The Paquete Habana

delivered the opinion of the court.

These are two appeals from decrees of the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Florida, condemning two fishing vessels and their cargoes.as prize of war.

Each vessel was a fishing smack, running in and out of Havana, and regularly engaged in fishing on the coast of Cuba; sailed under the Spanish flag; was owned by a Spanish subject of Cuban birth; living in .the city of Havana; was commanded by a subject of Spain, also residing in Havana; and her master and crew had no interest in the vessel, but were entitled to shares, amounting in all to two thirds, of her catch, the other third belonging to her owner. Her cargo consisted of fresh fish, caught by her crew from the sea, put on board as they were caught, and kept and sold alive. Until stopped by the blockading squadron, she had no knowledge of the existence of the war, or of any blockade. She had no arms or ammunition on board, and made no attempt to'run the blockade after she knew of its existence, nor any resistance at the time of the capture.

The Paquete Habana was a sloop, 48. feet lofig on the keel, *679 and of 25 tons burden, and had a crew of three Cubans, including the master, who had a fishing license from the Spanish Government, and no other commission or license. She left Havana March 25, 1898; sailed along the coast of Cuba to Cape San Antonio at the western end of the island, and there' fished for twenty-five days, lying between the reefs off the cape, within the territorial waters of Spain; and then started back for Havana, with a cargó of about 40 quintals of live fish. On April. 25, 1898, about two miles off Mariel, and eleven miles from Havana, she was captured by the United States gunboat Castiné.

The Lola was a schooner, 51.feet long on the keel, and of 35 tons burden, and had a crew of six Cubans, including the master, and no commission or license. She left Havana April 11, 1898, and proceeded to Campeachy Sound off Yucatan, fished there eight days, and started back for Havana with a cargo of about 10,000 pounds of live fish. On April 26, 1898, near Havana, she was stopped by the United States steámship Cincinnati, and was warned not to go into Havana, but was told that she would be allowed to land at Bahia Honda. She then changed her course, and put for Bahia Honda, but on the next morning, when near that port, was captured by the United States steamship Dolphin.

Both the fishing vessels were brought by their captors into Key "West. A libel for the condemnation- of each vessel and her cargo as prize of war was there filed on April 27, 1898; a • claim was interposed by her master, on behalf of himself and the other members of the crew, and of her owner; evidence was taken-, showing the facts above stated ; and on May 30, 1898, a final decree of condemnation and sale was entered, “ the. court not being satisfied that as a matter of law, without any ordinance, treaty or proclamation, fishing vessels of this class are exempt from seizure.”

Each vessel was thereupon sold by auction ; the Paquete Habana for the sum of $490; and the Lola for the sum of $800. There was no other evidence in the record of the" value of either vessel or of her cargo.

. It has been suggested, in béhalf of the United States, that *680 this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine these appeals, because the matter in dispute in either case does not exceed the suin or value of $2000,. and the District Judge has not certified that the adjudication involves a question- of general importance.

The suggestion is founded on section 695 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that “ an appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court from all final decrees of any District Court in prize causes where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars ; and shall be allowed, without reference to the matter in dispute, on the certificate of the District Judge that the adjudication involves a question of general importance.”

The Judiciary Acts of the United States, for a century after the organization of the Government under the Constitution, did ' impose pecuniary limits upon appellate jurisdiction.

In actions at law and suits in equity, the pecuniary limit of the appellate jurisdiction of this court from the Circuit Courts of. the United States was for a long time fixed at $2000. Acts, of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 22 ; 1 Stat. 84; March 3, 1803, c. 40; 2 Stat. 244; Gordon v. Ogden, 3 Pet. 33; Rev. Stat. §§ 691, 692. In 1875 it was raised to $5000. Act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 3; 18 Stat. 316. And in 1889 this was modified by providing that, where the judgment or decree did Hot exceed the sum of $5000, this court should have appellate jurisdiction upon the question of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, and upon that question only. Act of February 25, 1889, c. 236, § 1; 25 Stat. 693; Parker v. Ormsby, 141 U. S. 81.

