146 U.S. 657 (1892)

HUNTINGTON
v.
ATTRILL.

No. 33.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 26, 1892. Decided December 12, 1892. ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND.

*658 Mr. Hugh L. Bond, Jr. and Mr. John K. Cowen for plaintiff in error, (with whom was Mr. E.J.D. Cross on the brief.)

Mr. William A. Fisher, (with whom was Mr. S.T. Wallis on the brief,) for defendant in error.

*660 MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a bill in equity, filed March 21, 1888, in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, by Collis P. Huntington, a resident of New York, against the Equitable Gas Light Company of Baltimore, a corporation of Maryland, and against Henry Y. Attrill, his wife and three daughters, all residents of Canada, to set aside a transfer of stock in that company, made by him for their benefit and in fraud of his creditors, and to charge that stock with the payment of a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against him in the State of New York, upon his liability as a director in a New York corporation, under the statute of New York of 1875, c. 611, the material provisions of which are copied in the margin.^[1]

The bill alleged that on June 15, 1886, the plaintiff recovered, in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, in an action brought by him against Attrill on March 21, 1883, a *661 judgment for the sum of $100,240, which had not been paid, secured or satisfied; and that the cause of action on which that judgment was recovered was as follows: On February 29, 1880, the Rockaway Beach Improvement Company, Limited, of which Attrill was an incorporator and a director, became a corporation under the law of New York, with a capital stock of $700,000. On June 15, 1880, the plaintiff lent that company the sum of $100,000, to be repaid on demand. On February 26, 1880, Attrill was elected one of the directors of the company, and accepted the office, and continued to act as a director until after January 29, 1881. On June 30, 1880, Attrill, as a director of the company, signed and made oath to, and caused to be recorded, as required by the law of New York, a certificate, which he knew to be false, stating that the whole of the capital stock of the corporation had been paid in, whereas in truth no part had been paid in; and by making such false certificate became liable, by the law of New York, for all the debts of the company contracted before January 29, 1881, including its debt to the plaintiff. On March 8, 1882, by proceedings in a court of New York, the corporation was declared to be insolvent and to have been so since July, 1880, and was dissolved. A duly exemplified copy of the record of that judgment was annexed to and made part of the bill.

The bill also alleged that "at the time of its dissolution as aforesaid, the said company was indebted to the plaintiff and to other creditors to an amount far in excess of its assets; that by the law of the State of New York all the stockholders of the company were liable to pay all its debts, each to the amount of the stock held by him, and the defendant, Henry Y. Attrill, was liable at said date and on April 14, 1882, as such stockholder, to the amount of $340,000, the amount of stock held by him, and was on both said dates also severally and directly liable as a director, having signed the false report above mentioned, for all the debts of said company contracted between February 26, 1880, and January 29, 1881, which debts aggregate more than the whole value of the property owned by said Attrill."

*662 The bill further alleged that Attrill was in March, 1882, and had ever since remained, individually liable in a large amount over and above the debts for which he was liable as a stockholder and director in the company; and that he was insolvent, and had secreted and concealed all his property for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.

The bill then alleged that in April, 1882, Attrill acquired a large amount of stock in the Equitable Gas Light Company of Baltimore, and forthwith transferred into his own name as trustee for his wife 1000 shares of such stock, and as trustee for each of his three daughters 250 shares of the same, without valuable consideration, and with intent to delay, hinder and defraud his creditors, and especially with the intent to delay, hinder and defraud this plaintiff of his lawful suits, damages, debts and demands against Attrill, arising out of the cause of action on which the aforesaid judgment was recovered, and out of the plaintiff's claim against him as a stockholder; that the plaintiff in June, 1880, and ever since was domiciled and resident in the State of New York, and that from February, 1880, to December 6, 1884, Attrill was domiciled and resident in that State, and that his transfers of stock in the gas company were made in the city of New York where the principal office of the company then was, and where all its transfers of stock were made; and that those transfers were, by the laws of New York, as well as by those of Maryland, fraudulent and void as against the creditors of Attrill, including the creditors of the Rockaway Company, and were fraudulent and void as against the plaintiff.

