transaction clause, undercuts the attempt to impose the defendant’s narrow interpretation. Id. at 56-57, 118 S.Ct. 469. The Court’s emphasis on the expansive language in § 666(a)(1)(B) in Salinas suggests that the courts should avoid imposing narrowing constructions on that language. Furthermore, such a reading would foreclose large swaths of government activity that, though technically “non-commercial,” could be profitable for unscrupulous individuals to attempt to influence. This narrow construction would be contrary to Congress’s intent. See id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 469 (citing § 666’s “expansive, unqualified language, both as to the bribes forbidden and the entities covered,” as evidence of legislative intent to construe statute broadly). Recently confronting this argument, the Seventh Circuit stated:

The “business” of a federally funded “organization, government, or agency” is not commonly “business” in the commercial sense of the word. An interpretation that narrowly limits the scope of the transactional element to business or transactions that are commercial in nature would have the effect of excluding bribes paid to influence agents of state and local governments. This contradicts the express statutory text.

Robinson, 663 F.3d at 274; see also Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1191-92. We agree, and hold that the business or transaction clause in § 666 does not limit the statute’s reach to purely commercial conduct.

Third, Defendants focus on the word “involving,”7 and posit that in order *15to satisfy § 666, the profit that Ranger American would stand to gain from the passage of the Senate Projects would “have to have been a part of or a necessary consequence of the legislation or have been included in its scope to satisfy the $5,000 requirement.” Because the legislation itself was “revenue-neutral” and gave nothing directly to Ranger American, Defendants maintain that neither of the Senate Projects “involved” prospective revenues for Ranger American (and, by extension, Bravo).

We find no support in the case law or the statutory language for this unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of § 666. Even if legislation is revenue-neutral on its face, it is sufficient if the direct and foreseeable effect of that legislation would be to give the individual offering the bribe a particular desired result — assuming, of course, that the transaction involved something of value of $5,000 or more. Here, the government presented evidence that the foreseeable effect of the passage of Senate Project 471 would be a change in the armored car service industry, which in turn would result in financial benefits to Ranger American and Bravo far exceeding $5,000. This impact is sufficient to satisfy the “involving” requirement of § 666.8

3. Sufficiency of the Evidence

With the appropriate understanding of the statute in mind, we can easily reject Defendants’ sufficiency challenge as to the $5,000 requirement. Miguel Portilla, the president of Capitol Security — a company with which Ranger American competed — testified that Senate Project 471, which sought to amend Law 108,9 would have forced Ranger American’s only competitors in the armored car protection business to close down, thereby ensuring that Ranger American would have an effective monopoly on that sector of the security industry in Puerto Rico. Nestor Medina, the former general manager of Loomis Puerto Rico — a subsidiary of Loomis U.S., an armored car service— testified that Loomis controlled roughly 35% of the armored car service industry, Ranger American 52%, and Brinks the remainder. Medina stated that Loomis Puerto Rico netted $1.5 million in profits in 2005, and that there would therefore be an extra $1.5 million in additional profits available for other armored car companies to capture if Loomis were to leave the market.10 Because, according to Portilla’s *16testimony, Ranger American would have been the only company left in that market, it is reasonable to conclude that Bravo’s company would stand to capture a substantial portion of that profit. This testimony provided sufficient' evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Senate Project 471 was worth $5,000 or more to Bravo.

III.

Defendants challenge the district court’s jury instructions as to the § 666 counts on several grounds. We need reach only Defendants’ contention that the court’s instructions, reinforced by the government’s closing argument, permitted the jury to find them guilty of offering and receiving a gratuity, rather than a bribe. This claim necessarily encompasses the argument that § 666 does not in fact criminalize gratuities, a question of first impression in this circuit and an issue that has generated considerable debate in the courts and among commentators.

“We review de novo preserved claims of legal error in jury instructions, but we review for abuse of discretion claimed errors in instructions’ form or wording.” Uphoff Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 434 (1st Cir.2010). In our review, “we look to the challenged instructions in relation to the charge as a whole, asking whether the charge in its entirety— and in the context of the evidence — presented the relevant issues to the jury fairly and adequately.” Drumgold v. Callahan,