As to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including prize causes, the Judiciary Act of 1789, in § 9, vested the original jurisdiction in the District Courts, without regard to the sum or value in controversy; and in § 21, permitted an appeal from them to the Circuit Court where the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of $300. 1 Stat. 77, 83; The Betsey, 3 Dall. 6, 16; The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat; 546; Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4, 11. By the act of March 3, 1803, c. 40, appeals to the Circuit Court were permitted from all final decree's of a District Court where' *681 the matter in dispute exceeded the sum or value of $50; and from the Circuit Courts to this court in all cases “of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize,” in which the matter in dispute exceeded the sum dr value of $2000. 2 Stat. 244; Jenks v. Lewis, 3 Mason, 503; Stratton v. Jarvis, above cited; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603, 612. The acts of March 3, 1863, c. 86, § 7, and June 30, 1861, c. 174, § 13, provided that appeals from the District' Courts in prize causes should lie directly to this court, where the amount in controversy exceeded $2000, “ or on the certificate of the District judge that the adjudication involves a question of general importance.” 12 Stat. 760; 13 Stat. 310. The provision of the act of 1803, omitting the words, “ and of prize or no prize,” was reenacted in section 692 of the Revised Statutes ; and the provision of the act of 1861, concerning prize causes, was substantially reenacted in section 695 of the Revised Statutes, already quoted.

But all this has been changed by the act of March 3, 1891, c. 5T7, establishing the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and creating a new and complete scheme of appellate jurisdiction, depending upon the nature of the different cases, rather than upon the pecuniary amount involved. 26 Stat. 826.

By that act, as this court has declared, the entire appellate jurisdiction from the Circuit and District Courts of the United States was distributed, “according to the scheme of the act,” between this court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals thereby established, “by designating the classes of cases” of which each of these courts was to have final jurisdiction. McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 666; American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville Railway, 148 U. S. 372, 382; Carey v. Houston & Texas Railway, 150 U. S. 170, 179.

The intention of Congress, by the act of 1891, to make the nature of the case, and not the amount in dispute, the test' of the appellate jurisdiction of this court from the District and Circuit Courts clearly appears upon examination of the leading provisions of the act.

Section 1 provides that no appeal, whether by writ of error or otherwise, shall hereafter be taken from a District Court *682 ■to a Circuit Court; but that all appeals, by writ of error or otherwise, from the District Courts, “ shall only be subject to review ” in this court, or in the Circuit Court of Appeals, “ as is hereinafter provided,” and “ the review, by appeal, by writ of error, or otherwise,” from the Circuit Courts, “shall be had only ” in this court, or in the Circuit Court of Appeals, “according to the provisions of this act regülating the same.”

Section 5 provides that “ appeals or writs of error may be taken from the District Courts, or from the existing Circuit Courts, direct to the Supreme Court, in the following cases:”

First. “ In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be.certified to the Supreme Court from the court below for decision.” This clause includes “any case,” without regard to amount, in which the jurisdiction of the court-below is in issue; and differs in this respect from the act of. 1889, above cited.

Second. “From the final sentences and decrees in prize causes.” This clause includes the whole class of “the final sentences and decrees in prize causes,” and omits all provisions of former acts regarding amount in controversy, or certificate of a District Judge.

Third. “ In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime.” This clause looks to the nature of the crime, and not to the extent of the punishment actually imposed. A crime which might have been punished by imprisonment in a penitentiary is an infamous crime, even if the sentence actually pronounced is of a small fine only. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 426. Consequently, such a sentence for such a crime was subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this court, under .this clause, until this jurisdiction, so' far as regards crimes not capital, was transferred to the Circuit Court of Appeals by the act of January 20, 1897, c. 68. 29 Stat. 492.

Fourth. “In any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States.”

Fifth. “ In any case in which the constitutionality of any. law of the. United States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn, in question.”

*683 Sixth. “ In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.”