The bill further, by distinct allegations, averred that those transfers, unless set aside and annulled by a court of equity, would deprive the plaintiff of all his rights and interests of every sort therein, to which he was entitled as a creditor of Attrill at the time when those fraudulent transfers were made; and "that the said fraudulent transfers were wholly without legal consideration, were fraudulent and void, and should be set aside by a court of equity."

The bill prayed that the transfer of shares in the gas company be declared fraudulent and void, and executed for the *663 purpose of defrauding the plaintiff out of his claim as existing creditor; that the certificates of those shares in the name of Attrill as trustee be ordered to be brought into court and cancelled; and that the shares "be decreed to be subject to the claim of this plaintiff on the judgment aforesaid," and to be sold by a trustee appointed by the court, and new certificates issued by the gas company to the purchasers; and for further relief.

One of the daughters demurred to the bill, because it showed that the plaintiff's claim was for the recovery of a penalty against Attrill arising under a statute of the State of New York, and because it did not state a case which entitled the plaintiff to any relief in a court of equity in the State of Maryland.

By a stipulation of counsel, filed in the cause, it was agreed that, for the purposes of the demurrer, the bill should be treated as embodying the New York statute of June 21, 1875; and that the Rockaway Beach Improvement Company, Limited, was incorporated under the provisions of that statute.

The Circuit Court of Baltimore City overruled the demurrer. On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland, the order was reversed, and the bill dismissed. 70 Maryland, 191.

The ground most prominently brought forward and most fully discussed in the opinion of the majority of the court, delivered by Judge Bryan, was that the liability imposed by section 21 of the statute of New York upon officers of a corporation, making a false certificate of its condition, was for all its debts, without inquiring whether a creditor had been deceived and induced by deception to lend his money or to give credit, or whether he had incurred loss to any extent by the inability of the corporation to pay, and without limiting the recovery to the amount of loss sustained, and was intended as a punishment for doing any of the forbidden acts, and was, therefore, in view of the decisions in that State and in Maryland, a penalty which could not be enforced in the State of Maryland; and that the judgment obtained in New York for this penalty, while it "merged the original cause of action so that a suit cannot be again maintained upon it," and "is also *664 conclusive evidence of its existence in the form and under the circumstances stated in the pleadings," yet did not change the nature of the transaction, but, within the decision of this court in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, was in its "essential nature and real foundation" the same as the original cause of action, and therefore a suit could not be maintained upon such a judgment beyond the limits of the State in which it was rendered. pp. 193-198.

The court then took up the clause of the bill, above quoted, in which it was sought to charge Attrill as originally liable under the statute of New York, both as a stockholder and as a director; and observing that "this liability is asserted to exist independently of the judgment," summarily disposed of it, upon the grounds that it could not attach to him as a stockholder, because he had not been sued, as required by the New York statute, within two years after the plaintiff's debt became due; nor as a director, because "the judgment against Attrill for having made the false report certainly merges all right of action against him on this account;" but that, if he was liable at the times and on the grounds "mentioned in this clause of the bill," this liability was barred by the statute of limitations of Maryland. pp. 198, 199.

Having thus decided against the plaintiff's claim under his judgment, upon the single ground that it was for a penalty under the statute of New York, and therefore could not be enforced in Maryland; and against any original liability under the statute, for various reasons; the opinion concluded: "Upon the whole, it appears to us that the complainant has no cause of action, which he can maintain in this State." p. 199.