Each of these last three clauses, again, includes “ any case ” of the class mentioned. They all relate to what are commonly called Federal questions, and cannot reasonably be construed to have intended that the appellate jurisdiction of this court over such questions should be restricted by any pecuniary limit — especially in their connection with the succeeding sentence of the same section: “ Nothing in this act shall affect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases appealed from the highest court of a State, nor the construction of the statute providing for review of such cases.” Writs of error from this court to review the judgments of the highest court of a State upon such questions have never been subject to any pecuniary limit. Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, § 25; 1 Stat. 85; Buel v. Van Ness, 8 Wheat. 312; act of February 5, 1867, c. 28, § 2; 14 Stat. 386; Rev. Stat. § 709.

By section 6 of the act of 1891, this court is relieved of much of the appellate jurisdiction that it had before; the appellate jurisdiction from the District and Circuit Courts “ in all cases other than those provided for in the preceding section of this’act, unless otherwise provided by law,” is vested in the Circuit Court of Appeals; and its decisions in admiralty cases, as well as in cases arising under the criminal laws, and in certain other classes of cases, are made final, except that that court may certify to this court questions of law, and that this court may order up the whole case by writ of certiorari. It is settled that the words “unless otherwise provided by law,” in this section, refér only to provisions of the same act, or of- contemporaneous or subsequent acts, and do not include provisions of earlier statutes. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 57; Hubbard v. Soby, 146 U. S. 56; American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville Railway, 148 U. S. 372, 383.

The act of 1891 nowhere imposes a pecuniary limit upon the appellate jurisdiction, either of this court or of the Circuit Court of Appeals, from a District or Circuit Court of the United States. The only pecuniary limit imposed is one of *684 $1000 upon the appeal to this court of a case which has been once decided on appeal in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and in which the judgment of that court is not made final by section 6 of the act.

' Section 14 of the act of 1891, after specifically repealing section 691 of the Revised Statutes and section 8 of the act of February 16,1875, further provides that “ all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error, inconsistent with the, provisions for review by appeals or writs of error in the preceding sections five and six of this act, are hereby repealed.” 26 Stat. 829, 830. The object of the specific repeal, as this court has declared, was to get rid of the pecuniary limit in the acts referred to. McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 667. And, although neither section 692 nor section 695 of the Revised Statutes is repealed by name, yet, taking into consideration the general repealing clause, together with the affirmative provisions of the act, the case comes within the reason of the decision in an analogous case, in which this court said: “ The provisions relating to the subject-matter under consideration are, however, so comprehensive, as well as so variant from those of former acts, that we think the intention to substitute the one for the other is necessarily to be inferred and must prevail.” Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459, 468.

The decision of this court in the recent case of United, States v. Rider, 163 U. S. 132, affords an important, if not controlling precedent. From the beginning of this century until the passage of the act of 1891, both in civil and in criminal cases, questions of law, upon which two judges of the Circuit Court were divided in opinion, might be certified by them to this court for decision. Acts of: April 29, 1802, c. 31, § 6; 2 Stat. 159; June 1, 1872, c. 255, § 1; 17 Stat. 196; Rev. Stat. §§ 650-652, 693, 697; Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1, 21; United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 320. But in United States v. Rider, it was adjudged by this court that the act of 1891 had superseded and repealed the earlier acts authorizing questions of law to be certified from the Circuit Court to this court; and the grounds of that adjudication sufficiently appear by *685 the statement of the effect of the act of 1891 in two passages of the opinion: “ Appellate jurisdiction was given in all criminal cases by writ of error, either from this court or from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, and in all civil cases by appeal or error, without regard to the amount in controversy, except as. to appeals or writs of error to or from the Circuit Courts of Appeals in cases not made final, as specified in § 6.” “It is true that repeals by implication are not favored, but we cannot escape the conclusion that, tested by its scope, its obvious purpose and its terms, the act of March 3, 1891, covers the whole subject-matter under consideration, and furnishes the exclusive rule in respect of appellate jurisdiction on appeal, writ of error or certificate.” 163 TJ. S. 138-140.

That judgment was thus rested upon two successive propositions : First, that the act of 1891 gives appellate jurisdiction,. either to this court or to the Circuit Court of Appeals, in all criminal cases, and in all civil cases “ without regard to the amount in controversy.” Second, that the act, by its terms, its scope and its obvious purpose, “ furnishes the exclusive rule in respect of appellate jurisdiction on appeal, writ of error or certificate.”

As was long ago said by Chief Justice Marshall, “ the spirit as well as the letter of a statute must be respected, and where the whole context of the law demonstrates a particular intent in the legislature to effect a certain object, some degree of implication may be called in to aid that intent.” Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch, 307, 314. And it is a well settled rule m the construction of statutes, often affirmed and applied by this court, that, “ even where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions, plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.” United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, 92; King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395, 396; Tracy v. Tuffly, 134 U. S. 206, 223; Fisk v. Henarie, 142 U. S. 459, 468; District of Columbia v. Hutton, 143 U. S. 18, 27; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S. 136, 147.

. We are of opinion that the act of 1891, upon its face, read *686 in the light of settled rules of statutory construction, and of the decisions of this court, clearly manifests the intention of Congress to cover the whole subject of the appellate jurisdiction from the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, so far as regards in what cases, as well as to what courts, appeals may be taken, and to supersede and repeal, to this extent, all the provisions of earlier acts of Congress, including those that imposed pecuniary limits upon such jurisdiction; and, as part of the new scheme, to confer upon this court jurisdiction of appeals from all final sentences and decrees in prize causes, without regard to the amount in dispute, and without any certificate of the District Judge as to the importance of the particular case.

"We are then brought to the consideration of the question whether, upon the facts appearing in these records, the fishing smacks were .subject to capture by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent war with Spain.

■' By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cai’goes and crews, from capture as prize of war.

This doctrine, however, has been earnestly contested at the bar; and no complete collection of the instances illustrating it is to be found, so far as we are aware, in a single published work, although many are referred to and discussed, by the writers on international law, notably in 2 Ortolan, Ñégles Internationales et Diplomatic de la Mer, (4th ed.) lib. 3, c. 2, pp. 51-56 ; in 4 Calvo, Droit International, (5th ed.) §§ 2367-2373; in De Boeck, Propriété Privée Ennemie sous Ñavillon Ennemi, §§ 191-196; and in Hall, International Law, (4th. ed.) § 148. It is therefore worth the while to trace the history of the rule, from the earliest accessible sources, through the increasing recognition of it, with occasional setbacks, to what we may now justly consider as its final establishment in our own country and generally throughout the civilized world.

The earliest acts of any government on the subject, men *687 tioned in the books, either emanated from, or were approved by, a King of England.

In 1403 and 1406, Henry IY issued orders to his admirals and other officers, entitled “ Concerning Safety for' Fishermen — De Securitate fro JPisoatoribus” By an order of October 26, 1403, reciting that it was made pursuant to- a treaty between himself and the King of France; and for the greater safety of the fishermen of either country, and so that they could be, and carry on their industry, the more safely on the sea, and deal with each other in peace; and that the French King had consented that English fishermen should be treated likewise; it was ordained that French fishermen might, during the then pending season for the- herring fishery; safely fish for herrings and all other fish, from the harbor of Gravelines and the island of Thanet to the mouth of the Seine and the harbor of Hautoune. And by an order of October 5, 1406, he took into his safe conduct, and under his special protection, guardianship and defence, all' and singular the fishermen of France, Flanders and Brittany, with their fishing vessels and boats, everywhere on the sea, through and within his dominions, jurisdictions and territories, in regard to their fishery, while sailing, coming and going, and, at their pleasure, freely and lawfully fishing, delaying or proceeding, and returning homeward with their catch of fish,, without any molestation or hindrance whatever; and also their fish, nets, and other property and goods soever; and it was therefore ordered that such fishermen should not be interfered with, provided they should comport themselves well and properly, and should not, by- color of these presents, do or attempt, or presume to do or attempt,, anything that could . prejudice the King, or his kingdom of England, or his subjects. 8 Bymer’s Foedera, 336, 451.