Judge Stone, with whom Judge McSherry concurred, dissented from the opinion of the majority of the court, upon the ground that it did not give due effect to the act of Congress, passed in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, and providing that the records of judgments rendered by a court of any State shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State whence they are taken. Act of May 26, 1790, c. 11, 1 Stat. 122; Rev. Stat. *665 § 905. He began his opinion by saying: "I look upon the principal point as a Federal question, and am governed in my views more by my understanding of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States than by the decisions of the state courts." And he concluded thus: "I think the Supreme Court, in 127 U.S., meant to confine the operation of the rule that no country will execute the penal laws of another to such laws as are properly classed as criminal. It is not very easy to give any brief definition of a criminal law. It may perhaps be enough to say that, in general, all breaches of duty that confer no rights upon an individual or person, and which the State alone can take cognizance of, are in their nature criminal, and that all such come within the rule. But laws which, while imposing a duty, at the same time confer a right upon the citizens to claim damages for its nonperformance, are not criminal. If all the laws of the latter description are held penal in the sense of criminal, that clause in the Constitution which relates to records and judgments is of comparatively little value. There is a large, and constantly increasing, number of cases that may in one sense be termed penal, but can in no sense be classed as criminal. Examples of these may be found in suits for damages for negligence in causing death, for double damages for the injury to stock where railroads have neglected the state laws for fencing in their tracks, and the liability of officers of corporations for the debts of the company by reason of their neglect of a plain duty imposed by statute. I cannot think that judgments on such claims are not within the protection given by the Constitution of the United States. I therefore think the order in this case should be affirmed." pp. 200-205.

A writ of error was sued out by the plaintiff, and allowed by the Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, upon the ground "that the said Court of Appeals is the highest court of law or equity in the State of Maryland, in which a decision in the said suit could be had; that in said suit a right and privilege are claimed under the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and the decision is against the right and privilege set up and claimed by your petitioner *666 under said Constitution and statutes; and that in said suit there is drawn in question the validity of a statute of and an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against the validity of such statute and of such authority."

It thus appears that the judgment recovered in New York was made the foremost ground of the bill, was fully discussed and distinctly passed upon by the majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, and was the only subject of the dissenting opinion; and that the court, without considering whether the validity of the transfers impeached as fraudulent was to be governed by the law of New York, or by the law of Maryland; and without a suggestion that those transfers, alleged to have been made by Attrill with intent to delay, hinder and defraud all his creditors, were not voidable by subsequent, as well as by existing creditors, or that they could not be avoided by the plaintiff, claiming under the judgment recovered by him against Attrill after those transfers were made; declined to maintain his right to do so by virtue of that judgment, simply because the judgment had, as the court held, been recovered in another State in an action for a penalty.

The question whether due faith and credit were thereby denied to the judgment rendered in another State is a Federal question, of which this court has jurisdiction on this writ of error. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 311; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610, 619; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130, 134; Crescent City Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U.S. 141, 146, 147; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 103.

In order to determine this question, it will be necessary, in the first place, to consider the true scope and meaning of the fundamental maxim of international law, stated by Chief Justice Marshall in the fewest possible words: "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123. In interpreting this maxim, there is danger of being misled by the different shades of meaning allowed to the word "penal" in our language.

In the municipal law of England and America, the words *667 "penal" and "penalty" have been used in various senses. Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offence against its laws. United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402; United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611. But they are also commonly used as including any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to the damages suffered. They are so elastic in meaning as even to be familiarly applied to cases of private contracts, wholly independent of statutes, as when we speak of the "penal sum" or "penalty" of a bond. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: "In general, a sum of money in gross, to be paid for the non-performance of an agreement, is considered as a penalty, the legal operation of which is to cover the damages which the party, in whose favor the stipulation is made, may have sustained from the breach of contract by the opposite party." Tayloe v. Sandiford, 7 Wheat. 13, 17.

Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offence committed against the State, and which, by the English and American constitutions, the executive of the State has the power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action against the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature, but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal.