■'The treaty made October 2, 1521, between the Emperor Challes Y and Francis I of France, through their ambassadors, recited that a great and fierce war had. arisen between them, because pf.which there tfa.d been, both by land and by sea, frequent depredations and incursions on either side, to the grave detriment and intolerable injury of the innocent *688 subjects of each; and that a suitable time for the herring fishery was at hand, and, by reason of the sea being beset by the enemy, the fishermen did not dare to go out, whereby the subject of their industry, bestowed by heaven to allay the hunger of the poor, would wholly fail for the year, unless it were otherwise provided — quo fit, ut piscaturm commoditas, ad pauperum levandam famem a ccelesti numme concessa, cessare hoc anno omnino debeat, nisi aliter provideatur. And it was therefore agreed that the subjects of each sovereign, fishing in the sea, or exercising the calling of fishermen, could and might, until the end of .the next January, without incurring any attack, depredation, molestation, trouble or hindrance soever, safely and freely, everywhere in the sea, take herrings and every other kind of fish, the existing war by land and sea notwithstanding; and further that, during the time aforesaid, no subject of either sovereign should commit, or attempt or presume to commit, any depredation, force, violence, molestation or vexation, to or upon such fishermen, or their vessels, supplies, equipments, nets and fish, or other goods soever truly appertaining to fishing. The treaty was made at Calais, then an English possession. It recites that the ambassadors of the two sovereigns met there at the earnest request of Henry VIII, and with his countenance, and in the presence of Cardinal Wolsey, his chancellor and representative. And towards the end of the treaty it is agreed that the said King and his said representative, “ by whose means the treaty stands concluded, shall be conservators of the agreements therein, as if thereto by both parties elected and chosen.” 4 Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, pt. 1, pp. 352, 353.

The herring fishery was permitted, in time of war, by French and Dutch edicts in 1536. Bynkershoek, Quasstiones Juris Publicas, lib. 1, c. 3; 1 Emerigon des Assurances, c. 4, sect. 9 ; c. 12, sect. 19, § 8.

France, from remote times, set the example of alleviating the evils of war in favor of all coast fishermen. In the compilation entitled Us et Coutumes de la Mer, published by Cleirac in 1661, and in the third part thereof, containing “Maritime of Admiralty'Jurisdiction — la Jurisdiction, do la *689 Marine ou d’Admirante — as well in time of peace as in time of war,” article 80 is as follows: “ The admiral may in time of war accord fishing truces — tresnes pescheresses — to 'the enemy and to his subjects; provided that the enemy will likewise accord them to Frenchmen.” Cleirac, 544. Under this article, reference is made to articles 49 and 79 respectively of the French ordinances concerning the Admiralty in 1543 and 1584, of which it is but a reproduction. 4 Pardessus, Collection de Lois Maritimes, 319; 2 Ortolan, 51. ' And Cleirac adds, in a note, this quotation from Froissart’s Chronicles: “Fishermen on the sea, whatever war there were in.France and England, never did harm to one another; so they are friends, and help one another at need — P'eseheurs sv/r mer, guelgue guerre gui soit en Franee et Angleterre, jamais ne se firent mal Vun á V autre / aingois sont amis, et day dent Vun d Vautre au hesoinP

The same custom would seem to have prevailed in France until towards the end of the seventeenth century. For example, in 1675, Louis XIV and the States General of Holland, by mutual agreement, granted to Dutch and French fishermen the liberty, undisturbed by their vessels of war, of fishing along the coasts' of France, Holland and England. D’Hauterive et De Cussy, Traites de Commerce, pt. 1, vol.. 2, p. 278. But by the ordinances of 1681 and 1692 the practice was discontinued, because, Valin says, of the faithless conduct of the enemies of France, who, abusing the good faith with which she had always observed the treaties, habitually carried off her fishermen, while their own fished in safety. 2 Valin sur l’Ordonnance de la Marine, (1776) 689, 690; 2 Ortolan, 52; De Boeck, § 192.

.The doctrine which exempts coast fishermen with their vessels and cargoes from capture as prize of war has been familiar to the United States from the time of the War of Independence.

On June 5,1779, Louis XVI, our ally in that war, addressed a letter to his admiral, informing him that the wish he had always had of alleviating, as far as he could, the hardships of war,' had directed his attention to that class of his subjects *690 which devoted itself to the trade of fishing, and had no other means of livelihood; that he had thought that the example which he should give to his enemies, and which could have no other source than the sentiments of humanity which inspired him, would determine them to allow to fishermen the same facilities which he should consent to grant; and that he had therefore given orders to the commanders, of all his ships not to disturb English fishermen, nor to arrest their vessels laden with fresh fish, even if not caught by those, vessels; provided they had no offensive arms, and were not proved to have made any signals creating a suspicion' of intelligence with the enemy; and the admiral was directed to communicate the King’s intentions to all officers under his control. By a royal order in council of November 6, 1780, the former orders were confirmed; and the capture and ransom, by a French cruiser, of The John and Sarah, an English vessel, coming from Holland, laden with fresh fish, were pronounced to be illegal. 2 Code des Prises, (ed. 1781) 721, 901, 903.

Among the standing orders made by Sir James Marriott, Judge of the English High Court of Admiralty, was one of April 11, 1780, by which it was “ ordered, that all causes of prize of fishing boats or vessels taken from the enemy may be consolidated, in one monition, and one sentence or interlocutory, if under fifty tons burden, and- not more than six in number.” Marriott’s Formulary, 1. But by the statements of his successor, and of both French and English writers, it appears that England, as well as France, during the American Revolutionary War, abstained from interfering with the coast fisheries. The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 C. Rob. 20; 2 Ortolan, 53; Hall, § 148.

In the treaty of 1785 between the United States' and Prussia, article 23, (which was proposed by the American Commissioners, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and is said to have been drawn up by Franklin,) provided that, if war should arise- between the contracting parties, “all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers and fishermen, *691 unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages or places,, and in general all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons; nor shall their houses or goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields .wasted, by the armed force of the enemy, into whose power, by the events of war, they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price.” 8' Stat. 96; 1 Kent Com. 91 note; "Wheaton’s History of the Law of Nations, 306, 308. Here was the clearest exemption from hostile molestation or seizure of the persons, occupations, houses and goods of unarmed fishermen inhabiting unfortified places. The article was repeated in the later treaties between the United States and Prussia of 1799 and 1828. 8 Stat. 174, 384. And Dana, in a note to his edition of Wheaton’s International Law, says: “ In many treaties and decrees, fishermen catching fish as an article of food are added to the class of persons whose occupation is not to be disturbed in war.” Wheaton’s International Law, (8th ed.) § 345, note 168.

Since the United States became a nation, the only serious interruptions, so far ás we are informed, of the general recognition of the exemption of coast fishing vessels from hostile capture, arose out of the mutual suspicions and recriminations of England and France during the wars of the French Revolution.

In the first years of those wars, England having authorized the capture of French fishermen, a decree of the French National Convention of October 2, 1793, directed the executive power “to protest against this conduct, theretofore without example; to reclaim the fishing boats seized; and, in case of refusal, to resort to reprisals.” But in July, 1796, the Committee of Public Safety ordered the release of English fishermen seized under the former decree, “not considering them as prisoners of war.” La Nostra Segnora de la Piedad, (1801) cited below; 2 De Cussy, Droit Maritime, 164, 165; 1 Masse, Droit Commercial, (2d ed.) 266, 267.