The action of an owner of property against the hundred to recover damages caused by a mob was said by Justices Willes and Buller to be "penal against the hundred, but certainly remedial as to the sufferer." Hyde v. Cogan, 2 Doug. 699, 705, 706. A statute giving the right to recover back money lost at gaming, and, if the loser does not sue within a certain time, authorizing a qui tam action to be brought by any other person for threefold the amount, has been held to be remedial as to the loser, though penal as regards the suit by a common informer Bones v. Booth, 2 W. Bl. 1226; Brandon v. Pate, 2 H. Bl. 308; Grace v. M'Elroy, 1 Allen, 563; Read v. Stewart, 129 Mass. 407, 410; Cole v. Groves, 134 Mass. 471. As said *668 by Mr. Justice Ashhurst in the King's Bench, and repeated by Mr. Justice Wilde in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, "it has been held, in many instances, that where a statute gives accumulative damages to the party grieved, it is not a penal action." Woodgate v. Knatchbull, 2 T.R. 148, 154; Read v. Chelmsford, 16 Pick. 128, 132. Thus a statute giving to a tenant, ousted without notice, double the yearly value of the premises against the landlord, has been held to be "not like a penal law where a punishment is imposed for a crime," but "rather as a remedial than a penal law," because "the act indeed does give a penalty, but it is to the party grieved." Lake v. Smith, 1 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 174, 179, 180, 181; Wilkinson v. Colley, 5 Burrow, 2694, 2698. So in an action given by statute to a traveller injured through a defect in a highway, for double damages against the town, it was held unnecessary to aver that the facts constituted an offence, or to conclude against the form of the statute, because, as Chief Justice Shaw said: "The action is purely remedial, and has none of the characteristics of a penal prosecution. All damages for neglect or breach of duty operate to a certain extent as punishment; but the distinction is that it is prosecuted for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner. Here the plaintiff sets out the liability of the town to repair, and an injury to himself from a failure to perform that duty. The law gives him enhanced damages; but still they are recoverable to his own use, and in form and substance the suit calls for indemnity." Reed v. Northfield, 13 Pick. 94, 100, 101.

The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual, according to the familiar classification of Blackstone: "Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs and public wrongs. The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon frequently termed civil injuries: the latter are a breach and violation of public rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a community; and *669 are distinguished by the harsher appellation of crimes and misdemeanors." 3 Bl. Com. 2.

Laws have no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States. The general rules of international comity upon this subject were well summed up, before the American Revolution, by Chief Justice De Grey, as reported by Sir William Blackstone: "Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local. And so as to the rights of real property, the subject being fixed and immovable. But personal injuries are of a transitory nature, and sequuntur forum rei." Rafael v. Verelst, 2 W. Bl. 1055, 1058.

Crimes and offences against the laws of any State can only be defined, prosecuted and pardoned by the sovereign authority of that State; and the authorities, legislative, executive or judicial, of other States take no action with regard to them, except by way of extradition to surrender offenders to the State whose laws they have violated, and whose peace they have broken.

Proceedings in rem to determine the title to land must necessarily be brought in the State within whose borders the land is situated, and whose courts and officers alone can put the party in possession. Whether actions to recover pecuniary damages for trespasses to real estate, "of which the causes," as observed by Mr. Westlake (Private International Law, 3d ed. p. 213), "could not have occurred elsewhere than where they did occur," are purely local, or may be brought abroad, depends upon the question whether they are viewed as relating to the real estate, or only as affording a personal remedy. By the common law of England, adopted in most of the States of the Union, such actions are regarded as local, and can be brought only where the land is situated. Doulson v. Matthews, 4 T.R. 503; McKenna v. Fisk, 1 How. 241, 248. But in some States and countries they are regarded as transitory, like other personal actions; and whether an action for trespass to land in one State can be brought in another State depends on the view which the latter State takes of the *670 nature of the action. For instance, Chief Justice Marshall held that an action could not be maintained in Virginia, by whose law it was local, for a trespass to land in New Orleans. Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203. On the other hand, an action for a trespass to land in Illinois, where the rule of the common law prevailed, was maintained in Louisiana, Chief Justice Eustis saying: "The present action is, under our laws, a personal action, and is not distinguished from any ordinary civil action as to the place or tribunal in which it may be brought." Holmes v. Barclay, 4 La. Ann. 63. And in a very recent English case, in which the judges differed in opinion upon the question whether, since local venue has been abolished in England, an action can be maintained there for a trespass to land in a foreign country, all agreed that this question depended on the law of England. Companhia de Mocambique v. British South Africa Co. (1892) 2 Q.B. 358. See also Cragin v. Lovell, 88 N.Y. 258; Allin v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 150 Mass. 560.

In order to maintain an action for an injury to the person or to movable property, some courts have held that the wrong must be one which would be actionable by the law of the place where the redress is sought, as well as by the law of the place where the wrong was done. See, for example, The Halley, L.R. 2 P.C. 193, 204; Phillips v. Eyre, L.R. 6 Q.B. 1, 28, 29; The M. Moxham, 1 P.D. 107, 111; Wooden v. Western New York & Pennsylvania Railroad, 126 N.Y. 10; Ash v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 72 Maryland, 144. But such is not the law of this court. By our law, a private action may be maintained in one State, if not contrary to its own policy, for such a wrong done in another and actionable there, although a like wrong would not be actionable in the State where the suit is brought. Smith v. Condry, 1 How. 28; The China, 7 Wall. 53, 64; The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24, 29; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11; Texas & Pacific Railway v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593.

Upon the question what are to be considered penal laws of one country, within the international rule which forbids such laws to be enforced in any other country, so much reliance *671 was placed by each party in argument upon the opinion of this court in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, that it will be convenient to quote from that opinion the principal propositions there affirmed:

"The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties." p. 290.

"The application of the rule to the courts of the several States and of the United States is not affected by the provisions of the Constitution and of the act of Congress, by which the judgments of the courts of any State are to have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the State in which they were rendered." p. 291.

"The essential nature and real foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering judgment upon it; and the technical rules, which regard the original claim as merged in the judgment, and the judgment as implying a promise by the defendant to pay it, do not preclude a court, to which a judgment is presented for affirmative action, (while it cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim,) from ascertaining whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce it." pp. 292, 293.

"The statute of Wisconsin, under which the State recovered in one of her own courts the judgment now and here sued on, was in the strictest sense a penal statute, imposing a penalty upon any insurance company of another State, doing business in the State of Wisconsin without having deposited with the proper officer of the State a full statement of its property and business during the previous year. The cause of action was not any private injury, but solely the offence committed against the State by violating her law. The prosecution was in the name of the State, and the whole penalty, when recovered, would accrue to the State." p. 299.

*672 Such were the grounds upon which it was adjudged in that case that this court, under the provision of the Constitution giving it original jurisdiction of actions between a State and citizens of another State, had no jurisdiction of an action by a State upon a judgment recovered by it in one of its own courts against a citizen or a corporation of another State for a pecuniary penalty for a violation of its municipal law.

Upon similar grounds, the courts of a State cannot be compelled to take jurisdiction of a suit to recover a like penalty for a violation of a law of the United States. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 330, 337; United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4, 265; Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 159, 169; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Virg. Cas. 34; Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana, 442; State v. Pike, 15 N.H. 83, 85; Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Met. 583, 587; 1 Kent Com. 402-404. The only ground ever suggested for maintaining such suits in a state court is that the laws of the United States are in effect laws of each State. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137; Platt, J., in United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 22; Ordway v. Central Bank, 47 Maryland, 217. But in Claflin v. Houseman the point adjudged was that an assignee under the bankrupt law of the United States could assert in a state court the title vested in him by the assignment in bankruptcy; and Mr. Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion in that case, said the year before, when sitting in the Circuit Court, and speaking of a prosecution in a court of the State of Georgia for perjury committed in that State in testifying before a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States, "It would be a manifest incongruity for one sovereignty to punish a person for an offence committed against the laws of another sovereignty." Ex parte Bridges, 2 Woods, 428, 430. See also Loney's case, 134 U.S. 372.