*692 On January 24, 1798, the English Government, by express order, instructed the commanders of its ships to seize French and Dutch fishermen with their boats. 6 Martens, Recueil des Traités, (2d ed.) 505; 6 Schoell, Histoire des Traités, 119; 2 Ortolan, 53. After the promulgation of that order, Lord Stowell (then Sir William Scott) in the High Court of Admiralty of England condemned small Dutch fishing vessels as prize of war. In one case, the capture was in April, 1798, and the decree was made November 13, 1798. The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 C. Rob. 20. In another case, the decree was made August 23, 1799. The Noydt Gedacht, 2 C. Rob. 137, note.

For the year 1800, the orders of the English and French governments and the correspondence between them may be found in books already referred to. 6 Martens, 503-512; 6 Schoell, 118-120; 2 Ortolan, 53, 54. The doings for that year may be summed up as follows :■ On March 27, 1800, the French government, unwilling to resort to reprisals, reenacted the orders given by Louis XYI in 1780, above mentioned, prohibiting any seizure by the French ships of English fishermen, unless armed, or proved to have made signals to the enemy. On May 30, 1800, the English government, having received notice of that action of the French government, revoked its order of January 24, 1798. But, soon afterwards, the English government complained that French fishing boats had been, made into fireboats at Flushing, as well as that the French government had impressed, and had sent to Brest, to serve in its flotilla, French fishermen and their boats, even those whom the English had released on condition of their not serving; and on January 21, 1801, summarily revoked its last order, and again put in force its order of January 24, 1798. On February 16,1801, Napoleon Bonaparte, then First Consul, directed the French commissioner at London to return at once to France, first declaring to the English government that its conduct, “ contrary to all the usages of civilized nations, and to the common law which governs them, even in time of war, gave to the existing war a character of’ rage and bitterness which destroyed even the relations usual in a loyal war,” and *693 “ tended only to exasperate the two nations, and to put off the term of peace;” and that the French government, having always made it “ a maxim to alleviate, as much as possible the evils of war, could not think, on its part, of rendering wretched fishermen victims of a prolongation of hostilities, and would abstain from all reprisals.”

On March 16, 1801, the Addington Ministry, having come into power in England, revoked the orders of its predecessors against the French fishermen; maintaining, however, that “ the freedom of fishing was nowise founded upon' an agreement, but upon a simple concession; ” that “ this concession would be always subordinate to the convenience of the moment,” and that “it was never extended to the great fishery,-or to commerce in oysters or in fish.” And the freedom of the coast fisheries was again allowed on both sides. 6 Martens, 514; 6 Schoell, 121; 2 Ortolan, 54; Manning, Law of Nations, (Amos ed.) 206.

Lord Stowell’s judgment in The Young Jacob and Johanna, 1 C. Rob. 20, above cited, was much relied on by the counsel for the United States, and deserves careful consideration.

The vessel there condemned is described in the report as “ a small Dutch fishing vessel taken April, 1798, on her return from the Dogger bank to Holland; ” and Lord Stowell, in delivering judgment, said: “ In former wars, it has not been usual to make captures of these small fishing vessels; but this rule was a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision; it has prevailed from views of mutual accommodation between neighboring countries, and from tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. In the present war there has, I presume, been sufficient reason for changing this mode of treatment, and, as they are brought before me for my judgment, they must be referred to the general principles of this court; they fall under the character and description of the last class of cases; that is, of ships constantly and exclusively employed in the enemy’s trade.” And he added: “ It is a farther satisfaction to me in giving this judgment to observe that the facts also bear strong marks of a false and fraudulent transaction.”

*694 Both the capture and condemnation were within a year after the order of the English government of January 24, 1798, instructing the commanders of its ships to seize French and Dutch fishing vessels, and before any revocation of that order. Lord Stowell’s judgment shows that his decision was based upon the order of 1798, as well as upon strong evidence of fraud. Nothing more was adjudged in the case.