Beyond doubt, (except in cases removed from a state court in obedience to an express act of Congress in order to protect rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States,) a Circuit Court of the United States cannot entertain jurisdiction of a suit in behalf of the State, or of the people thereof, *673 to recover a penalty imposed by way of punishment for a violation of a statute of the State, "the courts of the United States," as observed by Mr. Justice Catron, delivering a judgment of this court, "having no power to execute the penal laws of the individual States." Gwin v. Breedlove, 2 How. 29, 36, 37; Gwin v. Barton, 6 How. 7; Iowa v. Chicago &c. Railway, 37 Fed. Rep. 497; Ferguson v. Ross, 38 Fed. Rep. 161; Texas v. Day Land & Cattle Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 228; Dey v. Chicago &c. Railway, 45 Fed. Rep. 82.

For the purposes of extra-territorial jurisdiction, it may well be that actions by a common informer, called, as Blackstone says, "popular actions, because they are given to the people in general," to recover a penalty imposed by statute for an offence against the law, and which may be barred by a pardon granted before action brought, may stand on the same ground as suits brought for such a penalty in the name of the State or of its officers, because they are equally brought to enforce the criminal law of the State. 3 Bl. Com. 161, 162; 2 Bl. Com. 437, 438; Adams v. Woods, 2 Cranch, 336; Gwin v. Breedlove, above cited; United States v. Connor, 138 U.S. 61, 66; Bryant v. Ela, Smith (N.H.) 396. And personal disabilities imposed by the law of a State, as an incident or consequence of a judicial sentence or decree, by way of punishment of an offender, and not for the benefit of any other person — such as attainder, or infamy, or incompetency of a convict to testify, or disqualification of the guilty party to a cause of divorce for adultery to marry again — are doubtless strictly penal, and therefore have no extra-territorial operation. Story on Conflict of Laws, §§ 91, 92; Dicey on Domicil, 162; Folliott v. Ogden, 1 H. Bl. 123, and 3 T.R. 726; Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 303; Dickson v. Dickson, 1 Yerger, 110; Ponsford v. Johnson, 2 Blatchford, 15; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 471; Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N.Y. 18, 28, 29.

The question whether a statute of one State, which in some aspects may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends upon the question whether its purpose is to *674 punish an offence against the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act. There could be no better illustration of this than the decision of this court in Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11.

In that case, it was held that, by virtue of a statute of New Jersey making a person or corporation, whose wrongful act, neglect or default should cause the death of any person, liable to an action by his administrator, for the benefit of his widow and next of kin, to recover damages for the pecuniary injury resulting to them from his death, such an action, where the neglect and the death took place in New Jersey, might, upon general principles of law, be maintained in a Circuit Court of the United States held in the State of New York by an administrator of the deceased, appointed in that State.

Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering judgment, said: "It can scarcely be contended that the act belongs to the class of criminal laws which can only be enforced by the courts of the State where the offence was committed, for it is, though a statutory remedy, a civil action to recover damages for a civil injury. It is, indeed, a right dependent solely on the statute of the State; but when the act is done for which the law says the person shall be liable, and the action by which the remedy is to be enforced is a personal and not a real action, and is of that character which the law recognizes as transitory and not local, we cannot see why the defendant may not be held liable in any court to whose jurisdiction he can be subjected by personal process or by voluntary appearance, as was the case here. It is difficult to understand how the nature of the remedy, or the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce it, is in any manner dependent on the question whether it is a statutory right or a common law right. Wherever, by either the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any court which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties." 103 U.S. 17, 18.

That decision is important as establishing two points: 1st. The court considered "criminal laws," that is to say, laws *675 punishing crimes, as constituting the whole class of penal laws which cannot be enforced extra-territorially. 2d. A statute of a State, manifestly intended to protect life, and to impose a new and extraordinary civil liability upon those causing death, by subjecting them to a private action for the pecuniary damages thereby resulting to the family of the deceased, might be enforced in a Circuit Court of the United States held in another State, without regard to the question whether a similar liability would have attached for a similar cause in that State. The decision was approved and followed at the last term in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Cox, 145 U.S. 593, 605, where the Chief Justice, speaking for the whole court, after alluding to cases recognizing the rule where the laws of both jurisdictions are similar, said: "The question, however, is one of general law, and we regard it as settled in Dennick v. Railroad Co."

That decision has been also followed in the courts of several States. Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway, 31 Minnesota, 11; Chicago &c. Railroad v. Doyle, 60 Mississippi, 977; Knight v. West Jersey Railroad, 108 Penn. St. 250; Morris v. Chicago &c. Railway, 65 Iowa, 727; Missouri Pacific Railway v. Lewis, 24 Nebraska, 848; Higgins v. Central New England Railroad, 155 Mass. 176.

In the case last cited, a statute of Connecticut having provided that all actions for injuries to the person, including those resulting instantaneously or otherwise in death, should survive; and that for an injury resulting in death from negligence the executor or administrator of the deceased might maintain an action to recover damages not exceeding $5000, to be distributed among his widow and heirs in certain proportions; it was held that such an action was not a penal action, and might be maintained under that statute in Massachusetts by an administrator, appointed there, of a citizen thereof, who had been instantly killed in Connecticut by the negligence of a railroad corporation; and the general principles applicable to the case were carefully stated as follows: "These principles require that, in cases of other than penal actions, the foreign law, if not contrary to our public policy, or to abstract justice or pure morals, or calculated to injure the State or its citizens, shall *676 be recognized and enforced here, if we have jurisdiction of all necessary parties, and if we can see that, consistently with our own forms of procedure and law of trials, we can do substantial justice between the parties. If the foreign law is a penal statute, or if it offends our own policy, or is repugnant to justice or to good morals, or is calculated to injure this State or its citizens, or if we have not jurisdiction of parties who must be brought in to enable us to give a satisfactory remedy, or if under our forms of procedure an action here cannot give a substantial remedy, we are at liberty to decline jurisdiction." 155 Mass. 180.

The provision of the statute of New York, now in question, making the officers of a corporation, who sign and record a false certificate of the amount of its capital stock, liable for all its debts, is in no sense a criminal or quasi criminal law. The statute, while it enables persons complying with its provisions to do business as a corporation, without being subject to the liability of general partners, takes pains to secure and maintain a proper corporate fund for the payment of the corporate debts. With this aim, it makes the stockholders individually liable for the debts of the corporation until the capital stock is paid in and a certificate of the payment made by the officers; and makes the officers liable for any false and material representation in that certificate. The individual liability of the stockholders takes the place of a corporate fund, until that fund has been duly created; and the individual liability of the officers takes the place of the fund, in case their statement that it has been duly created is false. If the officers do not truly state and record the facts which exempt them from liability, they are made liable directly to every creditor of the company, who by reason of their wrongful acts has not the security, for the payment of his debt out of the corporate property, on which he had a right to rely. As the statute imposes a burdensome liability on the officers for their wrongful act, it may well be considered penal, in the sense that it should be strictly construed. But as it gives a civil remedy, at the private suit of the creditor only, and measured by the amount of his debt, it is as to him clearly remedial. To maintain such a suit is not to administer a punishment imposed upon an offender against *677 the State, but simply to enforce a private right secured under its laws to an individual. We can see no just ground, on principle, for holding such a statute to be a penal law, in the sense that it cannot be enforced in a foreign state or country.

The decisions of the Court of Appeals of New York, so far as they have been brought to our notice, fall short of holding that the liability imposed upon the officers of the corporation by such statutes is a punishment or penalty which cannot be enforced in another State.

In Garrison v. Howe, the court held that the statute was so far penal that it must be construed strictly, and therefore the officers could not be charged with a debt of the corporation, which was neither contracted nor existing during a default in making the report required by the statute; and Chief Justice Denio, in delivering judgment, said: "If the statute were simply a remedial one, it might be said that the plaintiff's case was within its equity; for the general object of the law doubtless was, beside enforcing the duty of making reports for the benefit