But some expressions in his opinion have been given so much weight by English writers, that it may be well to examine them particularly. .The opinion begins by admitting the known custom in former wars not to capture such vessels — adding, however, “ but this was a rule of comity only, and not of legal decision.” Assuming the phrase “ legal decision ” to have been there used, in the sense in which courts are accustomed to use. it, as equivalent to “ judicial decision,” it is true that, so far as appears, there had been no such decision on the point in England. The word “ comity ” was apparently used by Lord Stowell as synonymous with courtesy or good will. But the period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized nations, into a settled rule of international law. As well said by Sir James Mackintosh: “ In the present century a slow and silent, but very substantial mitigation has taken place in the practice of war; and in. proportion as that mitigated practice has received the sanction of time, it is raised from the rank of mere usage, and becomes part óf the law of nations.” . Discourse on the Law of Nations, 38; 1 Miscellaneous Works, 360.

The French prize tribunals, both before and after Lord Stowell’s decision, took a wholly different view of the general question. In 1780, as already mentioned, an order in council of Louis XVI had declared illegal the capture by a French cruiser of The John and Sarah, an English vessel, coming from Holland, laden with fresh fish. And' on May 17, 1801, where a Portuguese fishing vessel, with her cargo of fish, having no more crew than was needed for her management, and for serving the nets, on a trip of several days, had been cap *695 tured in April, 1801, by a French cruiser, three leagues off the coast of Portugal, the Council of Prizes held that the capture was contrary to “ the principles of humanity, and the maxims of international law,” and decreed that the vessel, with the fish on board, or the net proceeds of any that had been sold, should be restored to her master. La Nostra Segnora de la Piedad, 25 Merlin, Jurisprudence, Prise Maritime, § 3, art. 1, 3; S. C. 1 Pistoye et Duverdy, Prises Maritimes, 331; 2 De Cussy, Droit Maritime, 166.

The English government, soon afterwards, more than once unqualifiedly prohibited the molestation of fishing vessels employed in catching and bringing to market fresh fish. On May 23, 1806, it was “ ordered in council, that all fishing vessels under Prussian and other colors, and engaged for the purpose of catching fish and conveying them fresh to market, with their crews, cargoes and stores, shall not be molested on their fishing voyages and bringing the same to market; and that no fishing vessels of this description shall hereafter be molested. And the Eight Honorable the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty’s Treasury, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty and’the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.” 5 C. Eob. 408. Again, in the order in council of May 2, 1810, which directed that “ all vessels which shall have cleared out from any port so far under the control of France’ or her allies as that British vessels may not freely trade thereat, and which are employed in the whale fishery, or other fishery of any description, save as hereinafter excepted, and are returning or destined to return either to the port from whence they cleared, or to any other port or place at which the British flag may not freely .trade, shall be captured, and condemned together with their stores and cargoes, as prize to’ the captors,” there were excepted “ vessels employed in catching and conveying fish fresh to market, such vessels not being fitted or provided for the- curing of fish.” Edw. Adm. appx. L.

Wheaton, in his Digest of the Law of Maritime Captures and Prizes, published in 1815, wrote: “It has been usual *696 in maritime wars to exempt from capture fishing boats and their cargoes, both from views of mutual accommodation between neighboring countries, and from tenderness to a poor and industrious order of people. This custom, so honorable to the humanity of civilized nation^, has fallen into disuse;' and it is remarkable that both France and England mutually reproach each other with that breach of good faith which has finally abolished it.” "Wheaton on Captures, c. 2, § 18.

This statement clearly exhibits Wheaton’s opinion that the custom had been a general one, as well as that it ought to remain so. His assumption that it had been abolished by the differences between France and England at the close of the last century was hardly justified by the state of things when he wrote, and has not since been borne out.

During the wars of the French Empire, as both French and English writers agree, the coast fisheries were left in peace. 2 Ortolan, 54; De Boeck, § 193 ; Hall, § 148. De Boeck quaintly and truly adds, “ and the incidents of 1800 and of 1801 had no morrow — nUurent jpas de Underlain.”

In the war with Mexico in 1846, the United States recognized the exemption of coast fishing boats from captur